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Preface 
This thesis deals with the development of the monetary 
and financial system of Ghana during the period 1950-64 and 
was conceived of as a sequ8l to "Money and Banking in British 
Colonial Africa" by W. T. Newlyn and D. C. Rowan. 
The period itself saw considerable changes in political 
and economic c. onditions and aspirations which left their 
mark on the financial system. Emphasis has generally been 
placed on the major changes and the work is largely a mixture 
of historical survey and analysis. 
The Introductory Chapter deals with the general framev, ork 
and characteristics of the economy laying emphasis on the 
changes and modifications which provide the background to 
some basic developments in monetary and financial practices. 
Chapters One to Three deal with the 'monetary institutions - 
the commercial banks and the Currency Board supplanted in 1957 
by the Central Bank. Chapter One deals with the commercial 
banking system. In Chapter Two are examined the functioning 
of the West African Currency Board, a review of discussions 
involving the change to a Central Bank and the evolution 
of Central Banking constitutional arrangements up to 1964. 
Chapter Three examines the structural development of the 
Central Bank as exemplified by the gradual gravitation of 
the Bank into the general economic administration of the 
nation and as reflected in important movements in the Bank's 
assets and liabilities structure. 
Chapters Tour to Six deal respectively with non-bank 
financial institutions extant at the end of 1964, a general 
appraisal of the prospects for the development of money and 
capital markets and a survey of the performances of various 
special credit schemes organised under governmental auspices. 
Included in Chapter Six is a survey of Agricultural Credit schemes 
and general related problems dating back much earlier than 1950. 
The final Chapter (Seven) is a theoretical analysis of 
the relationship between the balance of payments, domestic 
credit operations and the money supply. In this is generally 
undertaken a review of the literature on these and other 
questions relcted thereto. Section D of 
Chapter Seven 
examines the scope for monetary policy which only took active 
form in the last year of the period under review. The 
general argument put forward is that the greatest scope in 
the immediate future lay in the use of selective reserve 
requirements as actually employed in April 1964. First the 
literature on the various bases for couaputing reserve requirement: 
are reviewed with the special peculicrilics of Ghana for 
appraisal. This is followed by a brief analysis of the 
credit control regulations actually adopted. 
A separate chapter on summary and conclusions has not 
boon incorporated because in a broad study of this kind it 
would merely lead to repetitions of various ideas and 
conclusions stated in the text. 
The institutional arrangements described in-the thesis 
are based on interviews and discussions hold with representatives 
of the institutions concerned, publications of the Bank of Ghana 
and the Government Statistician's office and personal knowledge. 
Statistical data derive mainly from publications of the 
Bank of Ghana and the Government Statistician. Due to 
frequent changes in the basis of statistical data as well as 
revisions it has not been possible in all cases to present 
data comparable in every sense and covering the whole period 
under review. As far as practicable revised data have been 
used sometimes at the expense of presenting figures for the 
whole review period. 
-i- 
IPITIIODUCTORY CHLPTLR 
Political and Economic Background. S 
Political background 
On March 6 1957 after over a hundred years of colonisation 
by Britain the Gold Coast attained Independence under the 
present narre of Ghana. 
Ghana (or the Gold Coast) has a long history of struggle 
for political independence but the most significant wave of 
nationalism was that which began in 19+9 under Dr. Plkrunah 
whose Government and political party were deposed and disbanded 
by the military coup of February 1966. 
In 1951 the first I, irican-dominated Legislaturo sat in 
! sera. The other major political significance of this constit- 
utional advancement was the appointment of the head of the 
political party with majority representation in the Legislature 
to the position of Leader of Government Business. The precise 
responsibility which went with this position is a field for 
political commentary and is beyond the scope of this study. 
The administration of the colony continued to be carried out 
by the Colonial authorities. 
iiowever, internal self-government was achieved in 195+ 
when a local politician bocane Prime Minister at the head of a 
Government formed by Ministers drawn from the political party 
with a majority of the seats in the Legislature. From then 
there was a rapid developiaient to Independence although the path 
was by no moans smooth being marked by considerable political 
- ii - 
rivalry and physical conflict between opposing factions. 
Under the Independence constitution the country was 
politically based on a kind of federal structure with Regional 
;: ssemblies whose approval was necessary to the final enactment 
of laws passed in the central legislature based in ;. ccra. The 
Regional -L, ssei; iblies were abolished shortly after Independence 
by an amendment enacted under Government sponsorship. 
On ist July 1960 Ghana became a Republic thus shedding 
I 
the post of Governor-General. On that date Dr. Pikrumah who 
had boon Prime I1inister since 195+ became President of the 
Republic of Ghana, Head of Government and replaced the British 
Crown as Head of State. 
. An economic commentary on Ghana would be deficient without 
reference to three political developments which undoubtedly 
left their mark on the economy of Ghana. 
First, from 1958 immense political power carne to be centred 
in the hands of the Head of Government, namely Dr. Nkrumah, 
culminating in the formal dissolution of all Opposition by 
referendum in January 1964. There was widespread evidence that 
the Government did not countenance criticism of their policies 
and actions. Through the instrument of the much publicised 
Preventive Detention Lct passed in 1958 the Government prog- 
ressively stopped open criticism. 
Secondly, by 1960 public statements by members of the 
governing party (the Convention Peoples Party) and the Govern- 
ment-controlled press indicated that the Government's policy 
was to build a socialist economy. The interpretation of 
- iii - 
of socialism as frequently indicated in official statements 
was that tie State was to build a state sector, alongside 
private and co-operative sectors, in industry, agriculture 
and distribution. Froia about 1960 there was a general stepping 
up of the rate at which state-owned enterprises were built. 
But private enterprise was generally stagnant because not only 
was there a marked shift of resources into the public sector 
but also the Government-controlled press showed many signs of 
hostility to private enterprise. The attitude of the general 
public was frequently one of doubt. 
S-Tnilst the building of a relatively large public sector 
led to frequent calls for austerity the obvious opulence of 
the politicians often belied the call for austerity. 
Thirdly, shortly after the attainment of Independence 
Ghana was brow ht by the local politicians into the thick of 
Pan-Lfricanist movcnents. Towards the and of the period under 
revicu it teas clear that tue Government's aversion to criticism 
of or non-support für its ,, frican policy was no less severe then 
its reaction to criticism of its domestic political and economic 
policies. 
Ls all these political developments coincided with consid- 
erable economic hardships the public generally ascribed the 
economic difficulties to tie Governincnt' s political and economic 
policies. The public became apathetic to the Government' s 
policies although many on the Government' s side would not admit 
this. i-Iotiicver, there followed a' regime of compulsion and 
- iv - 
victiraisai. ion spearheaded by a growing corps of political 
careerists v,, Losc methods and pronouncements often short- 
circuited measures introduced in the attempts to resolve 
growing economic problems. 
Economic background. 
Over the period 1950-64 the economy of Ghana was under- 
going certain significant modifications in practically all 
sectors which explained largely the major basic developments 
in monetary and financial arrangements. The modifications 
were in many cases not final in complexion and the general 
picturo gras one of evolution rather than revolution thus 
rendering difficult and hazardous attempts at generalisations. 
To a considerable extent the general developments in the economy 
upon which was based or which gave rise to the main monetary 
and financial developments were the result of changing political 
circ uwmstance s. 
Thus in the course of the period under review the establish- 
rent of the first locally-owned indigenous commercial bank 
coincided with the approach of internal self-government in 
contrast to the period of full colonial status when the commercial 
banking system consisted of only British-owned institutions with 
relatively little credit dealings outside the expatriate sector. 
Secondly, shortly after the attainment of Independence 
the West Lfrican Currency Board which had issued currency for 
circulation in Ghana since 1913 was replaced by a. Central Bank. 
A Industrial Development Corporation formed as a development 
-V- 
bank in 1947 and later turned into a holding company organising 
a number of industrial establishmonts failed in 1962 and a yea:. 
later was succeeded by the National Investment Bank currently 
in operation. The Industrial Development Corporation was 
operated entirely on Government capital, whilst as presently 
constituted private participation in the share capital of the 
iTational Investment Bank is limigod to only 0.25 of the 
authorised capital. 
Thirdly, from about 1960 the Governmcnt embarked on a 
eiloral expansion of the public sector manifested in the purchase cst 
a previously privately owned trading company, five gold mining 
concerns, the establishment of various manufacturing industries 
and a publicly-organised agricultural sector. The latter 
consisted of the ZJorkers Brigade (formed about the time of 
Indcpendencc) and later trio State Farms Corporation consolidatod " 
in 1963 out of various small semi-public agricultural organis- 
ations. Similar developments also took place in other economic 
sectors. By the cnd of the period under examination the 
Government teas operating a modest international merchant navy 
an airline and a general insurance concern. The Government 
was also participating jointly with foreign private concerns 
in a number of distributive and manufacturing ventures. Thus 
for example the Government was a part-owner of the only oil 
refinery in the country. 
lall ýhesc davolopmonts originatcd from or worc mado 
possible by one or more of several general developments in the 
economy. These t'ere (a) a heavy investment programme in the 
- vi - 
infrastructurc coi onced in 1951; (b) a search -for structural 
diversification partly to raise the resilience of an economy 
dominated by a narr Lily-based export of primary produce, and 
partly to provide a long-term solution to a persistently adverse 
balance of payments; (c) the result of a socialist policy 
conceived in more than the welfare sense of the term. 
Ls a result of such developments as have been outlined 
above, by slic end of tho period under review large-scale manu- 
i actor ink; industry and agriculture was dominated by the Govern- 
mont sector. 
Previously the traditional structure of the economy was 
broadly divided as follows between the indigenous private sector 
and tale expatriate sector. The former, as now, had a virtual 
monopoly of agricultural production for both export and domestic 
consu: irption, the retail end of local foodstuffs 9 virtually the 
entire domcstic road transport system and a sizeable share of the 
retail distribution of imported consumer goods based mainly on 
supplies obtained from the largo expatriate. Jmporting firms. 
The expatriate sector on the other hand dominated all other 
sectors of the economy including timber and mineral exploitation. 
The basic framework of t: ie ecoriorly will be brought out in 
the following paragraphs where we examine briefly the major 
statistical eh iracteristics. 
Population 
I, population census c<<rricd out in 1948 estimated the total 
population at 1+. 12 Million. In iiarch 1960 a second census much 
Uettcr-organised under the supervision of United Nations experts 
- vii - 
arrived at a total population of 6.73 million. On the basis 
of : he tuo rc salts estimated population growth rate was 
calculated at 4.2 per year. This is generally regarded as an 
Table Z 
Ghana: Estimated slid-year Population 1950-64. 
(Selected Years) 
' 000 
19 50 5,239 
1955 5,91+6 
1957 6 , 21+7 
1960 6,727 
1964 7, '54 
Source: Luthor ts calculation based on 1960 
Census at an estimated pro-1960 annual 
growth rate of 2.5% and a post-1960 
growth rate of 2.6 (See Chapter 1 p. 63). 
overestimation arising from undernumeration in 1948 as indicated 
by a generally poor machinery for the collection of statistical 
data. Table I shows population figures in selected years over 
the period 1950--64 estimated from the 1960 census data based on 
annual growth rates as stated in the source to Table I. 
The age distribution of the population is readily available 
for only 1960 and is summarized in Table II. The 1960 Population 
Consuszevea1. ecl that a substantial proportion of the population 
was youthful . With the miniraue working ago officially taken as 
15 years it can be seen from Table II that in 1960 44.61, of the 
estimated total population were aged under 15 years. Of those 
in the age group 15 - 21+5 152,000 or 13.14 of the total population 
in that age group teere reported to be actually in various forms 
- viii - 
Tjble II 
1, r-c Distribution of Population, 1960. 
' 000 of 
Total 
lall wires 6,727 100 
Under 1 year 278 4.1 
1- 4 1,019 15.2 
5- 9 1,019 15.2 
10 - 14 681 10.1 
15 - 24 1,132 16.8 
25 - 44 1,762 26.2 
45 - 64 623 9.3 
65 and Over 213 3.2 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, 1962 
Statistical Year Book, pp. 6-9. 
N 
of full-time education. ýPheref ore of the total 1960 population 
of approximately 6.7 million over 3.1 million or 1+6.81' of the 
estimated total could be described as basically economically 
depondont. This does not talc account of tiio 2.3 /aged 
65 and 
above and the probably considerable number of the adult popul- 
ation dependent fully or partially on the normally active 
population. This huge backlog of youthful populations would 
require (1) correspondingly Heavy investment in social overheads 
not contributing; directly to the flow of goods (2) a high tax 
burden on iiie income-earnin; sections of the population and 
(3) a low level of personal savings Liven the fainilar low level 
of money inc oUc . As one would expect, by the end of the period 
- ix - 
under review there were huge additions to the supply side of 
the labour market t: ia ßaly as a result of Government and private 
invcstments in the education of the youth. This also partly 
explained the Government's policy of increasing investment 
in productive industries. 
The National `3 ccounts and General Structure of the Economy. 
In Table III are presented estimates of the Gross Domestic 
Product together with the major components at current market 
prices for the period 1955-64 for which usable data are 
available. 
The statistical limitations on the data are shown in the 
notes to Table III. 
From 1; 56 there was a general concurrence of stability, 
growth and contraction in the major components of Gross Domestic 
Product. It niay be useful to point specifically to developments 
in two of the listed items as providing explanations for the 
obLorved concurrence of stability, growth and contraction 
excoDtina the noney Grose "Doucatic : "roe uct itself which showed a 
consistent upward trend. The two items are the ratio of total 
domcstic expenditure to Gross Domestic Product and alternatively 
the difference between exports and imports. Over the period 
1955-64 the ratio of total domestic expenditure to Gross Domestic 
Product exceeded 1001 in all years except for 1955 and 1958. 
This is reflected in the excess of imports (visible and invisible 
trade) over exports in all years but 1955 and 1958. 
The problems posed by the continuinc deterioration of the 
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balance of trade are reflected in the fluctuations in the 
ratios to Gross Domestic Product of total consumption expenditure, 
private consum-ation expenditure, fixed capital formation, and 
imports of goods and services. Investment e: penditure and 
imports actually fluctuated in absolute terns as well.. It is 
interesting to note that tue one item of the national accounts 
which should a general upward trend in Boch absolute value and 
relative share of Gross Domestic Product was Government 
consumption expenditure. This at once was -chc result of rising 
Government investment expenditures and reflected the dominant 
role of Government in the economy. 
Available data does not ljermit a fair estimate of private 
capital expenditure, but the genoral evidence is that Government 
(includinL; various governmental bodies and enterprises) accounted 
for a lligh proportion of fixed investment 
1 
With export values not subject to local control the attempt 
to correct the external trade imbalance took the form of rising 
quantitative restrictions on imports through various taxes, 
tariffs and restrictions on external payments all inaugurated in 
1961. The answer was also partly sought in the building of 
rlyanufacturing industry mainly by tilt Governmcnt sector, leading 
to attempts to restrict imports of consumer goods. The monetary 
significance of -hose developments will be elucidated in the 
text. 
In the meanwhile we should drwo attention to the general 
aspects of the economy which necessitated the policies outlined 
in. the preceding paragraph and the general effects. 
1 This excludes >-ross additions to the otoo] of cocoa trees. 
1or an attempt to estimate the 'capital value" of the stock 
of cocoa trees see R. Szerezewski, "Capital and output in 
Th 7nnnnmie "? ulletin o± Ghana. ]To. 4. lA63. - 
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First, tic should note developments in the external account. 
The Current L--count balance for the period 1953-64 are presented 
in Table IV. Between 1956 and 1961- Ghana had an unfavourable 
balance on Current ^. ccoLnt with the exception of 1958 then 
there was a reversal into a surplus. With all items other than 
the balance of merchandise trade traditionally negative the 
general emergence of a negative balance on i-,, rchandise trade 
fror 1960 seeped to indicate a rather unfavourable prospect for 
the future. 
It shoUd be noted that tue larger negative balance on 
invest. icnt income in the period 1961-64 relative to 1953-60 and 
probably pre-1953 shows on the one hand a growing disinvestment 
of foreign savings and on tiie other hand a rise in net foreign 
liabilities from 1961. 
These paints are illustrated in Table V and Table VI which 
show estirm-od net foreign exchange assets and known external 
liabilities of the Government. There may be some error in the 
figures for not foreign exchange assets arising from uncertainty 
about the full extent of foreign liabilities in particular in 
respect of Government liabilities on suppliers' c. -,: edits the 
known size of uhicii, as can be seen from Table VI, rose from 
under £G1 million at the end of 1959 to £G156.9 million at the 
end of 196L+. 
The ratio of e : ports to Gross Domestic Product over the 
period 1955-C't fell consistently in successive years from 29.71' 
in 1955 to 17.6 in 1964 against which raust be seen the huge 
leakage frort domestic income circulation via imports. In both 
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absolute terms and as percentage of Gross Domestic Product, 
imports showed considerable fluctuations particularly between 
1961 and 1964. In absolute terms as well as the ratio to Gross 
Bomestic Product, imports tended to decline from 1962 to 1964 
relative to the peaks experienced in 1961. 
Iioticver 9 neither the pro ressi? ely declining ratio of 
exports to Gross Domestic Product nor the observed declining 
0 
ratio of imports to Gross Domestic Product indicate sufficiently 
a novernGnt away fror We characteristic external dependance of 
the economy. During the period 1961-61+ the effects of restr- 
ictions on imports tended to hide the true dependence of the " 
economy. It raust 9" howevcr , be pointed out that the decline in 
the ratio of exports to Gross Domestic Product reflected 
generally the effects of rising internal expenditure by the 
Government deriving to a significant extent from increased 
borrowing fro. u the domestic banking system. 
The characteristic Lionocultural structure of the developing 
economies is in the case of Ghana clearly illustrated in Table VII 
showing the composition of visible exports originating in the 
domestic economy in the five year's 1960-64 for which usable 
breakdowns are available. 
01 exports of domestic produce originated in the primary 
sector and Caere practically all in the rati, state with the limited 
exce-otion of sawci timber and semi-pr oco ssod. cocoa or cocoa butter. 
More significant, the value of a single crop'... cocoa, 
(processed and uriprocesscd) averaged annually over the period 
1960-64 63.3; of, total exports of domestic produco. 
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This illustrates the general structural imbalance of the 
econmy in being heavily dependent on the extractive industries, 
mainly agriculture. This is reflected in the structure of 
c:; 11J1oyrlcnt as revealed by the Population Census of 1960. 
Table VIII sho-us that in 1960 about 61.5; of the working 
population were employcd in agriculture, fishing and related 
activities. The , primary sector as a whole (agriculture, fishing, 
uiininE and quarrying) absorbed 63.41 of the working population. 
The considerably high ratio of employment in manufacturing 
industry should be seen against the fact that by 1960 large 
manufacturing establishments were few and the bulk of those 
reported as engaged in manufacturing activities, would be largely 
very small scale self-employed operators in such activities as 
woodwork and bread-baking. 
W, To may at this })oint draw attention to the fact that 
agriculture 'twas and still is organised almost entirely be self- 
employed individuals working on farms of very small size in 
comparison with the average size )f cultivated acreage per 
farmer in Western Europe or L: frican countries with a settled 
European coy unity. Table IX shoos the average size of agric- 
ultural holding in Ghana in 1963. For tute whole country the 
sample survey showed that on average each farmer' s cultivated 
acreage was 6.2 acres and there was considerable variation 
bctween individual Regions. The relatively high acreage in the 
Western Region is due )rincipally to the concentration in that 
Region of large plantation farms under Rubber and Oil Palms. 
We must neu emphasise one highly significant aspect of the 
Xi-7 - 
Table IX 
(a) 
Lverage Size of Lgricultural Holding 9 1,961. 
Region acres 
Western 11.1 
Central 4.5 
Lccra 1.3 
Eastern 3.8 
Volta 3.1 
L shanti 8.7 
Br ong -l. ha fo 7.1 Northern 7.2 
Upper 6.7 
x, 11 Ghana 6.2 
(a) In effect the-acreages represent average 
size of cultivation per farmer. The data 
arc based on a sample survey conducted by 
the Central Bureau of Statistics and the 
ilinistry of ;. griculture covering 1,000 
holdings and 2,510 fields (separate farms). 
Source: Economic Survey (of Ghana) 1963, p. 64. 
economy, namely the general deterioration of the terms of trade 
over most of the period under review. Indices of volume and 
average price of imports with 195+ as base year are plotted in 
Figure T. 1 for the period 1957-64. 
tirhereas tiie unit )y ice of visible imports was during 
1957-64 generally above the unit price as in 1951+ the correspond- 
ing magnitudes in respect of merchandise exports were in each of 
taose years below the average level in 1954. The index of 
avora;; o price of imports averaged over the period 1957-64 at 103 
over 1954 whereas the index of average price of exports averaged 
65.7. The result was a general deterioration in the terms of 
trade against Ghana. Table X illustrates this clearly. 1. lthough 
the terms of trade moved considerably in the favour of Ghana in 
---Nl v 11 - 
INDEX OF VOLUME AND AVERAGE PRICE OF IMPORTS AND 
DOMESTIC EXPORTS 1957- 64 1954 = 100 
190 
x 
W 
O 
Z 
175 
k 
150 
125 
100 
75 
Imports 
Ivoivmel 
/'/ N 
v 
Exports 
(Volume) 
-1_ 
IA 
imports Average price) 
=. 
-ýý_ 
\ 
\ Exports (Average price) 
50 
1957 1959 1961 1963 
Source: Economic Survey (of Ghana) 1964, p. 35 
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1963 and 1964 over 1962 that it was generally unfavourable 
cannot be denied. 
Table X 
(a) 
Ghana : The Terms of Trade 1 1957-61+ 
1957 
15 = 100 
157 
1958 112 
1959 123 
1960 8 
8 
1 
1962 198 
196 189 
196 4 182 
(a) Obtained by dividing the import 
price indices by the export price 
indices. 
Source: :s for Figure I. 1. 
1, noteworthy phenomenon revealed in Figure I. 1 is the strong 
negative correlation between the volume and average price of 
exports. Over the period 1957-64 in respect of which usable 
statistics are available an increase in the value of visi-ble exports 
(including non-monetary gold) was invariably associated with a 
fall in the average price and a fall in volume was associated 
with an increase in unit price. The general result was the 
absence of heavy swings in export proceeds. 
ý; lthou. gh strong; correlation does not ä priori determine 
causality botwccn the variables under examination in the case 
of the situation described here it can be safely argued that the 
volume of exports was the determinant of the average price of 
exports. The basis for this argument is the fact that Ghana's 
output of cocoa (which accounted on average for 63.3i of domestic 
exports in 1960-64) was in volume terms around 30% of total 
world output. This is shown in Table XI. Over the period 
1956-57 to 1963-64 the ratio of Ghana's real output of cocoa 
averaged 32.5;,, of total world production. 
Table XI 
Cocoas Ghana' s output_ Compared with Total World 
1 000 Long Tons 
1956- 1957- 1958- 1959- 1960- 1961- 1962- 1963- 
57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64. 
World 
Production 893 767 905 1,01+1 1,172 1,127 1,157 1,216 
Production 264 207 255 317 432 410 422 421 in Ghana 
Ghana' s 
production 29.6 27.0 28.2 30.5 36.9 36.4 36.5 34.6 
as Y. of 
World out- 
put. 
Source: Gill and Duffus Cocoa Market Report, Lpril, 1965 
(Reproduced in Economic Survey (of Ghana) 1961+ 
p. 64. 
Thus, quite apart from the continuing adverse Current 
l, ccount balance of international transactions the economy of 
Ghana was traditionally fraught with structural imbalance both 
as rcgcrds the structure of exports and the internal economic 
structure, all factors emphasizing the external dependence of 
the ec inofy. 
The basic external dependence of the economy is further 
illustrated in the composition of Government current revenue? 
that is excluding receipts on capital transactions, as reproduced 
in Table XII for the fiscal years 1957-58 to 1963-64 in respect 
of which reliable (revised) data are available. 
Govcrnment revenue derived from exports of cocoa averaged 
approximately 30;, of total current revenue of the Central 
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Government in the fiscal years shown in Table XII. altogether 
direct taxes on foreign trade (export taxes and import duties) 
constituted an annual average ratio of 61.1+% to total Government 
revenue as defined in Table XII over the period 1957-58 to 
1963-64. I-loreover, it is reasonable to assume that the bulk 
of "Other production and expenditure taxes" were in respect of 
imported durable and non-durable consumer goods so that the 
ratio of Government receipts derived from foreign trade would be 
higher than the figures given here. However, the fact that 
export proceeds from cocoa form the bulk of domestically-owned 
income from exports moans that in effect the value of cocoa 
exports was the most important single determinant of Government 
revenue from both exports and imports. 
As stated earlier various attempts were made, in particular 
from 1960, to diversify the economy and that this took the form 
largely of Government-financed productive investment in manu- 
facturing industry and other sectors generally. 
Table XIII to Table XVI' demonstrate the general trends in 
the economy resulting from the attempts at economic diversificatiOn. 
itself, partly due to increasing economic arises arising from the 
adverse balance of the external accounts. 
Table XIII shows the tilting of imports towards producer 
goods against consumer goods. In 1963 and 1964 in both absolute 
value and relative terms imports of producer goods excecdod 
imports of consumer goods. ý. further illustration of this trend 
is provided by Table XIV which cor pare s the absolute and relative 
levels of imported goods and domestically produced goods in 
estimated total consumation expenditure by the private sector 
- XYi 1 h- 
TABLE XIII 
Composition of Visible Imports, 195+-6+ 
(Values in Current Prices) 
Total Visiplp 
Imports 
(1) 
Imports 
of Consumer 
Goods 
M11 
(2) 
Imports 
of Producer 
Goods (b) 
Omi 
(3) 
Ratio of 
(2) to(1) 
(4) 
Ratio of 
(3) to (1) 
(5) 
1951+ 71.1 39.6 27.1 53.0 38.5 
1955 88.0 50.3 33.0 57.2 37.5 
1956 88.9 48.1 36.3 54.1 1x. 0.8 
1957 96.7 55.0 35.8 56.9 46.6 
1958 84.6 46.1 32.9 54.5 38.9 
1959 113.1 56.9 50.7 50.3 44.8 
1960 129.6 64.7 59.0 49.9 45.6 
1961 142.8 70.6 66.2 4.9.4 46. tß 
1962 116.7 55.9 54.3 47.9 46.5 
1963 130.4 51.4 71.7 39.4 55.1 
1964.121.6 40.8 73.8 33.6 60.7 
(a) Columns (2) and (3) do not add up to Column (1); the difference 
comprises imports of fuels and lubricants which cannot ordinarily 
be classified as consumer goods or producer goods. 
(b) Includes raw materials and semi-processed goods. 
Source: Obtained from detailed classifications 
of imports published by the Central Bureau 
of Statistics, Accra in Economic Surveys, etc. 
TJBLE XIV 
Domestic and Import Content of Estimated. Private 
Consumption Expenditure on Goods, 1955 and 1960-64. 
_ 
1955 1960 
GI; I. ;o of £GU. ,, of 7bta1 Tbtaa 
Total Durable an 
Non-Durable Good 200 100.0 265 100.0 
Imported 50.3 25.2 64.7 21.1+ 
Domestic 149.7 74.8 
ýM0.3 
75.6 
1861 1962 
1; 
196 
£G7ýi. 
ý£G: 
-x. öf I. of £M. f i 
Total Total Totall Total 
312 100.0 318 100.0t3-9+ 100.01380 100.0 
i 
70.6 22.6 55.9 175Jk 1ý. 5! 4.0-8 10.711 
21. Z4.77.4.2021 8?. 4 302.6 85 1339.2 89.3! 
Source: Based on Economic Survey 1964, Table 4, p. 19. 
,} 
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on durable and non-durable goods in 1955 and 1960-64. In 
absolute terms the iraport content declined from the peak (in 
terms of the years shown) of £G70.6 million in 1961 to £G40.8 
million in 196+. In relative terms the import content declined 
from 25.2% in 1955 to only 10.7% in 196L+. In real terms the 
observed domestic private expenditure on imported goods would 
repro sent much lower magnitudes from 1962 to 1961+ as imported 
consumer goods came to bear much higher expenditure taxes. 
The converse of a declining level (absolute and relative 
values) of imported consumer goods in both money and real terms 
may be seen in the rising value of domestic output of manu- 
factured goods as shown in Table XV. The relevant data, 
available for only 1962-64, show an increase in the gross value 
Table XV 
(a) 
Domestic Out-nut ofManufactured Goods, 1962-64. 
£G Million 
1962 1963 1964 
Gross Output in Current Prices 35.7 46.5 53.5 
Gross Output in 1962 Prices 35.7 43.9 47.3 
Value added in Current Prices 20.5 26.2 29.5 
Value L dded in 1962 Prices 20.5 24.6 25.0 
(a) Relate to manufacturing establishments 
in which a minimum of 30 persons were engaged. 
Source: Compiled from T. 38 & T. 41 of Economic Survey (of Ghana) 1964, p. 78 and p. 80. 
in current ; prices and 1962 prices from £35.7 million in 1962 
to £G53.5 million and £G+7.3 million respectively in 1964. 
Table XV also shots value added (that is gross market value 
"minus the value of imported raw materials). In current market 
prices value added increased from £G20.5 million in 1962 to 
£G29.5 million in 196-. In the same years value added in 
constant 1962 market prices rose from £G20.5 million to £G26.0 
million. These figures, as stated in Footnote (a) to Table XV 
referred to only manufacturing establishments with 30 or more 
persons engaged and therefore exclude the output of a large 
number of smaller establishments whose production was on the 
whole included in the national account estimates to only a 
modest extent. ' 
In Table -XVI a-, -o prosentod the absolute shares of the State 
sector in the output of manufactured goods. In terms of gross 
values measured in current markct prices the fully State-owned 
Table XVI 
Sectorial Distribution of Manufactured Goods 1962-64. 
1962 1963 1964 
£GM J of £GM / of £G M % of 
Total Total Total 
State Owned Establ- 
ishments 4.2 11.8 6.6 14.2 7. 5 14.0 
Joint State-Private" 2.5 7.0 3.4 7.3 3. 9 7.3 
Co-operative 0.04 - 0.1 2.1 0. 3 0.5 
Private Ell 28.9 80.9 36.3 78.0 41. 8 78.1 
Total 35.7 100.0 46.5 100.0 53. 5 100.0 
Jill figures refer to establishments in which 30 
or more persons were, engaged. 1.11 figures are gross 
values in current market prices. 
Source: A! ý for Table XV. 
manufacturing sector incroasod their output from £G4.2 million 
in 1962 to £G7.5 million in 1964. In relative terms this 
- xx - 
represented an increase of the fully State-owned sector from 
11.8% to 14.0; of total domestic output of manufactured goods 
from enterprises in which 30 or more persons were engaged. In 
absolute torus the combined output of the State-owned and'Joint 
State-Private sector increased their output from £G6.7 million 
in 1962 to £G11.4 million in 1964, equivalent to 18.71 and 
2l. 3iý of the totals in 1962 and 1964 respectively.. 
It must be emphasized that the output of State-owned 
ranufacturing industry most probably does not provide an adequate 
measure of governmental participation in the manufacturing 
sector as defined in Table XVI. It is a familiar knowledge 
that public enterprises were generally inefficient. 
The points raised in the preceding paragraphs appear to 
be adequately reflected in the industrial and sectorial distrib- 
ution of recorded employment in establishments employing 10 or 
more persons in the period 1961-64 for which usable statistics 
teere available. 
In all three broad industrial sectors employment in the 
public sector exceeded employment in the private sector. In 
the extractive industries the public sector was in terms of 
employment larger in both agriculture and mining. This was 
due to the oporation of a large agricultural organisation within 
the I. -Jorkers Brigade formed at about the time of Independence 
and, from 1963, the establishment of the State Farms Corporation. 
Secondly, as stated earlier the Government purchased five gold 
mines in 1960. The general domination of the Government sector 
in the other industrial divisions wore the result of developments 
, Ci 
recounted earlier. 
However, a few significant developments within the private 
sector must be noted. Within the period 1961-64 employment 
within the private sec --or declined in all industries taken 
together despite a continuous rise in total employment. The 
implied contraction of the private sec': c' on the basis of the 
size of establishment with which wo are here concerned was 
particularly marked in tiie Construction, Co. mncrce and Transport 
industries. Ls will be shown in the text this development 
was the result of two interconnected trends: restrictions on 
total imports, more severe limitations on imports of consumer 
goods and thirdly a general allocation of resources in favour 
of the-public sector. There is evidence that the public sector 
was in many cases about equally adversely affected by the 
restrictions on imports. That this was not reflected in the 
state of employment in that sector could be ascribed to an 
official policy that employment in Government-sponsored enter- 
prises should be at least maintained at existing levels even 
where retrenchment would be the obvious economic policy. 
The post-1960 developments outlined in this Chapter repres- 
onted basic deviations froi:: the traditional structure and nature 
of the economy. This was generally well mirrored in developments 
in the structure and practices of the monetary and financial 
system. In many senses 1960-61 marked the beginning of now 
trends in important areas of the financial system. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
C OM MERC IAL BANKING 
Introductory 
During the period 1950-64 three commercial banks were 
operating in Ghana. These were in the order of their 
establishment in the country the Bank of West Africa, Barclays 
B'nk (Dominion Colonial Overseas) and the Ghana Commercial 
Bank. Before the attainment of Independence by Ghana in 
March 1957 the Bank of West Africa was known as the Bank of 
British Vlest Africa. Similarly until that date the Ghana 
Commercial Bank operated under the name Bank of the Gold 
Coast. 
The Bank of West Africa and Barclays Bank are both 
British-owned banks incorporated in England. The Ghana 
Commercial Bank, on the other hand is an indigenous bank 
wholly owned by the Government of Ghana. 
The first banking- office Wns opened for business in Accra 
on 1st January 1897. Thus compered to the advanced countries 
and some developing countries such as India commercial banking 
is a relatively recent business activity in Ghana. 
One historical factor, among several, can be singled out 
as having been chiefly responsible for the late arrival of 
commercial banking in Ghana. This wns the proliferation before 
the turn of the 19th century of diverse kinds of currencies 
that circulated in the areas now known collectively as Ghana. 
This was also true of other parts of West Africa. The following 
paragraphs deal briefly with the progress towards a uniform 
T. The dank of west Africa merged with the English bank the 
Standard Bank Ltd., in April 1965. The newly reconstituted bank- 
now has American participants by the Chase Manhattan Bank of 
New York. 
-2- 
currency in Ghana' 
Prior to 1880 three-broad types of currencies, or objects 
used ^s such, circul? ted in present-day Ghana. These were: - 
(a) Primitive currencies such as cowrie shells, manillas, 
brass and copper rods. 
(b) Gold dust and nuggets. 
(c) Currencies issued and current in West European countries 
(including England) and other parts of the world notably 
the Americas. 
Of the primitive currencies cowrie shells were wholly 
indigenous whilst the others even if initially native to the 
area were certainly cheaply obtained by European merchants 
from Birmingham, England. 2 
The use of gold dust and nuggets both as currency 
and for ornamental purposes was a practice of long standing 
among the natives. 
3 Their use as currency or means of 
payment was, however, believed to have been restricted to 
1. For a detailed account see Albert Adomakoh, "The history 
of currency and banking in some West African countries" 
The Economic Bulletin of Ghana, Vol. VII, No. 4,1963; 
J. B. Loynes, "The West African Currency Board, 1912-62", 
H. M. S. O. 1964. 
See also Paul Einzig, "Primitive Money", Perga[rton 
Press, London 1966 (2nd Edition) pp. 137-46. 
2. E. K. Hawkins, "The growth of a money economy in Nigeria 
and Ghana", Oxford Economic Papers, October 1958. 
3. It has been estimated that "prior to 1880 the roduction 
of alluvial gold by the Africans (of the Gold Coast) was 
probably of the order of 15 million ounces", "The Gold 
Coast Handbook, 193710. (Gold Coast Government) p. 64. 
In 1873 a French trader, Pierre Bonnat, heard of the rich 
gold workings in the Wassa district whilst he was a prisoner 
of the Ashantis in Kumasi. Released from prison in 1874 he 
returned to France and formed a company to investigate these 
deposits- Thus began gold mining in the Gold Coast by 
Europeans. See "Gold Coast Handbook of Trade and Commerce", 
Accra 1955. p. 41. 
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transactions of high value mainly transactions in the Chief's 
court among the broad group of people classified ethnically 
as the Akans. 
1 
The foreign currencies consisted principally of British 
sterling (gold and silver), French gold napoleons, Spanish 
and South American doubloons, French give-franc pieces and 
the United States eagle of various denominations. 
2 The 
many different kinds of foreign national currencies that 
prevailed in the territory reflected the diversity of foreign 
(European) nationals that had trading interests in the 
territory and in the adjoining areas. 
In April 1880 the first group of currencies was demonetized, 
3 
thereby restricting legal tender to gold dust and nuggets, 
and British and other foreign currencies. In 1889 gold dust 
and nuggets were also demonetized. 
4 This followed increasing 
exports of gold dust by European traders, which raised its 
monetary value locally and inevitably gave rise to the use 
of adulter^ted gold dust as currency. 
By the turn of the 19th century the British silver was 
firmly entrenched; the other foreign currencies were already 
waning in popularity and were gradually disappearing. In 
1912 when the West African Currency Board (see Chapter Two) 
1. A. Adomakoh, op. cit., p. 10. 
2. Ibid. See also Colonial Report (Gold Coast) No. 465, 
1904. P. 12. 
3. Demonetization Ordinance, No. 2 of 1880 (Chap. 124 of the 
1920 Edition of the Gold Coast Laws). 
4. Ordinance No. 9/1889. 
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was being established the few remaining foreign currencies 
were completely demonetized. 
From 1880 onward British silver coins increased 
gre"tly in circulation as unlimited legal tender as did the 
British bronze to an amount not exceeding one shilling, 
throughout the areas that constitute present-day Ghana. ' 
Table 1 shows the amounts of British sterling silver issued 
for circulation in the former British West African colonies 
during the period 1886 to 1900. 
Table 1. 
Annual Issues of British Sterling Silver for 
Use in British West African Coloniesa), 1866-1900. 
(Amounts in £) 
Year Amount Year Amount Year Amount 
1886 550 1892 46,325 1898 334,340 
1887 7,000 1893 141,100 1899 418,875 
1888 16,150 1894 77,990 1900 154,730 
1889 33,400 1895 235,450 
1890 65,000 1896 108,815 
1891 RO, 750 1897 63,200 
(a) The Gold Coast, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Gambia. 
Source: Albert Adomakoh, op. cit. 
11 The demonetization of the other forms of currency was 
by no means simple in practice. In particular the absence 
of very small units of British coins encouraged the Africans 
to continue to use their own currencies for very small 
transactions. At that time, of course, such small transactions 
would represent roughly the average size of inter-African 
transactions. 
-5- 
Although during the period 1886-1900 imports of British 
currency into the West African colonies fluctuated annually 
the trend was clearly upward. This upward trend implied 
certain developments favourable to the beginning of commercial 
banking. First, the increasing annual imports of coins 
meant that trade on the West African coast was rising. 
Secondly, the place of British merchants in'the volume 
of business was rising relative to the merchants of other 
European nationalities. 
More important, from the point of view of commercial 
,i king was the emergence of British coins from 1886 onward 
as the dominant currency in these colonies. This development 
reduced the risk of demonetization, an event which would 
create immense difficulties for a bank which happened to hold 
a sizable amount of the demonetized currency since all foreign 
currencies circulating in the area were not subject to any 
redemption agreements in the colonies or in their countries 
of origin. 
Thus even though increasing foreign trade provided the 
fundamental basis for commercial banking in West Africa, the 
currency situation prevalent before the slid-1880's was 
clearly an extenuating influence. It required a rational 
and orderly currency system to reinforce the already well 
established trading lines before commercial banking could be 
regZrded as a stable prospect. 
The main body of this chapter is organised as follows. 
Section A deals with the expatriate banks with emphasis laid 
on their special features. There is, in addition, a brief 
-6- 
review of criticisms advanced against their policies and 
operations. Section B deals with the Ghana Commercial Bank - 
the Background to its establishment, its constitution and a 
general history of its operations. It must be emphasized 
that as an indigenous bank in an African country the Ghana 
Commercial Bank has a special significance which entitles it 
to a separate examination. Section C is the final and longest 
portion of this chapter. It deals with the development of 
the commercial banking system - involving all commercial banks - 
during the period 1950-64. Considerable space is devoted 
to ex^mingtion of developments in the location of co=ercial 
bank offices, growth of and changes in the structure of 
assets and liabilities. On the whole the high proportion 
of space devoted to the commercial banks reflects the dominant 
position of the commercial banks in a financial system which 
during the period under review was basically a simple one. 
Section A 
Expatriate Banks 
The first commercial bank in the whole of the former 
British West Africa was opened in Lagos (now Federal Capital 
of Nigeria) by the African Banking Corporation following upon 
the advice of Sir Alfred Jones a shipowner in the African 
Steamship Company. 
l This bank wis closed down in 1893 
probably because of the inconvenience of operating one branch 
in L'gos in view of the fact that the African Banking Corporation 
operated mainly in South Africa. 
2 
1, A. Adomakoh, op. cit. 
2, Ibid. 
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However, the shipowner persisted in his belief that the 
time was ripe for the provision of banking services in west 
Africa. 
Already by the turn of the 19th century the British 
colonies in West Africa had emerged with a uniform currency. 
Secondly, there was an increasing development of trade along 
the coast between the natives and European merchants, the 
latter being accustomed to banking services in their home 
countries. Thirdly, as the volume and value of trade increased, 
and production for export spread further inland it became 
increasingly expensive and probably unsafe for the merchants 
to transport large quantities of coins on their trading 
missions. Fourthly, to support the colonial administration 
there had emerged inter alia a sizable body of British adminis- 
trative personnel, a militia and police force all calling for 
some kind of banking services. 
Backed by such propitious circumstances the shipowner 
successfully persuaded the shipping firm of Elder Dempster 
and Company to take over the Lagos business of the African 
Banking Corporation. For one year the Lagos branch of this 
shipping firm operated as a bank keeping account for the 
Government of Lagos and controlling the flow of silver coins. 
1 
Upon the insistence of the Lagos Government that the banking 
office operated by the Elder Dempster shipping firm should be 
registered as a joint stock bank, four major English banks 
collar orated to form the Bank of British VTest Africa, hereafter 
referred to as Bank of T: 'est Africa. The four English banks 
1. A. Adomakoh, op. cit. 
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were Lloyds Bank, the 'Westminster Bank, the National Provincial 
Bank and the Standard Bank. 
' 
On the 31st May, 1894 the Bank of West Africa commenced 
operations in Lagos with a fully subscribed nominal capital 
of F, 100,000 with 140,000 paid. 
The first branch of the Bank of ! Fest Africa in present- 
day Ghana was opened in Accra on 1st January 1897. This was 
also the first commercial bank office to be established in 
Ghana. 
Twenty years later, on 24th February 1917 a second banking 
company commenced business in Accra. This was the Colonial 
Bank which had been established in 1836 by Royal Charter and 
whose main sphere of activity was the East Indies. In 1925 
the Colonial Bank was itself acquired by Barclays Bank which 
retained the business previously established in Ghana by 
the Colonial Bank. In 1926 the newly constituted bank 
opera+ed nine branches in the whole of the former British 
2 Vest Africa. 
General features 
As noted at the beginning of this chapter, both the Bank 
of West Africa and Barclays Bank are British banks incorporated 
in England with their head offices in London. The Ghanaian 
unit of each of these banks is part of a supra-territorial 
banking structure. Until recently this meant that the 
Ghanaian units were actively controlled from London. As 
will be shown presently and at other places in this study, 
there has been a considerable relaxation of the control 
2. A. Adomakoh, op. cit. 2. 
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exercised from the head offices. But that they still remain 
essentially branches within a broad international setting is 
evidenced by the fcct that separate accounts and reports 
are not published by either the Bank of West Africa or 
Barclays Bank in respect of their operations in Ghana. 
The Bank of West Africa as the name implies operates as 
a bank almost entirely in West Africa although as a result 
of its long association with the foreign trade involving 
West African countries it is represented in important world 
trading centres outside West Africa. In x. 964 its West 
African representation was as shown in Table 2. 
Table 2 
Total Number of Branches of the Bank of blest 
Africa cy Country, 31st March 1965. 
Country Number of Branches 
Ghana 40 
Nireria 60 
Sierra Leone 11 
Republic of Cpmeroons 2 
Total 113 
Source: The Bankers' Almanac, 1964-65. 
At the end of the period under review the Bank of West 
Africa operated in 4 West African countries. By contrast 
on the same date Barclays Bank D. C. O. was operating banking 
offices in 40 countries in addition to the United Kingdom 
where it is one of the 
"Big Five" of the London Clearing Banks. 
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At the time of writing, the expatriate banks operating 
in Ghana had obtained a large measure of autonomy in respect 
of control from the head offices in London. Already, such 
degree of autonomy as has been achieved was discernible 
towards the end of the period under review. It must, 
however, be noted that the measure of autonomy was acquired 
at slow stages probably in pace with the advancement of 
political independence in the country. Generally, expatriate 
business concerns initially controlled tightly from their 
foreign-based head offices were bound to be given a greater 
decree of local discretion as an expedient of averting the 
displeasure of the new political opinion. Moreover, given 
the extinction of colonial status there was always the possi- 
bility that the newly emerged political authorities would 
initiate reform of the relationships between local expatriate 
concerns and their head offices. Thus we would expect 
foreign businesses to take the initiative in this direction 
if only to forestall legislated policies likely to be more 
severe from the point of view of the foreign firms themselves. 
Towards the end of the period under review Barclays 
Bank operations in Ghana were actually administered by a locally- 
based Board of Directors known to include at least one Ghanaian 
national. On the other hand, the Ghana unit of the Bank of 
West Africa continued to be under a Local Director. 
The discretionary powers vested in the local executives 
or directors cover all the important areas of banking business 
including staffing, lending and investment. General overall 
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policies, h, vever, were and still are administered from London. 1 
For a former colonial territory the post-Independence 
developments outlined in the preceding three paragraphs were 
significant from the point of view ý of the new political status. 
However, whether or not the reforms made any difference 
to the policies of the banks would depend on the influence 
of other considerations. 
The Bank of kiest Africa was the currency agent, in the 
former British colonies of West Africa, for the West African 
Currency Board (a subject of the next chapter). This 
function dated back to 1892 when the bank's predecessor the 
African Banking Corpor^tion was given the monopoly by the 
United Kingdom Government to handle the repatriation of 
redundant British silver coins from Lagos to London, and to 
obtain British silver coins in Lagos against prepayment of 
sterling in London. 
2 
The Bank of lest Africa took over this 
business in Lagos in 1894 and subsequently in Accra when its 
first branch in present-day Ghana was opened in 1897. When 
the West African Currency Board was established in 1912 to 
issue and redeem a special currency for the British West 
African colonies it retained the Bank of Vvest Africa as its 
currency agent in all those territories. 
3 
1. This was disclosed to the author during discussions with 
executive directors at both banks' head-offices in London and 
Accra. 
2. See J. B. Loynes,, op. cit. p. 9. 
3. The only exception w-s the Southern Cameroons (now part 
of the Republic of Cameroons) where in 1948 the West African 
Currency Bo-rd opened a sub-centre managed by Barclays Bank 
D. C. O. (See J. B. Loynes, op. cit., p. 17. ) 
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In Ghana both expatriate banks kept accounts for the 
Government until the situation changed considerably on the 
/ 
establishment of the Ghana Commercial Bank in 1953, when  
Government accounts in Accra were generally transferred to 
the latter bank. There is evidence that before 1953 the 
Bank of West Africa was the principal depository of the 
Government accounts. 
' From 1953 onward Government accounts 
were handled by either of the two expatriate banks only at 
centres where the Ghana Commercial Bank (and from 1957 the 
Bank of Ghana) was not represented. 
Three important features of the expatriate banks were: - 
1. The general pattern of location of their banking 
offices. 
2. The place occupied by exp'ttriates-that is British 
nationals - on the personnel. 
3. The implications of the banks' position as branches 
within an international banking structure. 
The nature of these features were the subjects of complaint 
in Ghana and other countries where expatriate banks were 
dominant in the domestic banking system. We shall here be 
concerned with developments in each of the features enumerated 
in the previous paragraph. 
1. In terms of the number of branches the expatriate banks 
between them dominated the commercial banking system of Ghana 
up to the end of 1960. In Section B of this chapter there 
will be a detailed examination of the growth in the number of 
banking dots as well as the pattern of location during the 
1. According to Mr. J. B. Loynes (Ibid. p. 17) "The B. B. W. A. 
had a specs 1 pos, tion in the West African colonies as Government. anker . 
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period 1950-64. The following is only a brief account of the 
pattern along which the branch system of the expatriate 
banks developed in the earlier years compared to the 1950's and 
1960's. 
It must be pointed out here that available records show 
some inconsistency on numbers and location of bank branches 
in the period before 1951, and in some cases after 1951. 
The inconsistencies arise partly from the closure and reinstate- 
ment of branches between reporting periods. Figures 1 to 
5 show the location of bank offices for each of the three 
banks extant during the period under review on specific 
dates for which it was possible to obtain most of the 
necessary information. 
At the end of 1904 the Bank of West Africa had five 
branches in Ghana (Gold Coast) at the following towns: Accra, 
Cape Co? st, Sekondi, Axim and Tarkwa. With the exception of 
T? rkwa all the others were sea ports handling various 
proportions of the country's foreign trade. Accra was then 
as now the capital. All the others were leading commercial 
towns. Tarkwa occupied the special position of being at that 
time the only gold mining centre .l 
As mentioned earlier a second bank commenced operations 
in Ghana in 1917. At the end of 1937 when both banks were 
already firmly established numbers of banking offices had, 
of course, increased considerably over the 1904 figure. But 
the pattern of branch location had not changed fundamentally 
(See Figure 2 at the end of this chapter). In 1928 Takoradi 
1. See Figure 1 At rtho erl. of thig Ohzptor. 
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had supplanted the old ports as the major harbour in the 
country and both banks had opened a branch each in this fast- 
growing harbour town. In addition to Tarkwa, Obuasi and 
Oda had emerged earlier as large mining centres, the former a 
notable gold-mining town and the latter the centre of a 
prosperous diamond-mining district. Few other sea ports 
had become banking centres. These new mining centres and 
sea ports apart, the banks had by 1937 expanded their branches 
to a few towns which were fast developing as commercial and 
provincial administr^. tive centres. Such were Kumasi, 
capital of Ashanti, and Koforidua the centre of present-day 
E^-. stern Region of Ghana where up to the immediate post-war 
years the cocoa industry was principally concentrated. 
At the end of 1955 (see Figure 3) the Bank of Vilest 
11frica 
continued to be the larger of the two expatriate 
banks (the Ghana Commercial Bank established in 1953 had then 
only one office in the whole of Ghana). Significantly, by 
that date the Bank of West Africa had spread its branch 
network beyond the southern portion of the country and had 
branches at Suryani, Berekum and Tamale further north and 
away from the parts of the country which could be said to be 
relatively more developed. The Bank of 'Fest Africa had 
also established a branch at Tema which in 
1955 was being 
transformed from a small fishing village into what in the 
1960's became the countryts largest sea port. Such 
developments apart, the pre-1957 banking system of Ghana 
could be summed up as one entirely dominated by the two 
expatriate banks and with banking offices concentrated in the 
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southern half of the country. 
The basic caus e for this pattern wqs the fact that 
commercial banking developed in response to foreign trade 
involving European firms and merchants. Until recently 
the banks= business was heavily skewed to providing 
facilities for the financing of imports a nd exports and of 
the internal activities - mainly trading - of the foreign 
firms. This accounts for the concentration of expatriate 
bank offices (except in very recent years) in commercial 
centres and harbour towns. The banks were not involved in 
the productive sectors except to a limited extent in the 
ready facilities which were offered to mining and logging 
firms the most important of whom were foreign. That the 
banks concentrated their business in the main commercial 
centres was partly explained by the concentration in such 
towns of the African white-collar workers and professionals 
whose relatively high level of income and educatiop made them 
a substantial proportion (at least, numerically) of the 
b'nks' customers. 
However, from 1951 there wqs a tremendous expansion 
in the number of branches maintained by the expatriate banks. 
There was also a slight alteration in the pattern of location, 
At the end of 1960 the two banks had between them 97 branches 
as compared to 18 in the middle of 1951. Thus in the ten 
years from 1951 to 1960 the expatriate banks together 
opened an average of 8 branches per year as compared to one 
branch per three years during the period 1897 to 1950. 
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Two factors can be singled out as having influenced the 
post-1950 higher growth rate, namely rising economic prosperity, 
education and similar factors likely to influence the decisions 
of commercial banks anywhere affecting expansion. A 
sustained programme of investment initiated in 1951 by the 
Nkrumah Government obviously gave an edge to other economic 
trends operating independently as an inducement to bank 
expansion. The second factor - offered here tentatively - 
was the advent of the Ghana Commercial Bank as an additional 
stimulant to the expatriate banks to expand and thus strengthen 
further their already well-established position. Alternatively; 
it can be argued that the opening of the Ghana Commercial Bank 
induced the expatriate banks to bring forward existing plans 
for expansion which might otherwise have been realized at a 
slower rate. 
2. In Ghana, both before and in the years immediately 
following Independence there were often complaints from various 
(, uarters that the expatriate banks deliberately refrained 
from appointing Ghanaians to senior positions. While 
carrying out investigttions in Accra in connection with this 
study the author heard similar complaints from former Ghanaian 
employees of the expatriate banks. 
The extent to which such accusations were justified is, 
of course, difficult to establish. But that until relatively 
recently the banks l senior staff were mainly British nationals 
was largely true. 
We must, however, state in extenuation that until 
relatively recently a policy of appointing Ghanaians to senior 
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positions could not have been carried out at a speedy rate. 
There was a general scarcity of trained administrators, not 
to mention administrators trained in the technicalities of 
commercial banking. NToroover, the high demand for trained 
personnel in the rapidly growing civil service from 1951 
onward must have limited the effectiveness of 'Africanisationt 
policies in private enterprise, generally. 
This should not be taken to imply that at the end of 
1964, for example, problem had been completely solved. 
Whereas in 1951 the Gold Coast was administered by a small 
secretariat, the Ghana civil service today can be described 
as modern and comparable in structure to civil services in 
more advanced countries. However, with the continually 
rising supply of trained or educated people the banks t 
tAfricanisation policy' has parri passu been more effective. 
One fact which must be borne in mind is that in Ghana since 
the emergence of indigenous government in 1951 the bulk of 
trained men at the high levels have been sponsored by the 
State which has normally had a prior claim to their services. 
It must be pointed out that it was clearly in the banks' 
own interest to offer senior positions to Ghanaians in place 
of expatriates. First, expatriates were and still are 
relatively more expensive to the banks in terms of remuneration, 
Both public and private employers hive always paid higher 
salaries to expatriate employees than to their African 
counterparts. Secondly, the employment of African senior 
staff would reduce the social vacuum which was said to have 
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existed between the banks' executives and indigenous customers. 1 
Their knowledge of the social and economic habits of the 
indigenous popul'ition would most probably have helped to 
'Netter dealings with African customers. 
As fror its the 1950's were concerned one development which 
ret^rded the exp? triate banks' "Africanisation" Programme 
was clearly the establishment of the Ghana Commercial Bank 
which drew heavily on these banks to form the nucleus of its 
Ghanaian personnel. 
3. The general prLaciple underlying the international 
operations of the parent banks of both the Bank of West 
Africa and Barclays Bank D. C. O. is that each overseas unit 
should endeavour to stand on its own feet. In practice, when 
a territorial unit experiences a shortage of funds it can and 
does borrow from the London head office to supplement local 
resources. The corollary of this is the transfer to London 
of spare funds from the territorial units. Historically, 
as both banks operate in many countries - in particular 
Barclays Bank - they derive their strength from a pooling 
in London of resources from all the countries where they 
operate. Moreover, London provides a highly sensitive market 
where money can be implied overnight. By contrast, in many 
of the overseas countries where the banks operate there is a 
dearth of such facilities. 
Until the end of 1961 the expatriate banks operating in 
Ghana maintained large balances in London, invested in 
1. W. T. Newlyn and D. C. Rowan, "Money and banking in British 
Colonial Africa's, Oxford 1954, p. 77. 
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various Money Market instruments and other sterling securities. 
This practice virtually ceased from 1961 following the 
introduction in July 1961 of severe restrictions on payments 
to tho Rost of the Sterling Area. The exchange control 
regulations restricted every bank's sterling assets to a 
maximum of £G 0.5 million. Towards the end of the period 
under review the banks were sometimes net borrowers from 
overseas, implying for the expatriate banks that the balance 
of accounts with their head offices was negative. 
The significance of the payments restrictions is that 
in the last years of the review period the expatriate banks' 
business in Ghana became very much separ°ted from their 
general international business. During discussions with 
officials at the London offices of both the Bank of West 
Africa and Barclays Bank the author got. the impression that 
from mid-1961 onward they did not regard their operations 
in Ghana as part of their supra-territorial banking structure. 
In discussing the propriety of restricting the bank's 
sterling assatS 4o a legst 1 aximun of ýG 0.5 million per 
bank we should recall both the gloomy and bright faces of a 
banking system that includes banks operated as branches of 
supra-national banks. On the one hand the holding of external. 
(in this case sterling) assets implies an export of loanable 
funds from the domestic economy. On the other hand, it also 
implies that sterling resources can be brought in to 
supplement local resources when the latter proves inadequate 
for 1ocs. 1 credit operations. During the pre-1961 period 
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of free convertibility, from the point of view of the 
expatriate banks Ghana was a surplus area as indicated by the 
positive balances in their net external position. However, 
the expatriate banks did employ extensively sterling assets 
consisting of their own sterling balances and facilities 
implied at their London head offices. The use of sterling 
assets was limited to seasonal requirements for financing 
the cocoa crop and the upsurge in demand for credit associated 
with the cocoa harvesting season. 
Actually, the imposition of restrictions on the banks' 
(all banks) holdings of sterling assets coincided with the 
concentration of cocoa financing in the hands of the Ghana 
Commercial Bank. Thus the expatriate banks' need for additional 
resources through conversion of existing sterling assets and 
borrowing facilities from London was correspondingly diminished. 
From 1961 the commercial banks increased greatly their 
earning assets as compared to the period before. Towards 
the end of the period unrIer revycti. the banks taken together 
moved to a position of being fully loaned up. This, as will 
be shown later, is reflected by the low ratio of primary 
resources to deposit liabilities and low r^tios of non-earning 
resources to local assets. 
Assuming., therefore, that the expatriate banks were 
r. ctually in a fully-loaned position it would appear that they 
were in a position to increase the gross loanable resources 
of the commercial banking system by making use of borrowing 
facilities normally available from their London offices. 
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However, as a result of the severe payments restrictions 
mentioned earlier it is very doubtful that credit facilities 
from London were easily obtainable. It is important to note 
that in practice from 1962 low levels of foreign exchango 
resources made it considerably difficult to remit funds 
abroad. Confidential information made available to the 
author shows that one of the expatriate banks maintained a 
zero net external account throughout the second half of 1964. 
Generally, the indication is that the expatriate banks are 
under pressure from London to rely exclusively on their local 
resourceq, which is contrary to the expectation of the 
from 1961 Ghana was on a closed commercial banking system. 
_/ 
authorities. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that 
Some common criticisms of the expatriate banks 
Earlier investigations into banking practices prevailing 
in many British colonies tended to meet with several local 
criticisms of the branches of banks originating in the 
I: Ietropolitan country. in some cases the investigators made 
their own indepondent criticisms in the light of their 
1 
findings. 
Four of the recurring criticisms and conclusions 
kkh. ý 
1 Some of the references on this subject are: - 
Newlyn and Rowan, Op. Cit. Chapter IV; 
W. T. Newlyn, "The Colonial Empire" in "Banking; in the 
British Commonriealth" * (ed. R. S. Sayers), London 1952 Chap. 13; 
Sir Cecil Trevor, "Report on banking conditions in the 
Gold Coast and on the question of setting up a National Bank", 
Government Printer, Accra. 1951; 
J. W. Jliilliams, "State banking in the Gold Coast", The 
Banker, March 1957. 
E. Nevin, "Capital funds in underdeveloped countries" 
.7 MacMillan. London 1961, pp. 45-53. 
-22- 
are summarized here. These are 
1. That the operations and policies of the expatriate banks 
in the colonies made the monetary systems of the colonies an 
integral part of the monetary system of the United Kingdom 
without regard to the peculiarities of the colonial territories. 
2. That the expatriate banks did not adapt their lending 
policies and operations to local conditions. 
3. That, arising from the interaction of the first two alleged 
characteristics, the banks provided credit facilities mainly 
to expatriate business concerns. Since the latter were 
themselves engaged principally in foreign trade it follows 
from the allegation that the banks did not make an important 
direct contribution to the development of productive enterprise. 
4. On African countries a complaint glas frequently encountered 
that the banks deliberately discriminated against African 
applicants for credit accommodation. 
The validity of these generalisations would, of course, 
vary with regard to individual colonial territories, especially 
because the colonies were not all at the same stage of 
development and constitutional status. Whether presented in 
the literature sus conclusions, allegations or criticisms these 
points have been discussed in some depth in the references 
given above. 
In Ghana the manner in which the commercial banks 
functioned sa branch of the United Kingdom banking system 
has been briefly mentioned in the last subsection. We will 
also retum to the subject at various places in this study. 
hh, 
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The following paragraphs deal generally with the central 
complaints levelled in Ghana against the operations of the 
expatriate banks. 
In Ghana (or the Gold Coast) the dissatisfaction of the 
indigenous people with the banking services provided by the 
British-owned banks was echoed in the Trevor Report of 1951 
to which reference has already been made above. 
The European, Levantine and Asiatic communities were 
reported to have testified that the available banking 
facilities met their requirements. 
1 But "the complaint 
was made that African traders, both large and small, 
experienced difficulty in obtaining their financial 
requirements at reasonable rates, owing to lack of confidence 
by the banks in their credit worthiness. "2 
Such complaints seem to have been prevalent in the country 
during the 1940's. It was, without doubt, such considerations 
which in 1948 prompted one prominent Ghanaian politician the 
late Dr. J. B. Danquah to call upon the Colonial authorities 
to set up a national bank in the then colony of the Gold Coast. 
Although in the correspondence which took place between 
Dr. D^nquah and the Colonial ruthorities on this subject no 
explicit mention was made of such allegitions there was no 
doubt about their presence in undertones. It may be that 
Dr. Danquah was only being tactful in not arguing his case 
on the basis of the widespread allegations of discrimination 
by the expatriate banks against Africans. Such allegations 
1. air Cecil Trevor, op. cit.,. para. 45. 
2. Ibid, para. 49. 
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might have been difficult to prove. 
It is interesting to note that a few Ghanaians who were 
formerly employees of the exp-triate banks, and are now 
(1965) occupying high positions in state financial circles 
told the author about very grave difficulties, which the 
Ghanaian experienced "in the colonial days" when he sought 
financial accommodation from the expatriate banks. The 
allegations are further illustrated by the following quotation 
from the first Managing Director of the Ghana Commercial Bank 
who also later became the first Governor of the Bank of Ghana. 
ttThe Ghanaian business community claimed that the two 
British banks operating in the country (Ghana) 
favoured expatriate trading interests to the neglect 
of their Ghanaian counterparts. "I 
The statement ended: "there was some truth in this but it 
was only a half-truth". 
It is by no means easy to pass objective judgement on 
61 
the melee of ; allegations th't the expatri-ite banks 
discriminated against the African population on policy grounds. 
It is cle? rly inpossible to cross-check the accus'tions. As 
one would expect, the expatriate bankers interviewed by the 
author refuted all such allegations. Moreover, there 
appears to be no objective basis for supposing that a 
profit-seeking bank would deliberately desist from extending 
credit to any particular section of the community if the 
standards required were satisfied. The obvious implication 
of such a policy would be that the expatriate banks were 
1. A. Eggleston, Address delivered on the occasion of the 
tenth anniversary of the Ghana Commercial Bank in 1963, 
published in 
"Ghana Commercial Bank", Government Printer, 
Accra, 1963. 
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acting in concert with the expatri'tte business community 
to discourage indigenous trading or productive enterprise. 
Obviously, this would be a rather bold inference requiring 
substantiating evidence of considerable weight. 
Probably, the allegations had a nationalistic tinge 
which could have clouded fair criticism. 
1 The complaints 
did not seem to have been made in the light of the circumstances 
in which African applicants were rejected. Conversely, such 
complaints were not made in the context of the fact that 
some indigenous people were granted credit facilities albeit 
that the number was known to be very small and the amounts 
involved minute in relation to credits granted to expatriate 
businesses. 
One way of testing the validity of such accusations is to 
examine the +ýttitudes of Ghanaians to the indigenous Ghana 
Commercial Bank which was established in 1953 to provide the 
banking services so long demanded by the African population 
of the country. 
As one would expect there have been both favourable and 
unfavourable comments on this bank. It is significant that 
the criticisms made against the Ghana Commercial Bank are 
fundamentally similar to those put forward against the expatriate 
banks. To give one notable example, - coming as it does from 
a prominent Ghanaian businessman - in August 1960 a Private 
Member's Motion introduced in the Ghana Parliament contended 
1. Newlyn and Rowan found this to be largely true of 
Nigeria. Ibid, pp. 118-122. 
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that: 
"the conditions upon which the Ghana Commercial Bank 
grants loans and overdrafts should be made less 
restrictive . 
111 
It is clear from the arguments and discussions above that 
the real issues raised by the allegations devolved on the 
credit standards of the expatriate banks vis-a-vis the financial 
and general business habits of the indigenous people. Did 
the banks transport wholesale to Gh^na credit standjrds 
obtaining in the United Kingdom very likely to preclude 
the Africans from bank credit facilities? Could not such 
policies have been made less rigid to permit the Africans 
to benefit from credit facilities? Or were the banks' 
credit standards general universal standards likely to be 
found in any banking system, in which case the fault could be 
said to lie with Africans whose financial and business practices 
were not, developed to universally acceptable standards? 
These are questions which will be discussed in respect of all 
three commercial banks. Throughout the 1950's and indeed 
up to the end of the period under review the Ghana Commercial 
Bank maintained lending policies substantially the same as 
those of the expatriate banks. 
Section B 
The Ghana Commercial Bank 
The Ghana Commercial Bank was opened in 1953 under the 
name of the Bank: of the Gold 
Coast, on the recommendations 
of Sir Cecil Trevor in the 
Report referred to in the previous 
1. Mr. C. C. K. Baah, M. P. (C. p. p. - Eastern Gomoa), 
Parliamentary Debates, Ghana. August 24,1960. 
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section. 
In this section we deal with (a) the background to the 
establishment of this bank including earlier attempts by a 
Ghanaian politician the late Dr. J. B. Danquah to get an 
indigenous bank established during the colonial period; 
(b) the structure of the Ghana Commercial Bank as indicated 
in its constitution, and (c) a general history of the bank+s 
operations and policies . 
The Background 
It would be wrong to consider Sir Cecil Trevorts 
investigation of 1951 as the first expression of the need 
in Ghana fora bank substantially owned locally and required 
to crter for the interests of the Ghanaian section of the 
population. 
In 1948 Mr. G,. D. Paton an officer of the Bank of 
England was invited to the Gold Coast (I c hgxa ti%a tkgN o, &jjaZjI, 
by the colonial authorities to look into the question of 
setting up a State-aided commercial bank and agricultural 
bank. Mr. Paton advised against both propositions generally, 
and in particular against the establishment of a commercial 
bank because, in his view, it could not safely operate on any 
more lenient scale than the existing 
l 
g expatriate) banks. 
He thought that the consideration was premature and the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies advised similarly. 
Notwithstanding the expert , dvice to the contrary, 
Dr. J. B. D^nquah then Third Estern Provincial Member of the 
G. D. Paton, "Report on Banking in the Gold Coast", 
Government Printer, Accra, 1948. 
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(Colonial) Legislative Council took up the matter again. 
On May 18,1948, he published in "The West African Monitor", 
an indigenous political mouthpiece, the copy of a draft bill 
entitled The Gold Coast Bank Ordinance". 
' He sought leave 
by a letter to the Clerk of the Council to introduce the bill 
in the Legislative Council. The main points in his bill are 
set out below. 
Dr*. Danquaht s proposed bank was to be set up with a 
capital of "not less than seven million pounds sterling". 
Presumably this meant authorised capital although the draft 
bill did not specify. Two-thirds of the capital were to be 
provided by the recently established Gold Coast Cocoa 
Marketing Boird. The remainder was to be issued in shares 
to the general public. The appointment of directors, of 
whom there were to be seven, was vested in the Cocoa Marketing 
Board, the Governor (of the Gold Coast) and various native 
Provincial political and semi-political groupings including 
the Colony2 Farmers' Union and the Ashanti Farmers' Union. 
The proposed bank was to finance any approved system 
of cocoa marketing and of any other local produce. Secondly, 
the bank was to act as an agricultural bank arranging 
short- and long-term credits for cocoa and other agricultural 
L. There is evidence that Mr. Paton's investigation a few 
months earlier was to no small extent the result of pressures 
exerted on the Colonial authorities by Dr. Drtnquah. Official 
records made available to the author show that in November, 
1947, during a visit to England Dr. Drnquah had discussed the 
question of a Gold Coast bank with Mr. Rees Williams then 
British Under Secretary of State for the Colonies. 
2. Before Independence the Western, Central and Eastern 
Regions of present Ghana were referred to collectively as 
the Colony. 
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producers, and manufacturers. Thirdly, it was to finance any 
industrial concern and to co-operate with the Government and 
any business in the Gold Coast or elsewhere to support or 
maintain any industry designed to foster the development of 
the resources of the territory. Fourthly, the bank would 
be required to assist in the advancement of trade and commerce 
by African firms and specifically to grant financial facilities 
which would enable Africans to engage in the export and import 
trade. Fifthly, and perhaps one of the ambitions provisions 
of the draft bill, the proposed bank was to be so prepared 
as to make it ready to take over from the West African 
Currency Board the issuing of a local currency. 
These proposals for a national bank, as Dr. Danquah 
stated in the "Objects and Reasons" were intended tto meet 
the long-felt want of farmers and the public generally". 
Thus the proposed bank was aimed at alleviating the financial 
limitations on indigenous enterprise believed to exist as a 
result of the alleged "reluctance" of the two British banks 
to extend credit facilities to Africans. 
The practical significance of Dr. Danquah's proposals 
was that they reflected generally the form of a commercial 
bank and banking services demanded by the native people. 
Cle-arly a bank organised in the form outlined above would not 
answer to the name of Commercial Bank in the British sense. 
The kind of bank proposed by Dr. Danquah was clearly a multi- 
purpose institution closely resembling the development banks 
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found today in many developing countries. ' 
The existing British banks restricted their lending to 
short-term working capital requirements. This obviously 
worked well with the foreign firms which could and did obtain 
investment capital requirements in their home countries. 
But as far as the local people were concerned the absence 
of any institution providing loans for capital investment was 
obviously a serious gap in the domestic financial system. 
It was therefore not surprising that the bank as proposed 
by Dr. Danquah would be required to provide loans of at 
least medium-term duration. 
Viewed in a world-wide context, and assuming that the 
bank wns to be basically a commercial bank, it was and still 
is not unusual for a commercial bank to finance investment 
in industry and agriculture. A few ex-mples illustrate 
this point. 
Traditionally, Australian banks have been more ready 
to make loans which are in practice of long-term nature, 
especially for agriculture, than have say banks in the 
United Kingdom, even though since the War the central bank of 
Australia has tended to discourage bank lending for the finance 
of fixed capital. 
2 
Secondly, in Sweden as in other countries 
in Continental Europe, there have always been close relations 
between the banks and industry. In Sweden where the people 
-- ---------------- 
1. For a comprehensive account of development banks set up in 
developing countries see W. Diamond, "Development Banks't, 
. John 
Hopkins Press, Baltimore 1957; and Shirley Boskey, 
"Problems and Practices of Development Banks", I. B. R. D., John 
Hopkins Press, Baltimore 1957. 
2. D. J. M. Frazer, "Banking in Australia" in "Comparative 
Banking (ed. H. W. Auburn), Waterlow and Sons 1966. Third Edition. 
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were said to be disinclined to make direct investments in 
industrial enterprise, commercial banks are known to have 
played a major role at least at the initial stages of 
industrialisation, by financing a siz&ble part of long-term 
capital in industry. This was in spite of banking legislation 
which while not precluding the granting of long-term loans 
by the banks in Sweden was nevertheless positively in favour 
of short-term lending. 
l In recent years according to now 
rules introduced in July, 1965 a bank is allowed to grant 
loans maturing within ten years to an amount corresponding 
to 25% of its deposit liabilities plus capital and reserves. 
2 
Whnt was, however, controversial in Dr. Danquah's proposals 
wrs the suggestion that the bank should eventually take over 
the issuing of currency. Granting that the bank would not 
exercise direct controlling functions over the other 
commercial banks, the fact that the commercial banks would 
have to surrender some assets, local or foreign, to it in 
order to acquire currency would most probably give the currency- 
issuing bank an advantage over the others. The question of 
combining in one institution the issuing of currency and 
commercial banking has recurred several times in Ghana 
since the idea was pioneered by the late Dr. Danquah in 1948. 
This issue will be discussed in some detail in Chapter 2. 
A few other aspects of the proposals will now be discussed 
briefly. 
1. See Lars-Erik Thurholm on Sweden in "Banking Systems" 
(ed. B. H. Beckh"irt), Columbia University Press 1954. pp. 663-80, 
2. Rudolf Jalnkasin H. W. Auburn (ed. ) op. cit., p. 144. 
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The proposed minimum cipital of £7 million might be 
said to be rather high both in terms of the size of the 
economy and in terms of the relative sh-, re of bankable 
business in the hands of the African community. The 
following comparative figures serve to put the figure of 
£7 millioniin a meaningful context. On the 31st March, 1965 
the authorized and paid-up capital of the Bank of West Africa 
operating in four countries were £6 million and £4 million 
respectively. 
' Secondly, the proposed capital of £7 million 
may be compared to the initial authorized and paid-up capital 
of the national bank - the Ghana Commercial Bank - amounting 
to £G 1 million and £G 0.3 million respectively. Thirdly, 
the figure may be comp-red to authorized and paid-up capital 
of £G 1 million on which the central bank of Ghana has been 
operating since it was established in 1957. These comparisons 
indicate the relatively large size of the capital which 
Dr. Danquah proposed for "his" bank. The rather large sum 
was clearly a direct reflection of the wide range of commercial 
undertakings in which the bank was to be involved. 
Under the proposed constitution if the bank chose to be 
strict in its lending policies it might have remained heavily 
over-capitalized. On the other hand if it chose to be 
lenient - conceivably in the pious belief that it was serving 
a community starved dry of financial resources - it would 
most probably have ended up merely providing subsidies 
to 
African traders and farmers. There could be no doubt that 
lending to African farmers and traders of the Gold Coast of 
1. The Bankers' Almanac, 1964-65. 
kkhý 
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1948 on a large scale involved considerable risks. 
This, however, is only a tentative view as a lot would 
depend on how effectively the bank attempted to surpervise 
the use of credits granted by it. It remains true to say, 
however, that the draft constitution of the proposed bank 
was clearly a compromise and probably was intended to woo 
politically all important sections of the indigenous 
population. 
It was not clear how Dr. Danquah intended the difficult 
C question of security against loans to be solved. In the 
Memorrtndum ind Articles of Association which he specified 
in the dr. tft bill, coll«teral security was to take the form 
of "agricultural, landed or other securities or nssurances". 
The first two and the Last were the nearest that most traders 
and farmers "of Gold Coast birth" could offer to any bank by 
way of collateral, but for reasons which will be explored 
in Section C even such collateral left much to be desired. 
The draft bill did not go before the Legislative CounciC 
because the necessary permission was refused by the Colonial 
Governor who assigned the following reasons for his refusal. 
1. That the bill dealt with a matter of great importance 
committing public funds on a grand scale and could not, 
therefore, be introduced by an unofficial member of the Council 
2. That Mr. Paton hrid shortly before advised against the 
formation of a third commercial bank as well as a separate 
agricultural bank. 
3. That the Cocoa Marketing Board whose funds the bill 
kh, 
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attempted to utilize was limited to the use of its funds for 
the benefit of cocoa farmers. 
4. That the Cocoa Marketing Board had already earmarked 
a sum of £G 0.75 million for investment in an Agricultural Bank. 
The establishment and constitution of the Ghana Commercial Bank 
The efforts of Dr. J. B. Drnqunh achieved one important 
result; his proposils lrtid the b-isis for further demands for 
q nztional bank. 
By 1951 the nationalist movement which gathered momentum 
in 1948 had already achieved considerable success, and the 
foundations of internal self-government were realized in the 
form of a Legislative Assembly with an elected African majority. 
In that year a Ghanaian was appointed Leader of Government 
Business. That Ghanaian was Dr. Kwame Nkrumah. 
The demand for a national (indigenous) bank was by now 
regarded by the new politicians as a basis for installing 
the Ghanaian as master of his birthright. This attitude was 
echoed in the words of Mr. Eggleston: 
"It was clearly inconceivable 
approaching self-govarnment, 
to redress the economic bala] 
people, who had hitherto had 
and were now ..... demrinding 
national cake. ")- 
that, in a country rapidly 
no attempt should be made 
ace in favour of its own 
to be content with the crumbs 
a larger share of the 
By 1951 the fresh demands for ß bank that would cater for the 
interests of the African had, in effect, merged with the 
nationalist sentiment for political emancipation. 
2 
In 1951 Sir Cecil Trevor was invited by the Colonial 
1. A. Eggleston, op. cit. 
2. Official records made available to the author confidentially, 
show that Dr. Nkrumah then Leader of Government Business displayed 
great personal interest in the preparations, that preceded the 
opening of the Ghana Commercial Bank. 
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Government to "examine the whole field of banking in the Gold 
Coast and, in particular, to examine the question of setting 
up a national bank on commercial lines to finance development 
projects and to act as a reserve bank". 
In his Report published in 1951 and referred to hereafter 
as the Trevor Report, Sir Cecil Trevor advised against the 
establishment of a central bank. But he recommended "the 
formation of a semi-Government Bank to be conducted on commercial 
lines to meet the present needs of the country as a whole. "l 
He suggested that the bank should operate for the benefit of 
African industry, agriculture, commerce and trade. The bank 
could keep the Government's accounts, handle ipsues of 
government loans and provide credit to the Co-operatives. 
Lastly, a note of warning vias sounded against extension by 
the. bank of unproductive loans. 2 From the recommendations it 
tiaras .. lear that the bank was to undertake ordinary commercial 
banking business on what might be called the orthodox British 
pattern. There was no indication that Sir Cecil Trevor 
expected the bank to operate in a manner significantly differe: it 
from the oper'tions of the existing banks. As one writer 
has commented, perhaps aptly, this "was hardly a brilliant 
solution" .3 
It has been said that the terms of reference drawn up 
for Sir Cecil Trevor reflected the cofiTused ideas on banking 
which had been prevalent in the Gold Coast. 
4 One such 
1. Sir Cecil Trevor, op. cit., para. 153. 
2. Ibid. 
3. J. W. Williams, op. cit. 
4. Ibid. 
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confusion was the suggestion, embodied in the terms of reference, 
of a bank on commercial lines providing finance for development 
projects. As noted earlier, it is not unusual for commercial 
banks in countries without developed capital markets to finance 
industrial capital of medium-term nature. But a commercial 
bank operating on normal commercial lines can at best invest 
only a very limited proportion of its resources in loans connected 
with development projects which in an underdeveloped country 
usually means long-terror. capital projects of infrastructural 
kind. The other controversial aspect of the terms of reference 
was the idea of combining commercial banking and central banking 
in one institution. As noted earlier this idea was resurrected 
several times in Ghana and will be discussed in our examination, 
of the development of central banking in Ghana. 
We turn now to an outline of the constitution of the 
Ghana Commercial Bank known until 1957 as the Bank of the 
Gold Coast. To avoid confusion the current name of the bank 
will be used in further reference to it. 
The Bank of the Gold Coast Ordinance was enacted in 
October, 1952,1 The authorized capital of the Bank was 
£G 1 million, divided into 100,000 shares of a nominal value 
of £G 10 each. The general policy of the bank was to be 
administered by a Board of Directors. The power to increase 
the amount of authorized capital was vested in the Board of 
Directors, with the prior approval of the Ministry of Finance 
and with the consent of the shareholders. 
2 The Government, 
1. Ordinance No. 49/1952. 
2. Bank of the Gold Coast Ordinance, 1952, section 3. 
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the law stipulated, was to take up 30,000 shares upon the 
establishment of the bank and to pay £G 12 for each such 
share from funds appropriated by the Legislative Assembly. ' 
Provision was made in the law for the sale of shares originally 
purchased by the Government but with the prior approval of 
the Colonial Governor. 2 The Bank was required to pay 20% of 
profits into a Reserve Fund before it paid dividend and this 
was to continue until the Reserve Fund equalled paid-up capital. 
The law permitted the bank to transact practically the 
whole range of banking business developed in the United Kingdom. 
The range of permitted operations included 'the paying, receiving, 
collecting and remitting of money, bullion and securities on 
behalf of the Government and the undertaking and transacting 
of any other business which the Government may from time to 
time entrust to the Bank". 3 
It is interesting to note that apart from a provision 
that it could purchase bills of exchange payable out of the 
country at any usance not exceeding three months4 there was 
no specific ruling about the duration of any other forms of 
advances which the bank could make. 
In addition to normal commercial lending the bank could 
invest in 
1. stocks or other security issued by the Government of the 
]., The difference between . 
the nominal and purchase values of 
each such share was to be carried into a Reserve Fund. 
Ibid, section 13. 
2. Ibid, section 2. 
3. Ibid; section 15. 
4. Ibid. 
ký 
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Gold Coast. - 
2. stocks and securities in which a trustee is authorized to 
invest money by any law for the time being in force in the Gold 
Coast or by any Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom and 
Northern Ireland or by any law enacted by any duly constituted 
Government within the British Commonwealth. 
2 
Overdrafts could be granted "with or without security, 
to such extent as may be prescribed by bye-laws''. But loans 
and advances (as distinct from overdrafts) were required to 
be made against security. 3 
Majoring among the types of security which the bank as 
permitted to accept were: -4 
1. Stocks and other securities of the local Government and 
of Governments elsewhere in the British Commonwealth. 
2.. Debentures of limited liability companies incorporated 
locally or elsewhere, and fully paid shares of limited 
liability companies where an original security of the first 
type (that is (1) above) had already been obtained. 
3. Goods hypothecated or documents and titles to these, 
deposited with or assigned to the bank. 
4. Immovable property or documents of title if they were 
offered as secondary security. 
In the prohibitive clauses the bank was precluded from 
making loans or advances on the security of its oven shares. 
It was also forbidden to grant advances on mortgages or in any 
other manner on the original security of any immovable property 
or documents of. title thereto. Such prohibitions Were, however, 
1. Ibid. 
2. Bank of the Gold Coast Ordinance, 1952, section 15. 
3. Ibid. 4. Ibid. 
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to be waived in cases where their observance would prevent the 
bank from performing its duty 
, as agent of 
the Government. In 
addition when granting loans out of funds made available 
for that purpose by the Government such restrictions were to 
be waived. ' 
A brief comment on the constitution is called for. On 
the whole it could be said that the constitution of the bank 
was not rigid. It allowed considerable discretion to the 
Board in such matters as asset distribution, borrowing and 
lending rates and other terms relating there &. Judging from 
the background to the formation of the bank, the most 
interesting aspect of the bank's constitution were the provisions 
regarding collateral security. 
It was doubtful from the beginning how the bank was to 
fulfil its special function of assisting African enterprise to 
any significant extent. Among the Africans stocks and shares 
were conspicuously absent. Other forms of collateral normally 
acceptable to banks such as life insurance policies were also 
genorally unavailable to Africans. Thus it was obvious that 
the only permitted collateral which the Africans could offor 
were goods and related documents. This meant that oven if 
the bank was willing and able to grant medium-term loans to 
the indigenous business sector it could not do so to an 
important extent because the kind of securities which were 
required against such lending viore not available to African 
businessmen.. _ 
1. Ibid, section 16. 
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Ironically, house property obviously discouraged by the 
law was the one form of security frequently available to the 
Africans. In Ghana success was and still is customarily 
Qdentified by the ownership of house property. Secondly 
as most African businesses are usually rather small in size 
a house provides an asset on which to fall back in case of 
business failure. Finally, in the rapidly growing towns 
of the country a house could yield considerable income. 
1 
One would therefore expect that the bank would be 
empowered to accept house property as primary security. In 
a sense this argument could be extended to cover land. That 
both house and landed property were not favoured by the latz 
as suitable security against loans could be ascribed to the 
same practical reasons as must have discouraged the expatriate 
banks from accepting them. It is therefore useful to discuss 
such reasons in respect of all three banks. This will be 
done towards the end of Section C. 
However, it can be appreciated from the points raised 
above that if the credit requirements of the Africans were 
to be adequately met it was doubtless necessary to surmount 
the problem of adequate collateral. An attempt to solve this 
problem took the form of two Government-sponsored schemes 
organised under the agency of the Ghana Commercial Bank. 
were the Government Mortgage Loans Scheme and the Guarantee 
Corporation. 
The Government Mordgage Loans Schemo was in effect a 
These 
1ý See J. W. Williams, op. cit. 
-41- 
fund contributed entirely by the Government out of which 
medium-term loans were made. to Ghanaian businessmen against 
the security of house property. The Guarantee Corporation was 
also a fund subscribed by the Government and Ghanaian importers 
in the ratio 2: 1. With the fund as security the bank could 
pay oversea suppliers for goods supplied to the members of the 
Corporation who were then required to repay in a given period. 
At the time of writing both schemes had ceased to function. 
A brief account of their operation will be given later in this 
study. We now turn to vp a short history of the bank. 
A short history of the Ghana Commercial Bank 
Four broad aspects of the bankI s operations are outlined 
in this subsection. They are staffing and administration, 
capital and profits, deposits and credit operations and 
lending policy. 
Staffing and general administration 
The Ghana Commercial Bank was first opened for business 
on 20th May, 1953 seven months after the enactment of the law 
establishing it. 
It commenced business with a staff of 27 in one office 
in Accra. The Government acting by the recommendation of 
Sir Cecil Trevor appointed to the position of Managing Director, 
Mr. Albert Eggleston, a retired officer of the Imperial Bank 
of India (known since July 1955 as 
the State Bank of India). 
Sir Cecil's advice Was that for the post of chief executive a 
retired expatriate banker should be recruited until a 
Ghanaian 
with the requisite qualifications and experience became 
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available. 
It is worth noting that of twelve expatriates who served 
on the bank between 1953 and 1963 the first seven came from 
the State Bank of India, 
The initial problems were tackled with conscientious zeal. 
It was the first bank to introduce mechanised accounting in 
Ghrna. Agency arrangements were completed in international 
financial centres among them London, New York., Hamburg, 
Bombay and Tokyo. 
Having succeeded in attracting away from the existing 
banks its initial Ghanaian personnel the bank eagerly trained 
freshly recruited staff. University graduates and other high 
level personnel with professional qualifications were trained 
locally and abroad. Generally, the bank was overstaffed 
in the initial years in anticipation of future expansion. 
1 
From the initial staff of 27 the personnel development grew 
as shown in Table 3. In 1962 the bank opened a Banking 
Table 3 
Ghana Commercial Bank ; Staff Employment Position 
(End of Period) 
May 1953 27 
Juno 1960 270 
June 1961 800 
May 1963 1,300 
Note; the figures are approximate 
Source; Ghana Commercial Bank, Accra. 
1. T. O. Asare (Managing Director from September 1960) Address 
del'ivored on Tenth Anniversary of the Ghana Commercial Bank in 
1963, published in Ghana Commercial Bank", Government Printer, 
Aocra 1963. 
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Training School in Accra for its employees. As a result 
of intensive staff training begun in the initial years the 
bank advanced speedily its TAfricanisation" policy. In 1960 
the first Ghanaian rllnnaging Director was appointed and six 
Ghanaian managers were appointed to head the branches. 1 
High standards have throughout been maintained in the 
composition of the Board of Directors all of whom are appointed 
by the Government in its capacity as sole shareholder. The 
significance of the high standards mentioned here should not 
be underestimated. In Ghana the record of directorates of 
Government-sponsored enterprises has not often been a happy one. 
The Principal Secretary of the Ministry of Finance is an 
ex-officio member. Through him the Government maintains contact 
with the bank. Apart from this arrangement the Government 
wields no ostensibly direct control over the operations of 
the bank, having allowed it to work out its own policy. 
2 
When the bank started operations there was considerable 
scepticism about its chances of success. The critics were 
reported to have forecast for it a maximum life of two year3.3 
It will become clear in the subsequent paragraphs that the 
critics have been proved amply wrong. 
The gloomy forecasts dial not take account of the zeal and 
experience of the bank's senior executives. Secondly, the 
1. T. Q. Asare, op. cit. 
2. This is as far as can be judged by the known facts. It 
is' probable that with the increased involvement of the bank in 
the financing of Government enterprises in recent years the 
Government m . ay have exercised greater control over 
the bank 
, than meets the eyo. 
3. Statement by A. Eggleston, op. cit. 
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critics did not reckon with the later developments in the 
economy in which the bank was to derive a considgrable share. 
Furthermore, the 'Ghana Commercial Bank was not an ordinary 
indigenous bank in the sense that they were in Nigeria, for 
aaý, ý. ý; 
example. 
1 As a Government-owned bank it could z-s t on 
considerable assistance from the Government in various forms. 
As n state-owned commercial bank one of its potential 
advantages was that there would be no pressure on it to pay 
out dividends at the initial stages. But one comment was 
aimed at the foundation of the bank, that in view of its 
orthodox complexion it was doubtful that the bank could 
perform its special function of financing African enterprise. 
2 
Capital and profits 
In Table 4 is presented the paid capital of the bank as 
published in balance sheets for the dates shown. 
The initial paid capital of £G0.3 million was raised 
by stages reaching the full authorized capital of £Glmillion 
See D. C. Rowan, 'The native banking boom in Nigeria", 
The Banker, October 1951. 
2. For a discussion on the Ghana Commercial Bßnk shortly 
after. its establishment see Newlyn and Rowan, op. cit., pp. 241-5., 
The authors argued that since the bank was established on 
orthodox lines it could not expect sufficient numbers of 
acceptable African borrowers. This would necessarily limit 
the bank's earnings and hence reduce its ability to offer 
attractive terms on deposits. They argued further that 
since the bank lacked connections with London (in- contrast to 
the British banks) this would be a disadvantage to its 
operation. In these arguments was obviously implied considerob1 
doubt about the success of the Ghana Commercia. ý. Bank. 
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Table 4 
Ghana Commercial Bank : Paid Capital 1953-64 
31-10-54 
31-10-55 
31-10-56 
30-4-57 
30-6-58 
30-6-59 
30-6-60 
30-6-61 
30-6-62 
30-6-63 
30-6-64 
Paid Capital 
£ü Million 
by 4th April 1957. The establishment of the Bank of Ghana 
in 1957 affected the capital position of the Ghana Commercial 
Bank in two ways. The authorized and paid-up capital of the 
latter were reduced by the Government to £G0.5 million and 
£GO. 2 million respectively. 
' Secondly, the bank+s reserves 
which stood at £G0.3 million in April 1957 were reduced to 
£G4o, 000 in the same year. 
2 Funds and fixed assets 
realised from the reductions in the capitnl resources of the 
Ghana Commercial Bank were transferred to the Bank of Ghana 
1. Ghana Commercial Bank Act, 1957. 
2. Information supplied by the Ghana Commercial Bank. 
Source: Ghana Co=iercial Bank, Balance Sheets and Annual 
Reports 
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to form part of the latter's initial resources. 
Explaining the changes in the capital position of the 
Ghana Commercial Bank, the Minister of Finunce argued that 
the country's capital resources were under strain and hence it 
was necessary to let the available money serve as far as 
possible. Furthermore, the Minister argued, experience from 
the first three to four years of the bank's operation indicated 
that the new capital position (that is to say, authorized and 
paid capital as well as reserves) was adequate. 
' 
The strength of the second argument was dubious. In 
1957 when the changes took place the Ghana Commercial Bank 
was operating only two offices in the whole country, having 
till then concentrated on strengthening its position. 
During the 1960-61 financial year the Government 
paid the rest of the authorized capital thus hi4ý paid-up 
capital to £GO. 5 million. This further capital subscription 
coincided with the beginning of the big expansion-in the bank's 
branch network. Investigations by the author indicated that 
the expansion was the primary reason for the increased capital 
issues. In 1964, through capitalisation issues the bank's 
paid capital was again raised to £Gl million, the position in 
1957 before the transfer of capital resources to the central 
bank. 
The build up in issued share capital after 1957 was well 
reflected in a similar build up in the Reserve Fund. It has 
not been possible to obtain separate annual dntn on the state 
of reserves for the period before 1957. However, information 
1. K. A. Gbedemah, Ghana Parliamentary Debates, February 14, 
1957. The balance handed over to the Bank of Ghana was partly 
in cash and partly in premises at Accra, Kumasi and Takoradi. 
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made available to the author indicates that at some time in 
1957 the Reserve Fund amounted to £00.3 million from which it 
was reduced to £G40,000 for the reasons given earlier. From 
this position the same source shows that between May, 1957 
and 30th June 1960 a total sum of £G290,000 was credited to 
Reserves thus bringing the total to £G330,000 at the end of 
June 1960. From this level the Reserve Fund was raised 
substantially to £G850,000 at the end of June 1964. The 
level of the Reserve Fund is presented in Table 5. In 
Table 5 is also shown a second item the Development Reserve 
Fund which was started in 1961 to meet plans for expansion. 
Table 5 
Ghana Commercial Bank : Reserves 1960-64 
£G'000. 
Date 
Reserve 
Fund 
Development 
Reserve Fund Total 
30-6-60 330 - 330 
30-6-61 400 100 500 
30-6-62 500 370 670 
30-6-63 800 670 1,470 
30-6-64 850 720 1.9570 
Source: Ghana Commercial Bank, Accra. 
The Development Reserve Fund increased over sevenfold 
fror £G100,000 at the end of June 1961 to £G720,000 at the 
end of June 1964. The sum of both reserves showed the 
bank's financial position to be on the zseendancy during the 
period 1960-64. 
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In Table 6 we present the annual net profits of the 
Ghana Commercial Bank for the period 1957-64. Separate 
figures for net profits are not readily obtainable for the 
period before 1957. However, it can be safely assumed that 
Table 6 
Ghana Commercial Bank : Not Profits 
1957-64 
Date 
(a) Amount(£G'000) 
30-4-57 60.0 
30-6-58(b) 74.0 
30-6-59 102.0 
30-6-60 123.0 
30-6-61 185.5 
ZO-6-62 419.9 
30-6-63 871.2 
30-6-64 902.6 
(a) The dates correspond to the and of the bank's financial 
year and therefore the net profits refer to operations in the 
twelve months preceding the date shown, unless otherwise stated. 
(b) Fourteen months. 
Source: Ghana Commercial Bank, Accra. 
during the first few years of operation profits, if any, were 
negligible. In the early years the bank's revenue was derived 
principally from discounts on British Government Treasury Bi11q 
holdings which provided the fulcri: m for sound banking at a tinec4 
deposits other than the Government's were dominated by a large 
number of very small accounts. 
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From 1957 deposits increased in total volume and 
probably in average value. For one thing from 1957 statutory 
bodies were required to maintain accounts with this bank. 
Consequently the proportion of high yielding assets loans 
and advances could be increased. Towards the end of the 
period under review the bank was handling a substantial 
portion of foreign trade. This is borne out by confidential 
information supplied to the author showing inward and outwara 
transfers of funds through individual banks. This is, 
however, only a summary outline of the factors which could have 
contributed to the tremendous growth of net profits from 
£G60,000 in 1957 to over £GO. 9 million in 1964. 
Deposits 
Table 7 shows the bank's deposit liabilities during 
the period 1953-64 as published in balance shoets for the end 
of the financial year. For comparison the combined deposit 
liabilities for all commercial banks are presented in Table 7. 
It must be noted that columns (1) and (2) .n Table 7 are 
not strictly comparable. Column (1) includes provisions 
for taxation and contingencies and some internal capital 
liabilities of the Ghana Commercial Bank the exact nature 
of which is not known to the author. By contrast, Column (2) 
covers only total deposit liabilities to customers. The 
essence of the data in Table 7 is thus to demonstrate the 
approximate relative share of the Ghana Commercial Bank in 
the total deposits hold within the Commercial banking system. 
In particular we wish to draw attention to the tremendous 
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growth in this bank's deposits in the 19601s as compared to the 
pre-1960 period when deposits were clea;., ly of small order. 
Table 7 
Deposit Liabilities of the Ghana Commercial Bank and 
All Bank Deposits. 
Total depos is 
of G. C. B. (a 
£GtM llion 
(1) 
Total deposits 
of All Banks 
£G'Million 
(2) 
Ratio of 
(1) to (2) 
(3) 
31-10-53 1.2 n. a. _ 
31-10-54 2.4 
31-10-55 2.7 't r 
31-10-56 3.0 
30-4-57 3.0 r 
0-6-58 4.6 24.3 19.1 
0-6-59 6.9 30.7 22.4 
30-6-60 10.0 33.9 29.4 
30-6-61 15.3 45.2 33.8 
30-6-62 - 36.3 47.8 75.9 
30-6-63 33.6 61.6 54.5 
30-6-64 38.6 73.9 52.2 
Notes: - G. C. B. - Ghana Commercial Bank 
(a) Deposits of" G. C. B. include provision for taxation 
on profits and contingencies 
Sources: (i) Economic Survey (of Ghana) 1961,1963 and 1964. 
(ii) Balance Sheets and Annual Reports of the Ghana 
Commercial Bank. 
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From May 1953 when the Ghana Commercial Bank commenced 
banking operations its deposit liabilities consisted of only 
current accounts until a Savings Department was opened in 
August 1959. 
From the beginning the bank took over the Government's 
accounts. This was, however, a gradual process starting 
with the government master accounts in Accra. The only 
available factual information regarding the relative size of 
government accounts in the bank's total deposits states that 
on 31st October, 1956 of total deposits of £G3,033,953 
(including provisions for contingencies) an amount of approximate: 
£G2 million or 65% of the total was due to the Government. 
' 
In about August 1957 government deposits and the deposits 
of statutory corporations then keeping accounts with the Ghana 
Commercial Bank were transferred to the Bank of Ghana. 
Shortly afterward the accounts of statutory corporations were 
returned to the Ghana Commercial Bank. 
It is unlikely that the accounts of public and quasi-public 
bodies with the Ghana Commercial Bank amountod to much, before 
and by 1957. Most of such bodies (Local Authorities, Government 
educational institutions and corporations eto. 
) were until 
1957 generally free to bank where they chose. Moreover, 
at the end of 1957 the Ghana 
Commercial Bank maintained only 
two banking offices in the country rtt Accr.. and Takoradi. 
Thus all such public and semi-public bodies based outside these 
two centres would necessarily maintain accounts with the other 
banks. From 1957 it was the Government's expressed policy 
,. jW. iºýýlt '-4i. S, or. cý.. 
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that all public institutions should maintain their accounts 
with the Ghana Commercial Bank. By December 1961 most of 
them were already banking exclusively with the Ghana Commercial 
Bank and the rest wel'e in the process of transferring all 
their accounts to it. Certainly at the end of the period 
under review this process was complete. It will be argued 
shortly that this factor exerted a sizable upward influence 
on the observed high volume of the bank's deposits from 1960 
to 1964. The Government's policy that public institutions 
should maintain their accounts with the Ghana Commercial 
Bank was made effective as a result of immense expansion in 
the bank's branch network from 1960 onward. 
That the bank operated only two offices in 1957 would 
appear to imply that government accounts held by the bank, 
before it lost such accounts to the central bank, were a small 
proportion of total government bank balances. Such an 
inference would, however, be wrong. In a small country 
organised essentially on a centralised administrative system 
government accounts kept outside the capital must have been 
relatively small, being limitod to temporary balances held for 
ndministr? tive purposes. 
The large size of government accounts in the total 
deposit liabilities of the Ghana Commercial Bank carries the 
obvious itnplicntion th^t until mid-1957 government accounts 
eontý? ibuted substantially to the banks revenue. Given the 
fact (stated above) that the non-Government customer 
liabilities were small in aggregate and considering our 
earlier assumption that the average size of account was small. 
-53- 
that government accounts were a dominant factor in the bank's 
revenue was beyond dispute. 
However, even the influence of government deposits should 
not be over-estimated. Government balances are characteristically 
volatile or active. Against them the bank would need to hold 
a considerable amount of liquid reserves which at that time 
would consist of short-term sterling balances and local currency. 
The greater was the proportion of reserves required to be he]d 
in currency the srn ller would be the profitability permitted 
by the Government's deposits. ' The low interest rates which 
prevailed in tho United Kingdom from 1953 to early 1957 
would have discouraged Qxcessive holding of sterling assets 
as reserves especially if seen against the fact that it cost 
a total of 1% to transfer money to London and back. 
The following account explains the influence of specific 
factorsl in addition to general economic and social developmerts1 
on the growth in deposits recorded by the bank. 
1. From the early years of its operation the Ghana 
Commercial Bank acted as agent to the Government and a section 
of the Ghanaian business community in the management of the 
credit schemes referred to ßbove. As an attempt to ensure 
1. The bank's published balance sheets showed high currency 
holdings in the first seven years. In the first three years' 
accounts the ratio of cash to deposits were respectively 
32.4%. 34.3% and 33.2%. Of course, since those ratios 
obtained on the accounting dates it is conceivable that assets 
; rere deliberately arranged to indicate a high. level of 
liquidity. 
This tentative qualification does not, however, reduce the 
force of argument above that while it kept the Governmont's 
accounts the bank had to hold large non-earning liquid reserves 
against such accounts. 
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repayment of loans obtained from these sources, borrowers 
were required to maintain accounts with the Ghana Commercial 
Bank which could be debited to repay their debts under the 
credit schemes. , 
The bank maintained separate accounts in 
respect of the credit schemes. The effect of the arrangement 
on the bank's own deposit liabilities was obviously izolayile 
as the bank accounts of debtors to the schemes were periodically 
debited to the credit of the accounts held separately under 
these credit schemes. Therefore to the extent that the 
bank's own deposit liabilities were published before the 
necessary deductions were made the published deposit 
liabilities of the bank would represent an inflated position. 
However, in the fingl analysis the bank most probably gained 
in the arrangements through the attraction into it of 
Ghanaian businessmen who would otherwise have banked elsewhere. 
2. In August 1959 the bank established a savings department. 
In March 1962 it organised a National Banking Week marked by 
a nation-wide campaign for savings deposits. This was stated 
by the bank's chief executive to have marked the beginning 
of a steady increase in savings deposits held by the bank. 
3. As the number of public (state-owned) enterprises 
increased from 1960 on the bank's deposits have undoubtedly 
been influenced upward. 
41 From 1960 a change of policy initiated by the bank's 
executives permitted it to grant credits to non-Africans. 
previously, as the bank was not permitted by its constitution 
to lend to non-Africans the latter naturally had no incentive 
to maintain deposit accounts with it. 
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Corresponding to the increase in deposit liabilities 
has naturally been a large increase in assets of various kinds. 
We should note, in particular, the influence of the bank's 
monopoly in banking business affecting the state-ovrned 
enterprises from 1961. This included the financing of a 
high proportion of cocoa purchases. 
These developments spart, as far as deposits are concerned, 
we should note the influence of a tremendous growth in the 
number and coverage of the bank's offices from 1960 to 1964. 
This not only brought the bank within the reach of a wider 
section of the population, but also from a theoretical point 
of view meant that the net leakage of primary rioney from this 
bank was lessened. This development freed the bank from the 
obviously disadvantageous position, of operating virtually as 
a 'unit bank' alongside competitors which to all intents and 
purposes were branch banks. 
1 
Lending Policies 
The lending policy of the Ghana Commercial Bank altered 
considerably from 1960. In the 1952 Ordinance (to which 
references hago been made above) it was precluded from 
accepting immovable property or the documents of title against 
advanc's except where they were offered as secondary security. 
iron 1960 under Mr. T. O. Asare the first Ghznaian Managing 
Director the bank began to grant advances against the deposit 
(with the bank) of titles to residential buildings without 
1, Fora brief discussion 
of unit-banking'seb R. S. 5 
Oxford, 1960 pp. 21-5. For 
"Unit banking evaluated" in 
(ed. Deane Carson), Richard 
pp. 291-305. 
of characteristics and problems 
fers "Modern Banking", 5th edition, 
a fuller discussion sae R. I. Robinson "Ba: zking and monetary studies" 
D. Irwin, Inc. Homewood. 1063 
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taking chrtrge of the properties as such. 1 In practice there 
is no differnece between accepting only title deed and taking 
charge of We property concerned. However, the significant 
point was that the decision introduced an element of flexibility 
into the bank's lending policy. 
^: second rlijor deviation from the pre-1960 policy on 
lending; w--s the decision (referred to ^bove) In 1960 th-it the 
bank should be permitted to enter into credit transactions 
with any customer irrespective of nationality. 
An It portant perr: issive and flexible aspect of the bank's 
orir.. inal constitution was that it could, with the prior 
sanction of the Loard of Directors, allow overdrawing of 
accounts without security, or without security of a type 
stipulated elsewhere in the law. 
2 The granting of 
unsecured advances generally was a long-established practice 
among the expatriate banks. What should be noted, however, 
is that this provision allowed the authorities of the Ghana 
Commercial Bank considerable room for manoeuvre. It 
mitigated the effects of other provisions in the law which 
made the bank Tmost unsuitable as a bank intended to lend 
to the African population of the country. 
In the 1952 Byo-Lrw3 un3ocurod overdrafts oro limited 
in amount to £G20,000 per customer. The limit was lowered 
to £G5,000 by amendment to the bye-laws on 3rd 1: 1-arch, 1959. 
The reduction mxay have been proriptod by a high incidonCe 
of defaults. 
1. Information supplied by the Managing Director (1965) of 
the Ghana Commercial Bank. 
2. Bank of the Gold Coast Ordinance, 1952, section 15. 
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From the beginning the bank relied on personal 
guarantees as securities against overdrafts and other forms 
of customer credits. Such iu^rantees sere oftwo main kinds: 
-rt-au 
guarantees by the politician and,, by the registored money-lender. 
According to information supplied by the Hanaging Director 
(1965) both forms of guarantee or assurance were, by 1962, 
almost entirely discontinued. 
1 By 1964 the only form of 
personal fTuarantee acceptable, though rarely, was according to 
the Managing Director interviewed by the author in cases 
where the guarantor and the guaranteed were very close 
family relations. 
From 1960 the bank gave considerable weight to a policy 
of granting credit to businessmen on the basis of their 
liquidity rather than on what kind of collateral they could 
offer. Liquidity is here defined as r customers ability 
to settle his debts is determinod by the nzture of his 
business and turnover . rn+to. 
This policy of being liquidity- 
conscious r^. ther than security-conscious has constituted 
inother import-tnt element of flexibility in the bank's lending 
policy. 
1. The Cunrantee bfr the politician was abolished because 
it involved the bann in many difficulties. For example, 
according to a high officer of the Lank, in one case it teas 
discovered that one politician had guarznteed loans to a total 
of £G90,000. Vlhe"i confronted with týý s fact it turned out 
that he did not have the slightest intention of accepting 
liability. 
The money-lender's guarantee was abolished because it 
led to numerous small accounts repayments on which tended to 
fall into arrears, implying also that the money-lender 
usually guaranteed overdrafts and loans for personal 
financing. Furthermore, it was widely known that a 
considerable part of the resources thus obtained by borro 
was transferred in co, xni )lions to the money-lender who 'i; lýu^ 
uickly enriched himself. T 
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Section C 
Developments in Cormmercial Banking 1950-64 
In many senses 1960-61 stands out ?s the divide after 
which brisic ch, nges in the p-: ttorn of commercial banking 
activity were registered or were noticeable. 
First, from 1960 the 4traditional pattern of bank 
location began to alter and certainly at the end of 1964 
the location of bank offices showed a pattern radically 
different fromm. the 1950+s. 
Secondly, a continuous increase in doposit liabilities 
was accompanied bz- a decline in the relative share of demand 
deposits in f^vour of the tnUrre ; ato of time and savinrts 
deposits. 
Third, from mid-1961, in terms of earning assets, domestic 
assets became progressively more important quantitntively than 
sterling or foreign Rssets. 
(Foreign 
assets n, nd sterling 
, Insets werd in practice synonymous 
t©rrnss At the and oý the 
period under review the banks collectivoly hold sterling 
assets amounting to very little. Tho amounts of ster; ing 
assets held were substantially no'i-earnin[ b, lnnce^ maintainad 
or day-to--day workin purposes. This should be noted as 
one of the most significant changes in commercial banking 
practices since the commencoment of commercial banking in Ghana. 
Fourth, the developments outlined in the preceding 
paragraph were associated with two important chanties in tho 
cor_iposition of commercial bank nsseta. They vrero 
(a) the beginning of n pormnnent flo<t't of local 1'rensury 
. 
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Bills a large proportion of which was held by the banks ; and 
(b) the decline of cash as a proportion of deposit liabilities 
and total non-fixed assets. 
Fifth, in the 1-. st yerr of the period under review, in 
contr^st to tr^ditional practice cornnerci^1 enterprise ceased 
to be the user of a major portion of bnnk credit. This develop- 
m©nt was the culmi n^tion of official policy statements dating 
back to about 1057. The shift was finally effected by credit 
regulations introduced in April 1964. It must be noted that 
these credit control regulations themselves represented the 
first attempt to subject commercial banking activity to 
official regulation. Previously the banks arranged their 
asset structure to suit their own operational policies. 
Thus April 1964 marked another significant turning point 
in Ghana's credJ t system. 
Sixth, from about the end of 1960 the official policy 
tins to sever the automatic linkinp' of com_; ercial banking 
pr^ctices to rconPtr. ry measures prevailing; in the United Kingdom. 
The break came cleirly from mid-1961. Until then high 
interest rites, for example, in the United Kingdom viere usually 
followed by increased commercial bank rates in Ghana. 
The developments outlined above were responses to 
different forces political as well as economic, and were 
important aspects of monetary and ©neral financial adaptation. 
In the remainder of this chapter the trends and developments 
outlined above will be examined in detail. 
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Bank offices 
As noted erirlier the t; rro British t)aizks were attracted to 
Ghana, as indeed to West Afri -tas a whole, pritutrily in 
response to ri si ne, foreign trade. Until te closing years 
of the period under review the banks' major operations were 
related to activities ass) dated with foreign trade. As 
a result, bank offices . were for a lone time concentrated in 
the ports and commercial and mininI- centres where expatriate 
business activity was generally located. The establishment 
of the Ghana Commercial Bank did not change this pattern until 
after 1960. From then on bank offices were extended beyond 
the traditional centres in a pattern which; if maintained, 
will carry a considerable long-run significance for the 
development of the economy. 
T:: b1e 8 rind Table 9 show the number of bank offices 
(branches and agencies) in 1951 and 1955-64 comp-! red with 
the Gross t itS4, r'd. Product (GDP) and population of Ghana. 
The number of commercial bank offices increased by nearly 
nine times bettwweon mid-1951 (see Table 8 footnoto b) and 
the end of 1964, from 16 to 174. This represented an 
arithmetic ave rago increase of nearly 12 offices per year. 
Thus over the thirteen-year period commercial bank offices 
were opened. at the rite of one per month. This should be 
compared with an average ir7tl-wetic Fro;,. th rate of one branch 
per three ; ears in the period 1897 to mid-1951. 
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Tab1o 8 
Ghana Number of Commercial Bank offices Compared 
with GDP 
(a 
( 'nd of 
period) 
Number of (0) bnnk afficos 
Fstirl^ted GDP 
for the ye it 
C4 I. Iillion 
Fstimsted GDP 
per bank office 
£G Million 
1951(b) 18 - - 
1955 42 340 8.1 
1956 64 353 5.5 
1957 79. 370 4.7 
1958 88 390 4.4 
1959. 100 445 4.5 
1960 104 478 - 4.6 
1961 130 511 3.9 
1962 139 547 3.9 
1963 158 604 3.8 
1964 174 660 3.9 
(a) Fstimntes CllF rro in current rimrkot prices, and include 
f, ýrmerst subsistence output. Friir1y rolinälo ostimztes are 
avrjlnble for only 1955 onward. 
(b) Refers to mid-year total of branches. 
(c) Figures for 1955-59 include a few offices operated by a 
dissolved (1960) Co-opor-. tive bank. It has not been possible 
to separate out the small number of offices operated by the 
co-oper^tive bank. 
Figures for 1C50 and 1952-54 could not bo obtained. 
Sources: Central Bureau of Statistics, Accra -Economic Surveys. 
Bank of Ghana, Amual Reports. 
1951 - Sir Cecil Trevor, op. cit., prtras. 34 and 46. 
Over the period 1960-64 the arithmetic average increase 
in the number of bank offices vWa3 17.5 per year as compared 
to 12 officos annually over the period 1955-60. 
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Table 6 shows a fall over the period of GDP per bank offico 
although no causal relationships can be deduced between the two 
magnitudes on t'he' basis of the figures s, L-hcwn. It must be 
noted that the usefulness of comparing GDP to the nur. mbar of 
bank off ices is liniterl by the fact that the GDP , is a flow 
of expenditures or mon(; y income rece1. ptE within the year 
whereas the numbers of bank offices refer to the end of the 
year and should be aptly regarded as stock figures. 
Table 9 
Ghana : Banking Density 1951 and 1955-64 
Estimated Number of Estimated 
population(b) bank offices(e) population 
(End of period) 1 000 per bank office. 
(1) (2) (3)'000 
1951(x) 5,359 18 29 8 
1955 6,041 42 144 
1956 (3,193 64 97 
1957 6,355 79 80 
1958 ), 518 88 74 
1959 6,685 100 67 
1960 6,858 104/ 66 
1961 7,036 130 54 
1962 7.291 139 52 
1963 7,407 158 47 
1964 7,600 174 44 
(a) Figures for 1951 slow approximate rid-year position. 
(b) Author's calculation based on a census figure of 
6,727,000 for and of March, 1960. 
(c) See Table 8 footnote (c) 
Sources: Column (1) - based on 1960 population census 
of Ghana, Central 'Bureau of Statistics 
Statistical Yearbook of Ghana, 1961. 
Column (2) - As for Table B. 
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Moreover, one cannot drag: conclusions t-ith any useful de, yree 
of finality about the declining ratio of GDP to bank office. 
On the one hand it could imply that transactions per bank office 
were declining. Or, the other hand, it could mean that the 
expansion in banking dots was a lubricating factor in the 
growth of(DP in current prices. These are questions which 
it is clearly impossible to pursue further. 
Table 9 shows the npproximite size of population per 
bank office or baukinF density for the period 1951 to 1964 
excluding 1952-54 for which reasonably reliable statistics 
of bank offices could not be obtained. The population 
estimates are the author's own calculation based on census 
data in respect of the end of March 1960. The estimates given 
in Table 9 have been obtained first by projecting forward 
from 1960 at 2.6% annual i; rotrfth rate and backward at 2.5%1 
to give annual estimates corresponding to the end of March. 
From these estimates have been made for the end of each year 
on the basis of the simple formula; 
Pi = -Cl + 0.75(x2 - xi) = 0.25 (xl + 3x2) 
where P1 st^nds for the required end of year population 
estitm^. te, xl the estim^to for the end of March in that year 
and x2 the estirn to for the and of March in. the following year. 
Through this obviously simplified procedure it has been 
possible to brink; the populatio. i fil-ures and the number of 
banking offices on to a comparable basis. 
1. These are the official estimat is of population grovith rats.;. See Office of Planning Commission, "Ghana seven-your development 
plan", Government Printer, Ater... 1963. p. 7; and R. Szerezeviski tCapital and output in Ghana, 1955-61", The Economic Lulletin 
of Ghana, No. 4,1963. p. 39. 
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From a banking density of 293,000 of population 
per bank office in mid-1951 the ratio fell consistently 
J 
over the period reaching 44,000 per bank office at the end of 
1964. For the purpose of co; par son_ bai kin`. densities in 
terms of population in thirteen other countries as on 31st 
_ December 1964 are presented in Table 10. Thee of these 
M-1-11- If, % 
Banking Density :A Corpnrison of Ghana with "elected 
Foreign Countries, 31st December 1964. 
Number of 
banking 
offices 
Approximate popu- 
Tation per banking 
office. 
1. Finland 900 1,500 
2. Western Geinany 34,000 1,700 
3. Australia 5,580 2,000 
4. Canada 5,614 3,250 
5. England and Males 11,500 4,100 
6. Belgium 2,144 4,300 
7. Seeden 1,423 5,300 
8. U. S. A. 27,000 7,000 
9. Portugal 400 22,500 
10. Ghana 174 44,000 
11. Kenya 164 54.9000 
12. India 5p476 80)000 
13. Ur ^nda 70 92.9900 
14. Tanganyika t `ýý 91 96,700 
(a) Tanf-anyika is now part of Tanzania. 
Sources: For (1) - (9) and. 12 - H. W. auburn, op. cit. For (11), (13) and (14) - John Loxley, The development of the monetary and financial system of the East African Currency Aren", Unpublished Ph. D. 
Thesis, University of Leeds, 1966. 
ýr, ý_ - 
are African countries namely Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika 
which in 1964 merged with Zanzibar to form the Republic 
of Tanzania. On the 31st December, 1964 all the three 
African countries had a greater population per banking office 
than did Ghana. On the whole the advanced countries had a 
lower b:! nki nE; density. From this it may be inferred that 
the decline in banking density for G}inne was a reflection of 
general economic and social development. 
It is interesting to note the respective influences 
of the expatriate hacks on the one hand, and of the 
indigenous Ghana Commercial Bank on the other, in the observed 
increase in banking offices. 
Up to the end of 1959 the expansion was dominated almost 
entirely by the expatriate bz nkn, with Barclays Bank registering 
Frerter avoraFe yearly provrth from 1955. From 1960 the 
position ti-ris cornplotely reversed as the Ghana Comriercial. 
Brink expanded its brtncli i rsteri whilst the ©xpr triste banks 
re i-nod practically sty t ionriry in terms of numbers of offices. 
T^ble 11 il)ustr^tes there points clenrly. 
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Table 11 
Ghana : Banking; Offices of Expatriate Banks 
and the Ghana Commercial Bank. Selected Years. 
(End of 
period) 
`Dotal number 
of banking 
offices 
All Banks 
ý1) 
Banking, 
offices of the 
expatriate 
banks 
(2) 
Banking 
offices of 
the Ghana 
Commerc al 
Bankk a) 
(3) 
(3) as ratio 
of (1) 
:ö 
(4) 
1951(June) 18 18 - - 
1955 42 41 1 2.4 
1956 64 62 2 3.1 
1957 79 77 2 2.5 
1959 100 97 3 3.0 
1960 104 97 7 6.7 
1961 130 101 29 22.3 
1962 130' 100 40 28.8 
1963 158 100 58 36.7 
1964 174 100 74 42 4 
{a) The Ghanu Commercial Bank comn: ienced banking operations 
in May, 1953. 
Sources: Central Bureau of Statistics, Accra - Economic 
Surveys; 
Bank of Ghana, Annual Reports; 
Ghana Commercial Bank, Annual Reports. 
The Ghana Commercial Bank increased its f? -are of total 
banking offices from a nengre 2.4ö at the end of 1955 to 42.5% 
at the end of 1964. In nbsolute figures, whereas the Ghana 
Comm rcial Dank incrersed its offices by only 6 from end-1953 
to end-1960, it registered an incre-, se of 67 in the four 
years 1961-64, working out rt about 17 officos per year in 
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the latter period. This was the exact reverse of the pattern 
experienced by the expatriate banks taken together. By the 
end of 1963 in terms of the number of banking offices the Ghana 
Commercial Bank had come up from third (bottom) place to 
first position in the league. 
' 
This development raises several important questions. 
It could be argued that by 1960 tho expatriate banks had 
advanced their branch system to a point beyond which further 
expansion was considered unprofitable. Alternatively, it 
may be deduced that the establishment of the Ghana Commercial 
B^nk stimuln. ted the exp' riate banks to expand their branch 
network faster than they would have done in the absence of 
the potential competition from this bank. As a state-owned 
commercial bank it would be reasonable to assume from the 
beginning that in time its potential advantages would material e. 
The post-1960 tremendous expansion of the Ghana Commercial 
Bank raises the question of what criteria should influence the 
operations of a state-owned commercial bank in an underdeveloped 
country. In particular, we would like to know whether the 
observed expansion of this bank was profitable and, if not, 
what are the issues thereby rai3ed. These are questions to 
which we will return at the end of this subsection. Wo turn 
now to ©xamaine further tho distribution of banking offices. 
1. It is highly probable thßt the Ghana Commercial Bank will 
mairntnin its lending position in the distznt future. At the 
end of 1965 of n totnl of 186 banking offices the Ghana 
Commercial B'ºnk had 92 or 49.5% of the total with the two 
exprtri^. to bnnks shrtring 94 offices between 
them. At tho end 
of 1965 one of the expatriate banks had 6 offices fewer than 
at the end of 1960. 
See The Bankers' Magazine, March 1966, p. 188. 
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Table 12 shows the regional distribution of commercial 
bank offices from 1955 to 1964. Regional breakdown is not 
available for the e'rlier part of the period under review. 
Table 12 should be rend in conjunction with Table 13 which 
shows the average area served by one banking office for the 
whole country and individual administrative regions. 
It is clear frort Table 12 that most regions shared in 
the general branch expansion as is also indicated by the 
lowering of regional area per banking office (Table 13). 
The exceptions were the Northern and Upper Regions 
where in absolute figures there aas little expansion. In 
the case of the Northern Region at the end of 1964 there were 
only 3 banking offices same as at the end of 1955 although 
between the two dates the number actually rose to 5 in 1960 
and 1961. Table 13 shows that throughout the period the 
Northern R(; gion had by far a greater area per Banking office 
than did each of the other regions. At the end of 1964 
the average ^rer of the Northern Region per banking offico 
was nearly as large as the whole area of the Western Rggion, 
and larger than the aroa of the Central, Eastern, Volta 
Regions and, of course, the Accra Capital District. 
A rough division of the country into north and south 
.. ý with the Brone-Ahafo Region included in the northern division 
shows clearly that there was great disparity in terms of area 
per banking office as between north and south. The area in 
square miles per banking office for north and south as defined 
above were 2,146 and 264 respectively at the end of 1964. 
The corresponding figures at the end of 1955 were 7,500 and 
-GtA- 
Table 12 
Ghana: Regional Distribution of Commercial Bank 
Offices 1955-64 
(end of 
December) 
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1,151. Both divisions obviously saw considerable increases 
in the number of banking offices. But in the case of the 
northern section the modest improvement was dominated by the 
Bronn; -Ahnfo Region where the number of banking offices increased 
from only 2 it end-1955 to 15 at end-1964. 
Thus in spite of a large increase in the number of banking 
dots in the country, at the end of 1964 banking offices were 
still heavily concentrated in the sourthern half of the country 
after 67 years of commercial banking. This fact is illustrated 
clearly in Figure 5. 
Table 14 shows for 1960 the relationship between degree 
of urbanization and banking density on a regional basis. As 
stated in footnote (a) to Table 14 this exercise cannot be 
performed for other years because reliable regional estimates 
of population are only available for mid-1960. In view of 
the changes in the social and economic structure to be expected 
in Q rapidly changing society it would be unsafe to apply the 
estim^. ted national population growth rate to the separate 
regions. 
For the whole of Ghana 22.8% of the population lived in 
urban cent. re3 defined in Table 14 as towns with population 
of 5,000 or more. In the same year hankinp offices viere 
definitely concentrated in urban centres. Thus in 1960 and 
indeed all the period before the distribution of banking 
ofi'Ices was heavily unbalanced as between town and country in 
favour of the former. 
On the regionrtl level the relationship was not so 
-70- 
clear-cut. In 1960 the Volta, Northern and Upper Regions 
not only wore the least urbanized (in descending order 
respectively) but also had the highest banking density in 
Ghana: Urbanization and Bankinf Density, 1960(a) 
Region 
Estimated 
population 
Liid-1960 
1 000 
Number of 
Banking 
Offices 
End-1960 
Approximate 
population 
per banking 
office 
1000 
Proportioi- 
of popula-- 
tion in 
urban 
centres (b) 
Western 626 16 39.1 26.3 
Central 751 10 75.1 28.0 
Eastern 1,094 20 54.7 18.7 
Accra Capital District 492 17 27.3 80.0 
Volta 777 $ 97.1 13.1 
Ashanti 1,109 16 69.3 24.8 
Brong-Ahafo 588 9 65.3 15.6 
Northern 532 5. 106.4 13.0 
Upper 757 31 252.3 4.3 
All Ghana 6,727 104,, 64.7 22.0 
(a) Population figures relate to approximately mid-1960 
whereas the fiVuros of banking offices refer to end-1960. 
Population growth rates are not available for separate 
regions, and therefore this exercise cannot be done for 
years other than 1960 vrlien reliable regional population 
statistics are available from census figures. 
(b) Urban centres are taken to be towns with population of 
5,000 or more. This corresponds to official classificati, ou 
Sources: As for Table B. 
ascending order respectively. Accra District was the most 
urbanized and conformed to the pattern illustrated in the 
preceding sentence in having the lowest banking density. 
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Between the two ends the other regions did not show the same 
parallelism. Thus the Central Region second in the proportion 
of urban population vi? s sixth in banking density, whilst the 
Brong-Ahafo Region though sixth in urbanization was fourth 
in banking: density. The disparities arise from the fact that 
in each region individual towns exercised different degrees 
of pull on the banks. In some regions a few relatively large 
urban centres had well-established commercial and industrial 
bases. Thus in the Western Region, for example, the twin 
towns of Sekondi-Takoradi and Tnrkwa had special advantages 
which made them attractive centres for commercial banking. 
Furthermore, up to 1960 the Ghana Commercial Bank expanded 
mainly to the centres where the two older banks worn already 
established. In all, up to the end of 1960 commercial bank 
offices were concentrated in major commercial centres principally 
in the southern half of Ghana. 
The tremendous post-1960 expansion of the number of banking 
offices was marked by significant changes in the previous 
pattern of bank location. From 1961 banking offices were 
established in towns which though by our definition above 
could be described as urban were, however, not important 
commercial centres as were those in which banking offices 
had previously been established. Most of the now banking 
centres could be described an, small rural towns with many 
rural characteristics such as the preponderance of farming 
as the major occupation. From 1963 banking offices were 
established in even smaller rural centres. The : nap (Figure',, S) 
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showing bank location as in mid-1964 illustrates the developments 
described above. 
In mid-1964 out of a total of 79 banking centres 27, or 
34.2% of the total, were small towns or villages each with a 
mid-1960 population of less than 5,000. As mentioned above 
a considerable proportion of the rest were centres which 
though l"rger than the rural banking centres did, however, 
exhibit many of the ch-rqcteristics of a rural economy. 
On the other hand, it must be noted that a few, specifically 
three, of the smaller banking towns (with population less than 
5,000) were envisaged or in the process of becoming large 
industrial centres. These were up to mid-1964 Komendn in 
the Central Region, Akuse in the Eastern Region and Akosombo 
also in the Eastern Region. The first two were being rapidly 
developed as centres of a sizable sugar industry whilst 
hkosombo is the centre of the now completed hydro-electric 
power scheme on the River Volta. 
The position of the indigenous Ghana Commercial Bank 
in the 1961-64 expansion deserves special emphasis. By 
mid-1964 in all but the Northern Region the Ghana Commercial 
Bank had a larger number of offices than did each of the other 
bunks. More significant, on the same date out of 33 bank 
offices operated in small towns or villages each with a mid-1960 
population of under 5,000,21 were off ico s of the Ghana 
Commercial Bank. 
At this point we should emphasize that banking offices 
are concentrated in the area of the country which coincides 
-73- 
broadly with the boundaries of the cocoa industry as marked 
on Figure S. This f^ct illustrates the dominant position 
of the cocoa industry as the basic generating force in 
the 
economy. ', o examples Will illustrate further the influen6$. 
of the cocoa industry on the location of banking offices. 
In the Brong-Ahafo Region where the extension of banking 
facilities was particularly marked after 1960, banking offices 
were by mid-1964 confined entirely to the cocoa-producing 
parts of the region whilst over two-thirds of the area was 
without any corvnerciil banking facilities. Secondly, in 
the Volta Region brtnking offices were in mid-1964 densely 
concentrated in the cocoa-producing central portion. 
One important point should be noted about the illustrations 
m'de above. In contrast to the pre-1961 period the post-1961 
era of banking development was inrked by the location of bank 
offices in the actual centres of cocoa production. Previously, 
banking centres though enclosed by the line demarcating the 
location of the cocoa industry were themselves usually not 
centres of cocoa production but rather general commercial 
points no doubt deriving their being essentially from the 
industry. 
Four main conclusions emerge from the Glotz sled account 
of Bank exprnsion over the period under revievw. 
1. Except for the Northern and. Upper Regions there erns by 
the end of 1964 a wore oven retrional distribution of banking 
offices in the country. 
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2. Contrary to the pre-1961 pattern of location the period 
1961-64 was marked by a definite expansion of banking services 
to the rural or farming communities. 
3. The Ghana Commercial Bank played the leading role in 
these developments. 
4. The cocoa industry was, as in almost every aspect of 
the Ghanaian economy, the dominant factor in the observed 
expansion and pattern of location during; the 1960's. 
The points outlined above raise a number of questions 
which require some discussion. However, the post-1961 
more even distribution of banking offices on a regional basis 
deserves i brief comment to which we should turn our 
attention irmedi^. tely. 
It is, of course, to be expected that bank expansion 
would follow a growing monetized economy an improved communicnt4^- 
network and enlarged literacy - all factors which contribute 
to the grotirth of towns of commercial viability. But in 
qddition to such vniver"sally identifiable influences on 
bank expansion, in Ghana there could have been some political 
influences in the extension of banking services to most 
regions, as noted earlier. The present regional demarcations 
in Ghana are largely a post-Independence phenomenon. In 
some cases they arose from local political pressure and 
intrigues with influential members of the then ruling 
political party, in order to catch up with the level of 
economic development attained in other parts of the country. 
Thus the underlying', regional, if not tribal, consciousness 
hh, 
-75- 
could havo led to influence-external or internal - on 
bank authorities to establish branches in areas where ordinari: 11 
the authorities might not have chosen to provide banking 
services. Such es might be said to have influenced 
tb^e observed extension of banking into the Volta and 
Br ong-"Ahaf o Regions. Brong-Aha£o probably offers a good 
example. I aviný been administore d as part of Ashanti for a 
long period in the colonial era, it is common knowledge that 
the inhabitants of Brong-Ahafo accumulated numerous complaints 
of nef'lect in development in favour of Ashanti proper. It 
may not be unrealistic to argue that the leaders of the 
Region - rrhoso desire to gain from their newly-found freedom 
from ; shaanti, so to speak, was often reflected in near- 
hysterical pro-Nkrumah support - might have influenced the 
expansion of banking; to the Region as one element of pro,, -z95 
If this line of argument is realistic then it should 
also be noted that the one bank obviously susceptible to any 
such influence was the Ghana Connmorcialßank. As a state-owned 
bank it was in theory, at least, prone to the influence of 
politicians and beine manned by Channians it could be said 
to be susceptible to tribalistic considerations. l 
The oxtonsion of banking services into rural and other 
less commercialised wrens raises a few important questions to 
1. These are, of course, tentative arguments which, hovievtc,, 
are supported by evidence from other quarters. For example, 
during discussions in Ghana early 1965 the author learned 
from authorities of a few stnto-owned enterprises that as a 
result of pressure from politicians they had established 
branches in centres which did not qualify on economic 
considerations . 
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which we must now devote some attention. 
may be posed. 
Three main questions 
1. Why gras commercial bgnkin,:; carried to such areas only 
recently? 
2. How did the absence of banking services affect the 
economic life of the rural coriiunities? 
3. What are the implications of the recent developments 
for the economy and the banks themselves? 
One of the chief rtnsvyors to the first question z'n s the 
preoccupation of the expatriate banks with expatriate 
business concerns which were mostly concentrated in the major 
commercial centres. The expatriate banks, it will be 
recalled, dominated the banking scene until about 1960. 
Other important neg^tive forces were poor communications, 
a high degree of illiteracy among rural populations and the 
general nature of rural economic activity in relation to the 
British-oriented policies and practices of the expatriate 
banks. Those general observations requiro further 
elucidation. 
Under conditions of poor comaunicntions the operation 
of an extensive branch banking system would : nvolve high 
costs in the movement of cash as well as central control 
over all br nches. Two aspects of the high costs of moving 
cash should be noted. These v-ould be the internal cost 
of moving cosh from ab nkts own ln. r; or or district centres 
and from the few currency depots opornted by the Currency Boar(.. 
secondly, we should consider the cost of obtaining currency 
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supplies from the latter - and later the Bank of Ghana, which 
required prepa ment of sterling in London. Thus the further 
nwa y was a bank's branch from a currency centre the higher 
would be the cost of r, ioving Qash to such branches. The 
alternative would be to anticipate the cash needs of remote 
branches well in advance and to keep such branches sufficiently 
stocked with cash, a prospect not likely to be countenanced 
by the banks as it would involve the exchanging of income- 
yielding sterling assets for non-earning cash for mainly 
precautionary reasons. In the circumstances it was to be 
expected that the banks «rould restrict their offices to 
centres more cheaply accessible from currency centres and 
from their own district offices. 
Apart from these cost considerations an understanding 
of, and a willingness to use banking facilities required 
some degree of literacy or sophistication both of them matters 
in which the balance was heavily in favour of the urban contras. 
Furthermore, economic activity outside the commercialized 
urban centres was limited to mainly farming. Since the 
co ., ercial banks wore - and still are - largely avorso to 
accepting the debt of' farmers banking in such areas would 
necessarily be limited to the provision of deposit facilities. 
As the operation of current accounts would not appeal to 
illiterate populations it is likely that cash deposits would 
consist principally of snvir. C-s 4ccounts. As a considerable 
portion of farmerst money income is concentrated in the cocoa 
harvesting season (usually October to J ; 
t*) 
one would expect 
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a substantial proportion of the average farmer's savings 
deposits to consist of transactions b. Rlances. This implies' 
that a b^nkinU office serving rural con nunity would require 
large cash resources relative to deposit liabilities on which 
the bank would have to pay interest. In view of this analysis 
it could be argued further that the additions to total loanable 
resources for any particular banking institution arising from 
the extension of banking to rural or farming areas would be 
quite low. 
Moreover, since deposit liabilities of rural banking 
offices would consist largely of savings accounts it should 
be noted that in many of the rural contras savings bank 
facilities viere provided by the Ghana Savings Bank (post 
Office Savings Bank). Until the latter part of 1959 when 
commercial bank interest rate on deposit accounts was permanently 
raised the only major advantage which the bunks could have 
over the Ghanra Saºt'ings Bank was the fact that they allowed 
withdrawals at minimum intervals of seven days as opposed 
to fourteen days permitted by the latter. 
Such are some of the iiaportant mlsiderations against 
which one should appraise any sugCostions of conservatism 
on the part of the banks in the earlier pattern of branch 
location. 1 
On the second question raised earlier it can be argued that 
the absence of bnnkinf.: facilities among; the farming, communities 
until the modest beginning; mado in 1962 moant that the banking; 
habit gras not encournCed among the farming sector. This 
1.3QkBnnk of Ghani, Annuni Report June 1963 p. 68. 
kh, 
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point, however, should not be overstated because, as noted 
above, many farmin5 areas had access to savings bank 
facilities. However, what can be said with a reasonable 
degree of confidence is that partly as a result of his late 
contact with commercial banking the farmer remained largely 
a small-scale operator relying on his oven meagre resources 
or alternatively on credits obtq ned from the money-lender 
usually on very harsh terms. 
As it has been shown above the late 'arrival of commercial 
banking; to the famin¬ sector cannot in f airner, s be bla. r"e-I on the 
policies of profit-motivated private banks. There viere 
several factors that would militate against the profitability 
of commercial banking in rural communities. 
L 
By 1961 most of the conditions which tended to discourage 
commercial banking beyond the traditional banking centres 
were considerably altered. All forms of internal communication 
had improved considerably over the pre-Independence position, 
education including adult educational schemes were groll 
advanced; and many rural and semi-rural towns had been 
considerably infiltrated by non-farming populations bringing 
with them urban attitudes. The importance of these factors 
should not be underestimated as are reflected in the imbalance 
between the north and the south in the distribution of banking 
offices. From the distant colonial days the northern section 
of Ghana has always been behind the southern section in 
1. One of the anomalies in Chanainn economic arrangements 
durin5 the period under review was that ostensibly powerful 
mean3 of effecting needed economic changes yore shuT't-Circuited 
by political considerations. For example, as regards making 
the farmer's debt bankable the official support which could have 
been expected from the post-Independence organisation of farmers 
into one body never crme to fruition. It soon became evident 
that the motive was essentially political. 
^vv 
cornrnunications, education and general prosperity. Such 
considerations apart, the Bank of Ghana established more 
currency centres thus reducing the cost of moving currency 
round the country. 
The greater spread of corm ercial banking obviously augurs 
well for the future development of the economy. In addition 
to encouraging a greater spreading of the banking habit, it 
would, in future, be possible to extend commercial bank 
assistance to agriculture and general Ghanrlian private 
enterprise based outside the major urban centres. 
It would be interesting to know how the expansion of 
commercial bank branch system has been reflected in the 
profitability of banking. In this respect our interest is 
in the Ghana Commercial Bank which dorainzted the 1961-64 
expansion. 
It is theoretically in; posoirle to isolate the effect of 
expansion in the profitzbility of the bank. We do, 
however, know from Table 7 that the bank's net profits rose 
from £G185,513 for the year ending in Juno 1961 to £G902,561 
for the year ending in Juno 1964. During the period of 
remarkable branch expansion, 1961-62 to 1963-64, the average 
annual not profits of the bank were £G731,205 compared to an 
annual average of £G136,838 for the period 1959-60 to 1960-61. 
The obvious from this comparison would be that 
the period of remirkcble expansion vms mrrked by much hi 'h©r 
oc rninc-s. This, however, Innnot be n firm basis for concludi; lp 
th't the post-1960 expansion vwßs reflected proportionately 
in the -ibsolute level of profits. In fact, the bank's not 
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profits for the year 1963-64 increased by 3.65 over the 
previous year as comp^red , iith an increase of about 127% in 
1961-62 over 1960-61. Thus even though the net profits of 
the bank during the years covered rose in each successive 
year in absolute terms, the rate of increase was very much 
1=er in the financial year 1963-64 than in each of the 
previous gears. 
This shows that whether or not the branch expansion 
of the period 1961-64 was a profitable move cannot be 
determined solely from the rising absolute level of profits. 
As in all business enterprises one would have to allow for a 
gestation period. - 
This brings us to n brief discussion of the significance 
attaching to the dominance of the Ghana Commercial Bank in 
the recent expansion of banking network. As this bank 
handles the accounts of the Government in all centres whore 
the central bank (Bank of Ghana) is not directly represented 
the extended notviork of the bank's branch systom was necessarily 
called for as a response to the extension of government 
activity spread away from the old nr3ministrative centres. 
Secondly, as the bank responsible for the financing of cocoa 
purchases the expansion into the farming centres may have 
facilitated the movement of the crop. Thirdly, following 
ýts 
emergence around 1961 as sole banker to stnto-owned 
enterprises itc branch distribution has oither followed the 
distribution of existing state enterprises or, other things 
being equal, should fßcilitite amore even regiohal distribution 
.. 82.. 
of both go-vernment and private industrial enterprise. 
These cons ider. ti ons would also indicate favourable prospects 
of profitability in the new areas of banking. 
Lastly, it shoc_1, ' bo recognised that the expanded branch 
network of the Ghana Commorc2. al Bank derives partly from its 
policy of "Ibringing; banking to the people". Investigations 
by the author failed to disclose any direct pressures from 
the Government in the execution of this policy which, as noted 
earlier, had reached an advanced stage at the end of 1964. 
However, as the Government is the sole shareholder it is not 
unrealistic to assume some measure of governmental endorsement 
/ of the expansion. In any case even if the expansion should 
lower the bank's average profits per office or the rlarginmzl 
rate of profits, as a stete-ovined bank the opportunity cost of 
R loss in earnings (however calculated) within reasonable 
limits, can be classified as a government subsidy to the bank 
in the light of the long-run gains to be derived from an 
extensively-based banking system. 
The fact that the expatriate banks completely desisted 
from further branch expansion from 1961 raises the question 
of whether or not their unrrillinGnoss to expand arose from 
expectations of poor prospects of profit. Certainly one 
cannot rule out this possibility. On the other hand, their 
unwillingness to extend their branch network could have 
resulted from a cautious attitude in an environment in which 
the official attitude to private enterprise was, rightly or 
wrongly, re girded by many as hostile. 
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Binking Services 
Over the period under review p. 11 three,, coramercial 
b'nks provided the banking services developed over the years 
in the United KinLdem9 ranging from ope.. inp letter of credit 
for importers to offering advice to bust nessmen on financial 
arrangements and on mattors affecting business organisation 
genorally. The banks provide facilities for the safekeeping 
of customers' money and other valuables; they enable transaction; 
to be carried out by cheque, and facilitate the transfer of 
funds within Ghana and between Ghana and the outside world. 
The rapid expansion in banking offices since 1951 and 
the, improved communication system of the country are some of 
the factors that have contributed to the banks' competence 
in effecting such services. The establishment of the central 
bink in 1957 has hid two immediately favourable effects on 
the y^me efficiency' of the brinks. These viere the opening of 
the B^nkorsl C1eririn House in Acorn on 1st July, 1956, and 
the opening of more currency depots in the country by the 
}3aß; of Ghana. At the end of June 1961 there were already 
nine major currency depots compared with four under the West 
African Currency Board. Since 1961 many smaller currency 
cent res have been added to the major regional centres. 
Deposit facilities enter for the usual three kinds of 
nccourits, namely current flccount. s or deriand deposits., savinGs 
and time deposits. 
As in England current accounts are vrithdrewable on demand 
und efrn no interest, but nre subject to ledger chnrgos. 
-84- 
Ordinary snvings deposits are subject to withdraw 1 at 
riinimum interval of seven days. Withdrawals ire permitted 
only nt the customer' s branch though ri customer crin avoid 
the obvious inconvenience of this "arrl. ngement by using n banker's 
draft. 
Time deposits are in effect required to be lodged with 
the bank for a contractual mimimum period. The shortest 
period for which the banks accept time deposits is in pract3 c. e 
six months. In all six months and twelve months are the main 
siinimum periods for which the banks agree to accept time 
deposits. 
The banks pay interest on both savings and time deposits. 
Deposit or borrowing r^tos remained stnblo from September 
1960 to the end of 1964. Prior to the former date the banks, 
doposit rates fluctuated considerably allegedly in tune with 
movements of interest rtes in London. There will be n 
more detailed examination of the banks' debit and credit rates 
to inrds the, end of, this chapter. 
Generally the bankers interviewed in connection with this 
study crere roluctrtnt 
to divulge details of their rates, charges 
and other operational 
terms beyond broad generalisations 
corion to all banks. 
The inference to be drawn from this 
is that even where inter-bank agreements govern some of 
their terms of operation such agreements relate to basic 
teMI3 tiyith each bank free to work out the details for itself. 
lýttention 
. 
will be dray n to the operations which are governed 
by inter-bank agreement. There are indications that the 
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Ghana Commercial Bonk follows an independent policy in some sti 
matters. For example, from August 1959 when it started a- 
s^vings dep-rtment it usually paid s higher rate on savings 
deposits whilst the two British b? nks paid the same basic rate 
ind it a lower level. It mny be inferred from this that 
whilst the two British banks dominated the banking scene or 
were the only banks in the country the extent of inter-bank 
co-operation was greater. This inference would be supported 
by the fact that up to 1960 the clientele of the expatriate 
banks on the one hand and the Ghana Commercial Bank on the 
other were almost distinct. The former catered for all 
kinds of expatriate customers and, of course, African customers 
ºrhilst the latter catered for only African customers. 
On internal transfers Nevilyn and Rowan found in 1952 
that ch tr5es ranged up to 4ö in the former British West 
African Colonies .1 Other sources indicate that about the 
cýrne time the maximum chrrge on internal transfers wns 0.875 
2 
per cent. 
The rte eis, 1-ter reduced to ?% and finally to *% nt 
the end of 1960. The reduction of the maximum charge to 4ä 
Brno said to have boon duo to the insistence of the Bank of 
Ghana following the establishment of more currency depots 
to cover all the regions of Ghana. 
The incretsea -Iv, ilability of local earning assets from 
1959 cas rt1so an important factor which justified the reduction3 
in internal transfer ch^rges. The banks had argued in 1951 
Newlyn and Rowen, op. cit., p. 84. 
2. " Bank of 
Ghana, Annual Report June 1961, p. 9. 
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that the high ch'rges -., sere necess, ýry because the cost of 
keeping their branches in funds vras very high and that in 
ddition there ws such very little scope for making profits 
in the country that exch'nge charges on remittances constituted 
one of the few sources of profit. 1 
It has also been suggested that -the reductions in internal 
transfer charges were made possible by the reduction of 
currency as a proportion of the total money supply, 2 implying 
proportionately lower requirements of currency by the banks. 
However, the significance of this factor should not be over- 
stated. Most payments in Ghana, except for inter-business 
transactions, are riade in currency. The main force behind 
the reductions, in so f. -, r as the reductions were voluntary, 
ws the increased availability of local earning assets. 
Agreements between the banks applied to only the 
ýýirýZ st^tod : above. The opern. tive rates in each case were 
not necess^rily uniform for , All customers to any particular 
brink but voriod nccording to distances involved and the status 
of n particulqr customer in the estimation of the bank. 
Oiie cannot be any more specific about charges on external 
transfers beyond the broad generalization that the maximum 
liras' around 0.875 per cent. 
Both internal and external transfer charges are known 
to have caused considerable irritation to the. firms which 
., ýprp usually the ones with large sinne to transfer. Earlier 
Sir Cecil Trevor, op. cit., pnra. 123. 
2. Tony Xillick, "Monetary adaptation in a dependent econom r 
Paper on Ghanaian experience issued for limited circulation. 
196 4. 
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writers found abundant evidence of firms arranging to transfer 
Funds within the country through private clearing, and the 
use of trucks and other forms of transportation. 1 On 
external transfers similar arrangements are known to have 
been made to avoid bank charges, which, at the least, must 
have exceeded % because the banks themselves had to pay as 
fluch to the Currency Authority on currency redemptions. 
For, example, before 1961 the large expatriate trading firms 
used the cash resulting from sales in Ghana to buy cocoa 
from the farmers and were repaid by the Cocoa Marketing Board 
in London from the latterts sterling funds. Thus both the 
Board and the trading firras avoided payment of bank char" es. 
It is also known that the Cocoa Marketing Board did of its 
own initiative arrange some direct matching of funds with 
other firms in order to avoid transfer charges. 
2 
Before July 1961 when exchange control gras introduced 
in C-h^na ' grinst the rest of the Sterling: Aren the banks had 
been able to use their own sterling assets to effect external 
transfers, paying. the 11o charge to the Currency Authority 
for the portion not covered by their own sterling assets. 
pollojring the introduction of these controls when each bank 
was allowed a rlaximucii of £G0.5 million in sterling assets 
the situation described here hqs, of course, been removed. 
Most external transfers have since then had to be effected by 
moans of sterling obtained from the Bank of Ghana. The 
implication of this development is that the banks have in 
Sir Cecil Trevor, op. cit., paras 123-4 and 127-32. 
See also 1 evily and Rotiran, op. cit., p. 84. 
2. D. H. NiculesCti, "Growth of banking in Ghana", The Banker's 
Magazine, December 1961. 
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most cases had to pay to the Bank of Ghana !% in respect of 
each transfer. It is therefore highly probable that in 
order to preserve their profit margin on the exchange the 
banks have raised their own exchange charges. 
By opening letters of credit for importers the, banks lend 
their internationally know-ln names to Importers whose business 
reputation would otherwise be unknown to ovorsea suppliers. 
Since most expatriate trading firms are branches or subsidia»ies 
of famous international holding companies it would be true 
to say that the service rendered by the banks was most 
valuable to the less well-known native traders. 
1 
Letters of credit are of two kinds, revocable and 
irrevocable. The former is terminable by the bank without 
notice whereas an irrevocable credit cannot be cancelled 
Mithout the consent of both supplier and buyer. However, 
should ^ bank find a customer unreliable the credit opened 
rang be cancelled on the bank's o: wn initiative, although 
,, ccordinC to inform^tion supplied by one of the banks, as far 
.s it vas concerned the need for such action had not arisen 
for a loni, time. The coi; i missions charged on both types of 
1. The proportion of import trade handled directly by 
indigenous or African traders is unknown to the author. The 
indications are that over the last four years of the period 
r. : ny* of the indigenous importers lost their business or simply 
obtained their supplies 
from local wholesalers, mostly expatriate 
firms. In any case the stringent payments restrictions 
tended to neigh against the usually small African importer. 
Lioreover, if it is true that bribes or "commissions" were 
demanded prior to the granting of import licences and exchange 
permits, as indicated 
by the inquiries following- the overthrow 
of Dr. I1k_rumah's Government then it is reasonable to conclude 
that such practices affected most the usually small Ghanaian 
or African trader. 
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letters of credit have for a lone time been governed by an 
inter-bank agreement. The commissions, unchanged throughout 
the period under review, were at the end of 1964 % and `o for 
revocable and irrevocable credits respectively calculated on 
the value of imports involved. In either case there was 
additional postal charge of two Shillings and sixpence. 
The banks also act as intermediaries between importers 
and exporters by dandling Sight and Acceptance Bills drawn 
for the purpose of effecting payment on trade, between residents 
and non-residents. Oversea suppliers send such bills to 
the banks together with invoices and other documents of shipment. 
In the case of Sieht Bills the local importer is required to 
make payment to the bank immediately the documents covering 
the goods are received by the bank. With Acceptance Bills 
the drawee (importer) takes delivery of the goods but the 
payment is required to be made after a period stated on the 
bill. Sight bills were sometimes converted into Acceptance 
bills where the drayioes were unable to make immediate payment 
to the bank concerned. This would appear to substantiate 
n statement made to the author by one bank that it acted 
mainly as a passive agent between oversew suppliers and local 
importers. Generally, the bills indicate a "Case of Need", 
usually a local representative of the oversea supplier, 
whose duty is to intervene, wehere payment is delayed. However, 
it is difficult to envisage the extent of the bank's passivity 
in such transactions in a country where there is a complete 
absence of discount or accepting houses. In practice, 
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given an importer's creditworthiness all the banks dld, as 
no4w, ta good deal of such bills . What the alleged 
neutrzlity meant therefore wris thit the banks did not [: uarantee 
pr rnent for any Foods traded through the drawing of bills. 
. 'gis in: the c^ se of letters of credit the banks charged commission 
as tvell as a standard correspondence fee in respect of each 
transaction. The commission, fixed by agreement between 
the banks, was % of the value of the transaction. This 
charge too did not appear to have changed over the period 
under review. 
In the operations described above the banks performed 
free but invaluable service towards the administration of 
the Government's exchange control and import licensing regulations 
introduced in July, 1961. Import licences were checked to 
ensure that importers for whom. they opened credits or handled 
bills carried valid import licences actually issued in their 
naMQ 
and that they had paid a required tax of 1% on the value 
of 1Mports permitted by 
the licence. 1 
Frequent changes in or additions to the exchange control 
regulations seemed 
to the author to aggrevate the banks' 
consciousness of 
the many man-hours devoted to a service 
,, vhich does not yield 
them any income. 
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Commercial Bank Liabilities and Assets 
The various components of commercial bank liabilities and 
assets are presented in Table 15 and Table 16 respectively 
for the period 1950-64. The data are the most recently 
revised figures available to the author; as far as possible 
quarterly figures are shown to illustrate seasonal characteris- 
tics. Individual items aro analysed below. 
Deposit liabilities to non-bank customers 
As mentioned earlier, the bunks' deposit 1irbilities to 
non-bank customers consist of current accounts or demand deposits, 
savings and time deposits. 
Current accounts are withdrawable 
on demand and subject to cheque whether 
in withdrawals at the 
counter or in transactions 
involving a third party. Savings 
deposits. are normally withdrawable at a minimum interval of 
seven days from 
the date of last withdrawal. Time deposits 
are in theory required 
to be left undisturbed by the customer 
for an agreed minimum period. In practice the minima are 
six months, and a year and above. 
It will also be recalled 
that until August 1959 the Ghana Commercial Bank did not 
operate savings and 
time deposits. In fact, its lirtbilities 
on these. type of accounts only 
became quantitatively important 
as from 1962. 
In relation to private individuals current account 
facilities are generally open to only persons whose income 
receipts 
follow some regular pattern within the year, mainly 
on a monthly 
basis. In addition, there nre restrictions 
4;; ýich limit 
the utilization of current account facilities to 
individuals in receipt of some minimum level of annual income.. 
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Table 15 
Ghana : Summary of Commercial Bank Liabilities 
1950-64. £1000 
Total 
Liabilities 
Deposits and 
Balances of 
Deposits of Non-Bank Customers Other 
bi Li 
Other Banks Total Demand Savings Time 
- a 
litiesa 
1950 11,342+ 192 10,911 8,755 13611 545 240 
-1951 12,348 377 11 , 652 9,232 1,863 557 319 1952, 16,359 382 14,573 11,756 2,204 613 1,404 
1953 20,082 1,041 16,667 13,034 2,601 1,032 '2,37. 
1951+- 23,585 1,299 19,656 15,423 2,938 1,295 2,629 
1955 25,515 1,079 21,793 16,814 3,839 1,140 2,644 
1956 24,721 803 22,114 16.9289 4p69-3 1,132 1', 804. 
1957 .. 
27,315 3,186 22,796 16,058 5,439 1,299 1,335 
1958 30,168 1,323 27,340 19,150 6,675 1,515 1,504 
1959 
March 31,797 1,669 28,670 19,127 77,388 2,155 1,457 
June 34,578 3,207 30,015 20,335 7,572 2,108 1,357 
Sept. ' 39,361 8,337 29,274 20,034 7,598 1.9642 1,750 
Dec. . 37,583 3,287 
32,484 21,480 8,461 2,543 11810 
1960 
Marc 34,771 996 32,269 20,967 9,167 2,135 1,525 
June b) n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. 
Sept b) n. --. n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. 
])CO. , 
54,669 , 
12,788 38,855 26,102 10,747 2,006 3,026 
1961 
March 46,560 5,081 39,261 25,042 12,041 2,178 2,218 
June 48,502 3,354 41,612 26,882 12,316 2,1+14 3,536 
Sept. 47,116 5,292 38,019 25,175 10,491 2,353 3,805 
Dec. 54,825 6,464 43,165 29,806 10,756 2,603 5,196 
1962 
march 55,093 3,883 43,329 28,239 11,983 3,107 7,881 
June 63,84-3 2,1+39 47,810 31,470 11,795 4,545 13,594 
Sept. 61,297 1,631+ 46,139 30,617 11,395 4,127 13,524 
Dec. 79,442 2,112 58,776 41,470 12,491 4,815 18,554 
1963. 
March 77,242 2,355 57,961 39,332 13,1+69 5,160 16,926 
June 81,776 1,524 61 , 608 1+1,906 13,786 5,916 18,644 
Sept. 70,215 1,905 58,978 38,785 14,010 6,183 9,332 
Dec;. 83,084 6,586 67,033 45,816 15,068 
6,149 9,465 
1964 
March 83,596 3,016 70,734 47,654 16,312 6,768 9,801 
June 86,830 949 73,935 49,926 16,752 7,257 11 , 946 
Sept. 92,150 875 76,666 52,120 16,888 7,659 14,609 
Dec: 112,531 4,555 86,023 59,025 19,026 7,972 21,953 
(a) "Other liabilities" is a miscellaneous item comprising capital and 
reserves, interest 
due on deposits, liabilities arising in respect of 
documentary credits unused overdraft facilities, etc. 
(b) Revised figures not available. 
source: Central Bureau of Statistics and Bank of Ghana. 
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probably not uniform among all the banks. 
Such conditions preclude a large section of the population 
from current account ihcilities. Moreover, there is little 
doubt that the operation of a current account cannot appeal 
to illiterptes. 
Savings ßecounts are thus the only commercial bank deposit 
facilities ýccessib le to low-income earners both literate and 
illiterate. In theory as well as in practice law-income 
recipients are unable to meet the minimum balances required to 
keep open a time deposit account. Moreover, time deposits 
would not-. appeal to low-income earners whose financial balances 
are by -and large held for transactions purposes. 
Earlier writers, notably Sir Cecil Trevor, reported that 
w' 
s., wings accounts tended 
to be operated as current accounts; 
that is, a large number of customers tended to draw on their 
deposits at intervals of less than seven days. This practice, 
which from the authorºs conversations with bankers in Ghana 
hn s only been partially stopped by the banks, reflects the 
true-monetary nature of savings accounts to depositors whose 
choice of financial asset 
is in practice liruited to currency 
nd savings 
deposits. 
It seerils that the bulk of time deposits were held by 
firms and other corporate bodies including statutory or public 
Corporations with funds surplus 
to requirements over a given 
period. In an economy subject 
to strong seasonal flucturttions 
time deposits provided income on seasonally idle funds. Two 
points need to 
be noted here. First, for most firms and other 
End of Period 
1950 
1951 
. 1952, 1953 
195+. 
1955 
1956, 
1957 
1958, 
1959 ' March 
June 
Sept. 
Dec. 
1960 
LGV. 
1961. 
March 
June 
Sept. 
Dec. 
1962 
March 
June i 
Sept. 
Doc. 
1963, 
" Larch 
June 
Sept. 
Dec. 
1964(c) 
march 
June 
Sept. 
Ded. 
3. N ; .. 
TABLE '16 
.' 
.7 Ghana: Assets of Commercial Banks, 1950-64 £'OOO 
Cash Reserve Balances due by 
other Banks 
Treasury Bills Total 
Liquid 
Loans and Advances Securities 
Dotal 
Assets Total 'Cash 
Balances 
with Ban Total 
Banks 
in Banks Total 
Ghana 
Govt. 
Forei-En 
Govt-. 
Other 
Bills 
Assets 
(Gross) Total On Current 
t A 
On Other 
Total Ghana Foreign Other (al 
Oth r 
of Ghana Ghana 
Abroad (2)+(5)+(8) ccoun Account Govt. rs e 
+(11) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) " (14)* (15) (76) (17) (18) (19) 
11,344 2,495, 2,493 - 1 , 072 139 3,933 - - - 
6,565 3,993 781. 
12,348 3,540 3,540 -" 3,137 161 2,976 - - - 6,677 4,177 - - - - 2,155 
16,359 2,581 2,581 . - 
6,992 158 6,834 - - - 9,573 4,632 - - - - 1,811-1 
20,082 3,327 3,327 - 9,932 636 9,296 - - - 13,259 3,922 - - 1,060 - . 1,060 
2,755 
23,585 4,878 4,878 - 10,039 1,067 8,972 - - - 14,917 4,177 - - 1,736 126 1,610 1,925 
25,515 -2,956 5 - 12,359 908 11,451 
650 - 650 - 15,965 5,855 - - 1,769 91 1,678 1,859 
24,721 2,958 2,958 - 10,055 652 94.03 700 - 700 - 13,713 7,443 - - 1,707 36 1,671 2,04+ 
27,315 3,783 3,783 34 11,178 1,366 
15)8.12 
550 - 550 281 15,792 7,775 6,205 1,570 1,705 34 1,671 2,450 30,168 4,845 3,500 1,341 12,125 746 11,379 1,800 - 1,800 286 19,056 6,830 5,747 1,083 1,831 161 1,670 Z, 138 
31,797 4,073 2,562 1,511 14,294 788 13,566 2,000 - 2,000 288 20,655 6,890 5,513 1,377 1,910 24Ö 1,670 2,341 
34', 578 8,180 3,444 4,736 11,864 1,596 10,268 2,300 - 2,300 387 22,732 7,432 5,855 1,577 1,914 244 1,670 2,497 
39,361 13,433 6,262 7,167 8,335 970 7,365 3,000 "- 3,000 41,8 25,216 9,417 7,573 1,844 1,915 245 1,670 2,812 
37,583 6,524 4,234 2,290 11,318 764 19,554 1,100 - 1,000 551 19,493 14,113 12,653 1,460 1,837 245 1,592 2,138 
34,791 3,883 1,830 2,053 12,073 419 11,654 5,110 3,610 1,500 632 21,698 8,896 7,587 1,309 1,837 245 1,592 "2,359 
n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. - n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. me. n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. 
n. a. 
54,669 
n. a. 
7,349 
n. a. 
4,286 
n. a. 
3,063 
n. a. 
14,092 
n. a. 
1,081. 
no a. 
13,008 
n. a. 
4,635 
n. a. 
4,635 
n. a. 
- 
n. a. 
4,019 
n. a. 
30,095 
n. a. 
19,581 
n. a. 
17,972 
n. a. 
1,609 
n. a. 
1,838 
n. a. 
247 
n. a. 
1,591 
n. a. 
3,155 
+6,560 4,627 1,758 2,869 9,555 637 8,918 5,083 5,085 - 2,675. 21,942 19,349 17,829 1,520 1,838 247 1,591 3,433 +8,502 3,351 1,848 1,503 13,194 934 12,260 5,085 5,085 5,187 26,817 15,837 14,207 1,630 1,938 347 1,591 3,919 
+7,116 4,164 2,472 1,692 6,854 ', 942 5,912 5,030 5,030 - 1,659 17,707 23,208 21,543 1,755 1,857 1,766 1,591 4,344 
54,825 5,258 4,617 641 7,853 1,006 6,847 6,651 6,651 642 20,404. 26,673 24,957 1,716 2,135 544 1,591 5,612 
55,093 9,068 4,258 4,810 2,175 943 1,232 12,470 12,470 - 487 24,200 23,833 22,046 1,788 2,202 611 1,591 4,858 S3,843 6,240 2,822 3,418 1,317 774 543 21,906 21,906 - 4140 29,903 18,645 17,5+ 1', 141 3,333 2,235 1,098 11,962 51,297 7,313 2,850 4,463 1,921 
.. 
770 1,151 20,304 20,304 - - 382 29,920 17,582 16,430 1,152 2,344 1,246 1,098 11,451 
79,442 9,236 7,053 2,183 3,447 1,60t. 1,843 18,063 18,063 - 969 31,715 29,950 28,696 1,254 1,373 1,282 91 16,404 
77,242 5,218 3,570 1,648 1 996 ,. 622 1,374 21,314 21,314 -` 885 29,413 29,284 28,112 1,172 
1,323 1,232 91 17,222 
31,776 8,177 3,234 4,943 1', 597 645 952 24,823 24,823 -' 868 35,465 28,016 26,774 1,242 1,373 1,282 91 16,922 
70,215 6,405 3,299 
. 
3,106 1,214 653 561 9,273 9,273 - 4,083 20,975 30,378 29,200 1,178 11A23 11,332 91 7,439 
33,084 5,633 4,742 891 2,923 2,532 391 12)+34 12,434 - 3,361 24,351 38,700 37,394 1,306 11,45 11,365 91 8,577 
33,596 6,891 3,846 3,02+5 1,789 936 853 14,984 14,984 - 8,676 32,340 31,499 29,855 1,644 11,1f5 11,365 91 8,301 
36,830 8,243 3,813. 4,430 3,033 1,923 1,110 19,574 19,571 - 2,712 33,562 29,127 27,16 1,965 11,94 11,949 - 12,192 
92,150 9,723 3,510 6,213 1,893 n. a. n. a. 19,025 19,025 - 3,812 34,453 31,374 28,985 2,389 13,52 13,529 - 12,794 
12,531 12,994 n. a. n. a. 2,103 n. a. n. a. 26,699 26,699 4,938 47,734 37,883 n. a. n. a. 13,89 13,894 - 14,021 
(a peal assets and contra accounts 
(b Rcvisorl fij,, ures not available. 
(C Pre kt1o, ms of totals not avail 
Total liquid assets (Column 12ý 
,. 
JI 
(see Table 15 footnote (a)) Source: As. *for Table 15. 
)le for all items. for September and December 196) do not have the sane meaning as before due to alterations in the concept of n lirnt'. d as t 
implied in Crooit Co)itrol Reýülatiohs introiucod in the first half of 1961+. 
y 
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bodies wishing to esrn income on temporarily surplus funds the 
choice was until mid-1961 between local time and savings 
deposits (in both commercial banks and the Post Office Savings 
Bank) and short-term investments in London. Secondly, 
following the restrictions on the flow of funds out of Ghana 
from thckt dc4te local Treasury Bills provided an alternr' tive to 
bank debt as a source of income on temporarily surplus funds. 
These points will be further elucidated in various parts 
of this study. 
Table 17 shows commercial bunk deposit liabilities to 
non-bank customers, calculated as averages of end-of-month 
figures to enable comparison over the whole of the period 
under examination. Any other basis of calculation would 
either not be possible, for the whole period or, in being 
related to only one month, would be unrepresentative of any 
given year as a whole. 
.. 94. - 
Takle 17 
Ghana: Commercial Bank Deposit Liabilities 
to Non-Lank Customers, 1950-64 
(Averages of e nd-of-month figures) 
Total 
Demand Deposits Savings Deposits Time Dep osits 
deposits . "mount 5 of Amount of Amount ö of 
£G Million £G Million total £G Millio n total £G Million total 
1950 11.8 9.7 82.2 1.6 13.6 0.6 4.6 
1951 12.7 10.4 81.9 1.8 14.2 0.6 4.7 
1952 13.3 10.6 79.7 2.0 15.0 0.6 4.5 
1953 17.3 13.8 79.8 2.4 13.9 1.0 5.8 
1954 19.3 15.3 79.3 2.7 14.0 1.4 7.3 
1955 20.0 15. x+ 77.0 3.4 17.0 1.3 6.5 
1956 21.9 16.5 75,4 4.2 19.2 1.3 5.9 
1957 23.5 16.9 71.9 5.3 22.6 1.3 5.5 
1958 25.3 17.4 68.8 6.4 25.3 1.5 5.9 
1959 30.2+ 20.4 67.1 7.8 - 25.7 2.2 7.2 
1960 34.4 22.8 66.3 9.5 27.6 2.1 6.1 
1961 x+0.7 27.0 66.3 11.3 27.8 2.4 5.9 
1962 2+9.4 33.8 68.2 11.7 23.7 3.8 7.7 
1963 55.3 35.8 64.7 13.8 25.0 5.7 10.3 
1964 67.1 44.4 66.2 15.4 23.0 7.3 10.9 
Parts may not add u_-) to totals due to rounding. 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Accra. 
Tot, ql deposts as defined in Table 17 increased 
consistently over the period. The monthly average for 1964 
was £G67.1 million Zs comp'ired to £Gll. 8 million for 1950, an 
increase of 468% ör an arithmetic average growth rate of 
about 33% per year. 
Dividing the period somewhat arbitrarily into 1950-56 
and 1957-64 (with the latter coinciding with the period of 
political Independence) the annual arithmetic growth averages 
33% in 195'7-64 compared to 14% ouor 1950-56. Furthermore 
if. vie separate 1957-64 into 1957-60 and 1961-64 so that the 
latter coincides with the period of limited convertibility 
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in Ghana vie find th^t total bank deposits increRsed at nn 
arithmetic average rate of 20.3% in 1961-64 as compared to 
15.5 during 1957-60. 
The picture depicted by theso comparisons is also borne 
out in analysis conducted in terms of geometric averages. 
Over the period total bank deposits increased ,ta geometric 
average rate of approximately 13.5% per year. Over 1950-56 
and 1957-64 the average growth rates per year k7ýere 'respectively 
11.2% and 16.9dr. During 1957-60 and 1961-64 the annual 
and 17.2 average growth rates were 15.2 
%. 
It is thus clear that the growth of deposits was very 
rauch marked in the post-Independence period, and even-more 
so from 1961. 
The recorded -rovfth rates reflected the enema upward 
trends in the country during the period: increasing G. D. P. 
education and the expansion of banking offices to cover a 
re^ter irea, of the country. 
In iddition two brsic chRnEes in f. ingncial practices 
can be singled out as having influenced the higher growth 
ritte of bank deposits during the second half of the period. 
The factors, themselves larr ely interconnected, were first an 
increased level of domestic lending by the banks and secondly 
the imposition of stringent restrictions on external payments 
from July 1961. 
The first of these factors is clearly brought out in 
Table 16 where it can be seen that during most of the period 
1950-60 total outstanding domestic loans (that is, the sum of 
loans and advances, discounts, Government securities and 
-Jo- 
Treasury Bills held by the banks) were loser than total gross 
external assets . Althou h for the country as a whole the 
volume of gross foreign exchange assets is determined basically 
by the overall balance of payments, under conditions of free 
convertibility the commercial banks, and indeed all sectors 
other than the monetary authority, could increase their 
foreign exchange balances independently by selling, local 
currency for sterling held by the monetary or currency 
authority. Hence in relation to the banks a high level of 
foreign currency assets irplied a correspondingly lower level 
of domestic lending relative to lending abroad. This stands 
opposed to the developments of the 1930's characterized by a 
much higher volume of domestic lending by the banks in terms 
of both customer credits and open-market credits. 1 It can 
be seen from Table 15 any'. Table 1G th^t the combined commercial 
bank cash/deposit ratios were much higher before 1960 than 
during the 1960's implying considerable excess loanable 
resources in the period 1950-60 as compared to the period 
1961-64. 
The restrictions on external payments influenced the 
expansion of deposits in three ways. First, the restrictions 
closed to the banks their traditional access to the London 
Money Market and therefore the brinks teere faced with a choice 
between excessive cash resources in relation to liabilities 
payable in local currency, and increased domestic lending. 
1, The term "open-market credits" which is used here to refer 
to shiftýable asset.; as distinct from loans and advances as 
ordinarily understood is more appropriate to a setting with an 
established system of intermediate trading, in financial 
instruments. The use of t!:; is tern should not be interpreted to ir. iply the existence' of any s ign7 f, cant level of trading in 
either short or longer-dated financial assets prior to maturit j. 
-97= 
In the ci. rcumstnnces the b'. nks lncregsed their domestic 
lending to both the Government and the private sector. 
Secondly, other foreign firms unable to remit part of their 
funds abroad did invest such funds partly in income-earning 
deposits. As investment income duo to foreign residents 
the stra 1ding of such funds in Ghana in theory amounted to 
imports of capital which should show in the external account 
as debits on current account matched by aquivalent positive 
entries in the capital account. Thirdly, the restrictions 
on external payments led to severe real shortages with respect 
to both imports and domestically produced goods. Thus part 
of the increased deposits were forced savings in so far as 
they were cross of balances which would have been cancelled 
in payments for imports. 
^1 ^b1e 17 -Also shows breakdowns of total deposits into the 
three components mentioned rLbove. Fxcepting slight declines 
in 1955,1957 and 1960 time deposits (av defined in Table 47) 
showed : absolute annual increases over the period under review. 
It is intorestinE to note that while demind deposits 
tigere higher in each year than the sum of savings and time 
deposits, the proportional share of demand deposits in total 
non-bank deposits fell over the period as a whole within the 
range of 82.2% in 1950 to 64.7%a in 1963. By contrast, 
savings and time deposits each showed an upward trend in the 
annual relative share of total deposits, notwithstanding some 
fluctuation. 
It is generally to be expected that the fictors analysed 
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earlier as havinL influenced the expansion in total deposits 
were also influential in the risinr, absolute level of each of 
the separate deposit accounts. 
Seasonal characteristics of deposit liabilities are 
clearly illustrated in Table 15 which shows quarterly figures 
for the period 1959-64. For other years reliable monthly- 
or quarterly data irrere not readily obtainable. 
Total deposits were highest in December, as mentioned 
earlier in conformity to other economic variables in Ghana 
znd in response to the spurt of economic activity associated 
with the sale of cocoa. 
Table 15 also reveals a smaller quarterly peak in total 
deposits and demand deposits at the end of June. It is 
difficult to point to specific factors responsible for this. 
However we could re`ard Juno as a hypothetical watershed 
preceded by a period of debt repayments with the banks, and 
followed by n period of various financial adjustments including; 
remittances of profits abroad, payments of taxes and early 
orders for imports in anticipation of the ensuing cocoa 
season. 
On the basis of the quarterly. data in Table 15 it will 
be seen that fluctuations in total deposits arose mainly 
from the influence of demand deposits which exhibited a 
similar pattern of fluctuation. 
Prior to 1961 time deposits were known to have fluctuated 
considerably during the year in response to, among other thing$ 
changes in short-term rates in London relative to commercial 
-901- 
bank borrowing rates in Miami. Thus it is significant that 
from 1961, when severe restrictions were imposed on external 
payments including transactions with other Sterling Area 
countries, time deposits showed no Important fluctuati on, s. 
On the other hand available information indicates that 
savings deposits were traditionally subject to a persistent 
upward trend both between successive years and within the 
year. The only known deviation occurred from mid-1961 to 
the third quarter of 1962 (see Table 15) when there was a 
decrease in savings deposits. This was an unprecedented 
occurrence for which the following three reasons were offered 
in the annual economic survey. 
' 
1. That the increase in import duties and the introduction 
of purchase taxes in July 1961 led to intensified expenditure 
on goods which continued to bear pre-budget prices. Such 
expenditures were caid to have been financed partly by 
dissaving. 
2. That a wider coverage of income tax, and compulsory 
1. Economic Survey (of Ghana) 1961, p. 91. 
These explanations which may bo adopted as generally valid 
wore, of course, simplifications based on the assumption that 
there were no corapensatory additions to savings deposits from 
the sectors in whose favour the original withdrawals were made . 
iloreover, rumour-induced not withdrawals on savings deposits 
should be reflected in increased holdings of currency outside 
the banking system because those susceptible to such rumours 
would also be people whose choice of financial assets would be 
limited to sowings deposits and currency. In addition, the 
exp]mati_ons given above should affect deposits in the Post 
Office Savings Bank as well. But it is well nigh impossible 
to isolate the effects of these factors in all such magnitudes. 
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savings in the same state budget led to di s7 nvestmont in order 
to replenish reduced disnosable current income. 
3. That in July 1961 there were Wi despreadfalse rumours that 
the Government eras planning to confiscate all private savings 
in the country. - 
Re1irb1e d^ta on the vvrnorshi. p of deposits are available 
on a corlp^. rable basis for the period 1960 to September 1964. 
These ire presented in Tgble 18, with ownership classified into 
three broad c-. egories. Public Authorities include Central 
Government, government departments, and various st-tutory 
bodies and enterprises. Liniited Liability Cor:: panies rise 
f irres incorporated locally and abroad and "Other Customers" 
embrace private individuals and partnorships. 
Total deposits and the components should be equal to the 
figures shoran in Table 15 for the same items. That this is 
not so for everyone of the three items in Table 18 cannot be 
explained by the author. Hovvetier, the differences are so 
small that the picture depicted in Table 18 is not impaired 
in any sense. 
We must Also point out that deposits duo to Central 
- Government 
formed only n sim 11 proportion of deposits due to 
Public Authorities. This tiwns especially so in the case of 
time and savinLs deposits. 
' The investments of public 
institutions in such deposits derived in no small mersure fror 
excesses of budgetary allocations over requirenentsat any 
particular timo. 
2 
1. Bank of Ghana Annual Report, June 1964 p. 61. 
2. Bank of Ghana Annual Report June 1963, p. 54. 
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A few developments stand out prominently in Table 18. 
I 
First, Public Authorities increased their share of total 
bank deposits from 17.815 at the end of 1960 to 35.9% on the 
same date in 1963. At the end of September 1964 the relative 
share was 32% but in view of the concentration of economic 
_ctivity in the last quarter of the year we would expect the 
percentage to rise in December to over 3216% as in September. 
Of demand deposits Public Authorities' share increased from 
22.9% at the end of 1960 to approximately 50% on the same dato 
in 1963. At the end of September 1964, even before the 
seasonal upsurge of bank credit to the public sector in 
connection with the purchases of cocoa from producers, the 
share of Public Authorities in demand deposits stood at 43.6%. 
The increasing share of the public sector in-demand 
deposits demonstrates the growth of this sector in the economy 
of Ghana from 1960 one rtrd. On the basis of. Table 18, whilst 
the public sector increased its share of demand deposits 
(held with commorcial banks) from 22.9% in 1960 to 49.6% 
in 1963 the shire of the private sector (limited liability 
companies ^ndlother customers') declined from 77.1% to 50.5/%. 
From this it can be deduced that bank credit also shifted from 
the private sector in favour of the public sector. On the 
whole the increasing role of the public sector was an important 
aspect of developments in the monetary system over the period 
under examination. In the last three years of the period 
there was awe evidence of crodit stringency from the point 
of view of the private sector whilst the Government and its 
-102- 
various agencies continued to obtain a Food measure of their 
credit requirements. 
The other significant development in the ownership of 
bank deposit liabilities zs presented in `able 18 were the 
incroases in both the absolute and relative share of Limited 
Liability Companies in time and savings deposits (for which 
separate classifications by ownership were not available to 
the author) . From a more trickle of 0.8106' at the end of 1960 
this sector increased their share to 13.7% at the end of 
1963 and 15.9% at the end of September 1964. In so far as 
this sector was dominated by foreign firms in terms of volume 
of business the increases recorded would, in no small measure, 
be due to the stranding in Ghana of funds 
_earmarked 
for 
external remittance. 
Deposits and balances of other banks 
Deposits and balances of other banks are shown in Table 15. 
The corresponding assets, balances due by other banks, have 
been presented in Tablo 16. The litter have been seprtrrtted 
into balances with banks in Ghana and balances with banks 
abroad. In actual fact balances abroad were assets of 
e(special 
interest as they were an irnportnit part of the banks 
external assets. They consisted of liquid balances 
maintained with head offices and correspondents, mainly the 
expatriate banks' contributions to the pool of resources 
centred at their head offices and managed by the latter within 
the context of their supra-territorial banking operations. 
By contrast deposits and balances of other banks could not 
Iý 
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be separated into domestic li^bilities and external liabilities. 
However, in view of the fact that external balances were very 
high during most of the period it is reasonable to assume thZt 
the banks viere seldom, if ever indebted to their head offices 
or foreign correspondent banks. Thus we can re "ard the bulk 
of br. lances due to other bn. nks (T^b1e 15) its domestic liabilities 
comparable to balances due by other banks in Ghana on the 
assets side (Table 16). 
Theoretically, the sum of balances due to other banks 
and balances due by other banks in Ghana should be zero. 
In practice this was not so because of unadjusted debits and 
credits arising . 
frort customers' chequing operations with respect 
" to any pr? rticular day. 
Until the opening' of the Bankers Clearing House in Accra 
in April 1958, inter-bank clearincr was effected by debiting 
or crediting Recounts which each bank maintained with every 
other bank at major centres. Net indebtedness on the part 
of any prtrticular bank was settled by direct balnncing and 
in ttt few crises 
by settlement through bzlnnces maintained in 
London. From April 1958 clezring continued to be effected 
through inter-bank deposits outside Accra but all clearing 
in the orbit of Accra vmas settled through daily meetings at 
the Accra ClearinL house under the supervision of the Banking 
Department of the Bank of Ghana, which 11130 provided the 
'premises. At the Clearing House net indebtedness is settled 
-by\ a debit to bankers? current accounts tr_aintained at the 
central Bank. The author was unable to obtain specific 
.. 104-. 
information as to whether the occasion had ever arisen where 
a particular bank was overdrawn at the Central Bank and the 
terms on which a bank so indebted would be accommodated. 
However, the general impression gained from discussions with 
bankers in Ghana was that a bank was not normally allowed 
or expected to bo overdrawn on its accounts with the Central 
Bank. 
Other Liabilities 
Tablo 15 includes a separate item 'other liabilities'' 
the size of which rose remarkably from the end of 1961. 
"Other liabilitiest` is a miscellany comprising capital and 
reserves, interest due on deposits, margins against contingent 
liabilities or unused overdraft facilities and liabilities 
arising in respect of documentary credits. The very 
high 
level of "other lißbilities" between June 1962 and June 1963 
(Table 15) rel? tive to the previous period was said to have 
arisen from one bank including in 
its returns, inter-branch 
balances and thus overstating its sssets and correspondingly 
"other liabilities". 1 The discovery of this mistake and the 
consequent exclusion of the offending 
item fror returns 
explains the much lower level of 
"other liabilities" in the 
months immediately following June 1963. The upward turn of 
this collective item in 1964 may therefore be taken as of 
separate significance. 
In all, the remarkable increases in "other liabilities" 
from 1962 reflected the influence of the restrictions on 
external payments, mentioned earlier, as prearranged overdraft 
1. Bank of Ghana, Annual Report June 1964 p. 79. 
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facilities could not be utilized due to delays in obtaining 
foreign exchange 
. 
permits . 
Asset Distribution 
The distribution of commercial bank assets is presented 
in Table 16, showing the latest revised figures with quarterly 
positions given wherever possible. 
The collective and t iscellaneous item "other assets" 
corresponds largely to "other liabilities" as explained in 
the previous section. 
Total assets increased from £G11.3 million at the end of 
1950 to £G112.5 million at the end of 1964, a rise of 892%. 
Total assets excluding "other assets" increased by 838% from 
£G10.5 million at the end of 1950 to £G98.5 million at the 
end of 1964 (see Table 19). In terms of earning assets as 
defined and presented in Table 20 the increase was 739% 
from £G7.9 million to £G66.3 million at the end of 1950 and 
1964 respectively. In all these cases the expansion was 
strongly marked after 1957 and particularly' '196©. 
The most remarkable development in commercial banking 
operations over the period under examination was the decline 
of external assets in total assets from 1959. This is 
illustrated in Table 20 where it is shown that in terms of 
earning assets the proportion of foreign - that is, sterling - 
assets ranged from 59.11' to 72.7% between end-1952 and end-1958. 
To this must be contrasted the rapid decline of foreign assets 
from 48.8% at the end of 1959 to only 0.8% at the end of 1963. 
We. will now znglyse individually the main classes of assets. 
--1 aG -- Table 19 
Ghana: Gross Assets of Commercial Banks Classified 
into Domestic and Foreign Assets, 1950-64( ) 
(Fnrl nf' 73--4 -A% 
Domestic 
Assets 
£G Million 
( 1) 
Foreign 
Assets 
£G Million 
(2) 
Total 
( 1) & (2) 
(3) 
Rittes of 
(2) to (3) 
(4) 
1950 6.6 3.9 10.5 37.2 
1951 7.9 3.0 10.9 27.5 
1952 7.4 6.8 14.2 47.9 
1953 7.9 10.4 18.2 57.1 
1954 10.2 10.6 20.8 51.0 
1955 9.8 13.8 23.7 58.2 
1956 11.1 11.8 22.9 51.5 
1957 13.0 12.3 25.3 48.6 
1958" 12.6 15.1 27.7 54.5 
1959 20.2 13.7 33.9 40.4 
1960 32.9 18.6 51.5 36.1 
1961 40.7 8.6 48.2 17.9 
1962 60.7 2.3 63.0 3.7 
1963 74.0 0.5 74.5 0.7 
1964 97.7 0.8 98.5 0.8 
(n) Assets exclude "other assets" which were for the most 
part provisions of a non-earning nature. Thus unused 
overdraft facilities are exluded even though some minimum 
charge is made on such facilities. 
As far as possible trade bills have been sepirrited into 
the foreign and domestic components (see Table 16). 
Brlnnces with b'tnks in Ghana tind nbrond hive both been 
entered gross of corresponding li-ibilities. 
u. + 
Hlsox nai0, between totals and the sum of prtrts 
c: re due to rounding. 
Source: As for Table 16. 
Column (2) 1964 - Economic Survey 1964, p. 134. 
Table 20 
Ghana: Commercial Banks' Domestic and 
Foreign Earning Assets, (a) 1950-63 
Domestic 
Earning Assets 
£G Million 
(1) 
Foreign 
Earning Assets 
£G Million 
(2) 
Total 
Earning Assets 
£G Million 
(3) 
Ratio of 
(2) to (3) 
;o 
(4) 
1950 4.0 3.9 7.9 49.4 
1951 4.2 3.0 7.2 41.7 
1952 4.6 6.8 11.5 59.1 
1953 3.9 10.4 14.3 72.7 
1954 4.3 10.6 14.9 71.1 
1955 5.9 13.8 19.7 70.0 
1956 7.4 11.8 19.2 61.5 
1957 7.8 12.3 20.1 61.2 
1958 7.0 15.1 22.1 68.3 
1959 14.4 13.7 28.1 48.8 
1960 24.5 18.6 43.1 43.2 
1961 34.4 8.6 42.9 20.0 
1962 49.9 2.3 52.2 4.4 
1963 65.7 0.5 66.3 0.8 
(a) Foreign earning assets may be overstated because they 
consist largely of balances with banks abroad" some of which, 
would necessarily'be perfectly liquid balances held for the 
purpose of effecting current transactions. Thus balances 
abroad have been wholly treated as earning assets because 
the sources of information do not distinguish between income- 
earning and non-earning foreign balances. 
Domestic earning assets include all local assets 
other than cash (till money, balances with other banks 
and bankers' deposits at the Central Bank), and 
"other assets". 
Parts may not add up exactly to totals due to rounding. 
Source; As for Table 16. 
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Loans and advances 
Until the first quarter of 1960 loans and advances 
constituted practically the entire local earning assets of 
the commercial banks. 
On the basis of the data presented in Table 16 it can be 
seen th-it the high levels of loans and advances in the 1960's 
began in the last quarter of 1959 when the outstanding total 
of £G14.1 million was a little under twice the highest level 
at a comparable date in the period 1950-58. By contrast 
from the end of 1959 the level increased consistently, 
judging by the end-of-year position, to £G38.7 million in 1963. 
Loans and advances were basically of the short-term, 
in theory self-liquidating type, granted for periods ranging 
between six months and three years, the latter being an 
exception rather than the rule. 
For most of the period under examination (and certainly 
for the period before 1950) such credits were strongly 
associated with foreign trade, mainly inward trade. Commercial 
activity involving the importation and wholesale and retail 
of imported goods constituted the main beneficiary of bank 
credit until the last two to three years of the period 
under review. 
The main reasons for this were clearly put by Newlyn 
and Rowanl'and require only a brief analysis here. 
The expatriate banks which dominated the commercial 
banking system up to the closing years of our period were 
traditionally accustomed to finance expatriate enterprise 
1. Ibid pp. 79-84. 
See also 
*. Nevin, op. cit., pp. 45-67. 
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comprising mainly commerce and mining. Expatriate enterprise 
was (judged to be the principal creditworthy sector in terms 
of the bankst credit standards which in being standards 
prevailing in Britain and other Furopean countries were sometimes 
alleged to be in many cases Alien to the indigenous sector. 
This at once explains the small volume of domestic lending 
in the form of customer credits as well as the concentration 
of such credits in commerce. 
Agriculture, operated entirely by the indigenous population 
was until the 19601 s precluded from bank credit. On the 
other hand manufacturing industry was until the 19601s very 
much underdeveloped. The bulk of what could be described as 
manufacturing industry was of very small scale of the back 
yard type. Thus manufacturing was largely untouched by 
bank 
credit. The small number of large-scale indigenous manufacturing 
establishments operating before 1960 were mair_ly state-owned 
enterprises which obtained their working capital requirements 
from the national budget. ' Furthermore, the banks were as 
now basically opposed to granting, advances 
for other than 
short-term, mainly sersonal, purposes. 
Further analyticsl points emerge from these factoru. 
First, bank credit was of small volumo because, of the 
limited number of acceptable borrowers. The major ones were 
branches or subsidiaries of giant international firms which, 
in so far as they required external financing usually sought 
such credit in oversea money markets. 
Secondly, the banks were able to restrict their lending 
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to short-term requirements because the major firms which 
depended on heavy fixed capital raised all capital loans in 
the advanced capitalist countries. Moreover, given the 
banks, unwillingness to lend domestically at medium - and 
long-term, they were able to operate on such low levels of 
domestic lending bocause they could a 1xPrays lend in London. 
As part of supra-national banking organisations the expatriate 
banks could always contribute their surplus resources into 
the much wider international pool of resources centred on and 
operated frort London. 
Thirdly, it was remarkable that agriculture, despite its 
immense weight in the recorded gross national product and 
foreign exchange earnings, was completely outside the 
organised credit market except for sporadic arrangements 
organised under Government auspices. 
1960 and after 
The higher level of loans and advances (which actually 
first occurred in December 1959) was not accompanied by any 
noticertble change in the indur; trial clistribution of 
these assets up to 1962. 
Sever: t1 frctors ctn be singled out as having exerted an 
upward influence on loans and advances during the 1960'x. 
First, the expansion of the Ghana Commercial Bank - from 
1960 onvrard - which, in so far as its clientele comprised 
mainly Africans, extended credit to a section of the population 
previously with only very limited access to bank credit. 
Secondly, from the second half of 1961 each bank was, 
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the exchange control regulations, limited to only 
äG0.5 million in external assets. Thus foreign exchange 
assets held previously were rep<atrizted, that is transferred 
to the Bank of Ghana, in exchange for the latter's liabilities - 
deposits and/or currency. As both these Central Bank liabilities 
were non-e^. rning , issets to the banks there was, ceteris 
paribus, a heightened inducement to expand the volume of 
earning assets. 
Thirdly, corresponding to the point made above it is 
plausible to argue that the expatriate firms who could ordinaril-j 
obtain credit from abroad most probably refrained from doing 
so to the same extent because of difficulties involved in 
oversea remittances. This also would imply that such large 
firms made far greater use of local credit facilities. 
Fourthly, the restrictions on foreign payments, in theory, 
not only severed the link between British and Ghanaian costs 
of money, but also contributed to greater stability in bank 
deposits by removing the ease with which firms could previously 
trznsfer funds to London in response to prospects of higher 
earnings. Unlike fluctuations inherent in the economy, such 
shuttle movement of funds between Accra and London Uras less 
predictable and therefore the banks. needed to hold unnecessarily 
large cash balances,. 
Fifthly, it can be safely argued that there was a general 
improvement in creditworthiness due to the spread of education 
and, in no small measure, to the impact of the Ghana Commercial 
Bank whose constitution made it essentially a banker to the 
African populations. In other words, like racial prejudice 
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low creditworthiness is subject to a vicious circle which can 
hardly be broken as long as each side remains firm in its 
belief th'it contact with the other would inevitably lead to 
disappointment. Thus by granting higher credits to the 
indigenous people relative to the exp? triate banks the Ghana 
Commercial Bank has been able to influence the indigenous 
business sector to -improve their business methods and to adopt 
a more positive attitude to banks. 
Table 21 is a tabular analysis of the distribution of 
outstanding loans and advances according to various economic 
sectors for the period 1958-64 (earlier years not available). 
The classifications for 1958-60 differ from those of 1961-64 
jr, line with the prescriptions of the agents responsible for 
collection of data. The original separate kinds of sectorial 
classifications have been retained in Table 21 because there 
rre immense conceptual difficulties in merging the classificatiors. 
Furthermore, the more detailed classification in respect of 
1958-60 has its special usefulness in showing clearly the 
position with respect to particular economic activities even 
if only to indicate the smallness of credit to such areas. 
It must be pointed out that in a country such as Ghana 
with the probable exception of the large (expatriate) firms, 
it is very unsafe to attach a high degree of finality to the 
industrial or sectorial divisions shown in Table 21. Most 
Ghanaian businessmen hardly specialize in any particular 
type of activity nor can one often identify the main activity, 
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Furthermore, in a large part of the country the concept of 
the family is so wide and the social financial obligations of 
ostensibly well-off members of the-family so extensive that 
what is reported as an advance for a particular form of 
economic activity might in fact amount to an advance raised 
for the purpose of discharging purely social obligations. 
In recent years considerable coverage has been given 
in the literature to bank lending in Ghana and therefore only 
the 'special developments will be noted here. 
' 
First, until the third quarter of 1963 both the absolute 
and rel^3tive shares of the primary sector were remarkably low 
and particularly so for an economy heavily based on the 
primary sector. There is, however, evidence that 
before 
September 1963 one of the banks had included (in statistical 
returns) under credit for cocoa marketing credits which were 
actually connected with other agricultural purposes. 
2 The 
adjustments which followed the discovery of this error account 
for the large increase in Item (1) in September 1963 with a 
corresponding decrease in Item 
(6) on the same date. 
The increase in outstanding batik credit to the primary 
sector from' September 1963 to 
the ehd of 1964 went largely 
to the sectors classified together as Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fishing. 
Mining and quarrying were throughout the period small 
users of local bank credit 
due probably to the dominance of 
the mining industry by large firms with sufficient internal 
I 
lr See B. M. NiculesCU, op. cit. 
Also the Bznkers I Magazine. March 1966. 
For a full account of the manner in which local financing of 
cocoa purchases evolved overt 
the period see VI. F. Crick (editor), 
"Commonwealth Banking Systems , The Clarendon Press 1965, pp. 377"-9, 
P_ Bank of Ghana, Annual Report June 1964, p. 71. 
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resources. 
1 
The increased level of credit to Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fishing was due mainly to the influence of the State 
Farms Corporation established in 1963 out of various small 
agricultural organisations within the public sector. The 
State Farms Corporation would hive access to credit from the 
state--owned Ghana Commercial Bank in contrast to the ordinary 
private Ghanaian farmer. In addition, fisheries organisations 
both private, publicly-owned and co-operative, have be On on the 
increase since 1961 involving purchases of outboard motors 
fitted to traditional fishing canoes. 2 
Second, Table 21 shows that comalerce', was the largest 
single sectorial user of bank credit between 1958 and 1963 
as well as in the first half of 1964. There is also ample 
evidence that this was the case from the initial years of 
commercial banking in Ghana. 
3 
A distinction is made in Table 21 between credit for cocoa 
MnrketinG and credit for commerce involving other commodities. 
The. latter consisted of credits in respect of imports and 
other trriding szctivities involving imported goods. 
The large 
villolesale importers also supplied goods 
to a host of small 
petty-traders on credit terms obviously excluded 
from Table 21. 
1, - 
From the author's personal knowledge quarrying was largely 
a small-scale operation concerned with stone 
breaking though 
the construction of the Tema Harbour and the Volta Dam gave a 
considerable boost to the quarrying industry. 
2. The author is indebted to Mr. Wynn-Davies (formerly of 
the University College of Cape Coast, Ghana and now at the 
University of Leeds) for drawing attention to this point. 
7 , 
See Newlyn and Rowan, op. cit., pp. 79-84. 
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However, in an ultimate sense ouch credits might be regarded 
as financed by bank credit in so far the wholesale firms were 
themselves able to hold stock investments by means of bank credit. 
One of tho most significant developments in commeroial 
b^nking practices was the general decline in credit granted 
for commercial undertakings, other than cocoa, in 1964, One 
cannot say specifically that this necessarily indicated the 
beginning of a downward trend. However', two developments 
would indicate that credit for commerce was on the downward 
slope for the foreseeable future. First, a persistently 
adverse trade balance coupled with an all-time low level of 
convertible reserves indicated that imports would be further 
restricted in subsequent years. Secondly, the credit control 
regulations introduced in April 1964 were clearly intended to 
channel bank resources away from commerce as such. 
The use of local credit on a large scale to finance cocoa 
purchases is a recent development which commenced in 1960 
with the appoi ntment, by Government wishes, of the United 
Gh, inn Farmers Co-operative Council as the sole buying; agent 
to the Cocoa Marketin5 Board. 
Previously purchases of cocoa from producers had been 
handled mainly by the large expatriate trading firms. They 
depended largely on funds arising from their general trading 
operations and to a lesser extent on local credit and resources 
. mpli 
from overseas. After delivering their purchases at 
rý 
n 
scheduled warehouses appointed by the Cocoa Marketing Board 
the latter paid theca 90% of the value pending the marketing of 
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the crop overseas. During this period the Cocoa Marketing 
Board had large sterling funds and did not normally use bank 
credit to pay either the 90jä or the remainder. Where the 
Board- s sterling resources were not readily available to meet 
repayments to the buying agents it utilized credit in London 
on the security of its own sterling investments. 
The appointment of the Farmers' Co-operatives was 
accompanied by a Government decision that the Ghana Commercial 
Bank should be the sole financier of local cocoa purchases. 
Table 21 does not indicate the full extent of credits 
granted by the Ghana Commercial Bank for this purpose, as the 
act ni manner of the bank's involvement tended to change 
between 1961 and 1964. 
During the 1961-2 cocoa season (from September - October 
to February - March) purchases were financed partly through 
Government deposits with the Ghana Commercial Bank obtained 
by sale of sterling securities by the Government to the 
Bank of Ghana. These deposits were especially earmarked 
for cocoa financing) Part of the necessary finance was 
advanced from 
the bank's own resources with the aid of stand-by 
arrangerlents with the 
Bank of Ghana to cover the portion 
for which the bank's own'resources were inadequate. 
The Bank of Ghana granted the extra advances against the 
1. Economic Survey (of Ghana ) 1961, p. 98. At the end of 
Ii"ecember special deposits maintained with the Ghana Commercial 
sank amounted to approxim. n. tely £G20 million. One source 
otQtes that the 
initial deposit was £G23 million (see 
W. F. Crick, op. cit., p. 379) . That' as much is £G20 million 
remained on deposit nt the end of December, 1961 was partly 
because in th^. t scason the purchases of cocoa reached the peak 
jr, February 1962 instead of the usual peak in December. It 
could also be partly 
because the deposit was operited on a 
revolving basis replenished 
by proceeds from sales in the 
world markets . 
., 11 6. - 
security of sterling assets of the Cocoa marketing Board 
pledged to it by the Ghana Commercial Bank on the prior 
understanding that the latter would redeem the pledged assets 
with procoeds from cocoa sales overseas. 1 Thus Evas 
commenced t? iö participation I*j the Bank of Ghana in the financing 
of cocoa purchases. 
During the 1963-64 season a new method was introduced 
gýin involving joint participation by both the Ghana 
Commercial Bank and the Bank of Ghana. 
Domestic bills were drawn by the Cocoa Marketing Board 
on its m^rketing subsidiary the Cocoa Marketing Company, 
made payable to drawer' s order and endorsed to the order of 
the Ghana Commercial Bank. The &hana Commercial Bank discounted 
the bills thus providing direct finance, or re-discounted then 
with the Bank of Ghana. The Bank of Ghana played an important 
role in this financial arrangement by re-discounting a large 
portion of the cocoa bills. At the end of December, 1963 
out of a total of £G17 million of the bills outstanding the 
Bank of Ghana held £G14.5 million or 83.5%. 
2 
It is thus clear that the extent of commercial bank 
credit for cocoa financing is very much understated in 
Table 21 
with regard to the 
l-, st two years. Table 21 excludes the 
extension of credit through 
the discounting of, commercial 
bills. This also implies a modification of 'our e-rlier 
statement that bank credit 
for commercial enterprise declined 
jr, the last year relative to the previous years covered by 
this study. 
j. Bank of Ghana, Quarterly Economic Bulletin, June 1962, pal. 
2. Bank of Ghana Annual Report June 1964, p. 66. 
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Third, other economic activities until 1961 hardly using 
bank credit began in that year to use. bank credit on an 
increasing scale. These were building and construction, 
tunufßcturing, power generation and water services. 
This development which represented a deviation from the 
triditional pattern of uses of bank credit arose basically 
from several factors: the growing complexity of the economy 
and the increasing participation of the public sector in 
directly productive enterprise from 1960. 
From 1963 tile idea seemed to have dawned on the 
Authorities that the generally poor financial record of 
state-owned enterprises stemied largely from the fact that 
unlike private firms the state-owned enterprises did not have 
to pay for their working capital. Whether or not this was 
a relevant diagnosis of the ailments of state-ovmed enterprises 
is beyond the scope of this study. 
However, towards the end of the period under review many 
of the publicly-owned enterprises were obtaining working' 
capital requirements from the Ghana Commercial Bank either 
directly on the basis of their own credit rating or on the 
basis of gu-rantees given by the Ministry of Finance and the 
3tüte Enterprises Secretariat. it would be safe to argue 
that once the Government decided that its own enterprises 
should be financed by bank credit the Ghana Commercial 
Bank 
mould have little or no option. 
Fo_the the item labelled in Table 21 "other" (1958-60) 
or ", miscellaneous" 
(1961-64) declihed heavily from 1962. 
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The decline could have been due to one or both of two factors 
(a) A clearer identification of purposes for which advances 
were granted so that the reductions would be paralleled by 
increases in the other classifications. 
(b) In so far as the miscellaneous item embodied advances 
for sundry purposes, mainly personal, it would bear the brunt 
of any credit restrictions in an inflationary setting. 
Bills and securities 
Commercial bank holdings of Treasury Bills, commercial 
bills and Government securities are presented in Table 22. 
The significant developments with regard to the bill 
and security portfolios of the banks were1first, the high 
volume of such assets towards the end of the period compared 
to the 1950's and, secondly, the complete shift from foreign 
(sterling) to local assets during the 1960's. 
Local Teeasury Bills were first introduced in February 
1960 (after an unreplaced pioneer issue of £00.5 million in 
1954). From July 1961 the brinks «fiere not permitted to hold 
sterling assets in excess of £G1.5 million between them. 
Thus from th't drte whatever differential existed between 
London -nd loc^l short-term rates wes not relevant to the 
b,. nks' holdings of locil Treasury Bills. Given a bank's 
need for liquid assets for income purposes and as a secondary 
reserve the availability of local short-terra earning assets 
vlas an impovtuilt step i: i the evolution of a domestically- 
oriented banking system. 
A 
Table 22 
Commercial Bank Dills and Security Investments, 
1950-61- ,G Million 
(End of Period) 
Trea sury B ills Other Bil ls(Commerci al) Secu ritie s 
Ghana U. K. Foreign Ghana U. K. Total 
Govt. Govt. Total Domestic (sterling) Total Govt. Govt. 
1950 Nil Nil Nil ilil Nil Nil Nil Nil 
1951 ,t 11 it 
t, it 
1952  it ,,. ,i º,   
1953 it it U If It n ýt 1.1 1.1 
1954 ,t it it it it 0.1 1.6 1-7 ý 
1955 " 0.7 0.7 it It " 0.09 ' 
1.7 1.8 
1956 ' " 0.7 0.7 It  ºý 0-04 1.7 1.7 
1957 0.6 0.6 n. a. 0.3 0.3 0.03 1.. 7 1.7 
1958 1.8 1.8 0.03 0.3 0.3 0.2 1.7 
1.9 
959 1.1 1.1 0.01 
0.5 0.6. "0.2 1.6 1.8 
1960 4.6, Nil 4.6 0.02 4.0 4.0 0.2 1.6 
1.8 
961 6.7 6.7 0.5 0.1 0.6 0.5' 1.6 
2.1 
962 June) 21.9 r' 21.9 n. a. n. a. 0.4 2.3 
1.1 3.3 
1 4 
962(D eo. 18.9 it 
18.9 0.6 0.4 1.0 1.3 0.09 . 
1 4 
963(J e 24.8 11 24.8 n. a. n. a. 0.9 1.3 
0.09 . 
11 5 
963 (Dec . 
12.4 12.4 
6 1 
n. a. n. a. 3.4 
2 
11.4 
9 1 
0.09 
Nil 
. 
11.9 
964 (Jo 
964(Dec. 
19". 6 
26.. 7 11 
9. 
26.7 
n. a. 
n. a. 
n. a. 
n. a. 
.7 4.9 . 3.9 13.9 
n. a. = not available separately. However, the general 
indication 
is that up to 1960 practically all commercial bills were 
sterling bills. 
parts may not add up to totals due to rounding. 
source; As for Table 16. 
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Thus what requires analytical examination was the complete 
switch from sterling Treasury Bills to local Bills in 1960. 
It is very likely that the issuing of local Treasury Bills was 
predicated upon the brinks' prior indication of interest 
ascertained by the Authorities. However, since the choice 
between local and foreign earning liquid assets was still 
open to the banks we should need to consider the relative 
yields on local and forei¬: n, in this case sterling, assets 
of similar duration. 
Table 23 shows the relationship between the Treasury 
Bill Rate in Ghana and the average Discount on Treasury Bills 
on allotment in London. The latter is taken as representative 
of short-term rates in London. 
Table 23 
Short-Term. interest Rates in London and Accra, 1960-61. % 
Treasury Bill Rate 
(End of 1960 1961 
Period) 
London Accra London Accra 
January 4.16 3.87 
February 4.40 3.87 
March 4.48 3.94 
April 4.68 4.7, 4.41 3.94 
May 4.58 4.7. 4.44 3.94 
June 5.68 5.7, 4.54 3.94 
July 5.54 5.7. 6.69 n. a. 
August 5.58 5.7 6.70 n. a. 
September 5.56 5.0 6.55 4.37 
October 5.09 n. a. 5.72 4.37 
November 4.64 n. a. 5.44 4.37 
December 4.35 3.87 5.40 4.37 
Sources (i) Bank of England Reports 
(ii) Bank of Ghana Reports 
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The Discount Rnte on Treasury Bills in Ghana from April 
to August 1960 was actually higher than the rate on similar 
London short-term instrument. From September 1960 to 
June 1961 although the London rates were higher than those 
in Ghana the difference . ^ias not wide in view of the fact that 
it would cost the commercial banks in Ghana 2% to transfer 
funds to London. 
If vie assume that the banks' demand for short-term assets 
was seasonal then we should add l% to the Ghana rates or 
subtract 1, °! b from the London rates to make the rates comparable, 
in order to appreciate fully the banks' apparent preference 
for local Treasury Bills ';; linst similar short-term assets 
normally available in London. On the basis of this 
assumption the net yield on London assets (-ross of all but 
ror, i ttanc e expenses) would be considerably lower than the 
yield on local uses of sessonilly surplus funds. 
From 1962 to 1964 the bonkst holdings of Treasury Bills 
fluctuated is between June and December. This fluctuation 
could be analysed theoretically in terms of seasonal fluctuatiofls 
in their cash requirements as dictated by the ebb and flow 
of the demand for cash in the economy. Thus we would expect 
the banks to reduce their Treasury Bill portfolio to meet 
the high cash requirements associated directly and indirectly 
with the cocoa season around December. 
The decline of ttie Treasury Bill portfolio from £G24.8 º*16K 
at the end of June 1963 to £G12.4 million at the end of Decer e,; r 
ii 
was due to the funding of 
£G10 million into five-year 5% 
ýýýý_ 
Conversion Stock in August. 
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This operation did not make any 
difference to the volume of assets directly but certainly 
reduced the r", tio of liquid assets in total assets and to 
deposit li'bilities, The further increase at the end of 
1964 was the direct result of the credit control regulations 
which will be discussed separately in a subsequent Chapter. 
Commercial bills were only beginning to be important 
credit instruments towards the close of the period under 
examination. The commercial bill portfolio of £G4 million 
at the end of 1960 in fact consisted of sterling bills 
drawn by the Cocoa Marketing Board in the Cocoa Marketing 
Company and discounted by the Ghana Commercial Bank. The 
bills were treated as sterling assets because the Cocoa 
? Marketing Company was then resident in London. In addition, 
ns sterling bills they could be offered by the Ghana Commercial 
Bank in exchange for local currency as the prevailing central 
banking constitution was only modestly different from the 
Currency Bo^. rd in the conditions of currency issue (see 
Chapter 2. ) 
Towards the end of the period, however, cocoa bills 
pZyab le in local currency became the main commercial bills 
held in Ghana. 
The increased volume of Treasury Bills and securities 
resulted directly from the Government's rising cash deficits. 
But, abstracting from the experiments in the use of bills to 
finance the movement of cocoa, there was no similar force 
tending to encourage a general use of commercial bills. One 
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exp, itrinte brink is known to h've made efforts to promote 
interest in the use of such bills, but without any success. 
Commercial bank security investments were of very small 
I 
order relative to total earning assets until the funding 
operation in August 1963 mentioned earlier. Of the small 
volume held between 1953 and mid-1963 by far the 5reater 
part were sterling securities of the United Kingdom Government. 
From the end of 1962 sterling securities declined to £G92,000 
and thence to zero from June 1964. 
The negligible amounts of Ghana Government securities 
held by the banks prior to the funding operation did not, 
ho, aever, imply a dearth of such securities. Most of the 
Government's medium- and long-term debt was then held outside 
the banking system, notably by the Cocoa Marketing Board. 
The l'tter was also the underwriter of Government loans 
raised locally during most of the period under review. 
There is a dearth of f? ctual information regarding the 
maturity distribution of commercial bank security investments 
except for the recent funded debt. However, most of the 
early Government loans were issued under Government undertaking 
to repurchase them at par. At any rate, the credit control 
regulations appear to have invalidated any such repurchase 
agreements by making it oblif~atory on each bank to hold 
Government stocks to the equivalent of 18 ä of deposit liabilities, 
However, until April 1964 any Commercial bank holdings of 
Gh-ina Government securities subject to repurchase undertaking 
mere, 1n theory, classifiable as liquid assets because they 
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were guiranteed a market Rnd were not subject to diminution 
of capital value in mß°ney terms. 
Finally, it must be noted that during the period under 
review there was no significant development towards the 
beginnings of intermediate trading in any of the three 
financial instruments discussed in this section. The 
nearest to this were the re-discounting facilities provided 
by the Bank of Ghana on Treasury Bills fl nd the cocoa bills. 
For the most p^rt, all but the cocoa bills were held by the 
original purchasers pending maturity. 
Cash and liquidity ratios 
Table 24 shows approximate cash and liquidity ratios of 
the commercial banks on selected dates over the period 1950-63. 
Table 24 excludes 1964 because in that year the Central Bank 
credit control regulations changed radically the concept of 
bank liquidity. A remarkable aspect of the regulations was 
th'tt to a considerable extent the decision as to whether a 
p? rticula r type of asset was liquid or illiquid was to be 
determined essentially by the Bank of Ghana. These points 
will be analysed further in a separate Chapter to be devoted 
to analysis of the monetary system. For the moment our 
^_ttention will be focused on Table 24. 
Net bal^nces with commercial banks (Item 3) have been 
obtained by netting the sum of balances due by other banks 
in Ghana and abroad against balances due to other banks. 
The sources of information do not distinguish between gross 
balances due locally and abroad. 
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For the purpose of calculating the cash rrtio it would be 
ideal to obtain net inter-bank balances positive or negative 
due locally. This, however, cannot be done for the reason 
given above. 
Thus net inter-bank balances as calculated in Item 3 in 
Table 24 cover balances with banks in Ghana as well as abroad. 
Gross balances a road were in fact mainly balances maintained 
at the head offices by the expatriate banks. Until the end 
of 1961 these balances were quantitatively a large portion of 
gross commercial bank assets, and consisted partly of short-term 
assets as well as perfectly liquid balances. 
The fact that gross external bzl<ances consisted partly 
of perfectly liquid balances inseparable from the totals' 
implies th-t the cash ratios as calculated in Table 24 are 
for most of the period understated. This problem of calculation 
does not, however, affect the liquidity ratio. It is, 
however, debatable whether we should regard cash balances 
overseas in the same conceptual classification as till money. 
If one were to take this view - which would be the case under 
the above statement that the cash ratios are underestimated - 
then it would be necessary to take into consideration the fact that 
sterling did not, aas. now, change for local currency on a 
completely one to one basis. 
On the basis of Table 24 it will be seen that the cash 
ratios in the period 1961-63 were generally lower than the 
ratios for the earlier period 1950-60. At the end of June 
1961 the cash ratio was 69 and at the end of 1963 the ratio 
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was 8.41, the lowest ritios over the period 1950-63 on the 
basis of the data presented in Table 24. 
Similarly, the liquidity ratios were generally lower in 
1950-63 than in the earlier period. Taking the end-of-year 
position, the average liquidity ratio was 37.4% over 1960-63 
as compared with 66.2% over 1950-59. On the same basis the 
cash ratio iveraed 12.3; during 1961-63 as compared with 
19.6 over 1950-60.1 
From this it can be safely deducQd that the cßsh rind 
liquidity ratios underwent z secular decline in the 1960's 
over the earlier period. The concurrence of lower cash 
and liquidity ratios in the litter part of the review period 
symbolised the growing weight of non-liquid assets in the 
nggreg^te of non-provisional and non-fixed assets. Advances, 
though theoretically short-term in duration, in practice 
constituted a permanent float exhibiting the basic characteristics 
of illiquidity. 
The lower cash ratios of the 1960's (excluding 1960 
itself) would appear to bear a priori testimony to a secular 
decline in net or excess loanable resources. Under such 
conclusion brink lending in Ghana during the 19501s would 
conform to the alleged pattern in many underdeveloped countries 
of being determined by acceptable demand rather than supply. 
It would, of course, be märe useful to calculate cash 
and liquidity ritios bised on monthly or quarterly data in 
order to point out the banks' reactions to seasonal economic 
v? riations. ThRt this has not been done for 1950-60 is duo 
to inadequate classification of data available on annual 
monthly averages for that period. 
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. 
By implication this would niso indicate that 1961; 63 was an erb 
of fewer excess loanable resources. In some cases it might 
be argued that the banks were fully loaned zs exemplified by 
cash ratios as low as 8 and 8.4% or about the lowest normally 
permitted in the United Kingdom, for example. In practice 
bankers in Ghana would support these conclusions. However, 
if the cash ratio is to serve as a useful basis for comparative 
conclusions red-arding excesses and low levels of loanable 
resources over 1950-60 and 1961-63 respectively, we must be 
artrare of the underlying theoretical assumption: that the 
public's currency ratio during 1961-63 was proportionately 
lower than in the 1950's. 
Banks, like my other firm, ccn be conceived of ns 
oper^t ing on ? production function on which cash and other 
hssets re^dily convertible into perfectly liquid resources 
constitute a primary input determining output capacity. 
iIoreover, it is common knowledge that in a banking system 
incorporating internationally operated banks, other thins 
being equal loanable resources exceed at any one time locally 
held resources by facilities potentially available from 
oversew branches or headoffices. These are matters 
relevant to the general determination of bank credit on which 
further discussion will be postponed till Chapter 7. 
Finrtlly, we should draw attention to the emergence, from 
1962; for the first time in probßbly n lengthy period back, of 
negative net inter-bank balrtnces implying net external 
liability. However, the full analytical significance of net 
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inter-bank indebtedness is very difficult to establish. 
Information supplied to the author confidentially indicates 
that at the close of the period under review only one of the 
banks tended to maintain a negative external account without, 
in fact, giving sufficient detail about the nature of such 
negative external accounts. From the point of view of the 
monetary authorities a negative sign in a bank's net external 
position would be equivalent to cnpitel imports. Under the 
then reguistions on the holding of foreign exchange assets this 
would imply that it some prtst dzte the monetary authority 
added to its gross foreign exchange essets . On the other 
hind I net negative external account might be due to unrequited 
extern^. 1 li-ttility arising solely from corm fitments origin-tiny; 
in the domestic 'economy. 
Lendingpolicy (Summary) 
This section is devoted to n summzry of fundamental 
aspects of commercial bank lending policies over the period 
under review, to which references in varying degrees of 
detail have been made earlier. 
Abstracting from the fact that in practice short-term 
advances tended to be permanent floats there was no noticeable 
s, En-of a significant increase in the basic maturity period of 
customer credits except, probably, in the last year of the 
period under examination. Thus the granting of medium-term 
loans by the banks only applied in the case of investments in 
Government securities w'iich, as noted earlier, only became 
important both quantitatively . nd as a proportion of total 
-128- 
assets from August, 1963. Under current credit control 
regulations perhaps there will be a movement towards bank 
lending to the private sector at more than short-term. Or 
perhaps the answer to the need to fill this important gap in 
the Ghanaian credit system will eventually be provided by the 
recently established Nntional Investment Bank (see Chapter 4). 
Towards the end of the review period the banks were 
beginning to grant advances for productive enterprise as 
opposed to commercial enterprise involving foreign trnde, as 
was the practice during most of the period. Clearly this 
was n welcome development considering the implied downward 
effect on imports and, probably, diversity of export commodities. 
Already by 1961 the balance of payments crises showed every 
sign of becoming a more thin short-run phenomenon. 
Throughout the period under review a large volume of 
bank advances were unsecured or were secured by goods expected 
to be rapidly turned over. In this the banks were aided by 
their wide knowledge of the foreign trade sector. 
Personal guarantees and assurances, and property 
mortgages were generally less favoured by the banks as collateral 
security. The former were not easily enforceable in the event 
of default, whilst the litter were prone to special problems 
to be analysed shortly. 
As the most favoured criteria of creditworthiness were 
1n rgely considerrttions reltiting to the scale of business 
operations and assets a large section of the Ghanaian business 
community tended to experience difficulties v ith credit 
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requirements. Moreover, many Ghanaian businesses are not 
properly organised; in particular, it is often not possible 
to obtain from them audited or unaudited accounts. The 
Rrguments raised on this subject by Newlyn and Rowan were still 
being emphasized by expatri ite b^nking officials interviewed 
in-connection with this study. 
1 
Apirt from general considerßtions of n customer's 
business operations and assurances from third parties, other 
collateral known to be offered by the indigenous sector were 
house property and gold ornaments or jewels. House property 
is still in traffic as collateral security. 
There is evidence that one of the banks accepted gold 
jewels in the early years of its operation. Not only did 
this practice wane rapidly in time, but in fact the acceptance 
of such collateral was never really on a significant scale. 
The main objection to such locally fashioned jewels is that 
the intrinsic gold value is not standardized. Jewels which 
pissed for pure gold might in fact be alloys whose gold 
content would thus be unassayable in advance. 
On the other hand, for reasons given earlier residential 
houses were available in Dirge numbers to a section of the 
Ghanaian population. However, investigations by the iuthor 
indicated that at least in the earlier part of the period 
the banks were reluctant to accept mortgages and, indeed the 
constitution of the indigenous Ghana Commercial Bank forbade 
acceptance of mortgages of immovable property until this was 
modified by executive decision in 1960. 
1, Ibid., PP. 81-4. "_'_-' 
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Two main justifying reasons can be given for the low 
rating of house property as collateral against bank advances. 
First, the absence of firms dealing in real estate makes the 
sale of house property cumbersome and expensive especially if 
situated outside the large urban centres. Secondly, in 
most parts of Ghana house property is commonly a major form 
of asset passed on as legacy and the social system is such 
that a great deal of such legacies, even where made out in 
the name of pnrticul-ir individuals, are regarded operationally 
as common property by a large number of relations. Thus 
title is often unclear. 
LRnded property, also a common form of asset normally 
uvai1cble to the Ghantinn sector is- not known to have been 
ever accepted by a bank as collateral security. This is 
because title to land is singularly shady due to some form 
of cammun1l ownership within large clans originating from 
tribal customs and historical developments. 
' 
One form of collateral commonly applied in the unorganized 
credit market is the usufruct on land, that is, the pledging 
to a creditor of produce from a debtor's farm. However, 
this system often works successfully with the private 
money-1ender because he is usually on the spot And can ensure 
that the value of the produce comes to himself. On the 
other hand, a bank whose centre of operation would usually 
be distant from the location of cocoa farms would require 
the co-oper tion of numerous officers in the cocoa buying 
process to ensure recovery of 
loans made to defaulted debtors. 
See S. K. B. Asante, 'Interest in land and the customary 
law of Ghana -a new appraisal", The Yale Law Journal, No. 5, 
Vol. 75, April, 1965, p. 848 ff. 
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One can hardly imagine any appeal of such a system to 
commercial banks as presently constituted. in Ghana. 
The question of title to property is a general problem 
tied up with the social and inheritance system, and short of 
legislation (which we cannot pretend would be a simple process) 
the emergence of a system of clear and distinct title to 
property is a prospect of the distant future. Thus over the 
short-run improvements in the bankability of private 
Ghanainn debt will depend very much on the indigenous sectorts 
approach to modernisation of their business methods and 
operations including amalgamations of the existing atomized 
structure of Ghanainn enterprise. In addition to the 
initiative of the Ghanaians themselves, a lot can be done by 
n forward looking Government when such a Government appears 
in Ghana. 
Borrowing and lending rates 
Commercial bank interest rates are not readily available 
for the period before September 1957. The available data 
covering the period September 1957 to June 1963 are presented 
in Table 25. There is evidence that the rates obtaining at 
the end of the latter dates remained stable to the end of 
1964. 
Bqsic rates of all kinds (Table 25) remained completely 
stable from mid-1961 in contrast to the earlier period when 
, all the different rites 
fluctuated considerably between 
successive yeors and within ra given year. 
Taking both kinds of rates it can be seen that the 
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difference between minimum and maximum rates was generally 
lower in the case of borrowing rates than for lending rates. 
This was decidedly so as from March 1960. 
On the whole the stable borrowing rates, beginning around 
March 1960 in the case of fixed deposits and a year later for 
savings deposits, settled down at higher levels than the average 
levels in the previous period. On the other hand lending 
rates were stabilized at lower levels from 1961. Thus the 
difference between bank credit and debit rates narrowed from 
about 1961. But the significance of this development was 
indeterminate because on lending the operative rates stood 
within the ranges shown and therefore general reductions 
affecting the minima or maxima would not necessarily affect 
the operative rates. 
It is commonly asserted by bankers in the British 
Commonwealth and economists that by and large changes in the 
London Bank Rate and the associated changes in United Kingdom 
money rates were transmitted to Ghana and similar countries. 
The firmest statements of such a relationship between 
local rates (that is, the colonies and ex-colonies of Britain) 
and interest rates in London were made in written and oral 
evidence submitted before the 
Radcliffe Committee by the 
African Members of the British Overseas Banks Association. 
, 
The following quotation provides the necessary illustration: 
"Hitherto, local rates have generally changed more or 
less automatically with a change in the London Bank 
Rate. If Bank Rate in London went up, advance rates 
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, ind deposit rites in the (African) territory would 
also go up. "1 
This general statement was explained further in oral evidence 
before the said Committee. 
1. A rise in the London Bank Rate led to increases in various 
short-term rates on the London money market which tended to 
attract to London large deposits from the African territories. 
Therefore the banks raised their deposit rates in order to 
prevent a fall in their deposits. 2 
2. Lending rates were also raised to counteract the effects 
of higher costs of borrowing by the banks themselves, and 
partly because if a rise in United Kingdom rates was accompanied 
by a credit squeeze British firms normally able to obtain 
credit requirements in London tended to seek advances from 
local banks. Thus it would seem thit the increased local 
lending rates stemmed partly from a need to preserve the 
margin between borrowing and lending costs and partly from a 
desire to bring demand in line with available resources. 3 
The indications are that in Ghana, at least up to the and of 
1957 interest rates were adjusted in line with changes in 
the United Kingdom rates. 
4 
Committee on the Working of the Monetary System, 
Memoranda of Evidence, Vol. 2, p. 64; written evidence of the 
African Members of the British Overseas Banks Association. 
See also Minutes of Evidence, pp. 313-8. 
2. Minutes of Evidence, paras. 4341-2. 
3. Radcliffe Committee, Minutes of Evidence, paras. 4341-57. 
4. A clear illustration is given by the following quotation 
from the Minutes of Evidence: - 
uestion, Professor Cairncross: Do you find big variations in 
the rates of interest in the various African countries since 
the rise (19.9.57) in the London Bank Rate? 
Answer, Mr. Smith (Bank of West Africa): Yes. In many of the 
te r itories, for example in West Africa and Rast Africa, the 
rates have been adjusted 
in line with those in the United Kingdom. 
It is only in some territories, such as Rhodesia, where we have 
been specifically asked by the Central bank not to alter the 
rates, that 
there is any very great difference. 
4 -134- 
From M'irch, 1957 when Ghani obtained political 
Independence it is possible that pressure was brought to bear 
on the banks not to adjust their rates, in particular lending 
rates, merely In response to changes in the United Kingdom 
economic situation. Evidence before the Radcliffe Committee 
indicated that the growth of nationalism in Africa usually 
led to considerable disagreement over any automatic adoption 
of United Kingdom economic policies. 
In Ghana the relationship between local and United 
Kingdom rates is only modestly demonstrated by the available 
data. The attached graph shows a reasonably close positive 
relationship from 1957 to July 1961 between the London Bank 
R-te and local deposit rates. 
However, it is r^ther difficult to determine the link 
between London Bank Rate Rnd local advances r-ates. For one 
thing, a vailRble drta show separate rates for advances according 
to the' type of security. The absence of data showing the 
volume of advances per type of security prevents weighting. 
Thus on the assu ption that most advances were secured against 
some form of stock in 
trade we have shown on the graph a curve 
showing interest rates on advances so secured. 
This shows a 
weaker link between 
local advances rates and the London 
Bank Rate. It would thus appear that the link was stronger 
in the case of deposit rates. 
The deposit rates presented in Table 25 were first 
influenced locally by the Ghana Commercial Bank which started 
its. sfVings brink business in 
August 1959 with interest on 
savings deposits 
At 3% and thus compelled the expatriate banks 
--134A- 
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to raise their prevailing rite from 22% to 3%. In the first 
quarter of 1961 the Ghana Commercial Bank again raised its 
rate on savings deposits to 32% to which the expatrinte banks 
did not respond. At the end of 1964 the 2% differential 
was still being maintained. 
The complete stability in both deposit and lending rates 
was partly the result of the severance of automatic linking of 
local rates to United Kingdom rates by the operation of the 
exchange control regulations, and partly the result of the 
Central Bank's instructions to the commercial banks. 
The Bank of Ghana first announced its Re-discount rate 
in Feb ruiry 1960 simultaneously with the introduction of 
localTrensury Bills. Throughout 1960 and the first half 
of 1961 the Ghana Bank Rite itself was tailored to changes 
in the London Bank Rate. The autonomy of the Ghana Bank 
Rate seems to have been secured effectively only by the exchange 
control regulations. From September 1961 to the end of 1964 
the Ghana Bank Rate was stabilized at 4; % (the Bank Rate was 
raised to 7% early 1966). It would therefore appear that 
the stability of the commercial bank rates from mid-1961 was 
influenced by the Ghana Bank Rate. 
However, the connecting nexus would hardly be of economic 
origin., 
- 
For one thing the commercial banks were not known 
to have borrowed from the Central Bank to any significant 
extent. The combined effect of the need for commercial bank 
participation in Government deposit financing and the need to 
aw 
keeps the burden of public debt servicing dictated p margin 
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between the Re-discount Rate and the Discount Rate at a level 
which could hardly be regarded an penal. On the other hand 
re-discounting facilities at the Central Bank on the cocoa 
bills would in practice be expected to be on very soft 
terms because of the special arrangements under which the cocoa 
bills were employed. Rediscounting terms on both Treasury 
Bills and commercial bills did not necessarily reflect conditions 
in the credit market or in the economy generally. By and 
large it is true to say that money costs in Ghana during the 
period 
under review were managed rates. 
I 
r 
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CHAPTER T'. 710 
THE ? IOPTRTARY AUTHORITY-1. 
From 1913 to 1957 Ghana was on the currency board system 
of monetary arrangements sharing the services of the West 
African Currency Board with Nigeria; Sierra Leone and the 
Gambia now all independent countries after varying periods 
of colonisation. On 1st August 1957 the currency board was 
replaced in Ghana by a central bank, the Bank of Ghana whose 
statute was enacted early in March 1957. 
In this chapter, the first of two on the monetary 
authority we will outline briefly the main features of the 
West African Currency Board, examine the changeover to a 
central bank and, lastly, outline and discuss briefly devel- 
opments in constitution arrangements on central banking 
from 1957 to 1964. 
Section A 
The West African Currency Board 
The origin and modus operandi of the West African 
Currency Board have been widely covered in the literature 
and therefore only a brief summary is required in this study(. 
(Jý For a complete history see J. B. Loynes, op. cit. 
The following are a few of the many references: - 
Adomakcb*, op. cit., OF. &i, t-, G. i: I. Clatson, "The British A. 
colonial currency system", Economic Journal, April 1944; 
J. Llars in "Tuning, commerce and finance in Nigeria" (ed: 
11. penham), London 1948; Special Correspondent, "1Ionetary 
sy stems of the colonies - The West African Currency Board", 
The Banker, August 1948, H. A. Shannon, "The modern colonial 
sterling exchange stp, ndard II. I' Staff Papers, Vol. 2,1951-52; 
Sir Cecil Trevor, op'. cit.; Newlyn and Rowen, op. cit., Cha .2 Ida Greaves, "Colonial monetary conditions", Colonial 
p 
Research 
Studies, ITo. 10, H-11-8-0- 1953; 
-138- 
The tlest African Currency Board was appointed by the 
British Colonial Secretary on 21st November, 1912 and the Board 
first issued its currency for circulation in the constituent 
territories on. 26th June 1913 after due legal processes had 
been carried out by the governments of the territories. (1) 
Unlike most of its counterparts elsewhere in the colonies 
the Vest African Currency Board was based in London. 
Throughout its existence its members were appointed by the 
Colonial Secretary and were drawn from the Crown Agents for 
the Colonies, the Bank of England, the Colonial Office and, 
until 1942, the Bank of West Africa. Viewed in retrospect it 
is interesting to note that not a single member who served on 
the Board was an African. (Indeed, the U. K. Departmental 
Committee whose Report led to the formation of the Board did 
not consult a single African opinion). 
The function of the Board was a simple one. It issued 
, lest 4' fr"ican currency on demand in any of the constituent 
territories against sterling prepaid in London. Similarly, 
it redeemed its currency on demand paying back in London an 
equivalent amount in sterling. In practice, the Board dealt 
directly with the commercial banks. 
In these operations the Board had no discretion whatsoever: 
neither in the issue and redemption of its currency liabilities 
nor in the rate at which it exchanged lest African currency 
for sterling and vice versa. The exchange rate was fixed 
by the colonial Secretary (in a sense the British Government) 
in whom lay the power to change the parity. The parity remained 
ý1ý 
A. ! domakoh, op cit. 
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throughout the history of the Board at one West i frican pound 
to one pound sterling. 
In 1950 (the beginning of the period under review), the 
Board wts charging a commission of 2 per cent on issues and 
redemptions of its currency. This commission either side 
of parity dated back from March 1924 and stood unchanged at 
the time of GhanaTs withdrawal from the Board in 1957, 
notwithstanding a provision for a maximum charge of w' per 
cent in the final constitution of the Board drawn up in 
19401) 1) It may be useful to state at this point that the 
Bank of Ghana has retained' these charges up to the time of 
writing. 
In Ghana us in all the other constituent territories 
(with the minor exception of the former Southern Cameroons 
where a sub-centre was opened in 1948 under the management 
of Barclays Bank) the Bank of . '. est : Srica was the currency 
agent to the board. Towards the end of its business in 
Ghana the board had three major currency centres in Ghana. 
in iccra, Sekondi and Kumasi, with few other smaller sub- 
centres. The relatively larger number of centres had, of 
course, been arrived at gradually. More centres were opened i 
in addition to the original one in Accra as the demand for 
currency increased and the frontiers of the money economy 
(1)3eo J. B. Loynes, op. cit., :, pRendix III. 
Commencing with a commission of 4 per cent either side of 
parity in 1913 the Board raised its charge for the issue of 
sterling, drafts (that is, redemption) to 14 per cent in 1914 
following a trade recession in West ifrica which led to a 
high level of redundancy and consequently of currency red- 
emptions. From the end of 1919 issues were charged2 per 
cant and from March 1924 redemptions were subject to the 
same commission. Ibid, pp. 19-20. 
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advanced further from the main centres of regular commercial 
intercource. 
In addition to the currency agency held by the Bank of 
West Africa, a currency officer was appointed in each territory. 
Usually, as was the case in Ghana, he was the local Accountant- 
General. The main functions of the currency officer were to 
supervise the actual physical issue of currency upon telegraphic 
instructions from the Board and t 
presented for redemption which he 
in London thus enabling the Board 
in 's terling . The actual custody 
vested in the Bank of West Africa 
o receive notes and coins 
then notified to the Board 
to pay out the equivalent 
of local currency stocks was 
for which service it received 
a modest fee -from the Board. 
Toth the Currency Officer and the Currency agent were 
passive agents working to rules in whose formulation they 
played no vital role except for the little bits of advice on 
which their expertise in local conditions entitled them to 
a hearing. 
In the original recommendations of the Departmental 
Committee it was envisaged that the minting of coins and the 
printing of notes 
(both of these activities carried out in 
the United Kingdom) were to be financed by the `'lest African 
governments concerned., who 
were also to enjoy part of the 
profits on the Board's operations. 
In practice the Board's 
operations were 
financed, -: -henever necessary, by its bankers 
the -, Aidland Bank 
(known at the time of the establishment of 
the Board as the London 
Joint Stock Bank). 
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However, in January, 1920 the Board began to distribute 
part of its earning to governments of the constituent ter- 
ritories. This became a regular practice from then on. 
The 'dividends' received by the Ghana (Gold Coast) Government 
and the other West African governments are presented in 
Table 26. Table 27 shows the receipts of the Ghana Govern- 
ment in relation to the total public revenue for each year 
during the period under review when Ghana was served by the 
Board. 
Or.. the whole Ghana Government income from this source 
formed in each fiscal year only a small proportion of total 
revenue, although in the years 1950-51,1957-58 and 1958-59 
the proportion did exceed 1 per cent. however, total dis- 
bursements from the Board to the Government of Ghana for the 
whole period 1919-20 to 1960-61 came to a substantial sum 
of :G 11.8 million including £G 3.5 million additional 
to 
the customary anrrial disbursements, which was paid to the 
Government in 1960-61 from the accumulated surplus of reserves 
over currency liabilities. 
We now turn to a brief account of the assets of the 
currency board. We are particularly 
interested in the 
assets held agrin^t currency 
liabilities. The Board's assets 
other than those 
held against currency liabilities, and the 
capital surplus consisted of unissued stocks of notes and 
coins kept mainly 
in the West ifrican territories. 
The Board maintained against its currency liabilities 
Table 26 
Amounts Distributed to the West African Governments 
by the West African Currency Board, 1950-62 
£G'000 
Year of 
payment 
(Untiln6.3.57 
the Gold Coast) 
Nigeria Sierra Leone 
The 
lGambia 
t 
Total 
1919-20 1 34 53 1 6.5 6.5 loo 
1949-50 129.7 236.4 24.4 9.4 400 
1950-51 282.7 403.0 45.4 18.8 j 750 
1951-52 324.2 424.0 ý 38.0 13.8 800 
1952-53 161.8 213.2 19.2 5.9 400 
1953-54 309.2 433.4 41.8 1 15.6 ! 800 
1954-55 354.5 576.1 50.5 19.6 1,000 
1955-56 403.7 537.2 45.5 13.6 1,000 
1956-57 398.1 543.6 45.1 13.2 1,000 
1957-5Q 780.2 1,101.4 93.6 24.8 2,000 
1958-59 1,564.0 2,172.0 212.0 52.0 4,000 
1959-60 579.6 2,562.7 1 895.3 75.2 4,110 
1960-61 160.0 1,570.0 670.0. 11100.0 2,500 
1961-62 - 535.4 821.5 143.1 1,500 
Total regular 
payments 
1919-20 to 
8,344.6 1961-62 i 15,148.1 3,554.6 
I 
712.7 
I 
27.760 
From Reserves 7 
196n-61 3,503.1 5,959.3 9,462.4 
1961-62 - 53.6 - `- f 53.6 
ijb , payments 
11,847.7 21,161.0 X3,554.6 712.7 1 37,276.0 
Note: Differencessbetweeuntotals and the sum of parts are 
e r. 
Source: J. B. Loynes, op. cit., Appendix 1, pp 37-8. 
-- 't-lß - 
Table 27 
Ghana: Receipts from Vir. A. C. B. 
(a) 
And Total 
Government Revenue, 1950-61 
Ghana £G'000 % 
Government (b) Total central ; Income from Ratio of fiscal year i government revenue(c)t Cr. A. C. B. 
(1) ý 2} 
(2) to (1) 
(2) (3) 
1949-50 
1950-51 
1951-52 
1952-53 
1953-54 
1954-55 
1955-56 
1956-57 
1957-58 
1958-59 
1959-60 
1960-61(d) 
18,100 
20,852 
38,832 
429034 
48,163 
80,200 
52,473 
49.416 
59,831 
i 66,620 
k s, 
70,136 
83,228 
129.7 0.7 
282.7 1.4 
324.2 0.8 
161.8 0.4 
309.2 0.6 
354.5 0.4 
403.7 0.8 
398.1 0.8 
780.2 1.3 
1,564,0 2.3 
579.6 0.8 
160.0 1 0.2 
(a) W. A. C. B = West African Currency Board. 
(b) The financial year of the W. A. C. B. ended on 30th June, 
whilst Ghana Government fiscal year varied after 1955-56 
from April-March to July-June in 1960-61. 
(0 Excludes receipts from loans but includes grants. 
(d) Income from W. A. C. B. in 1960-61 excludes the special 
receipt from reserves in that year (see Table 26. ) 
Sources: Column (1) - Economic Survey (of Ghana), 1964, 
Table I, p. 114. 
Column (2) - As for Table 26. 
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a hundred per cent minimum sterling reserve. (1) In L; °_ 
practice the Board, as was also true of other British colonial 
currency boards did aim at sterling reserves in excess of its 
outstanding currency liabilities. This is illustrated in 
Table 28. 
Table 28 
Balance Sheet of the June 30,1950. 
Assets 
W'' W, 000 
1. Investments at market prices 05,058 
2. ., mount on deposit 6.1000 
3. Cash on hand and at banks 661 
4. Silver coin in currency centres, at 
face value 5 
5. Suspense account 11 
71#735 
Liabilities 
1. 'rest African currency in circulation 
at face value 66,277 
Less market value of silver in coins 636 
65,6., 11 
Surplus of assets over liabilitios 6,094 
Source: Report of the West african Currency Board, 30.6.50. 
(')In the early days the position was slightly different. 
r, ccording to the original constitution drawn up in 1912 
the 
Board was charged to hold against the silver coinage' a reserve 
of gold and securities with provision for the Colonial Secret-j'', 
ary to fix the minimum proportion of gold from time to time. 
The Colonial Secretary approved a 50 per cent minimum gold 
reserve in 1913. Shen 
the Board began a note issue in 1916 
its constitution as amended in 1915 provided for a note 
guarantee fund to be held partly in silver or gold specie, 
that is legal tender cash, but no gold back-in was specific- 
ally required. 
(See J. i- 5. Loyn es, op. cit., p. 2g). Even before 
the final constitution of 1949 (in which there was no reference 
to a gold reserve) the reserve was principall held in sterling 
as, indeed, the gold reserve requirement was 
Interpreted 
oporutionally, as gold sovereigns indistinguishable from sterling. 
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For the purpose of determining the size of the sterling 
reserve normally maintained to ensure redemption of currency 
we should disregard items 4 and 5 on the assets side. 'the 
former was not a sterling asset and the latter may be presumed 
to. be a pre-committed fund earmarked for administrative and 
other operational costs. In other words we take Items i, 
2 and 3 on the assets side to represent the assets normally 
available to meet redemptions of currency. Similarly on 
the liabilities side we should take account of the full 
face value of issued or (from the point of view of the Board) 
circulating currency. 
On the basis of these hypotheses, in mid-1950 the 
excess of sterling over issued currency was £5.4 million or 
8.1 per cent of the total currency liabilities. The 
preservation of such a surplus margin was said to be charact- 
eristic of practically all the colonial currency 
boards 
averaging about 10 per cent for all currency 
boards examined 
by one writer in 1951. 
(1) 
Ij e rationale of this kind of surplus was in the main 
the need to hedge against possible capital depreciation of 
the currency reserve assets. This would, of course, relate 
to the value as determined on the London capital markets as 
distinct from the effects of depreciation in the external 
value of sterling. _is noted earlier 
the value of the 
'"lest African pound remained unchanged in terms of sterling. 
(1) See H. A. Shannon, op. cit., 
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,i depreciation of sterling in terms of non-sterling external 
currencies led automatically to an equivalent depreciation 
of the Lest ýXrican pound in terms of those currencies. 
(l) 
however rationalized there could be no doubt that in 
time the currency reserve assets represented a substantial 
excess over the amount of currency ever likely to be redeemed 
for sterling. 
The 1949 constitution of the West African Currency 
Board required in Regulation II that "The Board may invest 
its, funds in sterling securities of the Government of any 
part of his Majesty's dominions, or in any such manner as 
the Secretary of State may approve. "(2) 
There was no direct ruling in this or earlier regul- 
ations against the Board investing in the securities issued 
by Governments of the West African constituent territories. 
Up to 1957 when Ghana withdrew from the Board ftexe. had not been 
any investments in the securities of any of those governments. 
!,. n explanation of this is partly afforded by a disclosure in 
1944 that according to a ruling by the Secretary of State 
a Currency Board mi,; ht invest its funds in U. s. sterling 
securities and securities of British Dominion and Colonial 
Governments except in loans issued by its own Government or 
(1) One writer aptly described the colonial currency board 
-system as 
"branch of ' satellito systems, o¬: sterlingftwhose 
major, movements follow those of 
the United Kindgom as 
inevitably as the mövements 
öf the planets 'fölloyi those of 
the sun", Special Correspondent, rrionetary systems of the 
Colonies - Part Is', The Banker,. July 1948. 
(2) See J. B. Loynes, op. cit., appendix 111, p. 42 
-145- 
Governments. (1) 
In December 1954 the Colonial Secretary authorized a 
small fiduciary issue but the 'lest African Currency Board did 
not make use of this until 1957 when it first acquired the 
non-sterling security of a constituent territory, namely 
Sierra Leone, amounting to £1 million which was increased to 
ä2 million in 1958. 
(2) 
That the Board did not utilize this provision earlier 
may be explained in terms of the policies of the Governments 
concerned. But it should be noted that even before December 
1954 these governments could have sought capital by issuing 
loans locally or in London, although any such loans could 
not have been subscribed by the Currency Board. jýs other 
currency boards were permitted to invest in the securities 
of colonial governments other than theirs a considerable 
proportion of currency board funds were in fact repatriated (3) 
to the colonies as a whole. How far each particular colony 
C i&4 6r 
(1) fý. N{" U om, op. cit. 
(2) This was a contrast to the position of the Southern 
Rhodesia Currer:. cy, hoard which by the Southern Rhodesia _ýct 
No. 2 of 1947 Evas permitted to hold the locally registered 
stocks of its constituent territories to a maximum of 20 per 
cent of currency liabilities. See R. x. Sowelem, 
"Monetary 
and financial developments in the federation of. Rhodesia 
and 1,1yasuland, 1952-6311, 
Lnpublished fh. D. Thesis, University 
of Leeds y 1966. j,. 
9. 
(3) ,i very recent account states that "the currency boards 
were collectively very much in the market for colonial 
governments securities 
issued in London.... " See 
J. F. Crick, "Commonwealth banking systems, " Oxford, 1965, p. 4. 
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benefited from this depended on its own financial needs and 
circumstances. (') 
From the account above it is clear that during the 
period of the currency board there was no monetary authority 
resident in Ghana nor could the West African Currency Board 
be regarded as the monetary authority in a policy sense. 
The actual monetary authority was the Colonial Secretary 
and, in an ultimate sense, the British Government. 
Of course, it must be added that from 1951 when internal 
self-government began in Ghana some measure of control over 
internal monetary arrangements could have been exercised 
locally. Such a possibility may be said to have been. 
illustrated by the indication in 1951 to establish a local 
institution to issue a separate currency for the Gold Coast. 
However, no serious decision affecting monetary arrangements 
was taken until the decision in 1956 to establish a central 
hank. Such apparent inaction may be interpreted as partly 
due. to the rapid advancement to Independence so that the 
existing arrangements became largely transitional and partly 
because the new (local) political authorities had considerable 
political unrest to attend to in the few years preceding 
Independence. 
0 
(1) Prior to Independence the Gold Goast (Ghana) Gnvernment 
raised very 
little loan capital in London. Up to 1957 the 
labt such Gold Coast loan issued in London was a 4- per cent 
1960-70 Stock issued in 1931. 
gee Anthony- Rudd, 'Ghana and the sterling area", Tho 'Banker, 
ijarch 1057 
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Section B 
THE CHANGE TO CENTRAL BANKING 
The idea of establishing in Ghana a monetary institution 
to function partly as a central bank was first expressed 
in 1948 by the late Dr. J. B. Danquah (See Chapter one, 
Section B). 
The next canvassing for a local bank of issue took 
place in 1951 when Sir Cecil Trevor (See Chapter One Section 
B) was invited to the country to examine, inter alia, the 
question of setting up a national bank that would combine 
commercial banking with the functions of "a reserve bank. " 
As stated in Chapter One Sir Cecil recommended the establish- 
ment of a national (that is, predominantly state-owned) 
commercial bank, but he did not consider the time "ripe for 
the formation of a fully-fledged Central Bank of Issue". 
(') 
In his judgement if a central bank were to be able "to 
operate the currency and credit system of a country to its 
(the country's) advantage, it is essential that all the 
flexible instruments necessary to an advanced economy should 
be available in the form of a Government Securities' Market, 
a Bill Market, a Stock Exchange, banking and insurance 
Systetns. *t(2) ". 
A second obstacle which he saw in the way of a central 
bank (although probably he considered it a minor one) was 
the difficulty of providing immediately suitable premises 
(]: ) Sir Cecil Trevor, op. cit., para 153 
(2) Ibid, para 100. 
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to house a fully-fledged institution. Thirdly he raised the 
question of obtaining the necessary trained staff. 
(l) 
Furthermore Sir Cecil Trevor argued that a separate 
Bank of Issue for the Gold Coast would entail maintaining 
reserves in the form of external securities and gold. Fhile 
he did not say anything further about the external securities 
component of a currency reserve, he considered it a waste 
that gold (which is mined in the country) should be taken 
out of the mines "merely to bury it again in the Bank's 
vaults. " He argued that the country's output of gold was 
a credit factor in the external account, enlarging the means 
at its disposal for consumption and development which advan- 
tage would be lost if the Gold Coast was to build up a 
currency reserve of gold. 
(2) 
The Trevor Report was followed a year later by another 
investigation into problems of finance and development in 
the Gold Coast. (3) In the Report issued after this invest- 
igation the authorc argued as follows about the Currency 
Board arrangements. 
"It is clear that the Currency Board system will 
become less satisfactory as time goes on: there 
is a case for anticipating the difficulties. 
.... a move towards a managed currency, at a time 
when there is no financial stringency, would make 
it possible to gain considerable experience in 
monetary operations before the new institutions were 
faced with acute problems. When such problems do 
(1) Ibid, para 101 
(2) Sir Cecil Trevor, op. cit., para 153. 
(3) See D. Seers and C. R. Ross, "Report on financial and 
physical problems of development in the Gold Coast, " 
Goverx-ment Printer, hccra 1952, pp 87-91 
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arise, they will be met by a system that is capable 
of dealing with them". (1) 
Later writers, while recognizing the difficulties in a 
central bank using as weapons of control the traditional 
measures developed in the advanced countries, nevertheless 
found other practical reasons for est.. blishing a central bank 
in an underdeveloped economy. $upiýorting arguments were 
advanced in terms of a central bank's role in fostering sound 
indigenous banking, agricultural credit and the development 
of a n. oney market. (2) 
These alternative views clearly represented different 
approaches to the question of central banking in pre-Independ- 
ence Ghana than did the views of Sir Cecil Trevor. "le 
can now discuss briefly the main arguments put forward by 
Sir Cecil Trevor as weighing against the establishment of a 
central bank. 
Lven if one did not wish to question the need for 
money and capital markets in an economy such as the Gold 
Coast was in the early 1950's, one could point to the role 
which a central bank could play in the development of such 
institutions as itself a strong; basis for the establishment 
of a central bank. 
On the question of a central bank maintaining a currency 
reserve in external securities and gold Sir Cecil's point 
was clearly erroneous. 
A newly established central bank 
seeking to maintain external assets against its currency 
liabilities could, given the necessary legal processes, 
, 0! 
ZZZ 
1) yýjlgl, p. 90, footnote (1). ýý) 
See v. e--rlyn and. Rowan, op. cit., pp 275-6. 
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merely take over the foreign exchange assets of the conmer- 
cial banks, offering in exchange local Government securities 
or interest-bearing deposits at the central bank. For a 
country that was already on a currency fully backed by foreign 
exchange assets there was clearly no difficulty involved. 
_Ls 
it actually happened in 1957, all that the new central 
bank had to do was to redeem the monetary liabilities of 
the Currency Board outstanding in the country in exchange 
for sterling according to the existing regulations pertinent 
to redemptions ., 
Also untenable was the waste allegedly implied in a 
gold reserve. The holding of any form of money means a, 
sacrifice of real consumption and ! nVQmtrnc nt*. Both 
gold and foreign currency assets are international media of 
payment albeit that the monetary role of a foreign currency 
asset is wider the greater is the degree of convertibility. 
.; s media of 
payment the holding of gold and other foreign 
exchange assets imply equally a sacrifice of 
imports. 
Moreover, as Zambia has recently shown any country holding 
convertible reserves can exchange 
them for gold. 
One strange thing was Sir Cecilts implied suggestion 
that the adoption of a national currency meant losing the 
advantage of belonging 
to the Sterling Area. As Seers and 
PLoss pointed out, this was equivalent to saying that count- 
rtes already having national currencies such as nustralia 
! few Zealänd and India did not enjoy full membership of the 
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Sterling Area. 
(') 
It is doubtful whether the new political leaders of 
the Gold Coast (under the leadership of Dr. Nkrumah) sýmpath- 
ised with Sir Cecil Trevor's line of reasoning. gis stated 
earlier, that a rank of : issue was not immediately established 
could be ascribed to a rapid pace towards Independence which, 
among other things, involved political unrest demanding the 
attention of the political authorities. 
On 5th April' 1955, about two years before Independence 
was formally granted, Mr. K. A. Gbedemah then l: Tinister of 
Finance announced in the National Assembly the Government's 
intention to issue a national currency. The solution as 
the Government saw it then was to add an Issue Department to 
the Ghana Commercial Bank to be distinct from the Banking 
Department. Preparations were actually made within the 
Ghana Commercial Bank for this purpose. In September, 1955 
agreement was reached with a London firm for the printing 
of the new notes which were to be signed by the Ghana Com- 
mercial bank and the L1inister of Finance. However, the 
idea was abandoned, followed by a Government decision in 
1956 to set up a separate central bank to be known as the 
(1) D. Seers and C. R. Ross, op. cit., p. 89. 
This kind of argument has since been expressed in other 
quarters. one writer argued that the replacement of the 
Currency Board by a central bank would create new risks 
to ljhich the (British) commercial banks might react by 
raising charges; that it was reasonable that "an independ- 
ent monetary position should end the trustee status of 
colonial government 
loans in the London market. " 
See Ida Greaves, "Colonial trade and payments, " Economicq, 
February 1957 
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Bank of Ghana. 
(') 
At the last phase of the process of setting up a 
central bank in Ghana the Government was faced with consider- 
able dissension within the country. In particular it may 
be useful to refer to the speeches of an Opposition front- 
bench spokesman: - 
"The establishment of the Central Bank (of Ghana) is 
only a luxury. It is not dictated by any sound 
principles of finance. The only justification 
that can be advanced for the establishment of a Central Bank is probably considerations of national 
pride" (2) 
To Mr . Owusu a Central Bank in Ghana would merely satisfy 
prestige consideration for the nation and, probably, for 
the Government. Mr. Owusu could not see how the proposed 
Bank of Ghana intended "to get any deposits at all either 
by commercial banks or by anyone else" if it would not pay 
interest on deposits. He argued that it was obvious "a 
person would not like to deposit his money, and certainly 
the commercial banks would not like. to deposit their reserves 
vrith the Central Bank, if no interest will be paid thereon. "(3) 
on the basis of this obviously faulty reasoning he (unsuccess- 
fully) suggested the deletion- of that section in the Bank 
(1) Since 1957 the idea of amalgamating the Hank of Ghana 
and the Ghana Commercial Bank has been raised more than 
once. Actually, before the-'end of 1958 the Government 
took a definite decision on this and it was known in offic- 
ial cricles that a Bill to amalgamate the two banks was to 
be introduced in Parliament in July 1959. However, as 
before, the plan was dropped. Later in this chapter we 
will examine briefly the case for and against the combination 
of central banking and commercial banking in one institution. 
t9) Mr. Victor Owusu, Gold Coast Legislative Assembly 
Debates, 1956-57, Vol. 3. colurgn 710. 
(3) Ibid. 
ý' 
rý 
. ýý, 
ý. 
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of Ghana Bill empowering the Bank to be banker to other 
banks. in Ghana. 
A Central Bank does not normally deal '11ith the general 
public; obviously 14r. O'Nusu's distinction between central 
and commercial banking was not particularly sharp. Moreover, 
commercial banks' deposits at a Central Bank do not normally 
earn interest. Such deposits are maintained primarily for 
the purposes of effecting inter-bank clearing and the banksº 
financial dealings with the Government. At any rate, central 
bank regulation of its deposit liabilities to commercial 
banks is recognized as a major weapon of monetary administ- 
ration in an underdeveloped economy. Moreover, in ordinary 
circunstances central bank deposit liabilities to commercial 
banks form a substantial part of the latterordinary cash 
reserve and there was no reason to suppose that the banks 
would expect the Central Bank to pay interest on reserves 
ordinarily held idle by themselves. Viewed in retrospect, 
the basic position which the Bank of Ghana has come to 
occupy in the country's economic administration (See Chapter 
3) is an adequate refutation or any assertion that the 
ß ank derived its justification mainly from considerations 
of. national pride. 
Before we turn to examine the laws that governed 
central banking in Ghana from 1957 to 1964 we will recount 
briefly developments in central banking objectives as embod- 
Jed in the statutes of the relatively newer central banks. 
Nowadays it is no longer necessary to discuss the 
rationale of central banking in an under-developed country 
"1.54ý- 
not endowed with the institutions of the advanced countries. 
It is generally accepted in academic circles that underdevel- 
oped countries require central banks for reasons peculiar 
to themselves. 
(') 
Moreover, with varying degrees of success 
central banks in many underdeveloped countries are evolving 
various special techniques of general economic controls 
akin to those that engage the attention of their counter- 
parts in developed nations. 
When at the International Financial Conference held 
in brussels in 1920 (convened by the League of Nations) 
every country was urged to establish a central bank, the 
conferring delegates saw in the central bank the machinery 
for curbing the natural extravagance of governments. (2) 
Since theme. devastating wars and severe economic recessions 
have contributed to the development by the long-established 
central banksweapons for combatting both inflationary and 
deflationary pressures. Even so the predominantly negative 
function of a central bank as implied in the spirit of the 
Brussels Conference still prevails in traditional central 
banking attitudes. 
By contrast, in underdeveloped countries central 
bank statutes have tended to confer upon them a positive 
role. 
(1) See R. S. Sayers, "Central banking after Bagehot", 
oxford University Press, London 1957, Chap. 9; E. Nevin, 
op. cit., pp 22-44; J. K. Horsefiead, "? 'Thy a central bank", 
The Fund and Bank Review, Vol. II, No. 3, September 1965 
pp. 159-66. 
(2) See J. K. llorsefi©ld, op. cit. 
'. 11 
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Already, before World War II the proliferation of 
Positively charged central banks that one sees today was 
becoming discernible. In 1924 the statute of the Central 
Bank of China required the Bank "to develop industry, to 
stabilize commerce, to rer_der financial help to the public 
(1) 
and to encourage international trade". Similarly, in 
New Zealand the Reserve Bank ýmendment Act of 1936 made it 
the general function of the Reserve Bank to give effect 
to the monetary policy of the Government, as communicated 
to the Bank by the Minister of Finance. 
(2) 
again, under 
the Bank of Canada Act, 1934 the Bank was charged with respon- 
sibilitity for a detailed array of economic matters, among 
them to mitigate fluctuations in the general level of prod- 
u ctior, trade, prices and emplo; rment.... and generally to 
promote economic and financial welfare of the Dominion. 
(3) 
.. bout 
three decades later, in May 1962 in submissions to 
the Royal Commission on Banking and Finance a representative 
of the Bank of Canada interpreted these functions to include, 
among other things, the promotion of a sustained economic (4) 
growth at high levels of en_ployment and efficiency. 
The central banks established after World War II are 
in their statutory objectives examples of the deviation 
from traditional central banking objectives. Thus the Bank 
of Ceylon has among its objectives the promotion and maint- 
enance of production, employment and real income; the 
(1) J. K. Iiorsefield, o: ). ei i. 
(2) Ibid 
(3) 1J. F. Crick, op. cit., p. 39 
(4) V. F. Crick, op. cit., p. 39 
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encouragement and promotion of the full development of 
productive resources of Ceylon. 
(') 
Two other examples, 
though modestly inscribed, are provided in the objectives 
of the central banks of Nigeria and Malaysia where among 
the usual objectives of regulating money and credit for 
stability the banks are required to promote a sound financial 
structure. 
(2) 
As will be shown presently, the statutory 
objectives of the Bank of Ghana have changed radically from 
the traditional form enshrined in the original law of 1957 to 
a detailed li. oti. ng, of objectives in the current law enacted 
in May- 1963. 
With the newer central ranks positively committed to 
a role of aiding the process of development there is even 
greater danger now that the extravagance of governments 
may become even more prorounced. This gives rise to various 
questions. In particular the question arises as to whether 
the central bank of an underdeveloped country should be 
subservient to the government or whether the relationship 
should be one of complementarity. Answers to this and 
other pertinent questions provide the shape and complexion 
of a particular country's central bank. 
xn the following section we examine developments 
in corstitutiona1 arrangements affecting central banking in 
Ghana from 1957 to 1964. 
(1) H. ý" de `'. ( nasekera, "From dependent currency to central 
banking in Ceylon, "Bell and Bons, London 1962, p. 265. 
(2) V F. Crick, op. cit., p. 41. On l; igeria see also G. V. 
t3ro, rin, "The evolution of 
banking power in West africa, 
The Bankers' Magazine, March 1966, pp. 171-4. 
. 
157 
SECTION C 
Developments in central banking constitutional 
arrangements 
The Bank of Ghana was established by the Bank of (1) 
Ghana ordinance 1957 finally passed on ist March five 
days before the formal att<i, _uient of Independence. Th e 
Bank was given all the usual trappings of a central bank: 
sole right to issue currency, banker to the Government and 
other resident and non-resident banks, and the issue and 
management of loans raised by the Government. 
In 1961 the Bank of Ghana Amendment Act(2) altered 
few of the original provisions affecting largely the compos- 
ition of currency cover assets. In May 1963 the original 
lave as amended in 1961 was replaced by the Bank of Ghana 
Act 1963(3) which introduced far-reaching changes in the 
Bank's constitution. In the rest of this chapter we examine 
and discuss briefly the important aspects of central banking 
constitutional .: rovisions over the period 1957-64. 
Principal objects. 
Under the Bank of Ghana ONdinance 1957 the Bank's 
principal objectives weist stated as: 
"to issue and redeem bank notes and coin; to 
keep and use reserves and to influence the 
credit situation -vith a view to maintaining 
monetary itability in Ghana and the external 
valpe of the Ghana L, ound; and to act as banker 
and financial adviser to the Governinent"(4) 
1 Ordinance i4o. 34/1957 
2 ! ct No. 84/1961 
3 het No. 182/1963 
4) Bank or Ghana Ordinance, 1957, section 5. 
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The law of 1963 required of the Bank of Ghana, in addition 
to the objectives as under the law of 1957 specifically, 
"to regulate and direct the credit and banking 
system in accordance with the economic policy 
of the Government"(1) 
In addition the 1963 constitution empowered the Bank to 
pron occ to the Cover nr1enýý to 11aýre a 
able effect on the balance of ra . iontri, -,, )rice movements,, 
the state o '),, hblic finance and the general development of 
the ecoiloIy and 'monetary- suaj)ilityS2) : iually, a, o under 
tlýe 1957 Ordinance, the i3anlc of Ghana Act 1963 tieo-ýed in 
the Ban!: l. o1. Je_r 
"to do all such things as are incidental or 
conducive to the efficient performance of 
its functions under this or any other enactment"(3) 
Thus as stated in the previous Bection the Dank of 
Ghana Pict 1963, in contrast to the provisions of the 1957 
Ordinance, conformed to the post-war pattern by detailing 
out central banking objectives which differed from the 
simpler formulations of the early central banks and by 
making the Bank of Ghana legally subservient to the Govern- 
raent on policy matters. 
` Relations with the Government 
The 1957 constitution left the Bank legally independent 
of the Government in all matters of policy. Apart from 
the fact that the Government, through the Prime Minister 
(1) Bank of Ghana Act, 1963, section 3, subsection (c). 
(2) ! bid, section 3, subsection (e) 
(3) Ibid, section 3, subsection (f) 
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.. 
and tLe Minister of Finance, was responsible for the appoint- 
raent of directors, the Government had no other statutory 
influence on the Bank. Once appointed the Board of Directors 
were free to operate the Bank within the framework of the 
law. The Government had no consultative rights other 
than in the appointment by the Bank of auditors of its own 
accounts, 
(1) 
and in the determination of the forms, designs, 
weight -and composition of coins, and denominations of the 
monetary unit. 
(2) 
It may, of course, be argued that in practice the 
Government could control the Bank1s policies through the 
members whom it appointed to the Board. For example, the 
official (as distinct from the political) head of the Ministry 
of Finance was made an ex officio member of the Board. 
14o-7evcr., the law did not allow the Government an 
entirely free hand in the choice of the other 
directors. 
All the directors including the Governor and Deputy 
a_ Governor were to ac rers'or-s oý xgcogrr: _sQ ste4n&h 
and experience' in financial affairs. Secondly, members of 
the LeCislative Assembly and salaried government officials 
(other than the official head of the Ministry of Finance) 
were barred by the law from becoming 
directors of the Bank. 
Thus the Government was considerably limited as to whom it 
could appoint to a directorship of 
the Bank. Moreover, 
even if the Government succeeded 
in appointing some persons 
likely to be amenable to its wishes, the fact that voting 
(1) Bank of Ghana ordinance, 1957, section 45 
(2) - Ibld, section 20. 
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rights were unweighted (but for a casting vote vested in the 
Chairman of the Board of Directors) implied, at least in 
theory that direct Government control over the policies of 
the Bank was considerably limited. The inference to be 
drawn from this is that under the Bank of Ghana Ordinance 
1957 the Bank was the 1,1onetary Authority in Ghana. 
By contrast, under the Bank of Ghana Act 1963 much 
closer relations came to exist between the Bank and the 
Government. 
First, as mentioned earlier in this Section the Bank 
was required to direct the credit and banking systems to 
accord with the economic policy of the Government. Secondly, 
the Government was not inhibited in any significant sense 
regarding the type of persons eligible or not eligible for 
directorship of the Bank save the repetition of the previous 
la 's provision that the Governor and Deputy Governor were 
to be persons of recognized financial and banking experience. 
(l)" 
T'hu, Members of Parliament and other members of the Govern- 
ment's Party could be appointed directors of the Bank. 
(2) 
Thirdly, various forms of control and consultative 
rights were vested in the Government through the Minister 
of Finance. The prominent ones are stated below. 
1. i. he Minister could request the Bank to guarantee a loan 
granted to the Government or to any person in Ghana by 
(1) Bank of Ghana Act, 1963, Section 6. 
(2) Generally,, the senior personnel and directorships of 
many public corporations and state enterprises were drawn 
from various ranks of the Governmentts Party. 
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(1) 
"a foreign institution. 
2. - The : iinister may in consultation with the Board take 
decisions relating to the exchange rate of the monetary 
unit in relation to external currencies. 
(2) 
3.1 e Bank was required to consult the Minister in the 
prescribing of asset ratios to the commercial banks 
for the purpose of credit regulation and the promotion 
of sound banking. 
(3) 
4. The Minister, in consultation with the Bank, was given 
the power to prescribe by legislative instrument the 
maximum borrowing and lending rates as well as commissions 
payable or chargeable by commercial banks and other 
financial institutions*(4) 
Thus under the Bank of Ghana act 1963 the Bank and 
the Minister of Finance constituted the Monetary Authority. 
(1) Bank of Ghana Act, 1963, section 24, subsection (1) . 
The lava did not specify whether "_foreign institution" 
meant a resident foreign institution or one actually resident 
abroad. However, a distinction was important as a non- 
resident creditor would most probably require a security 
- ; iahen the Bank gave any such guarantee - an asset realisable 
in convertible foreign currency and therefore a lavish use 
of this provision could in effect reduce the level of the 
Bank's free and convertible foreign exchange reserves. 
(2) Ibid, section N5. This provision itself should be 
pointed out as in effect a correction of a deficiency in 
the 1957 Ordinance which did not state the repository of 
power to change the external parity of the monetary unit. 
It could, however, be argued that having been tied to 
sterling the parity of the Ghana pound would follow changes 
in the external parity of sterling. In this case the 
British Government would be the body responsible for 
deterrsining the external currency value of the Ghana pound. 
(3) Ibid.. section 29 
(4) Ibid, Section 56. 
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Policies affecting vital areas of monetary adwinistration 
were to ire determined jointly by the i; ank and the Minister 
of Finance. In terms of the law the Bank was no longer 
independent of the Government in all the es., 3entials of 
central banking. 
The concept of an independent central bank is, of 
course, largely theoretical as in practice most central 
banks are rrcuired to assist the policy of the Government 
not fight against it. In the words of a prominent Governor 
of the Bank of England the central bank has "the unique 
right; to offer advice even to the point of nagging; but 
always of course subject to the supreme authority of the 
Government. Thus the need to integrate central bank 
policy with the broad economic policy of the Government has 
long been an accepted creed. In spite of this the central 
banks of advanced countries generally retain a special status 
which implies a considerable degree of freedom from polit'i. cal 
authorities in matters which are more than daily technical 
operations. 
(2) 
The large area of governmental influence on central 
banking policy allowed in the Bank of Ghana Act 1963 in 
theory did not remove the unique status of the central bank 
within the context stated in the previous paragraph. In 
practice it is the attitude of the Government which gives 
meaning to the status of the central bank. In the light 
(1) Lord I, iontagu Norman in Royal Commission on Indian 
Currency and Finance 1926. Quoted in R. S. Sayers, "Modern 
Banking, " 5th Edition, p. 65. 
(2) See R. S. Sayers, ibid. 
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of the monetary and general financial chaos which occurred 
in Ghana from 1963 to the present day it would appear that 
the Government reduced the Bank of Ghana to the position of 
an-ordinary department of government. 
Administration. 
The administration is vested in a seven-member Board 
of Directors including a Governor and Deputy Governor. The 
Governor and in his absence the Deputy Governor is the 
Chairman of the Board. Under both the laws of 1957 and 
1963 the Governor and Deputy Governor were made the only 
full-time directors, responsible for the day-to-day business 
and ". administration of the Bank, and answerable for their 
actions to the Board. 
Under the 1957 Ordinance the Governor and Deputy 
Governor viere to be appointed by the Governor of the Gold 
(1) 
Coast on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. 
The five ordinary (or part-time) directors were to 
be apZ: ointed by the Minister of Finance with the approval 
of the Governor of the countryýl) 
The membership of part-ti. me directors was to be entirely 
separate from any other intorests with which they were 
ordinarily connected. Their presence on the board Was 
not to be regarded as a representation on the Board of their 
(1) Tlýe Ordinance of 1957 was passed on 1st March 1957 when 
technically Ghana was still a colony and the name had not 
formally been changed from the Gold Coast to Ghana. From 
the 6th March 1957 the Governor's functions with regard 
to - th. e Bank 
wore exercised by the Governor General until 
Ist July 1960 when 
the latter post was abolished following 
the adoption of a 
Republican constitution. 
.ý 
.. ýhý. ý. 
own private interests. 
( 1) 
The ordinance barred from becoming directors (both 
full-time and part-time) anyone who gras, 
(2) 
1. A member of the Legislative : assembly 
2. A director, salaried official or shareholder of any other 
bank, and 
3. A salaried Government official, except that during the 
first nine years of operations the official head (Principal 
Secretary) of the Ministry of Finance could be appiinted 
as a part-time director. 
These provisions could be interpreted as desibned to 
preclude from directorship of the Bank persons directly 
involved in politics or directly subject to the control of 
politicians. Thus the provision regarding the appointment 
of the i'rincipal Secretary of the Ministry of Finance could 
looked upon as a direct Government representation on the 
Bank. Vie should also note the diffusion of responsibility 
for the appointment of directors between the Governor (in 
practice the Governor-General) the Prime Minister and the 
: Minister of Finance. 
(3) 
Under the 1957 constitution the Governor 
of the Hank 
and Deputy Governor were to hold office for five years and 
were to be eligible for reappointment. There was, hoviever, 
(1) Lank of Ghana ordinance, 1957, section 11, subsection (3). 
(2) ibid., section 12. 
(3) In practice the Prime Minister as head of the Government 
was likely to have the final cord in all these appointments. 
3, u t the tripartite arrangement in theory, at least, implied 
a broad basis for the appointment of directors thus reducing 
the possibility of any one person appc, inting his special 
favourites regardless of other considerations. 
i; '\. 
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a provision that the first Deputy-Governor should hold 
office for only three years after which he could be re- 
appoir ted. 
(1) 
In addition, as mentioned earlier, all seven directors 
: giere to be persons of recognized standing and experience 
in financial and related affairs. At meetings of the 
Board all members were to exercise ecual voting rights with 
acistinb vote residing in the chairman. 
(2) 
When the Bank of Ghana Act, 1963 was passed the 
national constitution had itself changed with the adoption 
of a Republican Government. Consequently the Governor and 
Deputy, Governor were to be appointed by the President of 
the Republic on the recommendations of the Minister of 
Finance, in whom resided the power to appoint the other 
five directors. 
however, the 1963 constitution differed from the 
original law in two important respects. 
First, the lu: v did not specify any particular kinds 
of persons as ineligible for appointment as 
directors save 
for the possible interpretation of .. Section 8 Which prescri- 
bed the conditions under which a member would cease to 
hold office. Under Section 8a member would cease to hold 
office on grounds of 
bankruptcy in his oven private affairs, 
conviction on a felony, serious misconduct 
in relation to 
(1) Inevitably both the first Governor and Deputy governor 
had to be expatriates. Thus this provision was intended 
most probably to enable 
the appointment of a Ghanaian Deputy 
Governor after the first three years of operation by the 
$anic. 
ý_. (2) Bank of Ghana 
Ordinance 1957, section 14. 
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duties and suspension or dismissal from a profession on 
disciplinary grounds. These could, by implication be 
adopted as guidelines to the appointment of directors. The 
significant point, however, is that under The Bank of Ghana 
Act 1963 politicians as such could be made directors of the 
Bank. 
Secondly, whereas the law of 1957 indicated that each 
of the part-time directors was to be a person of known 
financial experience etc., the law of 1963 was silent on 
this matter. 
The differences stated above were at once an element of 
flexirility and a potential danger. By 1963 political 
trends were such that the possibility of the Government 
appointing political supporters to positions demanding 
primarily less of political experience but more of other 
specialisation were becoming a matter of considerable 
concern. 
(l) 
Capital and Reserves 
The Bank of Ghana Ordinance 1957 stated an authorized 
capital of £Gl million all of which was to be subscribed and 
paid fully by the Government. The Bank was to pay specified 
proportions of ret profits into a General Reserve Fund 
(payix the remainder to the Government) until the Fund was 
equal to twice the amount of the authorized capital. After 
that the whole of the net profits was to be paid to the 
(1)- jr. Chapter 3 we will examine briefly the use which the 
Government made of its powers of appointing directors of the 
Dank. 
I 
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Government. 
The 1963 constitution raised the authorized capital to 
£G10 rLillion to be taken up from time to time by the Govern- 
ment. Unlike the 1957 constitution which was silent on the 
subject of changes in the authorized capital, the lawn of 
1963 stated that the capital "may be increased from titre to 
time. "(2) Even so the 1963 constitution did not specify 
who was to initiate proceedings for an increase. 
On the distribution of profits the Act of 1963 retained 
essentially the same formula as under the previous lay,, i with, 
only one difference. The Government was to be paid the 
tinhole of the net profits after the Reserve Fund equalled 
paid-up capital as opposed to authorized capital as under 
the law of 1957. 
(3) 
The high level of authorized capital relative to that 
stipulated in the original constitution indicated that the 
political authorities expected the Dank to undertake a much 
higher volume of business in the future. As stated in a 
Report of the Bank the increase was "in anticipation of the 
expanded role which it 
(the "trank) will play in the future 
and tie consequent possible expansion in its assets. 
"(4) 
Fay 1963 the political authorities were firmly committed to 
a planned programme of industrialisation in which the Bank 
of Ghana would be required to play an important role. 
(1) tank of Ghana Ordinance, 1957, sections 7-8. 
(2) Bank of Ghana Act, 1963, Section 4. 
(3) paid-up capital has since 1957 remained at Gl million. 
Thus up to now the new formula on the distribution of net 
profits has not made any practical difference. 
y 
(4) Bank of Ghana, Annual Report, June 1963, p. 8. 
-1.6ü- 
Currency system. 
There have been important changes in the conditions of 
issue, redemption and parity of the Bank's currency liabilit- 
ies. 
Under the Bank of Ghana Ordinance 1957 the parity of 
the Ghana pound (changed to the cedi in Jul; 1965) . vas fixed 
in terms of sterling on a one to one basis. 
(') 
The Bank was required to issue and redeem currency on 
demand against sterling immediately delivered in London, and 
subject to an exchange charge which the Bank could vary within 
a statutory limit of "fifteen shillings for every hundred 
(2) 
pounds", that it to say 4 per cent. 
A fiduciary issue not exceeding AG12 million at any 
time was-permitted against Government of Ghana Treasury Bills 
(3) 
and securities. To put it another way, the Bank was 
rocjuired to hold against its total outstanding currency 
liabilities a full cover of assets in sterling, and locally 
issued debt of the Ghana Government to a maximum of. , PG12 
million. of the local assets at least £G6 million were to 
be maturing within two years, and the remainder with a 
M 
maximum maturity period of twenty years. 
There was a strict separation of the issue and bunking 
departments of the Bank. To obtain local currency the 
b rll-in& dehartmer. t vias required to observe the same procedure 
(1) Br. nk of Ghana Ordinance, 1957, section 18. 
(2) Bank of Ghana Ordinance, 1957, section 25, subsection (1) 
(3) Ibid, section 28, subsection (1) 
(4) Ibid, section 28, subsection (2) 
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as an:., other merfber of the public, that is, submit to the 
issue department in exchange the specified assets against 
which the latter was permitted to issue locAl currency. she 
1 
req fired assets were. 
1. Sterling balances, gold coin or bullion. 
2. United rin, dom Treasury Bills maturing within ninety- 
three dA s. 
Z. hills of exch Inge maturing, within three months den. - 
orainated in sterling and payable in the United Iiingdor, ý. 
4. - Sterling securities of, or guaranteed by, the United 
1iingdom Government and maturing Within five years. 
5. For a maximum period of two years from the commencement 
of operations, the notes and coins of the West African 
U'urrency Bord vzhich the iý, ank replaced. 
6. Is noted above, the locally issued 
(that is payable in 
Ghana currency) ninety-three days Treasury : Dills and 
securities (see above) of the Ghana Government. These 
:, were also the t;; -pe of assets which the issue department 
was permitted to hold against its currency liabilities. 
The assets of the issue department were available to 
meet only the liabilities of that department including cur- 
rer. cy held in the banking department. 
(2) 
It should be noted that the ; wank of Ghana as established 
and operated under the 1957 constitution retained several 
features of the Currency '; oard in the arrargembnts regarding 
the issue and redemption of currency. These viere: 
(1) ILid, section 28, subsection (1) 
(2) i; ünk of Ghana Ordinance, 19& 7, section 28, subsection (3) 
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1. the issue and redemption of local currency on demand 
against sterling. 
2. The provision for only a limited fiduciary issue implying 
tLat the bulk of the currency reserve assets was to be 
held in sterling. 
3. The adoption of an upper limit of 4 per cent exchange 
clarge on issues and redemptions as was the case under 
tie Currency Board from 1949. 
The amendment of 1961 introduced a few but significant 
changes in the composition of currency reserve assets. 
First, instead of bills of exchange payable in sterling 
the issue department was simply required to hold bills of 
exchange drawn on any place outside Ghana and payable in 
convertible currency. 
Secondly-, in the place of sterling securities of, or 
guaranteed by the United Kingdom Government the 1961 umend- 
ment substituted securities of any foreign Government express- 
ed in convertible currency. 
The Bank of Ghana i'mendment Act 1961 introduced two 
other novelties into the extc; rnal securities component of 
the currency reserve assets. 
First, whereas the principal enactment required that 
the external securities (U. K. Government sterling securities) 
held against currency liabilities should be maturing within 
five years, the amendment was silent on the question of 
maturity. On the one hand this allowed the Monetary Author- 
ity some discretion in the use of the currency reserve fund 
t 
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with the implication that longer-dated external securities 
could be held against currency liabilities. On the other 
hand the discretion to invest the currency reserve fund in 
longer-dated securities could be said to have been introduced 
at-an inopportune time. It was not likely that securities 
with rr. ore than five years to run would appeal to the 3ankºs 
authorities. ; jy 1961 it was clear that Ghanas trade balance 
was likely to remain adverse for some time to come with the 
implication that the period of increasing external reserves 
was over. The prospect for the future was one of decreasing 
net external assets. In these circumstaaces it was essential 
that external securities held aEainst the currency liabilitics 
should be on the short end of maturity so as to minimize the 
risk of capital loss should it become necessary to liquidate 
security holdings. 
The relaxation of the original law to allow for non- 
sterling external securities was itself a necessary hedging 
against possible devaluation of sterling. 
3ut this does not 
explain why the amendment made it possible, 
in theory at 
least, to invest the currency reserve fund in external Goverr- 
ment securities with more than five years 
to mature. it 
is the authjorf s opinion, albeit tentative, that one probable 
explanation of this could 
be found in the Government's increas- 
116 political commitments in Africa. For, oy this change 
of, policy the bank could exchange 
its sterling assets for 
Ion,; -term debt of unT other African Governments expressed in 
any convertible currency 
includinp, that of the borroviing 
countrJ . 
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Secondly, while retaining the original ruling that the 
total of such foreign Government securities should not exceed 
50 per cent of the total currency reserve assets the amendment 
contained a novel provision that the 50 per cent limit was 
not t^ apply to foreign securities held for the financing of 
agricultural produce or the marketing of crops. 
This provision heralded a change in the method of 
financing- the purchase of cocoa from producers. For, it 
enabled the Cocoa Marketing o, ard to finance the 1961/62 cocoa 
crop by funds raised from the Bank of Ghana against the 
security of sterling securities, '. 'rithout an infringement of 
the 50 per cent limit on exterr-al Government securities in 
total currency reserve ., ssets. 
The Bank of Ghana Act, 1963 abolished the existing law 
as amended in 1961, and introduced many changes Jr the lavrts 
aovcrring the issue of currency and the corresponding cur. rei, cy 
reserve as. 3ets. 
The parity of the Ghana pound was expressed in terms of 
1 ( 
gold (2.44b Z8 -, rams of fine rold) instead of sterling. 
. 
e1j. e severance of the link between the Ghana pound and sterling r 
was demonstrated further by permitting the issue department 
to -rh. old foreif6r_ exchünge assets of all 
kinds. The only 
specified sterling assets -: 'ere notes, coin and bank baluncesc2) 
The strict separation of the issue department from the 
rest of the Bank was removed, implying a considerable discret- 
(1) E ank -)f Ghana Act, 1963, section 14. 
(2) Ibid, section 15, subsectiofl () 
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ion ir the use of fo. reivr exchange resources held within the 
Bank. For one tl_ing the issue department was not, under 
the 1 03 constitution, specifically required to issue currency 
to the banking department only against specified assets. 
For another, the assets of the issue department were made 
availE. ble to meet currency liabilities as well us any disposal 
1 
of assets "by the sank. 
The limit of foreign securities (medium und long-term) 
in the currency reserve assets was lowered from 50 per cent 
to 40 per cent. 
(2) 
Again, as under the previous constitution 
as amended in 1961 the 4: 0 per cert limit was to exclude any 
such -securities held in connection with 
the financing of 
agricultural produce. 
In place of a total fiduciary issue of £G12 million 
the 1 63 constitution fixed the fiduciary element us a 
proportion of total outstanding current v. 
'i'he limit was 
fixed ordinarily at 4-0 per cert, wzith a provision that the 
,, firister of Finance could by 
legislative instrument raise 
(3) 
the, limit to 60 per cent. 
Under the pre-1963 constitution not more than CG6 
million of locally issued currency reserve assets was 
to 
be in Goverment debt maturing within a period of over two 
years. Tho 1903 constitution changed 
this radically.. They 
meximum maturity of any 
Ghana Government security so held 
was 'fixed at twenty years. 
This ince. rused tremendouslT 
(1) Ibid, section 15, subsection (4), para (b) 
? bid, section 15, subsection (2), papa (o) 
(3) Ibid, section 15, s1Oseetion (3) 
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the extent to viti_ich currency could be printed to the Govern- 
ment to finance long-term projects. It also meant that the 
Government could excharge a larger amount of its locally 
issued debt for external securities held by the issue depart- 
ment. In all the currency resert? e regulations introduced 
in 19(3 increased the possibility of the Bank lending to the 
Government at lor. g term and to a greater volume. 
"Media of Payment" or money supply was given a legal 
definition in the 1963 constitution, to consist of currency 
in circulation plus demand deposits with banking institutions, 
excluding currency held by the banking institutions and the 
demand deposits of the Government and of banking irstitut- 
(1) 
Tolls . In , 
ddition the law provided that, 
If on agil; particular day the total amount of media 
of payment exceeds by 15 per cent or more the total 
amount of media of payment which have been in 
existence at any time during the twelve months 
immediately preceding that day, the Board shall forth- 
make a report to this effect to the Linister 
specifying the causes which in their opinion have 
led to that situation -, nd their proposals 
to the 
Linister as to the steps to be taken in view 
thereof ." (2) 
These two legal specificutinns introduced important rigidities 
jr, a corstitution wricL bererully allowed a considerable 
: nargin of discretion in monetary ad. rninistr-ition, compared 
to the earlier constitution. We will discuss these re8ulat- 
ions in the concluding pages of this Chapter. 
(1) Lank of Ghana . pct, 1963 section 22, subsection (2) 
(2) Ibid., section 22, subsection (1) 
Chas provision has been interpreted by the Bank as "a further 
check on excesses inherent it the raising of the fiduciary 
issue" . Bank of 
Ghana, , innual Report June 1963, p. 9. 
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Lending to the Government 
It was shown in the preceding subsection that under 
the current constitution (dating back from ý. 2ay 1963) the 
Bank of Ghana can hold outstanding Government debt to an 
amour t corresponding to 40 per cent ordinarily und 60 per 
cent if the ; vAnister so directs by way of the fiduciar-T issue. 
This represents a considerable potential increase over the 
position under the previous constitution were the limit was 
'G12 million - Under the current regulations totul outstand- 
ink Government borrowing b11 w< y of the fiduciary issue could 
excaeä G12 million so lonp as the total currency in circul- 
ation outside the issue department exceeded G20 million. 
In addition the bank V1as required in both constitutions 
to lend to the Government in the form of 1'lays and Means 
advances. Under the current law such advances are limited 
to 10 per cent of estimated budget revenue as laid before 
Parliament in respect of the Government's financial year. 
The 1. ercentdgo may, however, be ireraacedto 15 per cent if 
(1) 
the iresident of the Repuulic so recuests. Under the 
1957 c^rstitution the limit was 10 per cent of budget revenue. 
In addition to the raedia described above, urder both 
(1) E,,. nk of Ghana . pct, 
1963, section 37. 
17 frs and i,, ieans advances are esser, tiallýr overdraft facilities 
used tier- the Government to cover temporary cash deficits 
especially during the second and third quarters of the 
calendar year --hen Government revenue receipts are at the 
ebb. V. -Jays and means 
facilities viere first utilized in 
1961 Lnd since then have become a regular feature of fiscal 
arran& emer is . 
It must be noted that the limits referred to daily 
positi. on_s. 
Also the lave (both 1957 and 1963) did not speei y 
Zwhether estimated 
budget revenue included receipts on both 
current and loan accounts. 
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the constitutions of 1957 and 1963 the Government could 
borrow from the Bank through provisions allowing the latter 
to purchase securities of the Government. Under the Bank 
of Ghana Ordinance 1957 the limit of total holdings of Govern- 
ment securities (other than on account of the issue deportment) 
was fixed at six times the capital of the Bunk. 
(1) 
This 
limit could be interpreted to include Ghana Government finan- 
cial instruments held by the Bank. os a-ce. s , 
The current constitution imposed no such limits. More- 
over, in the current law the Bank's transactions in securities 
are regarded partly as a- means of influencing the monetary 
situation in the manner that central banks in advanced count- 
ries deal in open-market operations. Thus the Bank is e'n- 
po: wered to buy and sell not only the securities (short and 
long-term) of ttýe Government but also other fixed-interest 
securities realisable in Ghana currency. In this respect 
the Bank is now permitted, after consultation with the 
to issue its own securities and sell or purchase them. 
(2) 
Other customers of the Bank 
According to the Bank of Ghana Act 1963 the Bank can 
buy, discount and rediscount specified instruments in trans- 
actions with "individuals, public institutions or bodies 
corporate whether private or public. 11 It is also allowed 
to k, rant advances against specified financial instruments to 
(1) Bank of Ghana Act, 1957, section 37. 
The law did not state the relevant definition of capital 
vihic1: could either be paid-up capital or the sum of paid-up 
capital and reserves. 
(2) F. ank of Ghana act, 1963, section 35. 
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these broad categories of customers. 
This provision does not by itself imply that the Bank 
can keep accounts for individuals and the various bodies 
listed above. On the other hand it or any otter provision 
of the law does not preclude the Bank from carrying out 
normal commercial banking operations. 
Whilst private individuals and bodies cannot be comp8: &- 
led to keep accounts with the central bank, public bodies 
are in a different position since they are directly subject 
to the authority of the Government. Thus from the point 
of view of monetary control it is significant that the 
i3anic of Ghana is not expressly precluded from being banker 
to public institutions. For, the credit base of nomnercial 
banks can be lowered or expanded in accordance with the 
dictates of monetary policy by shifting the accounts of the 
public sector between the commercial banks and the central 
.. 
(2) 
b anlc. 
Coritrol over the banks 
Prior to the er_actment of the 1963 constitution 
central bank statutory powers of control over 
the financial 
S stcm was limited to control over the commercial 
banks. 
In the Bank of Ghana Act 1963 some limited powers of 
control were extended 
to cover non-banking financial ir. stit- 
(1) ibid, section 28. 
(2) . his is obviously a simplification. The significant 
point is that the Bank of 
Ghana : sct 1963 does not preclude 
, the ßL:. nk 
from undertaking normal commercial banking opera} 
ions. Lyle 1957 Ordinance differed in not specifically 
providing 
for credit dealings between the Lank and the 
private sector other than the commercial banks. 
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ions r, _airly in 
the form of powers to request information. 
These involve rights to examine their books, and report to 
the Governor findings and : >r. opos:. ls for correcting irre , ul- 1 
arides. 
regard to the commercial banks the position is 
quite different. The current constitution gives the bank 
wide powers of control the main features of . ihlch are summar- 
ized below. 
1. The ýank has power, in consultation with the hinister 
of Finance, to prescribe for a commercial bank "liquid 
assets of a specified amount and compositi. or. " The 
amount of such assets may be fixed "either as a certain 
percentage of all deposit liabilities .... or in any 
other manner. " The sank may also fix different percent- 
aces for different classes of deposits or assets. 
Failure to comply with prescribed asset ratios is runish- 
alle by paJment of interest on the deficiency to be 
determined by the hank and the :, iinister. 
(3) 
It is 
also an offence for a bank deficient with regard to 
specified assets to make fresh advances nhile the 
deficiency lasts. 
(n. ) 
2. Tie Bank has poser, with the prior approval of the 
I; ir"ister to direct banks to refrain from increasing 
p. rticu1, ir kinds of credit as specified by the Bunk. 
(5) 
(1) Lank of Ghana act, 1963, section 31. 
(;: ) Tbi. d, section 29, subsection (1) 
(3) Zbid, section 30, subsection (1) 
(4) Icid, section 30, subsection (2) 
(5) Bonk of Ghana Act, 1963, section 33. 
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3. The Bank may also fix the minimum amount of the paid-up 
capital and of the balance of undistributed Pet profits 
which a bank shall hold as a percentage of the total 
t 1) 
ar, _ount of its assets . 
4. As mentioned earlier, the i.; ir_ister of Finance in consult- 
ation yvith the bank may prescribe commercial bunks 
(2) 
m, -.. xi. mum borrowing and lending rates. 
a. The Bank has consultative rights on the establishment, 
Jý 
closure, change of capital and merger of banks. 
The powers outlined above are much wider in scope 
and detail than was the case under the Ordinance of 1957. 
In the first constitution the Bankts powers of control 
over commercial banks were mainly powers to prescribe separate 
asset ratios one in relation to demand deposits and the other 
in relation to time (and savings) deposits. More important, 
the Bank had no discretion in the type of assets to be so 
prescribed. The 1957 constitution laid d-wn in detail the 
! sind of assets and the Bank's discretion could only be 
exercise. in the uxnounts and ratios of the assets. 'The 
currer. t constitution does not specify any particular assets. 
In conclusion to these constitutional developments on 
ee, n-Itral banking we will 
discuss briefly three points of 
fundamental importance. They are (a) the sigr. ificar. co cC rules 
and discretion in central 
Äankint; operations; (b) the 
(1), Ibid, section 34 
(2)' Iüid, section 56 
(3) Ibid, section 32 
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relationship oetween the cei: tral "Dark 
(c) the conduct of commercial -o, -LjijcjrE, 
b an'' . 
a) First, --re ohould discuss the 
mr oneý supply in the ank of Ghana Act 
the provision calling for action -Then 
by over 15 per cent over the amount of 
precedinC, t'. elve months. 
Since the ultimate significance 
ar_d tine Government and 
business by a certral 
legal definition of 
1963 (see above), and 
the mone-' supply rises 
i any day vii ti jr- tr, e 
of the supply of means 
of payment devolves on its potential effect on the real 
, goods market vie cannot disregard the importance of savings 
deposits held essentially as transactions balances. '. hile 
admitting that it is impossible to 'separate out what portion 
of savings deposits is so held vie can, nevertl'eless, leritim- 
atelyT query a st... tutory definition of means of pulyrient which 
conforms to definitions conventionally adopted in the advan- 
ced countries. Loreover, the definition given in the law 
has itself been the subject of academic polemics in the 
advanced countries. To specify legally assets or liabilit- 
ies výr. ich cor.. stitute the woney supt, ly in an economy -rhich 
has obviousl-, not settled dorm to stablc processes and habits 
was ill advised. 
If wo int; rpret the 15 per cent rule as constituting 
the signal f, )r policy action similar criticisms can be 
advanced against the ruling. Even admitting for the moment 
the reed for such a statutory, ruling it is debatable vil. ether 
the money supply was the appropriate criterion to legislate 
3a sirrlal for rionetary- action. The money supply itself 
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can be a misleading, basis for Action. If a rule vas to be 
stipiAlated it : could have be(-. n more appropriate to relate the 
need for polir:,; * to some other index such ). s the rate of 
increLse in the price level or, more significant for ar 
underdeveloped economy, to the size of convertible foreign 
exchar. ge reserves in relation to expected demurd for foreign 
exchange. It is generally agreed that a rapidl r rising price 
level and/or £ ra ýlý declining foreign exchange position 
are disruptive of an orderly and desir_Lble pattern of economic 
(1) 
growtl_ . Moreover, as noted earlier, 
the two statutory 
provisions discussed here introduced rules into a consiýon 
. which generally, unlike 
the central bank 1ai7 of 1957. allow- 
eck a considerable measure of discretion in monetary administ- 
ration. 
In some. 'advanced countries, notably the U . S., academic 
opinion has tended to differ on the subject of whether monet- 
ary Fnlicy should be administered on legally stipulated rules 
or on the basis of executive discretion. 
Should human 
judgment and discretion determine the proper course of action 
ir. tl. e light of the central L: tinkers t views of economic 
conditions, or should ü set of rules or 
formulas be establish- 
ed '/h1 Ch , tutomaticall 
inui_cJ. te the direction of monetary 
(1) one economist has written in relation to East Africa 
that "it is the state of foreign exchange reserves rather 
than inflation which is the important criterion of monetary' 
policy, " W. I. Pewlyn, 
"IvIonetary' systems and integration'' 
Reprint from The East African Economics Review, June 1964. 
In a dependent economy to emphasize the money Supply 
as the major criterion of monetary policy could be described 
as a case of misplaced concreteness. 
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policy under different circumstances. 
An early view on the subject of rules versus descretion 
was generally in favour of rules on the grounds that rules 
could diminish uncertainty. A contemporary keen supporter 
of rules is I`rofessor L ilton Friedman. Professor Friedman's 
major objection to discretionary administration by the monet- 
ri"  t' nY j ý-zr j_! 7 t1! tc of the -: lo netarir 'ii: i'1or- 
ity Oenei1,7,: to" or acci. "Aentc o: 11 personality, (Ii erzen 
recpone1-bility, obstruct. C appraisat of yer fo once. gives 
tpv `Much Scope to the ni-,? irneted rreoccunation of bankers 
with how policy affects interest rate^ end credit availabil-- 
it r . ray, er_ 
than how it affects the quantity of money. 
(2) 
pontrary to the above views other authors have expressed 
serious doubts about the propriety of rules in any complex 
set-up where relationships are not demarcated in any simple 
manner. one author concludes that it is better to have no 
fixed rules and to tolerate the blunders of descretion than 
to accept blindly a rule based on faith or simple deductive 
(3) 
analysis. More recent doubts against central banking by 
rules have been based on the difficulties of legislating 
. rules which 
can be effective guidelines to policy. In 
particular there is doubt about the choice of rules and the 
(1) See I. L. C. jimmons, ': Rules versus authority in monetary 
policy, " Journal of Political Economy, Februar', 1936. 
(2) M. Friedman, "Should there be an independent monetary 
authority", in "In search of a monetary constitution" (ed: 
L. B. Jeager), Harvard University Press, 1962. Chapter B. 
The reference to quantity of money is, of course, a 
reflection of Professor Friendman's stand as an epitomy of the 
resurrected Quantity Theorist. 
(3) See ', V. A. Morton, "Human judment and central banking", 
, nerican 
Economic Reviel, r, May 1951. 
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theoretical justification for an 
(1) 
y particular choice of rules. 
The cnrtrovers-y is relevart to a developing country 
not only in the context of rules stipulated in terms of some 
index such "s the quar_tity, of money, but also regarding the 
degree of discretion allowed to the central bank executives 
in such matters as currency- reserve assets and the basis of 
control over the banking; system. 
In a developing country where central banking and 
indeed monetary management is a recent experience there 
would seem to be a strong case for legislated rules and 
specifications as opposed to executive judgement. However, 
it is the author's opinion that given the abilities of the 
central bank's executives, it is necessary that the monetary 
authorities should not be hampered by rigid rules and detailed 
statutory specifications. Central banking itself is at 
an experimental stage and legislated rules might rot encour- 
age a broad and original approach to monetary administration. 
(b) During the period under review (and indeed up to 
the time of writing) the ; yank of Ghana w us in a curious 
position with regard to the extent of its relationship 
with the Government in matters of policy. On the one hand 
the Bank of Ghana ordinance 1957 allowed the Bank to function 
largely independent of the Government. At the same time 
the constitution did not allow the Bank's executives any 
range of discretion. A central bank which operates under 
r-; (1) Jacob Viner, "The necessary and the desirable range of 
discretion to be allowed to a monetary authority", in L. B. 
Yeager (ed), op. cit., Chapter 9. 
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a regime of statutory regulations cannot be said to operate 
indei. ender_t1 of the Government since such rules are legis- 
lated by the Government and therefore likely to reflect 
rnostl` the policy of the Government. On the other hand, 
the current constitution enacted in 1963 while allowing a 
large room for policy formulation requires that in many 
important areas of policy the Bank should take dbcisions 
jointly with the Minister of Finance. 
close relationship between the central bank and the 
Govorrment as provided for in the Bank of Ghana Act 1963 - 
almost to the point of making the Bank subservient 
to the 
Government - reflects the Government's commitment to building 
a large public sector in industry and agriculture. 
(Follow- 
ing the overthrow of the Government in February 1966 this 
policy is now clearly in the balance) It would appear 
therefore that the Bank of Ghana came to be regarded concept- 
uall as part of the state machinery 
for the achievement of 
this policy. 
1": evertheless, as argued eaarlier, even a central bank 
so corceived should be allowed considerable roori 
to initiate, 
and advise. on, monetary and general economic policy 
independ- 
ently of the political authorities. 
c) The question of co, mbinin_g commercial banking und 
central banking in one 
institution has been discussed at 
some length in the 
literature and only a brief discussion 
is required here. 
1) 
(1) See R. S. äayers, "Central banking after Lagehot; "C11.9. 
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As mentioned earlier this idea has been raised several 
times in Ghana. 
While admitting the need to establish a central bank 
in a developing country Professor Sayers, in the work cited 
elow, has suggested also that in its early years the central 
bank of such a country can undertake ordinary commercial 
banking operations. This would help speed up the spread 
of banking services and thus the banking habit; and help 
create the environment in which a central bank can be most 
effective in monetary and credit controls. In the Ghanaian 
context we should add that such a plan would provide vital 
information about the indigenous business sector who must 
inevitably be encouraged to play a more significant role in 
the country's trade and industry. It would also enable the 
-central bank to deznon_str.. 
te at least to nov!, say, indigenous 
banks the banking standards that would serve as its criteria 
3br dealing with commercial banks. 
There are, holmever, strong arguments against the idea 
of a central bank carrying out commercial banking. _1 very 
important argument is that the idea implies the odd situation 
of one department of the central bank controlling the other 
half on equal terms with the other commercial banks. This 
lind of situation, unless the two departments were kept 
visibly distinct, would give rise to suspicion among the 
other banks. Since commercial banks would need to maintain 
non-interest bearing deposits with the central bank the ordin- 
ary commerciäl banks could argue With dissent that they Would 
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be providirg the central bank w. -with resources for competing 
against them. The important element of moral suasion in 
the central bank's armoury of control over banking operations 
might have to be replaced by compulsion in an atmosphere 
already fraught with dissent and non-co-operation. 
In Ghana, the Government had established in 1953 the 
Ghana Commercial Bank on state capital for the express 
purpose of filling what was believed, to be a wide gap 
in the banking system. Therefore it was unnecessary to 
amalgamate central banking and commercial banking in one 
institution. 
One writer has suggested that the plans since 1957 
to amalgamate the Ghana Commercial Bank with the Bank 
of Ghana arose "to some extent (from) the difficulties the 
Ghana Commercial Bank has experienced. " 
(1) 
It is difficult 
to arLue about this view because the discussion in Ghana' 
on the subject was confined to official and political circles 
only. 
however, having taken the decision to establish a 
: separL to central bank it was wise to maintain the status 
quo. This would leave the central bank the opportunity 
to concentrate on laying dovrn the foundations for dealing 
with the complex economic system that was likely to emerge 
. 
in the near future in a country committed to a rapid pace 
, of economic 
development. 
't i. 1) E. uck er. -Iý'leetyrood, cflI. c, i 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE MMONETIRY -, UTHORIZY - 2. 
The Bank of Ghana commenced operations on 1st. August 
1957. Until 1962 the Bank was mainly concerned with currency 
administration and other basic central bank functions arising 
from issues and management of a growing public debt. From 
1962 the Bank became more deeply involved in the general 
economic administration of the country. This is reflected 
in the growth and complexity of its administrative structure 
and, more important, in the structure of its assets and 
liabilities. 
In this Chapter we shall first describe briefly the 
personalities who held the highest executive posts in, the 
Bank; secondly, we will describe the departmental structure 
of the Bank so as to bring out the position of the Bank in 
relation to the general economic administration of the 
country and lastly we will analyse briefly the assets and 
liabilities of the Bank over the period 1957-64. 
Executive personalities 
Mr. Albert Eggleston, O. B. E., Managing Director of 
. 
the Ghana Commercial Bank from its inception in 1953, was 
appoir. ted the first Governor of the Bank of Ghana in 1957. 
Mr. D. F. Stone, formerly of the Bank of England, was appointed 
first Deputy-Governor. 
Mr. Eggleston retired in the first half of 1959 after 
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serving only two years of the normal five-year term. V)hether 
or not his early retirement was voluntary one cannot say. 
He was succeeded on 3rd duly by Mr. Kessels from the 
DeuscLe Bundesbank (Frankfurt) to which Bank he returned on 
his retirement from the Bank of Ghana in 1962. Like his 
predecessor, Mr. Kessels did not serve out the full five- 
year term provided for in the then prevailing constitution. 
Again, as in the case of ihr. Eggleston, it is not known to 
. the author whether Mr. Kessels' earlier retirement was 
voluntary. For one thing it is possible that each of the 
first two Governors was appointed for less than the full term 
of office stipulated in the Bank's statute. However, the 
author was unable to obtain any specific information on this 
question. 
Earlier, in 1960 on the retirement of ihr. D. F. Stone 
from the post of Deputy-Governor he was succeeded by 
dir. Jmoako- . tta the first Ghanaian to serve as executive 
director of the Bank. Later in 1962, following the retire- 
ment of Y11'. Kessels the first Ghanaian Governor was appointed. 
He was dir. W. IM. Q. halm. 
In May 1964 Mr. Amoako-Attu became a Member of Parl- 
iarnent and was appointed 1-Ai nister of Finance, and Mr, halm 
became a member of the last parliament appointed in 1965. 
Ile bias made Minister for Economic Planning which post he 
held until the overthrow of Dr. Nkrumah's Government in 
February 1966. 
ý'Ve should note a few points of interest regarding 
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the appointments outlined above. The non-Ghanaian top 
executives of the Bank were men with long experience in 
financial administration. In the cases of Mr. Stone and 
Mr. Kessels their experience had been acquired in central 
banks; whilst Mr. Eggleston had served for many years on 
the Imperial Bank of India (now State Bank of India) and 
immediately prior to his appointment as Governor had been 
the cl. ief executive of the Ghana Commercial Bank. 
By contrast, the Ghanaian executives were in a differ- 
ent position. Mr. Amoako-Atta had been previously involved 
in commercial banking for a long time having moved from 
one of the expatriate banks to be one of the foundation staff 
of the Ghana Commercial Bank. In spite of this considerable 
banL nß experience Mr. rnoako-. jtta was, to all intents and 
purposes, a politician of high standing in the Government 
party. Mr. Halm, on the other hand was primarily a politic- 
ian not known to have possessed previous experience in 
finance on any significant level. Prior to his appointment 
as Governor of the Bank he had been Ghana's Ambassador 
to the United States. 
The present encumbents of the posts of Governor and 
Deputy-Governor represent a return to the initial position 
when the men at the helm of the Bank were technical men 
rather than politicians. In the early part of 1965 the 
Chief Statistician of the Bank was appointed Deputy-Governor 
and towards the end of 1965 Mr. Albert Adomakoh was made 
Governor of the Bank. The latter had previously been 
Secretary to the Bank and at the time of his appointment 
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was director of the Bank and Managing Director of the 
Tatior. al Investment Bank. 
This account should not be interpreted as implying 
that the appointment of technicians to top executive positions 
on the Bank as opposed to politicians necessarily implied 
the technically equipped men were in a better position to 
resist unwise political influence. In pre-coup Ghana it 
was very doubtful that any high officer whose position dep- 
ended on the Government or President in one sense or another 
ever boldly resisted political influence on grounds of 
conviction. However, it was essential that those at the 
helm of the Central Bank should be in a position to under- 
stand the economic consequences of the Central Bank's 
policies and actions. 
Departmental structure. 
At the end of 1964 there were eleven departments within 
the Bank. The early ones were the Issue, Secretary's, 
Banking (from July 1963 known as the Chief Accountant fs 
Department), Internal Audit, Research and Investment Depart- 
ments. The functions of each of these 
departments stard 
out clearly in their names, and only a 
brief account is 
necessary. 
The Research department contains the Bank's pool of 
eco iorhists and statisticians who publish the Annual Report 
and Cuarterly Economic Bulletin, both publications whicl.. 
give a comprehensive analysis of general economic, and 
nlonetl. ry developments. 
The Investment Department is 
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responsible for the issue and administration of Government 
loans raised locally or abroad. From July, 1961 the Depart- 
went was entrusted with administration of the Government's 
Compulsory Savings Scheme, otherwise known as i: ational 
Development Bonds, itself discontinued from October 1963. 
To the initial departments were later added five more 
departments in response to developments arising Within the 
Bark itself or in Government economic policy. These were 
the Exchange Control Departirent, the Foreign Department, 
the Banks Examination Department, the Notes Verification 
and Destruction Department and the Rural Credit Department. 
The fourth-mentioned department is self-explanatory and 
does not require further comment. 
The functions of the Exchange Control Department and 
the Foreign Department were related. The former administered 
the Government's exchange control regulations which function 
became more complicated as the scope of the regulations 
widened and foreign exchange resources declined 
further. 
The latter was chargod with management of foreign exchange 
resources, recording of clearing accounts arising 
from the 
Governmentts bilateral trade agreements with the so called 
trade-pact countries (mainly China, East European countries 
and a few. other African countries). 
The establishment of 
the Foreign Department was itself an immediate response 
to the centralisation of all foreign exchange assets held 
by residents in the Bank of Ghana in August 1963. The 
Department thus came to occupy an important place in the' 
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Hank especially as the assets of the issue department were 
no forger separate from ti-_e i3eneral foreign exclian- Ge assets 
of tie i. )ank. Through this centralisation of foreign exchange 
as-ets and their management it liras possible to incorporate 
a foreign exchange purl in the national oudget of 1965. 
The Banks Examination Department was established in 
1963 following the enactment of the Bank of Ghana Act 1963 
which gave the Bank wide powers of control over commercial 
bankir_g operations. .s noted in Chapter One credit control 
regulations were actually published in April 1964 and this 
department is charged with the follow up of the regulations 
to report on compliance by the banks. 
T be Rural Credit Department was established in April 
1964 to provide loans for the development of agriculture, 
fishing, and handicrafts in accordance with the Govern-ment'e 
expressed desire for expansion in these three areas of the 
primary sector of the economy. It also stemmed partly from 
a dooire to alleviate the alleged high incidence of rural 
indebtedness within the unorganized credit market. Origin- 
ally intended as the embryo of an Agricultural Development 
Bank the Rural Credit Department was converted into such 
a bunk in 1965 with strong links with the Bank of Ghana. 
other aspects of the Bank's operations deserve mention- 
ing. 
First, the Bank demonstrated a versatility in its 
staff training programrie which should augur well for the 
future efficient organisation of the economy. ! in essential 
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part of the training programme was the attaclunent of senior 
and other less senior staff to foreign central banks and the 
Interrational : monetary Furd. Countries lahere such attach-n. " 
meet and observation courses were provided are: the United 
Kingdom, West Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, the 
United States of America, Pakistan, India, the Philippines, 
(1) 
the United Arab Republic and the Sudan. Clearly 
this is a motley group of countries with diverse economic 
ideologies and stages of economic development and there- 
fore there is tree inherent danger of serious clashes of 
thougl. t in the central bank. But there can be little 
dispute that in a new country a diversity of thinking could 
finally lead to a healthy balance of ideas to constitute 
the foundations of development. 
Secondly, towards the end of the period under examin- 
ation there was a very close relationship between the Lank 
and other departments and bodies of the Government. 
The Bank was participating actively in the preparation 
of the : annual budget, offering advice intended to help trim 
the budget into feasible form. It is, however, debatable 
whetter such advice was adopted by the Government. 
The Bank wds involved in a search for a suitable 
preparation of the balunce of payments that would have 
practical meaning in the context of Ghana's circumstances. 
For this objective the Bank received the help of an expert 
released by the International iionetary Fund in 1964: for a 
(1) Lark: of Ghana, Annual Reports. 
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t. relve-month period to institute appropriate machinery for 
the preparation of the balance of payments. This was clears 
ly an important operation as even in the advanced countries 
there is some controversy about the manner in which the 
external account should be dru: m up. 
(') 
For u country 
where foreign firms export . rar; materials entries shown in 
the external account could be quite dubious. For example 
how reliable could be the returns submitted to the statist- 
icians by o foreign firm that exports raw materials directly 
to its parent company in the United 13tates or Western Europe. 
The Bank was represented on the Capital investments 
; 3oard. This is a body which examines applications by 
foreigners to invest in Ghana, to ensure that the proposed 
investment tallies with the Government's economic policy, 
and also determines terms for the exemption of foreign firms 
from taxation, their entitlement to various other concessions 
and guarantees for the repatriation of profits. 
Vihile Mr. Maim was Governor of the Bank he was also 
Chairn. an of the Foreign Exchange Committee to which applic- 
ations for foreign exchange permits are submitted for 
approval. he was also a member of the State Planning 
Commission. 
Thirdly, the Bank has increased the number of major 
currency depots from three in July 1958 when it introduced 
(1) / See Paul Ilost-Maden, ". Issymetries between balance of 
payments surpluses and deficits", IMF Staff Papers, Volume 
9.1962. 
dlso Christopher McMahon,; '%terling in the sixties', 
oxford University cress, 1964. Chapter. 1. 
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its own currency to nine .` she end of the period under exam- 
ination. In addition it maintained a number of smaller 
currency depots all of whi^, h, together with eight of the 
larger ones, were managed in agency by the Ghana Commercial 
Bank. The initial three currency centres were distributed 
in the same 'Play as were the three principal currency centres 
operated by the West African Currency Board in Ghana towards 
the end of its relationship with Ghana. They were in Accra, 
Kumasi and Takoradi a pattern which described roughly a 
trianCle over the southern half of the country. By contrast, 
the Bank of Ghana operates a major currency centre in each 
Region of the country. As noted in Chapter One this devel- 
opment aided immensely the spro; ad of bankinc offices into 
semi-rural communities and was a contributory factor to 
the 1ovierin8 of the banks' internal transfer charges 
Developments in the assets and liabilities of 
the Bank of Ghana 
Liabilities . 
The liabilities of the 3anlc of Ghana are presented in 
TTaiý le } 
Over. the period shown in Tab1e)4 the Bank's paid 
capital remained at £G1 myilimn notwithstanding the increase 
in the authorized capital from wGl million (as provided 
for it the bank of Ghana Ordinance 1957) to £G10 mi11ian 
in the Lank of Ghana At 1963. 'thus ch anges in the capital 
Table 29 
Liabilities of the Bank of Ghana Sept. 1957-Sept. 1964(a) XG Million 
Currency Capita]. Accounts Deposits 
ho 4-3 
°% 
Cd r-I 
C C. r+ + +' ý+ H+ f4 f-i HCO ý,. r4 -H 
4-> 
Pa 
-P .ý 
-P, 
* r, '' -ih 
> 
-N +' cad 
cd G'i NOH cd a3 0 i. + O0 Cd 0 +. r O "rl 
Fq ý- rd HuW C) Ch 4? H ü' FA 0 E1(ß Or L-I ri 
(1) (2) (3) (4+-) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 11 12) 
1957 
Sept ---1.0 - 1.0 0.2 0.5 0.1.1.1 - 2.1 
Dec ---1.0 - 1.0 1.6 - 0.2 1.8 - 2.8 
19 
Mar ---1.0 - 1.0 1.9 - 0.1 2.0 - 3.0 
June ---1.0 - 1.0 1.7 1.1 0.2 2.9 - 3.9 
Sept 17.0 0.4 17. lß. 1.0 - 1.0 1.9 2.3 0.1 4.3 - 22.7(22.3) 
Dec 27.6 0.4 28.0 1.0 - 1.0 1.5 1.4.0,4.3.3 - 32.3 31.9) 
1959 
1,1ar 24.3 0.4 24.7 1.0 - 1.0 1.6 1.3 0.6 3.6 - 29.3(28.9) 
June 25.0 1.0 26.0 1.0 0.1 1.1 2.2 5.0 0.7 7.9 0.1 35: 1(34: 1) 
Sept 28.1+ 1.1 29.5 1.0 0.1 1.1 1.3 7.1 0.2 8.7 n. a 39.13(38.7 '; 
Dec 38.6 0.5 39.1 1.0 0.1 1.1 1.3 2.3 0.9 4.6 - 44.8(44.3 
1960 
1.1ar 30.3 0.7 31.0 1.0 0.1 1.1 1.4 2.1 1.1+ 4.9 - 36.9(36.2) 
June 28.0 0.5 28.5 1.0 0.2 1.2 2.1 1.1 1.2 4.4 - 34.1(33.6) 
Sept n. a n. a n. a 1.0 n. a n. a n. a n. a n. a n. a n. a n. a 
Dec 47.7 0.8 18.5 1.0 0.2 1.2 2.0 3.1 1.9 7.0 0.1 56.8(56.0) 
1961 
; iar 40.4 0.5 140.9 1.0 0.2 1.2 2.4.0.8 2.6 5.8 - ! }8.1 47.6 
June 33.6 0.7 34.3 1.0 0.6 1.6 4.7 1.5 1.2 7.4.0.3 43.6(42.9) 
Sept 31.8 0.7 32.5 1.0 0.6 1.6 9.6 1.8 2.0 13.1+ 0.2 47.7(47.0) 
Dec 47.8 0.3 48.1 1.0 0.6 1.6 3.2 1.6 1.9 6.7,0.1 56.5(56.2) 
1962 
7.; ar 46.0 0.6 46.6 1.0 0.6 1.6 4.7 4.0 2.5 11.2 0.1 59.5(58.9 ) 
June 38.1 1.1 39.2 1.0 1.0 2.0 12.9 3.8 1.8 19.6 0.1 60.9(59.8 
Sept 34.1 0.7 34.8 1.0 1.0 2.0 3.3 3.5 2.4,9.2 0.3 46.3(1+5.6) 
Dec 54.2 0.9 55.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 4,4.5.0 4.7 14.1 7.9 79.1(78.2) 
1963 
Mar 1+3.4 0.6 44.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 5.2 5.4.4.1 14.7 7.7 68.4(67.8) 
June 41-0 0.8 11.8 1.0 1.2 2.2 4.7 7.1 3.4.15.2 11.1 70.3(69.5) 
Sept 38.3 - 38.3 1.0 1.2 2.2 24.5 5.0 8.2 37.7 12.6 90.7 
Dec 53.5 - 53.5 1.0 1.2 2.2 4.2 4.7 8.8 17.7 16.5 89.9 
1961+ 
Mar 50.3 - 50.3 1.0 1.2 2.2 6.4.. 3.9 4.8 15.1 18.3 85.9 
June 47.0 - 4-7.0 1.0 1.4 2.4.6.8 7.9 4.1+ 19.0 31.2 99.6 
Sept 46.0 - 1+6.0 1. Q 1.1+ 2.4 7.813.4.4.5 25.7 38.3112.5 
a Figures not available for fourth quarter of 1964.. 
(b) Figures in brackets exclude currency held in the Banking Department 
n. a = not readily availably. 
Source: Bank of Ghana Reports and Balance Sheets. 
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posi. tion were due exclusivel;, to amounts credited annually 
to the general reserve fund from net profits. 
The Bank introduced its currency on 13th July 1958 and 
begun on the same day to withdraw the currency of the Viest 
African Currency Board outstanding in the country. At the 
end of June 1960 the total amount of West African currency 
withdravr, n from circulation in Ghana was -G26.1 million. 
This exceeded the estimated circulation (including bank 
holdings) by GO. 6 million. Withdravin notes exceeded the 
(1) 
estimated note circulation by £G3.4- million. 
From the lowest amount of ß'G17.4 million on 30th Sept- 
ember 1958 the Bank's currency liabilities increased tremend- 
ously in the course of the period under review. Growth 
rates are not very useful because of the strong element of 
seasoral fluctuation in issued currency. 
It will be seen from 'rfabler-l that separute currency 
stdtJ. stics are sho-; m for currency net of the Bank's own 
holdings and a separate column showing currency held in 
the Central Bank's otn banking department for most of the 
period. Column (3) is the summation of both items. 
Correspondingly total liabilities of the Bank as presented 
in the Bank's statistical returns included for most of the 
period currency held in its own banking departxnent. 
(1) Bank of Ghana, Annual Report, June 1960 p. 6. 
The excesses over estimated circulation were most probably 
due to unrecorded net movement of currency into Ghana from 
the other territories which shared the services of the West 
African Currency Board With Ghana. 
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However, in practice we do not need to include the 
Bank's holdings of its own currency among its liabilities. 
Therefore the figures shovm in brackets in Table2f (column 
12) represent total liabilities (all items) minus the Bank's 
holdings of currency issued to the banking department. 
There was, however, a theoretical justification on the part 
of the Bunk for showing currency held in its banking depart- 
ment among total liabilities. Under the Bank of Ghana Ord- 
inance 1957 the issue department was legally separate from 
the banking department with statutory ohligations on the 
issue department to hold one or more of specified assets- 
against currency issued to the banking department. In 
other words, like everyone else, the banking department 
was required to surrender resources in order to acquire 
local currency. This argument is reflected in the fact 
that from the end of June 1963 following the enactment of 
the B. nk of Ghana Act 1963, which abolished the strict 
separation of departments, the Bank's balance sheet and 
statistical returns did not include among liabilities the 
currency held in the banking department. 
Whether or not one disregards currency held in the 
banking department it is clear from Table 2? that the curr- 
ency liabilities followed a marked seasonal pattern. 
On the basis of the quarterly figures it can be Seen that 
the peak occurred in December, whilst the trough occurred 
in either June or September. 
= L98- 
The realisation oi'ti., e peak in December again reflects 
v 
the dominance of cocoa in the economy. Generally December 
is the peak of the purchases of cocoa from producers. 
Usually for most of the period this was reflected in the 
seasonal fluctuations in the money supply the peak of which 
occurred in December. However, in the last two years of 
the period the money supply though remaining high in December 
actually reached its peak in the early, °, months of the immed- 
iately ensuing years in contrast to the currency liabilities 
of the Bank of Ghana. The difference was explained by 
commercial bank holdings of currency to relatively higher 
amounts in that month due to delays in the cocoa season. 
During the cocoa harvesting season (which begins 
around October) the commercial banks acquire more currency 
from the Bank either to finance directly the purchases of 
cocoa or to meet cash withdrawals assoqiated with immense 
economic activity in this period. From about March, depend- 
ing on how far the cocoa season is extended into the ensuing 
calendar year, currency flows back to the banks as the 
economy adjusts to equilibrium, and the banks in turn 
return currency to the Bank of Ghana. Prior to mid-1961 
they would acquire in exchange sterling assets delivered 
London or simply exchange the Bank's currency liabilit- 
ies for its deposit liabilities leaving the banking depart- 
merit of the Bank of Ghana-to make its own necessary adjust- 
ments with the issue department. With the imposition of 
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exchange control the banks could no longer exchange curr- 
ency with the central bank's sterling assets except for 
transactions purposes which do not add to the banks' exter- 
nal assets. Fron mid-1961 the seasonal reflux of currency 
to the central bank was associated with increases in the 
central bank's deposit liabilities to the commercial 
banks. 
This initial position was followed by various adjust- 
ments culminating in a decline in central bank deposit:: 
liabilties to the commercial banks but an increase in 
central bank deposit liabilities to the Government, matched 
by increases in the Government's indebtedness to the coni- 
laercial banks. This process was generally reversed during 
the period of intense economic activity from October to 
about February or March, again depending on whether the 
cocoa season started early or late. During this period 
the banks generally acquired more currency by liquidat- 
ing their. holdings of short-term Government debt. 
In spite of the seasonal fluctuations in the central 
bank's currency liabilities the upward trand shows clearly 
in Table 30 A simple tabular illustration of the under- 
-200- 
ly inb upward trend is shogun in Tab le3O where figures for 
particular quarters are compared over successive years. 
Table 30 
(a) 
Bank of Ghana Currency Liabilities, 19-64 
(End of quarter). 
End of + End of End of End of 
March June Sept. Dec. 
1958 17.0 27.6 
1959 
{ 
24.3 25.0 1 28.4 38.6 
196 0 30.3 f 28.0 n. a 47.7 
1961 40.4 33.6 31.8 47.8 
1962 46.0 38.1 34.1 54.2 
1963 ; 43.4 41.0 38.3 I 53.5 
196/: 50.3 47.0 46.0 71.4 
(a) Currency hold outside the Bank of Ghana 
Source: as for Table 29 
The Bank's deposit liabilities fluctuated considerably 
reflecting the operations of its major customers, the 
Government and the commercial banks. 
Movements in government deposits responded mainly to 
the Government's fiscal operations up to the end of 1959. 
From I'ebruarv 1000 Government deposits were influenced 
principally by its debt operations following the introduction 
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of Treasury Bills. Secondly, commencing in the second half 
of 1961 the Government made considerable use of normal over- 
draft facilities available through the 'mechanism of ways and 
means advances from the Bank of Ghana. In addition to 
normal overdraft operations of the Government at the Central 
Bank, the Government's indebtedness to the Bank through: 
the isLnk's acquisition of Treasury ? ills and other securities 
reached high levels in the period 1962-64. Thus fluctuat- 
ions in Government deposits reflected essentially its credit 
and debit transactions on both current and capital accounts. 
The exceptionally high. level of Government deposits at the 
end of September 1963 arose from a peculiar transaction. 
The Government acquired foreign exchange assets of several 
public and quasi-public institutions offering in exchange 
its on debt on similar terms but payable in local currency 
ri"he Government then exchanged the foreign exchange assets 
for deposits at the Central Bank, part of which was used 
to retire debts to the Central Bank. 
"Other deposits" consists of various items. internal 
reserves against contingencies, deposits of international 
institutions such as the Interrational irionetary Fund, 
deposits due to public institutions from budgetary and 
other Government illoe: Ations each of which could not be 
itel, tized from the available data. 
"Other liabilities! ' is a miscellany of items mainly 
contra accounts, and the result of special financial arrange- 
mer-ta between the Government and the Bank. The huge 
e paj. sion in 
"other liabilities" from December 1962 reflects 
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the Lünl. fs increas inJ involvement in the Government's 
general capital operations. In particular, we should note 
the very high level of this item from June 1963 bearing in 
: mina the fact that the rank of Ghana Act 1963, enacted a 
: north before, provided for the Bank's deep involvement with 
Government financial arranaernents. 
.a very 
high proportion of "other liabilities" was 
made up of the contra accounts letters of credit opened 
in respect of imports (that is, liabilities under document- 
ary credits), guarantees given by the Bank on behalf of the 
Government and Government obligations under lone-term 
external credits. Table 31 illustrates the tremendous 
importance of these items in the last two years of the period 
under examination. 
Table 31 
Bank of Ghana: Contra Accounts (Liabilities) 1962-64. 
(End of June). £G Million 
} 1962 1963 , 1964 
- 7.1 12.4 Lia ilities under guarantees 
Long-term external ; 
credits - 
4ý 3.6 7.9 
ý' " documentary credits - 0.5 10. x: j 
Total 11.2 30.7! 
Source: Bank of Ghana, Balance Sheets. 
-203- 
Assets. 
The assets of the Bank of Ghana over the period 1957-64 
are presented in 'c'able Sj. The assets have been itemized 
as far as made possible by availability of reliable data. 
As in the case of liabilities important 
chances in the structure of assets occurred mainly towards 
the close of the period under examination. 
It will be recalled from Chapter 2 that the rank of 
Ghana ordinance 1957 permitted holdings of ? lest African 
currency against the Bank's own outstanding currency ilab- 
ilities for a period of two tireürs from the date on which the 
l3anlc introduced its currency. Thus from 13th July 1958 
ali West African currency not converted into sterling was 
held Ly the 1; ank as stipulated in the law. After June 
30th 1960, two weeks before the scheduled time, both the 
Ban'k's previous holdings of Vlest African currency as well 
as additional presentations were transferred to the Banking 
Department to form part of the Bank's holdings of foreign 
currency. There was no cuestion of the Blest African 
currerc-; r being sterilized in the Banks possession because 
the currency was still in active use in other parts of 
. lest Lfrica. Moreover, the amounts held by the Bank were 
very small in relation to the potential demand for both 
trading; and other personal purposes. 
The Ban? C showed in its accounts separate assets held 
aLiainst currency liabilities even after May 1963 when it 
Table 32 
(a) 
End of Psriöd) Assets of the Bank of Ghana, 3,957-6ý. 
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1957 
Sept 2.1 
Dec ? 2.8 
1958 
Mar 3.0 
June 3.9 
Sept 0.1 - 17.2 - - 17.4 0.4 T 0.03 3.8 - 0.4 22.7 
Dec 0.1 - 27.9 - -- 28. Ö 0.4. - 0.02 3.1 - 0.7 0.08 32.3" 
1959 
Max 0.04 - 17.8 6.8 - 24.7 0.4 - 0.01. 3.3 - 0.2 29.3 
June n. a. n. a n. a n. a - - - - - - - n. a 0.2 n. a 
Sept 0.06 - 22.7 6.8 - 29.5 1.1 0.07 8.3 - 0.6 n. a 39.8 
Dec 0.01 - 27.3 11.8 - 39.1 0.5 - - 4.3 , - 
0.7 0.3 44.8 
1960 - - Mar 0.03 - 19.1' 11.8 31.0 0.7 0.1 ' 
3.8 - 0.7 n. a 36.9 
June 0.02 - 16.8 11.6 - 28.5 0.5 0.2" - 3.8 0.6 0.5 3L. 1 
Sept - - - - - - - - - n. a 
Dec - 2.0 34,9 11.6 - 1+"8.5 0.8 0.7,, 0.03. 5.3. - 0.6 0.9 56.8 
1961 ---- 
Mar - 2.0 30.3 . 8,7 - 4 0.9 0.5 1.2 0.04 3.0 1.2 0.6 - n. a 48.1 
June - 2.0 20.9 11.4 - 34.3 0.. 7 1.3 2.0 3.7 - 0.5 " 1.1 43.6 
Sept - 2.0 8.1 16.3 6.1 32.5 0.7 0.1 0.05 6.9 6.5 0.5 n. a 47.7" 
Dec - 2.0 .. 2.1 37.8 
6.2 48,1 0.3 0.3 0.3 1.0 3.0 0.5 2.8 56.5, 
1962 
Mar - 2.0 2.5 34.6 7.5 46.6 0.6 0.1 0.3 2.0 3.8, 0.5 5.4 59.5 
June - 2.0 . 
'547 24.1 7.4 39.2 1.1 2.6 -0.4. 7.9 8.0 0.1. 1.2 60.1 
Sept - 2.0 "3.6 18.0 11.2 34.8 0.7 1.2 0.4 : '7.8 0.4 0.4 0.7 46.3, 
Dec - 2.0 2.3 39.3 11.4 55.0 0.9 5.8 . 
0-4- 5.1 - 0.1. 8.3' 79.1 
1963 
Mar - 2.0 0.1 31.9 9.9 44.0 0.6 3.4 0.4 6-4.. ° 5.0 0.4 
} 
7.9 68.4 
June "- 2.0 3.3 24.5 12.0 4a.. 8 0.8 210 0.3 
. 7.0 6.0 
1 
0.4 11.8 70.3 
Sept - 2.0 7.9 17.3 11.0 38.3 - 7.0 . 0.6 8.4 
1500 0.4. 12.6 90.7 
Dec - 2.0 16.5 22.2 12.8 53.5 - 6.9 0.7 8.3 0.4 16.5 , 
89.9 
1964 
Mar - 2.0 11.9 24.4 12.0 50.3 - 2.9 0.3 10.4 - 0.4 18.0, 85.9 
June 2.0 3.2 27.6 14.2 47.0 - - 6.6 6.3 7,0 0.4 32.3 99.6, 
Sept 2.0 n. a n. a - n. a n. a - n. a n. ä n. a 14.0 0.3 45.0 
112.5 
(a) 
Breakdown of totals not available for September 1957 to June 1958, and 
September 1964.. Figures not available for December 1964. 
(b) 
"Other Assets" is a miscellany of *items µ`ýmainlY contra account Ysa (sea text): 
Parts may not add to totals due to, effeots of röunding. -.. '- 
- Souroe: As Table, 29. 
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Table 33 
Percentage Distribution of Currency Cover assets, 1958-64 
(Lnd of 
period). 
Gold Sterling 
assets (a) 
Total foreign 
exchange 
asset 
Local assets 
1958 Dec. Eil 100.0 100.0 
_ Nil 
15") LOC. 100.0 100.0 If 
16J June 100.0 100.0 it 
Dec. i:. 0 96.0 100.0 U 
1)G 1 June 5.8 92:. 2 100.0 
Dec. 4.2 83.0 67.2 12.8 
1902 June 5.1 75.9 81.0 19.0 
Dec. 3.6 75.6 79.2 20.6 
1963 June 4.6 66.6 71.41 28.6 
Lec . 3.7 72.3 76.0 24.0 
196'x' June 4.2 65.5 79.7 30.3 
(a) Includes negligible amounts of West African 
Currency hourd notes and coin up to June 30th 1960. 
source: as for Table 29 
could be said that it was not positively required to do so. 
The distinction dram between ussets held against currency 
liabilities and other assets served primarily to illustrate 
adherence to statutory requirements resarding the asset 
cover of, the currency liabilities. 
On the basis of the calculations in Table 33 the 
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Ghana pound could be said to have been heavily backed by 
foreign exchange up to the end of 1963 after which the ratio 
fell below 70 per cent. 
hoiever, even if one can understand the publication 
of sorarate currency cover assets before the end of June 
1963 as a statutory obligation one cannot so easily, under- 
stand the continuation of ti-:. is practice -after that date. 
If the purpose was to show convertibility of the Ghana 
pound then, of course, the authorities chose a very mislead=ing 
statistic. For, quite apart from the fact that from 
July 1961 various panients restrictions were imposed, there 
can be no doubt that the per"ccnta`e of' convertible assets 
to currency liabilities tells nothing about the real extent-ý 
of corvertibility. The question of convertibility shöuld 
in an approximate sense be related to total payments commit- 
ments in the economy including those of the Central Bank 
and the Government. To be approaching realism what is 
required is some kind of formula which should embrace the 
expected balance of trade including debt servicing. 
Assumptions about convertibility which are based on 
the ratio of convertible asoet: 3 to currency liabilities are 
clearly erroneous. In time all kinds of expansionary 
forces, such as Government cash deficit operations, endanger 
convertibility to such an extent that even a modest degree 
of cor_vertibility can only be sustained under a regime of 
restrictions. 
We may now comment briefly on the asset structure 
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maintained by the Bank. 
The Bank first issued currency against local securities 
in July 1961 , when the Issue Department acquired ; GG. 1 million 
of Ghana Government Treasury Bills and locally registered 
stocks . This mounted to half the total fiduciary issue 
permitted under the is ark of Ghana Ordinance 1957. L. irlier 
theme ii. id been smaller holdings of Government Treasury Lills 
and securities in transactions not involving the fiduciary 
issue. The Bank came very close to the fiduciary limit 
in the third and fourth quarters of 1962. 
Practically all the foreign exchange assets of the 
Bank consisted of various sterling assets: balances on 
deposit and liquid balances with the bank of Lngland, call 
-., joyey and United Kingdom Government' Treasury Bills purchased on 
allotr:: ent or on the open market, and United Kingdom 
Government securities. Thus the Bank continued to hold 
practically all foreign exchange assets in sterling despite 
the provisions of the 1961 : fl1endment act which permitted 
the Lank to hold assets denominatbd in any convertible 
currencies. In all, the Bank's foreign investment policy 
rerutair)ed the same throughout the period under study. In 
the period 1956 to the end of June 1961 a lar&, er proportion 
of the foreign exchange assets consisted of liquid and semi- 
liquid sterling balances and other short-term sterling 
assets. From the second half of 1961 sterling securities 
maturing within five years composed a higher proportion of 
these assets. No specific reasons can be ascribed to the 
-207- 
Table 34. 
3-ink of Ghana: Distribution of Gross Bissets other than Fixed 
Assets and "Other Assets" 
(, averages of quarterly figures) 
Foreign exchange 
Total assats including 
gold and 71I. r1. C. B. 
notes 
1959 
1960 
1961 
19¬2 
1 Xi 
19ö4. 
37.1 
41.3 
47.1 
56.3 
63.9 
81.7 
Domestic assets 
0 ., 7 
1.0 
r/ .6 
16.1 
23.6 
42.6 
Source: as for Table 29 
z11s o other Bank Reports 
pattern descried here other than a surmise that up to mid- 
1961 Ghana's currency vies fully and freely convertible and 
therefore it was necessary to keep foreign exchange assets 
on the short end of maturity. 
. 
Abstracting from fixed assets and the miscellany of 
items labelled together as "other assets" it will be seen 
from viable 34 that from 1962 local assets came to form an 
increasing proportion of total assets as defined here. On 
the basis of the averages of quarterly figures presented in 
fable 34 domestic assets actually exceeded foreign exchange 
assets in 1964. 
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The increases in the volume of domestic assets as well 
as their proportional share in total assets reflected increas- 
ing Central Bank lending to the Government through purchases 
of the latter's securities (including Treasury bills), and 
ways and means advances. In addition to direct Government 
debt, from 1963 the isank held among its domestic assets 
bills issued in connection with cocoa financing. The 
jank discounted large amounts of such bills for the Ghana 
Commercial Bank to whose order they were drawn by the Cocoa 
Ijarketing Board on its own marketing subsidiary the Cocoa 
Marketing Company. At the end of 1963 and 1964 the value 
of such bills held by the Bank amounted to wGl4.5 million 
and CG33.9 million respectively. 
Hank of Ghana interest rates. 
The Bank first announced its Re-discount Rate in 
February, 1960 when Treasury Bills were first introduced 
from the time of the Rank's establishment. 
From then up to the end of 1964 the Rediscount Rate was 
kept L, t 8-per cent above the Discount Rate on Treasury i., 
Bills . 
The Discount Rate itself followed closely movements 
in tr. e London discount market buying rate on Treasury 
3i11s from February 1i'60 to mid-190.1. Thus the Bank's 
Re-discount Rate was during that time changed up and down 
with changes in the London sank Rate. The princil5a1 r 
reason for this Sias gilben in Chapter One, namely that the 
local Re-discount Rate in so far as it was kept at a 
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def'ir ite margin above the Discount Rate on local Treasury 
Dills h. Ad to be at a level sufficiently close to London 
rates in order to encourage investment in Ghana Government 
lreasü'ry _, ills. 
From mid-1661 the conditions described above were 
no longer applicable and the Discount Rate itself was, fixed 
at a level high enough to encourage the commercial banks 
continued support for local Treasury dills and at the same 
time to avoid an unduly high burden on Government debt 
servicing. 
From July 1961 to the end of 1964 the Re-discount 
Rate was pegged at 42 per cent. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Non-Bank Financial Institutions. 
Over the period under review the financial system of 
Ghana was dominated by the monetary institutions. The 
development of the non-banking sector of the financial system 
was at only a very modest stage at the end of the period. 
--This Chapter is devoted to an examination of the three main 
non-banking financial institutions which existed at the end of 
1964; the Ghana Savings Bank, the First Ghana Building Society 
and the National Investment Bank. In 1960 the Ghana Commercial 
Bank absorbed a small Co-operative Bank whose operations before 
the merger has not received a separate study in this work due 
to a general lack of the necessary data. Other institutions, 
the Guarantee Corporation, the Government Mortgage Loans Scheme 
and the Industrial Development Corporation failed in the course 
of the review period. These have been briefly examined in 
Chapter Six. 
The Ghana Savings Bank. 
The Ghana Savings Bank acq. uired its current name from the 
20th June, 1962 having previously been known oficially as the 
post office Savings Bank. The current name will be used in 
this study wherever this will not entail serious inconvenience. 
The Savings Bank is the oldest financial institution in 
Ghana. The first brar. ches were established in Accra and Cape 
Coast by Ordinance on 1st January, 1888 under the control of the 
Gold Coast Government Treasury. By the Savings Bank Transfer 
Ordinance, 1904 it was placed under the control of the Post office 
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as froia ist Januar, - 1905. tro1,2 .: hen it rerlained part of the 
Department of Posts and Telecommunications. 
The central adiýti_ni. stration was v es ted in the Controller 
of tie Savings Denk lioused with his staff in premises of the 
General Post Office in Accra. The day- to-da- business is 
conducted bfr the Postmaster General's Depar:, ünnt through postal 
o" ficos scattered throughout the country. The Ghana Savings 
Bain; is and has always been a Government institution. 
The Bank has iui the past utilized the services of two 
catorna7. bodies: the local Accouuitant-General's Department in 
Accra and the Crown Agents in London. The former administered 
the accoul-its of the Banff: and the latter were responsible for the 
Bank' ýý business in London, particu. larl;; its investments on the 
Stock Exchange. Investment plans communicated first to the 
Accountant-General were pasod on to the Crown Agents who 
purchased, redeemed or sold specified or unspecified investments 
according; to instructions received from the Accountant-Gemral. 
The pre--1962 constitution ! )eruitted a ra,; irnum of one-third 
of tota]. assets to be invested in local instruii nts. In practice, 
t11c; Bank's local assets consisted onl, of cash and commercial 
ban« deposits the ar; gro: gato of which was well below the maximum 
pornissihlo. 
As a Government institution the Savings Bank had claim on 
the Consolidated FLuid to meet operating deficits. This provision 
trils utilized c tu" ire;, most of the review .. period w. t, en the annual 
balance of deposit transactions was frequently- negative. 
The s i. atus of L'hc Bank was changed considerably b; the 
- 212 - 
j 
Sav iz's Bane Act, 1 62 (No. 129 of 1962) the main feats s of 
u hich are given below. 
While retainint; the over-all adm iistration under the 
Director of Post and Telecoruuunicat ions, the Bank was brought 
under -the influence of the Minis ter of Finance 
1 
in several 
important aspects of its _'olicies and operations. The Minister' s 
approval is required in the closure and installation of Savings 
2 
Bank facilities at any --postal of-fice in tile aim-try. The 
Minister has pouter » with tole prior approval of the President 
3 
to determine the rate of interest payable on deposits. The 
Minister has ootiler to direct the investment of funds surplus 
to operational requixcn nts , including reinvestment of existing 
assets. In addition, the Minister may make regulations, by 
legislative insrrizient, affecting; various aspects of the Bank 
thclud Ln the appointment of an Advisory Board 9 limits on and 
forms of deposits 9 and depos is and withdrawals by minors, 
trustees, charitableLwomen etc. 
The services previously performed bar the Crown Agents are 
now ve s bed In the Bank of Ghana. In line with directions from 
the Rini: ter the Bank of Ghana is to Invest the funds of the 
Sav. in;; s Bank primarily in securities of the Ghana Government 
-""r., . ... ... ý.. ý,...,. nr .. r.. S. ý ww. 
wvy ý, r. ý, ý e w+- - --e- -- , r.. wi,,. w. a. w, r, a_ 
1+ According to the law t: ie Minister responsible for the 
Savings Bank, in practice the Minister of Finance. 
2. Savings Bank Act, 1962, Section 3- 
0 Ibid, Section 
7, a. 
Ibid, Section 9, subsection (1). 
5. Savings Bank Act 2 1962. Section 9. 
6. Ibid, Section 15. 
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or, with the Minister's approval, in any other securities. 
Finall, T,, as under the previous arrangements, cash deficits 
on current operations are chargeable on tale Consolidated Fund 
in ti-is form of advances at interest as paid by the Bank to 
creditors on deposit accounts. Any such advances are) in 
-theory, intended to be obtained pending; the receipt of funds 
bfr way of investment liquidations, investment income or additional 
deposits. Conversely, at the close of its financial year an 
excess of curent income over expenditure is to be paid into 
the Coxisolidatod Fund provided that after such a payment "the 
asset: of the Bank ...... shall exceed the liabilities by not 2 
less than fifteen por centum of the liabilities to depositors". 
Since in aggregate assets must equal liabilities the former can 
exceed the latter where liabilities as used here exclude reserves, 
for example. Unless interpreted in aom such manner this 
provision appears eni-rnatic. The law itself is silent on the 
subject of Reserves. Tuus the operation of a Reserve Fund 
would der iv© from unobligatory expediency and therefore amounts 
so held would not necessari7.4- be classifiable under liabilities. 
iIowever, if the interpretation above is valid, then under this 
provision the Sav int; s Bank raust pay to the Government the amount 
by which total assets el-; ceed deposit liabilities by 15°0. 
Two of the provisions outlined above require brief discussion. 
In the first place., although up to the end of 196+ the Account- 
ant-Generals s past elat ionship with the Bank was retained it 
would appear that the law transferred this function to the 
1.. T__Ibid, Section 9. 
2. Ibid., Section111. 
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Bank of Ghana . 
Secondly, -; '. he provision for re investment of the Bank's 
investment is an unusual provision which can be explained by 
a hypothesis (later actually put into practice) that the Govern- 
L, wanted the Bank to shift from foreign securities to local 
assets. But an active use of this and the general powers of 
direction reposed in the Minister would clearly diminish 
va st, ly the exercise of initiative within the Bank. For there 
would be a per7)etuat ion of buying, selling and maturing of 
Treasury W -11s and other 
debt of te Government. In such a 
setting it would probably be simpler to channel all Savings Bank 
funds d rectl; - into Government. funds with interest due to 
depositors being paid over to the Savings Bank by the Government 
as the need arose each half-year or rear. 
Ob er " 
The Bank inns established for the basic purpose of absorbing 
Small iav thgs 
throUgiloUi '; i h6 country to ti1lic11 is connected the 
still Lio e fundamcnta1 objective of cultivating ti=ift and 
Enooara, ung t, -ie a ass of tue Zpeo; )le to exchan e their savings 
for the debt of orLaniced institutions in eon-.; rast to the risky 
h: bit, common in aconoraicall: T backward countries, of keeping 
savings in tine fox,: of unproductive currenC-ir. 
r, : "om di scuss io1zs with a senior official of the Bank the 
impression was gained tiiat tiie Bank did not encourag© co i rcial 
establ3. shbents to invest with it because such establishments 
had ee s/ access to cormnerclal banks. But a second explanation 
, aa ýr be offered s From the beg inning of its operations the Bank's 
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deposit rate vas stabilized at 2zf . Until 1959 so far as 
interest rates taer"e concerned the Bank would be largely 
competitive witii the cotiunereial banks. From the second half 
of 1959, however, its cr i. rate was 
2o less than the minimum 
paid on savings deposits b; r the coimmrcial banks. Even if one 
made the debatable assumption that the ordinar: r Ghanaian saver 
was not inter n. st--rate conscious, asl uilar assumption about a 
sophisticatt: cd co aer. cia1 establis: ltaent would be clearly 
unrealistic. 
It seems to be generall;, r true that the authorities of the 
Bank have , over the years, 
been particularly concerned with the 
small private saver. Thus, a senior official of the Bank told 
the author, they have been content with witnessing an increase 
in the habit of thrift among the general population. Am oaning- 
ful roes sure of increased thrift -'equines reference to a number 
of variables vhicli we can not [go into in this work. But even if 
one measures thrift by the level of savings, as far as the Bank 
is concerned, the view quoted above would hardly be borne out 
by the statistics of the Bank's operations. 
Sav.;. n. ýs Banlý Offices 
As noted earlier, the daily business of the Bank is performed 
tlixough postal offices by Postmasters and Postal Agents. It is 
therefore the largest sin[; ls savir ;s institution in terms of 
number: of offices. i"iore significant, it is very widely repres- 
ented with offices in very remote parts of the country in 
response to 'Eile post-3-950 was e spans ion of the general 
cowLnunication network. Table 35 presents the number of postal 
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offices at which Savings Bank facilities teere available over I 
the period 191+9-50 to 1963-64. 
The number as st the end of Mardi each year 
Table 
Number of Savings Bank Office s2 1950-64. (As at 31st March) 
1951 216 
23 
1952 2'+9 
1953 272 
1951+ 293 
195 5 
19 6 338 
195 355 
B 
i9 59 
1 60 
39} 
x 9 +16 
2 1 4 96 36 
1 46 964 6 
Source: Ghana Savings Bank, Accra. 
rose consistently from 216 in 1950 to 1+66 in 1964. At the end 
of 1'3arch 1950 the number of Savings Bank offices was twelve times 
the nummbei' of connuercial bank branches in mid-1950. Notwith- 
Standing a hi her acceleration rate in commercial bank branch 
expansion, at the end of March 196 - the Ghana Savings Bank 
operated over twice as enany offices as were operated by all the 
co nr, lerc ia1 banks at the end of 1964. 
Table 35 does not tell Au full story of the process of 
e :. pansion in the nui2sDers of Savings ; and, offiecs, as the Bank's 
hi; tort' : gas been imarý: ed by fairly frequent closure 9 -withdrawal 
1; lic' äüthör is indebted to Mr" Ä; R, S Eh- - Controller of the Ghana Siv ims bank taho promptly sent by 
the Bank" 
air mail statistics .1t requirod of . ll gaps in the watcr. iainitially obtained on 
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and restoration of savings facilities at various postal offices. 
In recei t , rea"'s, 
during 1961-62 27 offices were closed or with- 
drawn; 'in 1962-63 (acuities withdrawn from 13 postal offices 
were :, ostored later in the same year. In all between March 1961 
and tii. a oai: ae month in 196+ Savings Bank facilities were reinstated 1 
or newly established in 60 places- 
The alternations of closures and restorations of Savings 
Bank facilities n be construed as on the ons hand an indication 
of some fundamental difficulties encountered by the Bank in its 
bid to spread its services on a nationwide scale, and on the 
other hand! a consciousness of the long-run pivotal role of an 
institution of its kind in the development process. As regards 
the difficulties, it is difficult to isolate any specifically 
factual considerations due to a lack of the necessary, information. 
But a few I; entativa explanations may be offered. 
The Savings Bank meets a part of the salaries of Postmasters 
and Iostal Agents who handle its business in the individual 
offices. To this must be added other current expenditures. 
Thus the cancellation of servicas gray be attributed to failure 
of net deposits to justify the operational costs. 
IIIowever 
y as noted earlier, the frequent reinstatement of 
withdra, an -; ervicas would appear to cvidence official recognition 
that the rationale of expansion in i; 1le services of such an 
institution should be sought outside short--t^ria profitability. 
There is a strong case for extension of savings bank facilities 
wherever the frontiers of the exchange economy advance. 
1, GYaana Savings Bank] Annual Reports. 
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In this respect, it is interes-cin,,; to note that of the 
60 Pos'-al offices to which savings facilities wore restored) 
or newly established between 1961 and 196'+, all but one were in 
small towns and villages with an average n id-1960 population 
of probably less -'Chan 3,000. 
^jle postal offices a part I tho Ghana Savings Bank offers 
savings fac. ilitios through the medium of lIobile Savings Banks. 
At the end of 1961E the. ý"e were, nominally, seven such banks. 
The first was .: _ntroduced on 
the 1st parch' 191 +, the second in 
191+5-1f6, four more in 1948_49 and the seventh in 191+9-50. 
Me Hobile Savings Bank operates in the more remote parts 
of the country where savings facilities are not available in 
the ordinary way. The visits of the vans are usually timed to 
coinc1do with ni rket days and are proceeded by advance information 
cora; nýný. ca red :o the respective village chiefs. Actual busirr ss 
is heralded by lectures and other propaganda conducted by Postal 
and social Welfare officers and through film shows provided by 
the Inforlaation Department of the Government. 
On a i'Iobil© Savings Bark deposits are acce-pted to any 
amount whilst demand withdrawals are limited to £GlO per account. 
Not all seven iiobilo Banks were in service in any given 
year as from 1960. Daring 1961-62 only L. of the stock of 7 were 
on the road; 3 did not operate throughout the following year, 
and of the ret nthing 1- only one operated during the first three 
months of that IL 
vans we? re off the 
3 were in aerv ce 
1. Ghana Savings 
to the autlho3? 
Want ial year; f inally, in 1963-64 1t of the 
road for tie whole roar whilst the remaining 
1 
only for a few months. 
Bank Reports and inforwation suppliacd directly by the Controller. 
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In all these cases the Mobile Banks were ; tithdrawn from service 
because of frequent breakdowns intensified by a general scarcity 
of spares wliicil the malade inistered import licencing brought in 
its wake from around 1962. 
Table 36 shows coiiiparat ive figures on business carried out 
on the iiobile Savings Banks. 
Table 6 
Transactions on Mobile Savinr: s Banks. 1951+-5 to 196.3-4. 
1st April How Accounts Deposits Withdrawals' 
to 31st No. £G £G. 
March. 
1954-55 1,601 102550 494 
1955-56 27172 117221 514- 
1956-57 2,323 15,44 a 965 
1957-58 17492 11734 12533 
1958-59 1,139 7,901 652 
1959-60 571- 31917 454 
1960-61 938 3,015 215 
1961-62 1+89 1,714 264 
1962-63 1-71 2,162 95 
1963-61+ 337 681 27 
Note: All figures are "flows" in the financial year. 
Source: Ghana Savings Bank, Accra. 
It must be pointed out that no direct connection exists 
between deposits or withdrawals and new accounts. Deposits, 
as I-lithdraWals, would be to the credit and debit of new accounts 
uaii; hin a given year as to old accounts. 
It can be deduced fror. Table 36 that the impact of the 
Mobile Savings banks i. -was on the decline from 1960. This was 
partly attributable to the inactivity of the vans from 1960. 
As fewer vans showed up and at greater intervals of time their 
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volume of business would naturally tend to decline. Moreover, 
the fact of fewer visits by the savings vans could have led to a 
lull in the enthusiasm of the communities served. These hypo- 
thetical explanations apart, the decline in the Bank' s business 
on mobile savings vans could have been due to the extension of 
postal offices and with them savings bank facilities to tue. 
remoter places previously plied by the mobile banks. In a sense 
it might be said that in the latter years of the period under 
examination the 11obile Savings Bank was becoming redundant. 
Procedure on Bavin s Bank transactions. 
Until 1961 each customer of the Savings Bank was limited, 
to £G500 additional deposits per year and to an aggregate of 
£G57000. The discontinuation of these rather puzzling limiý t ions 
was said to have followed representations by the management to 
the Government. Probably a major factor behind the aboliticn 
of the limits was the increasing competition offered by the 
coramercial banks whose post-1960 branch development was directed 
into places -there previously the Savings Bank had been the sole 
institution represented. 
Withdrawals could 1: e made at the co unter, by telegram or 
by post. By l96+ withdrawals at the counter were subject to a 
limit of £GlO at a time and those by telegram to a limit of £G1+0 
whilst those by lost were not subject to any limit. Any of the 
three modes of withdrawal was officially allowed only once in 
a period of fou_rtecn days. 
In acdaitiori tb the innniiiüm interval of fourteen days which 
raust elapse between withdrawals there were a few other limitatirna 
--'y: 
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Thus a days s prior notice was required in respect of withdrawals 
e±ceeding £G10. Auounts in excess of £G10 actually required the 
sanction of the head office in Accra. Three months prior notice 
1 
was required in the case of aLiounts exceeding £Gl000. 
! 'Accelerated' service was provided at the headoffice of the 
Bank to depositors who called personally for withdrawals involving 
sums in excess of £GlO. For such -'accelerated' service a fee 
of two shillings was debited to the customer's account before he 
encashed his deposit or part of it as the case might be. A 
charge of one shilling and sixpence was also made on telegraphic 
withdrawals. Lastly, one special advantage of the Savings Bank 
was thct credit and debit transactions were permitted in any 
Savings Bank office. 
The account given above of rules affecting drawings on 
deposits which in comparison with the rules of the commercial 
banks were frequently regarded as cumbersome did in fact repregu 
a considerable modification of earlier regulations. 
In 1951 Sir Cecil Trevor reported that deposits were with- 
drava:, & on demand (that is, at the counter without prior notice 
additional to the normal interval of fourteen days) to a limit 
of £G3 at a time. Telegraphic withdrawals tigere subject to a 
limit of £G20, whilst the Controller had power to demand a months s 
2 
notice in respect of withdrawals in excess of £G200. 
Teilt Uolic 
Prior to the 1961-62 financial year the local assets of the 
1. The Controller of the Savings Bank had power to rescind 
or modify this condition in individual cases. 
2. Ibid, para. 126. 
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Savings Bank comprised only cash on hand and bank deposits 
maintained for current payments including operational expenditure: 
and depositors' cash requirements. The aggregate of such local 
assets formed a negligible proportion of total assets. Invest- 
ments were almost exclusively various sterling securities of the 
British and other Commonwealth and Colonial Governments as well 
as securities of various public corporations and municipalities 
of the United Kingdom. 
The description of investments as at the end of March 1962 
is presented in Table 37 which, as it refers to the year in which 
local investments other than income-earning bank deposits were 
first acquired, includes local Treasury Bills to the value of 
£G50,000. As on that date local investments (abstracting from 
negligible bank deposit accounts) amounted to only about 1.1% 
of total investments. Similarly, on the 31st March, 1963 with 
local investments as clarified above remaining at £G50,000 and 
total investments at £G1+. ß- million (face value) local investments 
again amoiünted to only 1.11 of the total. Until the 1961-62 
financial year the Bank's entire financial assets consisted of 
sterling securities, a relatively small amount of cash resources 
and small amounts due from sundry debtors. Thus the ratio of 
local assets of all kinds to total assets was far below the 30`0 
maxinum allowed by the pre-1962 (June) constitution. 
In several ways local Treasury Bills, with immediate and 
non-penal marketability guaranteed by the Central Bank, provided 
investment opportunities suitable for a Savings Bank whose 
annual net deposit business; had been negative almost continuousl1 
1. Ghana Savings Bank, Annual Reports. 
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Table 37 
GHANA OST OFFICE)SAVINGS BANK INVESTMENTS AS AT 31ST MARCH, 1962 
Middle 
Rate Market 
Period / Face Value Book Value Price 
£G s. d. £G s. d. 
1961-66 31 45,078 34 45,078 3 4 89k 
1965-69 31 115,194 26 115,194' 2 6 821 
1970-75 21 45,756 53 45,000 0 0 641 1965-67 3 18,989 10 4 18,939 10 4 861 
1961-64 4 20,000 00 20,000 0 0 97 1963-66 21 2,697 10 11 2,687 8 7 881 1957-62 31 1,375 00 1,375 0 0 100 
1960-70 31 4,420 79 4,420 7 9 811 1968-73 3 7,969 12 7,520 18 11 75 1967-69 41 7,152 10 1 6,821 14 0 911 1975-80 3 117,712 15 11 117,712 15 11 53j 1966-68 3 20,618 11 2 20,000 0 0 73J 1968-73 3 48,426 18 11 48,426 18 11 75 1966-71 2.1 6,245 18 10 5,785 6 1 74J 1959-64 3 15,167 67 15,167 6 7 881 1965 41 10,000 00 
, 10,000 0 0 83rd 1957 or 
after 4 29,465 92 29,465 9 2 63 1969-71 31 14,000 00 14,000.0 0 72} 1966-68 31 177,688 97 177,683 9 7 63 
1957-62 31 5,500 00 5,500 0 0, 99 
1966 51 37,290 4 11 37,290 4 11 100 
1960-70 3 143,053 01 135,517 8 1 701 
1974-76,, 3 79,718 17 0 79,623 16 5 701 
1966-68 3 354,602 88 291,226 15. 1 851 
1960-70 31 40,690 14 1 40,690 14 1 81 
1964 31 2,000 00 2,000 0 0 94J 
1968-73 31 48,487 17 11 48,274 18 11 " 71 
1961-71 41 1,221 06 1,211 11 3 671 1965-70 21 43,719 2.8 41,000 0 0 561 
1973-78 31 89,676 19 7 89,260 15 2 49 
1971-78 41 60,000 00 50,000 0 0 59 
1962-67 3 45,470 69 45,463 1 0 87 
1960-70 31 1,250 00 1,250 0 0 811 
1956-71 5 "6,793 16 2 6,793 16 2 91 
1960-64 31 27,033 80 27,033 8 0 95 
1962-65 31 20,640 49 20,640 4 9 901 
. 
1966-68 3 142,202 27 142,202 2 7 82 
1966-71 21 352 16 7 352 16 7 681 
1975-77 3 10,000 00 10,000 0 0 641 
1964-66 31 20,618 11 2 20,000 0 0 871 1963-65 3 1,831 17 11 1,776 18 9 82 
1970-72 3} 103,252 19 6 " 103,252 19 6 62 1962-67 3 4,180.11 3 . 4,180 11 3 87 1957-62 31 3,500 00 3,500 0 0 99} 
1955-65 3 200,495 10 1 200,495 10 1 931 1960-70 3 974,531 16 7 974,531 16 7 80 1965-75 3 843,238 10 11 843,238 10 11 711 1903-70 31 20,965 04 20.965 0 4 67} 1953-73 31 2,000.0 0 1,930 0 0 70 1955-65 3 . 6,212 1 11 ., " , . 5,500 0 0 911 1963-66 3 
, 
12 847 5 11 12,847 5 11 881 1965-70 3" 3,200 00 3,200 0 0 71} 1967-71 . 3. 183,753 11 5' 179,200 9 1 691 
. 1966-69 31 : 36,505,11 11 "-- 33,912 4 1 64 1955-65 ' , 31 15,723 12 9 15,723 12 ' 9 85 1952 or 31 40,624 33 
' 
40,614 12 4 56 
after 
Description of Stock 
Australia (Commonwealth of) Registered Stock 
Australia (Commonwealth of) Registered Stock 
Australia (Commonwealth of) Registered Stock 
Australia (Commonwealth of) Registered Stock 
Australia (Commonwealth of) Registered Stock 
Belfast Corporation Registered Stock 
Birmingham Corporation Registered Stock 
Bristol Corporation Registered Stock .... British Electricity, Guaranteed Stock .... British Electricity 
British Guiana Inscribed Stock 
..,,., British Guiana Inscribed Stock 
" British Transport Guaranteed Stock .... Cardiff Corporation Registered Stock .... Ceylon Inscribed Stock 
Ceylon Inscribed Stock 
Consolidated Loan Stock 
Cyprus Government Inscribed Stock 
East Africa High Commission 
Essex County Registered Stock 
Exchequer Stock 
Federated Malaya States Inscribed Stock 
Federation of Malaya Inscribed Stock .... Funding Stock Registered 
Hull Corporation Registered Stock 
Ipswich Corporation Registered Stock 
.... Jamaica Inscribed Stock 
Kenya Inscribed Stock .... ..,,,, Kenya Inscribed Stock .... .... .. Kenya Inscribed Stock .... ..,.., Kenya Stock .... ..,,,, London County Consolidated 
Middlesex County Corp Red "A" Stock ..., New Zealand Stock .... .... ,. New Zealand Stock .. ",,,,,, 
{ New Zealand Stock .... .... .. New Zealand Stock .... .... ., Nigeria Inscribed Stock .... .... .. Nigeria Inscribed Stock .... .... Nigeria Inscribed Stock 
Northern Rhodesia Inscribed Stock ..,, Northern Rhodesia Inscribed Stock 
Palestine Guaranteed Stock . ..,, Plymouth Corporation Registered Stock .... Savings Bonds .... .... .. 'Savings Bonds .... .. Savings Bonds .... Sierra Leone Inscribed Stock .,... South Africa (Union of) Inscribed Stock .... Swansea Corporation Registered Stock 
Swansea Corporation Registered Stock .... Trinidad Inscribed Stock .... .. Trinidad Inscribed Stock .... .. Uganda Inscribed Stock .... .... Uganda Inscribed Stock .... .... War Loan .... .... .... .. 
Ghana Treasury Bills .... 
Source 
£G4.331,152 684,245,544 16 $" 
.... 50,000 00 X9,508 68 "" 
£G4,331,152 684,295,053 2 11 
.i_ Annual Renort`of. 'Ghana: Savings Bank.. Report: 1962. App. l. 
ý ., 
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from 195+. 
Unt4il *, hhe second half of 1963 the Bank's sterling assets 
were not part of the national convertible reserves and therefore 
liquidation of sterling assets in favour of local assets would 
represent an effective addition to local capital resources. This 
wound amount to the Bank backing its deposit liabilities by assets 
which enable other domestic sectors to increase their consumption 
or real investment. 
However 2 that the Savings Bank did not voluntarily take 
advantage of the availability of local Treasury Bills or securities 
on which earnings teere higher than on its sterling investments 
m ,y be explained 
in terms of a general decline in the market 
value of its sterling securities. For fair comparison of the 
two alternatives it would be an oversimplification to compare 
the rate of return on foreign investments calculated on original 
cost with the rate of return in Ghana on, say, Treasury Bills. 
Assume a sterling security at original cost of £G100 and 
bearing interest at 3/5Z- Assume further that Ghana Government 
Treasury Bills bear interest at 4;,,. Assume finally that current 
interest i: ate s in the United Kingdom rise to 6ý3 so that the price 
of the sterling investment falls to £G50. In this hypothetical 
ex: amlple , if the Bank teere to sell its sterling assets at the 
current U. I. rates and to invest the funds realized in local 
Treasury Bills it would, in fact, be losing on the transaction. 
For , wher-eas 
it would got only £G2 on £G50 in Ghana it would 
still get £G3 for each £G50 market value of sterling securities. 
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Thus there would be complications in a sLiift by the Savings 
Bank from sterling to local assets given the current market 
value of the 
lZtr 
vis-a-vis the rate of return on the latter. 
I; Then such a shift actually took place it was by compulsion. 
By a Parliamentary resolution on 27th June, 1963 each public 
authority and corporation was required to transfer its foreign 
exchange securities to the Bank of Ghana. 
Thus the sterling securities of the Savings Bank were 
replaced in August 1963 by Compensatory Stocks of the Government 
bearing the same face value and terms as the original investments. 
Compensatory Stocks held by the Savings Bank were to be purchased 
by the Bank of Ghana when the Savings Bank required extra liquid 
balances. In any such repurchase the price was to be the market 
value of the particular original security current on the London 
1 
Stock Exchange. 
Analysis of deposit transactions 
Table 38 shows in respect of deposits and withdrawals for 
the period 1950--51 to 1963-61+ the number of transactions, gross 
annual totals and the average values. Numbers of deposit and 
withdrawal transactions rose annually in the first half of the 
period but declined generally from 1956-57 and 1957-58 respect- 
ively. Gross deposits and withdrawals were each subjec t to 
annual fluctuations but, again, the trends over the period were 
generally dot-mward, as were the annual average values. 
In 9 out of the 14 years 1950-51 to 1963-61+ annual with- 
drawals exceeded annual deposits. Over the whole period the 
1o Ghana Savings Bank, Annual Report 1964, - p. 4. 
. -ax- 
Table 18 
Annual b-nosits and Withdrawals, 1950-51 to 1963-64 
'(Lst Aprils Humber Number I Gross deg-Grosswith- Average Average 
to 31st of dep-1 of with-"1 osits in rawals value of value of IIMarch) f osits drawal: I the year in the deposit withdrawal fi in the l in the fi year 
i year 1 year 1 
1 003 1 000 I £Gl'iillio £GHtillio £G £G 
1950-51 308 1% 3 1.8 7.60 9.10 
1951-52 320 ! 215 2.1 1.8 6.70 8.4o 
1.9 5.85 8.80 1952--53 31-P 2:. 8 2.0 
1953-51+ 329 1235 1.8 2.0 5.65 8.45 
1954-55 330 2ý-1 1,8 2.1 5.45 8.85 
1955-56 13 3 247 1.9 1.8 5.10 7.20 
1956-57 376 1253 1.9 1.9 4.05 7.55 
1957-58 336 1269 1.6 2.0 4.85 -J 7.75 
195859 325 241 1.6 1.8 . 90 - 7.10 11959-60 327 237 1.5 1. 
; 1960-61 354 224 1.8 1.6 4.95 7.15 ; 1961-62 261 239 1.3 2.0 4.90 8.20- 
11962-64 249 214 1.2 1.5 4.65 6.95 19 279 211 1.3 1.5 4.55 7+15 
Source: Ghana Savings Bank, Accra. 
net balance on yearly transactions averaged -£G77.6 thousand. 
The necescnry data are presented in Table 39. Over the perica 
there was a net outflow of funds in each year. 
Table 
i 
Net Balance on Annual Transactions, to 1961-64. 
ist April G_. 'oss flew Gross flow Excess of 
to of doposits of with- deposits(+) 
31st March in the year drawals in or withdrawals(. -. 
z9äß^51 
1951.52 
1952-53 
1953-54 
1954-55 
1955-56 
1956-57 
1957-58 
1958-59 
1959-60 
1960-61 
1961-62 
', ----ý--ý 1962-63 1963-6ý+ 
£Gll Ilion 
2.3 
2.1 
2.0 
1.8 
108 
169 
109 
1.6 
1.6 
1.5 
1.8 
1.3 
1.2 
1.3 
the year 
£GHUllion £GMillion 
1.8 o. 5 1.8 0.3 
1.9 0.1 
2.0 -0.1 2.1 -0.3 1.8 0.1 
1.9 (Minus 13,005, 
2.0 -0. )+ 
1.8 -0.2 
1.7 -0.3, 1.6 0.2 
2.0 -0.7 1.5 -0.3 _.. _. z-. _. ý. 1.5 -0.2 
Alote : des between totals and the sum of 
parts are. the effects of rounding. source: Ghana Savings Bank, Accra. 
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The general results of the developments outlined here were 
by the end of the period a fall in total (outstanding) deposit 
balances, a rise in the number of accounts and a fall in the 
average value of account. These are shown in Table 40. The 
number of accounts rose consistently for each year shown in 
Table 40 whilst the average value of account exhibited a 
consistently declining trend. 
At this point it may be useful to compare the position of 
the Ghana Savings Bank vith its Nigerian counterpart, the 
Table 1F0 
Outstanding Deposit Balances, Number of Accounts and 
Average Value of Account9 1950-51-to 1963-64. 
End of 
March 
Total deposit 
balances excl- 
uding interest 
£GAlillion 
(1) 
Total deposit 
balances incl- 
uding interest 
£GMillion 
(2) 
Number of 
Accounts 
1000 
-(3) 
Average Value 
of Account 
(2) 1 (3) 
£G 
1951 4.6 4-7 338 13.35 
1952 5.0 5.1 366 14.0 
1953 5.2 5.3 97 + 13.1+ 
195'+ 5.2 5.3 26 12.45 
1955 5.0 5.1 1+56 11.2 
1956 5.2 5.3 x+88 10.85 
1957 5.3 5"'+ 522 10.35 
1958 ýo0 5.1 52 8: 85 1 8 
1960 4. 4.9 592 8.25 
1961 - 1 
1962 
.5 4.6 641 5 7. 
196 .3 ý+. 4 66'- 6.55 1961+ 1+. 1 1+02 691 6.1 
Note: cascrepanci. es are aue to rounaing. 
Source: Ghana Savings Bank, Accra. 
I1igerian Post Office Savings Bank whose financial year was 
1 
identical with that of the Ghana Savings Bank. 
1. The author is indebted to Mr. K. J. Woolmer who sent from 
Zaria (Northern Nigeria) the figures quoted on Nigeria. 
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At the end of March 1964 total deposit balances including 
interest held by the Nigerian Post Office Savings Bank amounted 
to 
Amillion 
compared with £G4.2million for the Ghana Savings 
Bank. On the same date the number of accounts maintained with 
the Nigerian institution was 330,661 compared with 691,000 
in Ghana. Under the plausible assumption that in Nigeria as 
in Ghana each depositor was allowed only one account these 
figures means that in Ghana over 10% of the population had 
accounts against some in Nigeria. These comparisons 
(obviously crude because of the much larger number of commercial 
banks in Nigeria) may provide some indication of how widespread 
the Savings Bank is in Ghana. 
We will now discuss briefly the general falling trends in 
the business of the Ghana Savings Bank as outlined above. 
The combined effect of 4 declining total deposit liabilities 
and a rising number of Savings Bank offices produced a fall, 
over the period, of deposits per office. This probably meant 
rising costs per account. Viewed in a static sense the decline 
in average value of account has serious implications for the 
earning capacity of the Bank. 
One may advance the tentative argument that holders of 
small accounts would also be individuals not likely to add 
substantially to their credit balances by reason of a general 
low level of income. Theoretically, it is highly probable 
that in so far as they belonged in the low income brackets such 
customers t-gere more severely affected by the rapidly rising cost 
of living in the last four years of the period. Thus the implied 
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Table 41 
Deposits Per Savings Bank Office, Selected Dates 
End Total deposit Number of Deposits per 
of balances incl- Savings Bank Office 
March uding interest Offices 
£G' 000 £G' 000 
1951 1+, 683 232 19.7 
1956 5,295 a38 15.7 
1960 , 893 16 ll"a 1961+ 4)207 1-66 9.0 
Source: Based on Table 35 and Table 40. 
high propensity to draw on deposits would dictate a need for 
the Bank to maintain higher cash balances in relation to deposits. 
This would exert a contractive influence on income-yielding 
investments. 
The Bank's creditors, in the circumstances described above, 
would include a substantial number of people whose deposits one 
could hardly expect to be stable or to shov a significant 
inclination to rise. This point. recalls the finding by Sir 
Cecil Trevor in 1951 that Savings Bank deposits were operated 
extensively as current accounts. In a sense the concept of 
Current Account, as normally understood in banking vocabulary 
may be said to derive its actual meaning in the attitude of the 
depositor. In Ghana it is quite probable that a substantial 
number of individuals who operate small savings accounts are 
attracted primarily by the security afforded to their money by 
the vaults of a bank. Thus the rules governing intervals 
between withdrawals may be cited as the major barrier to the 
operation of many small deposit accounts as Current Accounts. 
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For illustration it would be illuminating to know what proportion 
of Pm 71 savers draw on their deposits in order to cancel deb-', S: t tc'b 
may have been acquired during the interval that one had, of 
necessity, to await the subsequent withdrawal day. In other 
words to put matters baldly, in a country such as Ghana a 
movement to small accounts does not seem to offer a favourable 
prospect for a savings bank. 
From 1961 the Savings Bank faced greater competition from 
the commercial banks in more areas of its branch system. In the 
circumstances therefore one may theorize that a substantial 
addition to the number of creditors would come from the rural 
areas not covered by commercial banks. With the expansion in 
the communications network it is possible that the resulting 
closer contact. of the rural communities with urban standards 
of living may have reduced the general propensity to save of the 
rural sector. 
Such theoretical possibilities apart a few other practical 
factors must be mentioned as having exercised a downward pressw- tc 
on the Bank' s deposits and general business. 
Throughout the 1950's the Bank counted among its largest 
customers Local Councils and other similar bodies who later 1 
withdrew part or the whole of their substantial deposits, mainly 
to invest in Local Treasury Bills or to carry out development 
V 
projects. The withdrawal of such large depositors meant that 
the Bank lost one group of its major creditors whose balances 
were more likely to be reasonably stable. 
Also among the important customers lost by the bank might 
1, Ghana Savings Bank, Annual Report 1962, p"3" 
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be Ghanaian traders. As the latter' s business grcý1 they rat 
have required financial accommodation from time to time which 
the Savings Bank could not sleet; not beirg a lending institutic_:. 
in the ordinary sense of tho terra, 
In all as an oxpanding section of the community came within 
reach of alternative uses of savings (coiunercial bank debt 
Treasury Bills) bearing higher returns this ha:; posed consider. Je 
disadvantages to the Bank*-s position. 
In addition to the abcvo factors, it is a frequent complaifit 
that the mode of withdrawal is rather cumbersome involving in 
some cases identification by a third party. Uppermost among 
general public complaints is an alleged lack of civility on the 
part of Savings Bank clerks towards customers. The impact of 
such discourteous manners may have been less serious for the 
Bank' s business in the days of few other banking facilities: hi. 
in the present stage of banking development any such discourtesj- 
is clearly ill rdvised. 
These peculiarities of the Bank have not escaped official 
notice. Both the Government Statistician in his annual "Economic. 
Survey" 9 and the Bank of Ghana in their Annual Reports have 
called for reform in the structure and regulations. We reproducc 
here as a matter of illustration two extracts from these source ^; 
«..... the commercial banks offer better services by 
way of a simple procedure for withdrawals which contrasts 
strongly with the rather cumbersome process of withdrawal 
adopted by the Post Office Savings Bank ... "l 
and "The persistent downward trend in Savings Bank accounts 
1. Economic Survey (of Ghana), 1962. p. 91. 
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can only be explained by the lack of dynamism shown 
by this institt. tion in a period when total savings 
are rising. "l 
These quotations, though oversimplifications of the problems 
faced by this institution, m vertheless do sum up well the 
position and the call for reform. 
The Ghana Savings Bank was set up to fulfil a dual purpose; 
to encourage thrift and mobilise savings from a wide section of 
the country. Until the commercial banking system spreads to 
the more remote parts of the country, the Savings Bank will, 
at least in concept, continue to occupy an essential place in 
the encouragement and mobilisation of savings. 
Already the wide coverage of the Bank' s facilities is an 
important first step towards the fulfilment of these objectives. 
The question which calls for comment is how one can reconcile 
the fact of increased savings facilities with the falling value 
of deposits. 
A realistic answer should be sought in the short and the 
long run. Its long run impact can assume significant- proportioiº. 5ý 
As has been reiterated in this study the economy of Ghana is 
based predominantly on rural activity. A realistic plan to 
speed up the growth or diversification of the economy must 
necessarily involve a plan for greater output, from the rural 
(agricultural) sector. Thus the long-run possibilities for the 
bank are 2 in theory, 
immense. 
In the short run, however, certain reforms are necessary 
to enable the Bank to realize its long run potentialities. 
lo Bank of Ghana, Annual Report, 1963, - p"5 " 
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Interest paid on deposits would have to be raised to a 
competitive level. Secondly, it is essential that the need 
for security against impersonation should not be pushed so fay' 
as to rep3l customers. 
In a paper issued for limited circulation by an Officer 
of the Bank of Ghana two suggestions were offered for stream- 
1 
lining the procedure on withdrawals. These proposals are 
(a) the fixing of a passport size photograph in a depositors 
passbook, and (b) tie adoption of a "security word system" 
embracing the adoption by the depositor of a code word to be 
quoted by him at any time of withdrawal. These, it is suggested, 
would safeguard against fraudulent impersonation, and provide 
a basis for speeding up the process of withdrawal. 
Each of these proposals involves serious problems. An 
imposter would only have to substitute his own photograph for 
that of the legal holder, albeit that this can be averted by 
ricans of official stamping on photographs. But the question 
arises as to who should bear the cost of the photograph. 
Clearly a potential customer with access to a commercial bank 
would not relish the thought of bearing this extra cost. Neith3r 
would it be feasible to ? naintain photographic equipment at ever, 
Savings Bank office, even if the Bank would be in a position to 
carry costs. 
Similarly the "security word system` cannot be applied 
successfully without gcing to great expense. The most important. 
I. I. K. Brenya T. Bank of Ghana), 'Raising the level of -' 
savings (typescript) October 1964, p. 6. 
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attraction of the Savings Bank is the provision of withdrawal 
service at every branch office in the country, a practice not 
allot-wed by the commercial banks. Thus, if this special feature- 
is to be retained then under a "security word system" code 
words would have to bo transmitted to all Savings Bank offices 
together with the names to which they apply. This is obviously 
a most cumbersome process. The truth is that the request for 
a third partyis identification of the depositor is most 
unnecessary and must be abolished. 
It seems to the author that three measures of reform would 
be essential: 
1. A general raising of interest rates offered to depositors. 
2. The introduction of a variety of deposits and savings 
schemes tiiitii progressively higher interest rates for 
regularity of saving and length of period of deposit. 
3. The institution of much closer links between the Savings 
Bank and the organisations concerned with the incomes 
and expenditures of p"tential savers. This would facilitate 
automatic voluntary deductior3 from wages or crop payments. 
Ali The First Ghana Building Society 
lAs is a brief section devoted to the organisation and 
operations of the First Ghana Building Society, the only 
institution of its kind in Ghana during the period under review. 
Incorporated -n 15th June 1956 after the Building Societies 
Ordinance 9 1955 the Society Sias a joint venture by the Government 
and the private sector. Government participation took the fogm 
of share and deposit accounts. At the and of 1963 total 
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Government investment on various accounts amounted to some 50%, 
of liabilities on share and deposit accounts. 
Like its counterparts in other countries the Society 
collects savings from the public and grants loans to finance 
only one kind of capital formation, private dwelling houses. 
Holders of Savings and Ordinary share accounts are members 
of the Society. By contrast holders of deposit accounts are 
essentially creditors with a prior claim on the resources of 
the Society with intero-st, in the event of liquidation. As a 
result Deposit accounts comprise the greatest proportion of 
aggregate deposits. Its special attraction is reinforced by 
the fact that investments on this account are withdrawable 
ordinarily at a month' s notice and where large sums are involved 
at a notice of up to six months. The rate of interest is i+% 
per annum. 
,, Savings shape account carries interest at 5% and is A 
required to be maintained for a contractual period of five pars. 
Interest is credited at 2% in the first four years the difference 
being added in the fifth year. 
Ordinary share accounts carry interest at , mature in 
a contractual period and withdrawal in part (exact portions 
unspecified in sources of information) before maturity. 
Taking aggregate deposit liabilities on all three accounts 
it would a_ipear that tiie response of the general public has not 
been verb; active. The accounts of the Government and insurance 
companies together constituted over half total deposit liabil9 t( 
in most of the years. ''rith average annual deposits on all 
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accounts equal to £G906,000 over the period 1958--61+ the invest: - 
ments of private individuals would average less than £GO. 5 mila. t'n. 
Loans granted for the purchase or construction of houses 
carrying interest rate at 9% were determined on the basis of 
three factors: the value of the house (as estimated by 
Surveyors appointed by the Society), the applicant's income 
and age. 
The maximum repayment period allowed was 20 years 9 at the 
age of 60 the borrower was required to have repaid the entire 
loan. 
Normally the Society advanced not more than 80°0 of the 
price of the property. However, there were two circumstances 
in which it would advance up to 95%: 
1. ZIhere the applicant had life assurance policies to cover 
the excess over 80/Z, or 
2. If there vas a guarantee froia an insurance company that 
1 
they were ready to take on the excess over 80%. 
According to officials of the Society loans were made to 
anybody found suitable under the various criteria outlined above. 
It is, however, likely that in actual practice preference was 
given to holders of large accounts. Houses financed by the 
Society were properties with modern amenities. Apart from the 
obvious consideration that houses of good quality represent a 
more durable addition (abstracting from the case where a loan 
is to enable transfer of an existing asset) to the capital stock; 
1, Such guarantees were accepted on the basis of investments 
of the insurance companies in the Society which would be 
debited to the relevant amount (the excess over 80% of the 
cost) to effect repayment. 
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this requirement was very important from the Soc iety' s point 
of view. Tic house on which money was advanced was usually the 
sole security against the loan and therefore the need to finance 
houses easily saleable in the event of default. The question 
of the percentage of bad debts and the subsequent realizability 
of security (that is mortgaged property) is of great interest 
to the development of a financial system. 
Available information indicates that at the end of 1962 
there uere repayment arrears on 19 mortgages, out of a total 
of 556, amounting to approximately £G36,000a At the end of 
1963 the number of mortgages on which repayment were in arrears 
was 21 out of 591 and the amount involved was approximately 
fG42,3OO. The outstanding debts amounted to 1+. 1% and 4.5% of 
total outstanding mortgages (see Table 1+4) at the end of 1962 
and 1963 -. respectively. In each case the arrears were outstanding 
for over a year. This may be compared to the- rate of bad. debt 
of under l estimated for one of the commercial banks. 
Table 1+2 
?+ Total Doposit 
,,, 
All lLccounts) 
.. 
1958-6 
End of December : EG' 000 
1958 
800 
1960 910 
1962 996 
1963 1,050 
1964 1,168 
Sources 
. 
Economic Survey (of Ghana) , 1964, p. 132. 
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Total assets; as reflected in total deposits, were 
relatively stagnant froý--, i 1959. These are shown in Table 43 
which shows data available to the author covering 1958-63" 
Table 43 
Total Assets of the Building Society, 1958-63 
End of December Gt000 
1958 521 
60 1 891 9 
1961 1 0 0 , 6 
1963 1,128 
Source: First Ghana Building Society, Accra. 
Table 1P- shots the composition of assets in 1962 and 1963 
for which details were made available to the author. 
The general stagnation demonstrated in the annual growth 
rates of deposits and assets was further punctuated* by declining 
profits. ITet profits for the year ended 31st December were 
£G51,000, £GLf +, 300 and £G44,100 in the three years 1961-63. 
It Zuovld thus be reasonable to conclude that the Building 
{Society has made little impact as borrower. and probably as a 
A 
', lender. 
One coniraontator has contended that in Ghana "the desire 
to acquire" i: a major factor in household or the individual's 
budget decisions, and thcrefore the Society should lay emphasis 
on the individual's prospect of acquiring a house of his own 
by investing in the Society. This argument which seems largely 
a valid interpretation of the social attitude to durable assets 
1. M. K. Brenya, op. cit. 
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would not, of course necessarily lead -co increases in savings 
for the nation as a whole in the short run. But from the point 
of view of the Sociat3 - the adoption of such a scheme might 
raise the level of funds in the -short run. 
The Bank of Ghana, in its Annual Report of 1963 (pp. 54-5) 
commented on the Building Society as follows: 
"The stagnation in the business of the Building 
Society could not be duo to a decline in investments 
in real e sta ue . Private househuilding is proceeding 
at a ver r fast rate. Indeed it is one of the bye- 
e'ffects of inflationary trends in this country that 
private Ghanaian investors find that...... the only 
way to hedge against further loss in real earnings 
on investments is to invest in private house building 
since expectations about rent are fairly high now. " 
he stagnation, therefore, was blamed on the lack of "a bold and 
imaginative plan to meet the current wishes of investors 
in real estate-" 
Table 44 
Corilnosition of Building Society Assets,. 1962 and 1963. 
(End of Deeeriber) £G' 000 
22 196 
mortgage loans 877.4 931. 5 
Investnrsnts (including interest) 
Ghana Government Securities & 
Treasury Bills 91. '+ 103. 2 
British Government Securities 24.6 24. 6 
British Colonial and Commonwealth 
Securities 10.0 10. 0 
Other Assets (approximate) 56.6 58. 7 
17060 .01,12 .0 
Source: First Ghana Building Society, Accra. 
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It is not clear whether "investors" Meant from the point 
of view of the Society, borrowers or lenders (depositors). 
One cannot say with certainty on which side lies the bottleneck: 
the demand for or supply of funds. At the end of 1962 the sum 
of. gilt-edge securities and cash assets held by the Society 
constituted 1)+. 8% of all mortgage assets and other financial 
assets (excluding internal staff loans etc. of small value)* 
At the end of 1963 the ratio was 15.25. Neither of these 
ratios does automatically indicate scarcity of supply or demand 
from the Societyt s point of view with regard to mortgages. 
For one thing we would need to imow the unsatisfied demand for 
acceptable mortgage loans. For another the ratios would be 
high or low (indicating excess of supply or demand) according 
to the expected regularity or otherwise of repayments on 
mortgages and on the maturity distribution of its own debts to 
investors on all accounts. 
There can be little or no doubt about the importance of 
prestige considerations, given the level of income, in the 
general psychology of the average Ghanaian as "the desire to 
acquire" argument seems to imply. The long-run prospect of 
schemes based on this national characteristic cannot be 
underestimated. However, "the desire to acquiro11 argument is a 
simplification indicating that housing is regarded as an asset 
which is in very inelastic demand relative to other assets with 
respect to relative prices of assets. Even if viewed in tore is 
of owner-occupancy housing provides real income, and within the 
individual's scale of preferences if this can be obtained more 
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cheaply relative to other goods more will be purchased. 
On tho other hand, the comment quoted above from the 
Bank of Ghana Report is, in terms of orthodox theory, correct 
with regard to the relationship between inflation and marginal 
investment in real estate. But the exact connection with the 
stagnancy of Building Society assets and liabilities is not 
easy to establish. The concurrence of stagnation in Building 
Society assets and liabilities and the upward trends in real 
estate investment in the country as a whole shows that in 
Ghana investors in this kind of capital formation depend on 
their own savings. 
Perhaps the short-run significance of the Building Society 
is that its establishment constitutes an important step towards 
the development of a broadly based financial system. 
C 
« The National Investment Bank. 
The Hational Investment Bank, officially opened for 
business on 15th June, 1963 was established on tho 22nd March 
1963 by the National Investment Act, 1963 (i'1o. 163) . In a 
sense it was a successor (not from the legal point of view) 
to tie Industrial Development Corporation dissolved in 1962. 
lit the end of 1961+ it was one of two institutions (the other one 
being the Building Society) ! ri, th the primary function of financing 
long-term fixed investment. 
The objectives and statutory- functions of tie National 
Investment Bank present a somewhat conip]ex picture indicating 
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a tonst iousnc ss of the tasks of a development bank operating 
in the peculiar environment of a developing country. As 
will be shown, the details of its statute and bye-laws take 
it well beyond the realm of merely providing capital to would-be 
investors. 
The major objective is to assist, financially and otherwise, 
in the establishment, expansion and modernisation of industrial, 
commercial and agricultural ente_Tprises. It is called upon to 
advise and encourage small Ghanaian private businesses, and to 
provide the basis for bringing together local investment 
opportunities, capital and experienced management. Finally, 
it is expected to encourage 'and facilitate the participation 
of other internal and external capital in the enterprises with 
which it becomes connected in one form or another. 
The Bank is empowered to operate in all sectors of the 
economy: public, private and co-operative. With respect to the 
public sector it is required to channel as loans, funds allocated 
by Parliament and proceeds of loans raised locally or abroad, 
and specifically designated for investment in the public sector. 
The following major amen g the functions of the Bank as 
2 
laid down in its statutory constitution. It is required to 
grant medium and long-term loans with or without security, and 
to purchase or subscribe to shares or othcr securities of any 
is National Invcstiaent Bank Act, 1963, Section 3. 
2. National Investment Bank Act, 1963, Section 
+. 
3. These are defined in the "Particulars of the Bank" as of 
3 to 15 years duration. 
242 - 
suitable enterprise. Secondly, it may transact all kinds of 
guarantee business. Thirdly, it may furnish managerial, 
technical and administrative advice and assist in obtaining 
services under these categories to industrial, agricultural 
and other enterprises. Fourthly, it is permitted to issue, 
acec;, )t, endorse, discount and re-discount bills of exchange 
and similar paper. It may underwrite new issues of stocks and 
other securities. Finally, the Bank is to undertake research 
and investigations into the technical feasibility of various 
kinds of project and enterprise. 
The Bank is not to seek a controlling interest in any 
1 
enterprise financed by it, subject to a provision that it 
should reserve the right to ensure that the enterprises are 
efficiently operated, and that financial assistax_co is utilized 
for the original purpose. 
On the basis of a statutory provision that the Bank is to 
diversify its investment structure the Bye-Laws impose the 
following limitations: - 
1. To invest not more than 10% of its paid-up share capital 
in either ordinary or preference shares of enterprises 
financed by it. 
2. ! lot to invest any part of its borrowed (as distinct from 
oquity) funds in ordinary or preference sharps of enterprises 
1. Frort this it may be deduced that the Bank cannot hold over 
5CF/j of the equity capital in any particular enterprise. 
Thus i sere a particular enterprise cannot raise more than 
501 cf its capital requirements from its own or other external 
resources further investment by the Bank will have to consist 
of advances. 
2. Byo-La: Js, 1963, para. 5. 
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financed by it. 
3. Ordinarily, not to rake loans or give guarantees for loss 
than £G5,000 or, cxcopt in the case of operations in the 
public sector, for over £G100,000 in any one enterprise 
or group of enterprises controlled by a single interest. 
4. Ordinarily, not to grant loans to, or guarantee, or 
invest in the shares of, enterprises of the same industrial 
activity to a total sum in excess of 10% of its entire 
funds. 
5. Not to finance over 75% of a given project except within 
the public sector. 
Furthermore, the Regulations state that the Bank is to 
operate within the framework of priorities and broad economic 
policies set down by the Government in its plans. Equity 
investment by the Bank would be made with a view to re-selling 
them to hanaian investors after due consideration to the 
interests of the principal investors in the enterprise concerned. 
On the re-sale of investments held in State-owned enterprises 
the Bank would obtain the prior consent of the Minister of 
Finance. 
Ca-, 'tal3 shareholders and administration. 
The authorised capital of the Bank is £G10 million divided 
1 
into 10 million Ordinary Shnres of £Gl each. 757, of the 
authorised capital is statutorily allottc8. to the Government 
and the remainder available for subscription by the general 
1. Power to raise the share capital is vested in the Board 
of J)irecto= s, on the prior approval of the Minister of 
Finance. 
- 
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1 
public, resident and non-resident. 
The Bankas statute guarantees to private shareholders 
a minimum dividend of 35 except in the first year of operations 
in respect of which no dividends teere to be paid. A second 
statutory limitation on private shareholders' dividends is 
that while the general reserve fund stands at less than one- 
2 
half of the share capital annual dividends are not to exceed 
3 
in accordance with provisions in the Bank' s statute the 
Government paid £G2.5 million of its total subscription of 
X7.5 million of the share capital on the establishment of the 
Bank. Of the remaining £G2.5 million open to subscription by 
other invcstors £GO. 75 million was issued on 16th Septembor, 1963 
and was 2eported to have been oversubscribed by £G50,000 by the 4 
and of the two-tiwweek period for which subscriptions wore opened. 
I, s in mid-1964 the largest shareholder second to the 
Government was the Ghana Commercial Bank. The list of the other 
private shareholders as on the date noted above presented a 
considerable i_ieasur_e of confidcneo in the economic future of 
Ghana. There were a number of locally-based foreign firms and 
foreign firms actually based abroad. 
Lmong the first group of foreign private firms tigere the 
United .. friea Co. Ltd- 9 Barclays Bank, Bank of list Lfrica and 
the Royal L;: change ! ssuranee. In the sccond group wore, among 
1. national Investment Bank . 1', ct, 
1963, Scction 5. 
ý. The 1at1 does not specify tihother this refers to authorised 
or paid-up capital. 
a il tional Lnvestmciit Bank Lct, 1963, Section 6. 
. 1. nnual Report, 
December 1963, p. 10. 
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others, the MorGan Guaranty Trust Company of Nc ; York, Kaiser 
Engineers and Constructors of Oakland (U. S. A. ) and the Union 
Carbide of the United States through its subsidiary in Ghana 
the ý, frican ikanganese Co. Ltd. 
The administration of the Bank is entrusted to a five- 
member Board of Directors. The official head of the Ministry 
of 1 inance is an ox officio member and the President is to 
appoint the Managing Director w'_io must be the Chairman. The 
other three directors arc appointed by the "Minister of Finance, 
and two of these must be shareholder, of the Bank. 
S',, ructure-and oDcratic: ls. 
Only a brief account is given here about the initial 
operations of the Bank as data relating to the last year in the 
review period teere at the time of writing, not yet available to 
the author. We are here concerned wh the Bank' s formulation 
1 
of a framework for future operations, derived from the first 
L: n_nual Report of the Bank as well as discussions between the 
author and senior officials of the Bank. 
One of the first operations of the Bank was the establish- 
rannt of a tecluzical departriant 1c-nown as the Dovelopmcflt Sarvico 
Institute. Its function is to conduct investigations and 
feasibility studies to provide a basis for the Bank's appraisal 
of applications for financial participation. It also carries 
out such studies for prospective investors rho may not necessarily 
be customers of the Bank. Operationally the Institute is divided 
1. For a comprohcnsive account of similar institutions in 
otiicr countries sec William Diamond, op. cit; and Shirley 
Bosley, op. cit. 
See also t. i'. Schatz, 
"Development Dank Lending in Nigeria=', 
Oxford 1964. 
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into industrial, comLiorcial and agricultural sections. 
In the first six months, that is fron June to December 
1963, the Bank received 303 applicctions for loans and other 
facilities ranging from very small amounts to surmount personal 
financial difficulties, to largo loan requirements by State- 
owned enterprises. The bulk of the applications were subjected 
to the thorough examination which has so far boon a distinguishing 
feature of this Bank in contrast to the practices of previous, 
now defunct, similar institutions established by the Government 
(See Chaptcr 6 */, d zgyo ). 
;,. c cord ink; to tie Bank's Report for 1963 only 27 of the 
original 303 applications satisfied the basic, non-technical 
standards of the Bank. The 27 applications were for a total 
financial assistance of £G8.5 million. One was for a loan of 
£G4.2 million, another for £G2.6 million; tic remainder amcurte. ä 
to a total of Gl. 6 million averaging £G65,000 and ranging in 
size from £G5,671H to £G1f99,000. 
these 27 applications were than submitted to the Development 
Service Institute for feasibility analysis to screen out those 
not likely to be viable propositions. analysis of 16 application,,,, 
ty; "s comj, leted within the year. 9 of these for a total £G1+. 5 
riillion were: approved, 4 micro rejected and the remaining 3 though 
not rejected were first considered to be cases for technical 
assistance from the Bank to improve on their operations. Three 
of the applications approved were fron State-owned enterprises. 
For one of these seeking a loan of £G4.3 million the Bank arranged 
1, [, nnual Itoport, 1963, p" 11. 
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for e: stcrnal (that is, oversca) finance under Government 
guarantee. 
It could be said that the major lesson learnt in the initial 
operations was that projects wore not usually adequately thought 
j4 ge.., k 
out before applications wore made to tbom for lcalns. Ls a 
remedial measure the Bank subsequently commenced a system of 
independently undertaking investigations into possible fields 
for investscnt. In this way, it was hoped to have on hand a 
number of feasible projects which they could recommend to 
intending investors or for which they could seek out possible 
investors. 
Some general coi cents incorporated in tho original draft 
of this brief section scorn to the author to have bocn made 
unnecessary by the change of government which took place in 
February 1966. Prior to the recent change of Goverrimli tiro 
official recognition of a private section as indicated in the banks s 
statute p : tQd a& a, Tosite. #%C-e. -bb t? ic gcneral oiricia1 ttitude 
to private enterprise in the economy. It was not enough simply 
to establish an institution of this kind and expect that it 
would operate effectively on the basis of lCgislation and 
efficient management. The Government would be batter advised 
to exercise control over itself and its political supporters 
in their pronouncements against private capitalists. During the 
last fete years of the period under examination one got the 
impression that the Press (completely owned by the Government) 
were united in a crusade against private enterprise, especially 
Ghanaian private enterprise. In such an atmosphere a development 
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bank designed on paper to assist private enterprise would appear 
to to rodandan. t. 
.; noto iorthy feature of the National Investment Bank is 
the provision in its *statute to act as a focal point for the 
development of a capital market in the sense of a flow of 
capital funds between industries and between savers and investors. 
The realization of this possibility is, however, a matter for 
the future. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
MONEY AND CAPITAL MARKETS 
In the previous chapters we discussed or made references 
to various aspects of monetary and -financial institutions 
which will now be consolidated into a general discussion of 
money and capital markets. 
The volume of short-term marketable financial assets 
outstanding on various dates in respect of which data could 
be obtained are presented in Table 45. Separate columns 
are shown for Treasury Bills and commercial bills because 
except for the end of 1963 and 1964 it is not possible to 
sum the total outstanding of both kind of assets. Table 46 
shows the volume of outstanding marketable internal medium 
and long-term instruments over the period 1959-64. All 
these were Government debt as explained in Footnote (a) 
Table 46. Private internal marketable instruments were not 
easily obtainable though it is very likely that if any 
the size would be very small because of the preponderance 
of foreign firms among that section of the business sector 
that operates on equity capital. 
In a completely socialist economy (in px-a-et-i-arrl terminology 
communism) financial institutions are part of the general economic 
plan and their existence is in an ultimate sense supervisory. 
With investment and workin¬ capital pre-determined from 
budgetary allocations, financial institutions are relegated 
to the role of ensuring equality of ex post demand for 
finance and ex ante planned distribution of funds. By 
a4g A- 
Table 4 
Outstanding Short-Term Marketable Financial assets, 
1960-6L3 
Ghana Government Commercial Bills 
Treasury Bills 
Date £GM. Date fGM 
31/12/60 6-/ 3 
61 / 8 . 
/61 6/6 8 31/12/61 0.5 
/ 10/1 la 31/12/62 0.6 
5/12/61 
62 2 
31/12/63 
L 
17.5 
7/3/ 2 31/12/6 + 38.8 
19/6/62 36.7 
18/9/62 36.7 
18/12/62 38.2 
19/3/62 38.2 
31/12/63 2.3 
4 
30/4/61+ 43.8 
30/6/61+ 40.8 
31/12/64 51.7 
4 Source: Bank of Ghana, Imnual Roports 
Economic Survey, 1961+ p. 123. 
Table 45B 
Quarterly Values of Outstanding Internal 
Corunorcial Bills 
£GM. 
1963 196)+ Comme- Central Total Comme- Central Total 
rcial Bank, rcial Bank 
Banks Banks 
March 0" 
0 
0.8.4 
1 
150 23.9 
June 
September 
. 3.6. 0: 2.8 -36 
10.5 
5.1 
13.0 
8.9 
December 3.0 14.5 17.5 69 33.9 38.8 
Sourco: Bank of Ghana, . 1nnual Report June 1964 Economic Survoy, 1961+ p. 29 and p. 137. 
4 
a« 
- 2)`i 19 - 
Table 1+6 
Known Internal Medi qnd Long Term Marketable 
Finance Lssetskaý 1959-64 
£GM. 
1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1961+ 
47 Stock 1968/73 0.5 0.5 
. 
0.5 0.5 0.5* 0.5 
3 " 1969/74 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
5/ lt 1965/6 - 4.0 4.0 4.0 4-o 
1967/92 - -- - 1.0 1.0 1. (0 
5ý' ty 1967 - - - 0.5 0.5 0.5 
5; 1973 - - - - 0.2 0.2 
5/ " 1967/68 - - - - 10.0 10.0 
1970/74 - - - - - 5.0 
5/ 1969/70 - - - - - 3.0 
3- Compensatory 
stocks - - - - 37.3 38.1 
1.5 1.5 5.5 7.0 51+. 5 64.3 
(a) Exclude Cocoa Marketing Board loans to the 
Government on which the statistical sources 
do not indicate whether they are custoner 
credits or shiftable assets. 
l. lso excluded are National Development 
Bonds (or Compulsory Savings) and all other 
debt or assets which cannot ordinarily be 
disposed of prior to the maturity date. 
Source: Ls for Table 45. 
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contrast the Ghanaian economy was dominated by private 
enterprise and hence our interest in the pro.: pect for the 
development of institutions through which there can be a 
fluid channelling of funds between lenders and borrowers 
since unlike public enterprise the private sector does not 
rely directly on the public purse for investment and working 
capital. Moreover, even in the public sector there is no 
theoretical automatic dependence on the national budget; 
the extent of this depends on how centralised or otherwise 
is the control of the public sector. 
On the whole one of the most serious ; nps in the finrtncirtl 
a 
system of Ghana was the general absence of opportunity for 
switching assets both real and financial. To the knowledge 
of the author there is a near--complete absence of such 
institutions as pawn shops and dealings in second-hand goods 
(except in the case of cars) both being rudimentary media 
through which an individual can. shift between assets or 
obtain resources to reduce liabilities. 
The honey 1.2arket 
As shown in Table 45, in the lhst two to three yerrs 
of the period under exrmin"tion there va: ts n substrtntial 
volume of Trei sury Bills ind commercirl bills within the 
monet? ry system. The only other form of money mzrket 
. Isset 
(abstracting from securities on the short end of mnturity) :1 
as one finds in the London money m^rke> in which there w . 1s 
no significant development were the d^y-to-day call loans 
through which the London Clearing Banks make substnntial 
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funds available to the London Discount Houses. The absence 
of call loans was probably due to the absence of discount 
houses in the economy. 
By the ehd of the period under review whet could be 
described ^s the money mrirket in Gh-ni consisted of the 
outstanding volume of Treasury Bills rind commercial bills 
drzwn in respect of loc^l cocoa purcheses. The institutional 
base of the money m'irket could be described ns nsrrow, being 
limited pricticnlly to the Central Bank and the three 
commercial banks. 
Except for the Treasury Bills which have become a 
permanent float the strong seasonal pattern of commercial 
bills did not permit that fluidity which is essential for a 
developed money market in'view of the multi-dimensional 
significance of money markets as conceived in modern 
economies. Commercial bills were up to the end of the 
review period limited to the internal financing of cocoa. 
It may be useful to discuss briefly the emergence of the 
present marketable short-term assets. 
The 1°. rge volume of Treasury Bills in the domestic 
economy vr^ s b's icn lly the result of Government c? sh deficit 
oper^tions. Even ^. bstr'cting from the effects of deficit 
financing there is gre-it scope for the use of T ressury Bills 
because of the importance of seasonal cocoa exports in the 
Government's revenue receipts. In such a situation if one 
disregards short-term foreign credits then the only 
alternatives to Treasury Bills as a means of closing temporary 
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cash deficits would be reductions in reserves, if any or 
resort to Central Bank adv-. nces nnmely Ways and Means. The 
special attractions of Treasury Bills are the dissipation of 
Government financing among various surplus units and the 
theoretical shiftability which it allows to asset holders. 
Treasury Bills therefore, are a necessary leverage for 
circumventing the seasonal shortage of funds whilst the 
bulk of Government revenue receipts continue to be seasonal. 
An interesting theoretical question is whether the 
growing reliance on indirect taxes in recent years has the 
advantage of a more regular time pattern of finance compared 
with income tax, which in so far as it must include taxes 
on cocoa at nll stiges, is bound to be seasonally skewed 
whether or not collected PAYE. With respect to the future 
positive answer to this question would depend crucially 
on there being a higher r^ to of growth in various forms of 
taxable money income relative to gross receipts from cocoa, 
and on the political strength of cocoa farmers vis-a-vis 
the incidence of taxation on them relative to other income 
earners. Whilst income from cocoa constitutes n substantial 
proportion of the disposable income of the household sector 
the replacement of direct taxation by indirect taxation 
(disregarding equity effects with which we are not concerned 
here) will not lead to any significant change in the 
regularity and time pattern of Government revenue receipts. 
These arguments : ire relevant only where the Government's 
fiscal policy is to balance the budget. In conditions of 
4 
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deficit financing based on the issue of debt in the domestic 
economy Treasury Bills are to be regarded as a regular feature 
of Government fiscal operations. This was the main ground 
on which the observed substantial float of Treasury Bills 
developed in Ghana from 1960. 
The volume of commercial bills on the other hind is z 
function of the inter-industry payments mechanism and of the 
prttern of production over time in relation to the time- 
pattern of consumption. 
In pr. tcticzl terms the use of commercial bills in Ghana 
in n subst-ntial volume c'n be identified with the issues 
of cocoa bills which ^-. s shown in TRble 45 assumed important 
qunntit^tive dimensions only in the 1^st two years of the 
period under review. Prior to the use of the cocort bills, 
small volumes of commercial bills viere known to hive been used 
in respect of timber products at about the turn of the 1950's 
following the formttion of a Timber Marketing Board to buy 
and export the produce of the smaller 
(mainly indigenous) 
lo ginC firms. 
' But neither this nor other experiments - 
mainly a small volume of bills in respect of car salos - 
proved n permznent practice. In the case of the 
"timber 
bills" the failure Wets due to the general impotence of the 
Bord rirising p^rtly from Q11eged irregularities in the 
1. Information supplied by bankers in Minn. 
It is not cler from the sources of information whether the 
timber "bills" were discounted by the timber producers to 
the commercial banks or whether the banks bought the bills 
directly from the Board thus providing the Board with the 
finance to pay the producers. The evidence would seem to 
suggest the litter. 
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Board' s internal practices. 
It was shown in Chapter One that a good deal of the 
import trade in consumer goods is carried out through Sight 
and Acceptance Bills drawn on local importers by oversea 
suppliers. Payment for goods covered by Sight Bills is 
required to be effected immediately and the available evidence 
suggests that the banks stand ready to advance the necessary 
finance. However, it is most unlikely that Sight Bills 
would normally develop directly into money market assets 
although one could conceive of an intermediary ready to 
discount them directly or to purchase them directly on its 
own resources as do the commercial banks in Ghana, or from 
short-term loans implied from other intermediaries such 
as the Call Loans supplied on the London Money Market by the 
London Clearing Banks. 
On the other hand, a money market was not developed 
from Acceptance Bills because firstly, as in the case of 
Sight Bills the commercial banks were generally ready to 
provide overdraft facilities to drawees and secondly 
because 
Acceptance Bills allow the drawee a time epan within which the 
goods concerned can be sold to effect payment. Even where 
the banks do not provide the credit they would nevertheless 
be the ona. y lr: rgo recognised "nrtme" which is usually necessary 
for in ? cceptance bill to be widely used. 
With further reference to foreign trade tr'nsnctions as 
a fulcrum for the growth of n money market several reasons 
may be advanced to explain the late usage of trade bills 
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in the export trade, considering the long history of export 
activity in the country. First, with regard to cocoa exports 
probably local banking resources would not haue been 
adequate to support a large volume of discounting. It 
would have been necessary to bring in additional resources 
from abroad. Secondly, therefore, with major buyers resident 
in countries with well developed short-term credit markets 
. 
there was less incentive to use locally denominated bills 
whilst such large world cocoa marketing centres as London 
and New York provided all the discounting facilities 
required. Thirdly,. and perhaps more important the institutional 
fr'mework was not sufficiently bro^d nor adequately developed 
to support a large volume of open-market credit instruments. 
Obviously, the liquidity aspect of trade bills commonly 
assured in advanced Western economies would have had no 
practical significance in a system devoid of a Central Bank 
or one adequately developed for this purpose. 
It is necessnry to clarify the list point further. 
The banks - the only financial institutions in Ghana relevant 
in this respect other than the Contrsl Bank - would normally 
need some short term mrkotnble assets in order to adjust 
their liquidity positions to short term fluctuations. 
This did not develop in many of the present developing countries 
p^rtly because the banks were integral ports of larger 
intern^tional banks and portly because there simply was no 
suitable local short term earning asset. Thus it would 
not be true to argue that a bill market could not develop 
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in the absence of a Central Bank which was prepared to put 
an orderly basis to the market. What would be valid, 
however, is that in the absence of a Central Bank a bill 
market would be very 
, 
restricted in its objectives and would 
not be likely to develop to any extent. Moreover, whilst 
the commercial banks dominated the credit system, until 
the, modification, up to end-1964 largely theoretical, 
introduced with the establishment of the Central Bank the 
scope for flexible dealings in both trade and finance bills 
was rather limited. The pronounced similarity in the seasonal 
assets structure of all the banks would mean all banks 
acquiring or unloading: the same kinds of assets at the same 
time. 
All these ^rguments apart, the tardy development of a 
bill m^rket cah be ascribed to the fact thrt much trade urns 
financed by overdrafts, which could have been in mnrketablo 
debt form. This Was, in fact, both c, cause and an effect 
arising from the general underdevelopment of the financial 
system. 
The above arguments explaining generally why a bill 
market did not develop on the basis of foreign trade 
transactions also apply to the fact that internal trade 
did not lead to the development of a bill market. However, 
with respect to the latter further causes can be identified 
in the structure of internal trade organisation. ' 
1. For in e'r1y account of the orgznis^tion of internal 
tr"de which remains valid to the present see P. T. Bluer, 
"West African Tride" Cambridge University Press 1954, Chapter 1. 
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in Ghana the bulk of goods produced and sold loczlly 
consists of foodstuffs. There is virtually no participation 
in the sale of these by large trading firms, nor even by the 
small one-man shops. Foodstuffs are sold to the final 
consumer by small producers and petty traders (mostly women) 
who buy in relatively small quantities directly from equally 
small producers. 
VJholest. le dealers in all imported goods are usually 
large, mainly foreign, firms who sire in a position to 
supplement deficiencies in their own resources by readily 
obtainable credit facilities from the domestic banking 
system or from foreign credit markets. On the other hand 
the indigenous retailers in imported goods even where they 
are not able to obtain overdraft facilities from the commercial 
banks are themselves offered credit terms by the large 
wholesalers. 
Thus in the case of locally produced foodstuffs the 
use of trade bills is entirely discouraged by the small 
average size of stocks and the vory lnrgo number of buyers 
and sellers leading to very small nvorage size of transactions 
on both sides of the market. The estriblished use of bunk 
Zdvnnces discouraged the development of n bill mmrket in the 
internal trade in -imported goods where numbers rand size of 
stocks 7rere probably of some consequence quantitatively, 
and whore creditworthiness is relatively easier to determine. 
Vie mrty now turn to ri brief description of the money 
market in Ghinß is constituted 't the end of 1964. The 
institution^1 fr^mework of the money mctrket comprised the 
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commercial banks acting on their own or on beh'lf of their 
clients, and the Central Bank. Treasury Bills though 
developed to a float of substantial volume was held between 
these two groups of institutions with the bulk known to be 
held within the commercial banking system. But 
intermedi^te trading yr-s prob^bly negligible so th-it most 
dtiº 
Treasury Bill holdings would be largely liquid? ted only maturity. 
Under the Credit Control Regulations introduced in 1964 
Treasury Bills became one of vnrious assets required to be 
held by the commercial banks. By the end of 1964 primary 
loanable resources within the commercial banking system as 
a whole showed signs of being strained. The Credit 
regulations actually classified Treasury Bills with cash and 
some part of ordinary comiaercial advances as liquid assets 
for the purpose of computing liquidity ratios. Thus if 
the low cash/deposits ratios of the last three years of the 
period continued after 1964 we could expect considerable 
shuttle operations by the commercial banks between Treasury 
Bills and ordinary ndvnnces or customer credits. 
' This 
1 At such n stagq which is probably a prospect for the 
near future, the buying rates on Treasury Bills and other 
short-term instruments would indicate the relative costs 
of v. rious other debt acquisitions. 
In both the short and the long run the willingness of 
the banks to shift between open market credits and customer 
credits would dopend on the interaction of the risks of 
capital loss vis-a-vis expected returns in money terms on 
customer credits. This borders on an aspect of the Availability 
Theory, one of the currently unresolved areas of monetary 
thought. In a system where prices of open market assets 
are flexible a special theoretical significance attaches to 
the ratio of such assets to lenders' total assets in relation 
to existing loanable resources vis-a-vis increased demand for 
customer credits. A rise in interest rates is said to 
depress lenders supply curve downward because the capital 
(contd. on page ) 
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would constitute the beginning of active trading in short-term 
funds and thus cre^. te that fluidity which frtcilitate the 
multi-purpose ». ctioning of similar mp. rkets in ridvnnced 
economies. 
It should be noted that the institutional base of the 
cocoa bills (the only form of commercial bills at the end 
of the period under review) was narrower than as described 
for Treasury Bills at the comparable date. The cocoa 
bills were held between the Ghana Commercial Bank and the 
Central Bank though there is no theoretical reason why 
either of those two could not soll such bills to the other 
commercial banks. More s ig-nif icant, however, is the fact 
that the cocoa bills were and will most probably continue 
to show wide seasonal fluctuation in volume. 
(footnote contd. from page 258 ) 
v-lue of n liquidity hedge held in securities is reduced and 
lenders are said to be unwilling to acquire more private 
debt. Secondly, that even where lenders' own estimation 
of the yield on private debt was considered profitable they 
would be pinned in by the yield on government securities 
(short and longer-dated) and other open-market assets (tire 
are assuming a situation where banks can only grant more 
advances by liquidating existing assets), which reduces the 
actual realisable market value of such assets. 
On all this and other views on the Availability Theory 
see Joseph Ascheim, 
"Techniques of Monetary Control', The 
John Hopkins Pross, 1961, Chapters 1 and 4; J. A. Galbraith, 
"The Economics of Banking Operations', McGill University Press, 
1963, pp. 55-60; J. Tobin, 'A New Theory of Credit Control: 
The Availability Thesis".. in "Money and Economic Activity" 
(ed. L. S. Ritter), Carabridge, Massachusetts 1962 pp. 167-71. 
A survey in the United States on this subject concluded 
"The evidence appears to indicate that the 'lock-in' effect 
though it is far from being; a universal influence, is an 
important one". Federal Reserve Bulletin March 1953, pp. 219-26. 
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However, as composed by the end of 1964 the function 
of the money market as normally understood in the advanced 
countries of the West was very limited in scope. A money 
, market in its sophisticated form has three basic functions. 
It allows the banks and other asset holders to redistribute 
their funds in order to maximise returns. This will be 
reflected of course, in changing costs of borrowing to 
different borrowers. Secondly, it fzcilitntes the flow of 
short-term funds between lenders and borrowers. Thirdly, 
developed money m^rket provides the wherewithal to influence 
the cost -nd direction of short-term funds nd consequently 
to'regul"te the level of economic activity. Up to the end 
of 1964 only the first function was pnrtir, lly applicable in 
Ghana. The prospect for the other functions which would 
become important both as a cuase and effect of the emergence 
of a more complex economic structure would require a greater 
diversity of money market instruments in a system of adequately 
integrated sub-markets. 1 In the short run the development 
of the money market will depend largely on the already 
established float of Treasury Bills and the orderliness 
implied in the readiness of the Central Bank to support 
roasoneble strtbility in the cnpitrtl values. A ; tin, in 
the short run this should be coupled with reforms rimed at 
rising generrtl stnnd? rds of creditworthiness as a necessary 
vehicle for the ? ttr<Rction of various local forms of rtssets 
into the orgrnised short-term credit mrirket. 2 
On 111 this see S. N. Sen "Central Bnn: tiing in Underdeveloped 
Money Markets", Bookl'md Ltd., C lcuttß 1952, Chnpters 1 ctnd 2. 
2. On this see E. Nevin, op. cit., pp. 90-5. 
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ACn pit? 1 PZL rket 
During practically nil the period under review there were 
three m: n jor sources of investment capital: foreign borrowing, 
tin. distributed profits ploughed back into the private and 
public firms and various special lending schemes introduced 
under governmental auspices (on the letter see Chapter Six). 
In practice a considerable proportion of public investment 
was derived from locally issued longer dated Government 
securities which during the review period constituted the 
bulk of conceptually marketable medium and long-term 
securities of domestic origin. Both in theory and in practice 
it would be wrong to suggest that these securities constituted 
n capital market. Like the bulk of the Treasury Bills and 
the cocoa bills nil Government securities wore held by 
original purchasers pending maturity. --''h^t is more important, 
there vans no means whereby the locally based indigenous 
agricultural and industrial sector could obtain capital 
resources save under the credit schemes described in 
Chapter 
4 and Chapter 6. There v/as clearly a need for initiating 
facilities to enable issues of equity shares and similar 
industrial securities by intending investors to surplus 
units. 
The main reason for the absence of even a moderately 
-luid market in long-term capital is to be sought in the 
general underdeveloped nature of the financial system, the 
small scale of indigenous. enterprises which could also be an 
effect of the last factor, and the fact that large scale private 
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enterprise generally »>ps dog, i noted by foreign firms who sought 
investment capital from abroad and invested their savings 
on oversea capital markets. 
In the advanced countries of the West the development 
of capital markets hinged on the multiplicity of financial 
institutions with mainly long-term liabilities. In Ghana 
life assurance business is very recent and the stock of 
policy values was believed to be negligible by 1964. Pension 
funds organised in both the public and the private sectors 
were either used directly as investment capital by the 
bodies concerned or were simply invested in oversee markets. 
Hire purchsse firms qua hire purchase firms were completely 
absent from the Gh^naian -economy. These factors are 
obviously basic to the absence of the most rudimentary form 
of dealings in equity and rol^ted instruments. 
For the reasons given in the early part of this Chiptor 
it is necessary to formulate plans for the eradication of 
this serious gap in the domestic credit system. Any scheme 
alone. these lines should necessarily embrace a number of 
institutions which normally would not participate in 
securities other than gilt-edged securities. 
Thus 
commercial banks, local authorities, 
trading and industrial 
enterprises and higher oducntional 
institutions --to give a 
few examples - could be encouraged to participate. 
As noted in Chapter Four (Section C), the National 
Investment Bank appears to be the major institution around 
which a capital market can be most conveniently developed. 
-263- 
This is because of its st^tutory functions which =ire permissive 
of such rin ope rn. tion ihd bec'-use its internal orgsnisational 
structure 'ffords facilities for the technical advice and 
supervision which must necessarily accompany any attempts 
at economic reforms in developing countries. 
Given these facilities, including the facilities fol' 
the technical evaluation of industrial projects, the National 
Investment Bank could become at once an underwriter of 
securities issued by firms which pass its feasibility 
standards, arrange for subscription by various prospective 
investors and arrange for the transfer of existing securities. 
The B^"nk as presently constituted is a viable focus for 
channelling into industry long; term funds raised by it or 
by the Government from both local and oversoa sources. 
Any such oper-itions must perforce be accompanied by 
measures designed to afford liquidity in the sense of instant 
salability without capital loss to both its own equity 
capital held by private investors and to the shares held by 
similar investors in enterprises allowed access to debt issues 
through the Bank's direct and indirect sponsorship. This 
would call for a substantial Government investment in the 
Bank comparable to the provisions made for a securities 
purchasing fund in the Central Bank of San Domingo to foster 
the growth of a market in Government securities, and inter to 
provide a basis for Central Bank regulation of economic conditions 
1. See N. A. D. Macrae, "A Study of San Domingo's New Central 
Bank", The Banker, October 1948. 
For r sumulary of various views on the manner in which 
long-term capital markets may be developed in the developing 
countries see E. Nevin, op. cit., pp. 95-101. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
ORGýi'IIS, iTIOI'T OF SMMIALL LOANS 
SECTION 4. 
Agricultural Credit 
General Survey of the Problems 
Detailed information on the actual operation of agric- 
ultural credit in Ghana is difficult to come by. In the 
first place much of agricultural credit (to be clarified 
shortly) was operated in the unorganized market for funds 
based on the private money lender who would be a registered 
professional or simply another farmer of the same village 
relying on his o': in savings. There are no records of trans- 
actions carried out in this sector of the credit market 
except for summary findings from investigations - mainly 
official - into general problems of agricultural credit. 
Secondly, except in the case of the credit schemes operated 
under the Cocoa Furchasing Company (more on this later) 
decumentation on official and quasi-official credit schemes 
is very limited and often not easily obtainable. The account 
in this Chapter is based on various reports dating baot to 
1916, and actual interviews with a few people involved in 
one way or another in the organisation of agricultural 
credit. 
Ger. era11ýj, Ghanaian farmers' requests for credit were 
based on one or more of the following motivations. 
1. For purely consumption purposes during the off-season 
-265- 
of cocoa. 
2. To redeem cocoa farms previously pledged to a 
private money-lender in respect of previous credits. 
3. To meet capital costs of new farms. 
4. To meet the costs of litigation, social customs 
and in some cases expensive funeral rites. 
Theoretically, provision of agricultural credit under 
goverrmental auspices Baas in connection with relief of 
farmers' indebtedness incurred for any of theother purposes 
listed above. The official organisation of agricultural 
credit directly for investment in agriculture assumed sizable 
dimensions only in the last year of the period under exam- 
ination under the then newly constituted Rural Credit Depart- 
mert of the Bank of Ghana. Equally significant was the 
broader interpretation of agricultural credit adopted under 
that credit scheme involving the cultivation of crops in 
addition to cocoa, small scale fisheries as Gell as rural 
ecgnorr. ic activity generall, T. 
Previously agricultural credit 
whether granted for consumption, investment or for the 
relief of indebtedness was invariably associated with cocoa 
usually referred to as the 
'bash crop" of the economy. 
(1) 
Il,; addition to the credits granted by the money-lender 
and under Government auspices various cocoa buying agents 
were known to have advanced money to cocoa farmers against 
the impending crop harvests. Most of such credits might be 
(1) The term "cash crop" limited to cocoa is clearly out- 
of-date as it usually meant export crop and carried the 
implication that all agricultural production other than for 
export was for subsistence purposes. 
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said to have been for any one or more of the basic purposes 
listed above as constituting the motivations of the farmers' 
demand for credit. It must be noted that credits derived 
from this origin would hardly contribute to the general 
indebtedness of farmers because repayments were secured 
simply by ensuring that a debtor-farmer sold his crop to 
the creditor firm and credits were deducted at source from 
the proceeds of the farmer's crop. 
The reported perennial indebtedness of the cocoa 
farmer arose principally from very high interest charges 
on the loans obtained from private money-lenders estimated 
to be within the range 25 per cent to 100 per cent. In 
marry cases the debtor's cocoa farm was pledged as security 
in a manner that amounted to a ceding of isufruct to the 
creditor. In the extreme case the creditor took control 
of the pledged farm dividing the annual value of produce 
into several parts; to defray expenses, to amortize the 
principal and interest and other operational incottes accruing 
to the creditor or debtor according to the agreeuent struck 
betvicen creditor and debtor. Under these circum- 
stances some pledged farms never left the hands of the 
creditor because he continually understated the actual 
yield and because with the debtor farmer obtaining little 
or no income directly from the farm he tended to get into 
further indebtedness. For these reasons the cocoa farmer 
was frequently cited as meriting credit schemes organized 
under Government sponsorship. Such schemes, it was 
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believed, would serve two major purposes. First, it would 
enable the farmer to break the injustices which he suffered 
at the hands of both professional and non-professional 
money lenders. Secondly, the farmer would thus be able 
to obtain some profits on his investments and hence have 
the inducement to invest in improvements and expansion to 
his farms in response to positive incentives. 
The problem of agricultural credit was first brought 
to official notice in Larch 1918 by Chiefs of the Eastern 
Region in a request for a Government sponsored agricultural 
bank. This was followed by another deputation to the 
Government in 1925. In both cases the call for. Government 
action was based on the need to alleviate the cocoa farmerts 
disconcerting rate of indebtedness. 
(l) 
The Great Depression of the early 1930ts brought about 
a calamitous fall in cocoa prices which Intensified the 
indebtedness of farmers. Futhermore, it has been reported 
that unaware of the depressional spiral in which he was 
caught the farmer continued to borrow to supplement the 
decline in his money income. 
2' The resulting difficulties 
gave birth to the creation of native organisations 
dedicated 
to the defence of farmers' interests. 
The Legislative Council passed the Co-operative 
Societies ordinance, 1931 borne out of the then official 
(1) See La : in. yane, ''Ghana Agriculture", Oxford 1963, p. 179 
(2) "in October 1930, ewer the main marketing season began 
the average f. o. b. value of cocoa was 133 per ton, and was 
falling repidly. By February, 1931 the f. o. b. value had 
dropped to 00 per ton as compared with £50 per ton in 1928. " 
La =; ane, op. cit. p. 101. 
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admission that a credit system for farmers would be effective 
only if based on co-operative societies in contrast to the 
atomistic structure of agricultural organisation which up to 
1964 only been modestly modified. 
The second result of the sharp decline in proceeds 
from cocoa was an investigation in 19,34 into problems of 
agricultural credit by Professor C. Y. Shephard of the 
Imperial College of Tropical Agriculture in Trinidad on 
(1) 
invitation by the Government. Professor Shephard 
reported that the farmer borrowed for extravagant expenditure 
on religious and social customs and that cocoa farms and 
land for cocoa cultivation were themselves frequently subjects 
for expensive litigation for which the farmer borrowed 
extensivelii thus increasing his indebtedness. 
(2) Professor 
Shephard stated that the cost of borrowing was very high 
and the debtor-farmer often obtained only one-half of the 
estimated value of the yield and that this created a disinter- 
estedness on the part of the farmer in needed improvements 
to his farm. Professor Shephard did not consider the 
establishment of an agricultural bank as the suitable 
approach. Instead he recommended that the farmers. should 
be organised under co-operatives through which would be 
channelled credit by the Government in real form instead 
(1) Professor Snephard's Report 
Paper No. 1 of 1936. a 
(2) The farmer who borrowed to 
would find his liabilities on debt 
by any assets if he lost his case 
in respect of which he litigated. 
was published as Sessional 
meet litigation costs 
account not matched 
and the farm or land 
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of outright cash. 
Professor. Shephard's investigation marked the beginning 
of a ruriber of others all carried out at the initiative of 
Government. The findings followed lines generally similar 
to the main tenets of Professor Shephard. They generally 
laid emphasis on the need for Government credit to be channel- 
led through co-operative societies. Among the novel features 
of su. sequent findings were: 
1. That the farmer should be given economic instruction 
to erable him to appreciate the effects and implications 
of costs of production expecially borrowing at exhorbitant 
1 
rates of interest. 
2. That loans were sought to finance expenditure considered 
essential by the farmer and his family but which nevertheless 
they could not afford. That controlled low rates of interest 
would reduce the amount of loans the farmer could obtain 
because of the lender's lower incentive to lend. This, 
it ACAS believed, would force the farmer to reduce hiss 
expen4iture. 
(2) 
(1) Report of the Nowell Commission, 1938. 
2) The Becket Report based on a study of Akokoaso village in 
Ghana. For a fuller account of this Report see La Anyane, 
op. cit D. 181-2. The idea that a low rate of interest would 
reduce the farmer's borroviin3 due to a lo\i incentive on the 
part of the lender is, of course, a simplification based on the 
assumption that the lender's estimates of risks would remain 
unchanged if in fact the risk element was a major factor in the 
high interest rates charged by the private money-lenders. 
More important, there was hardly any means of controlling the 
pegged love mates. However, low interest rates combined with 
deliberate rationing under a Government credit scheme could 
reduce the general money rate of interest if the supply of 
loanable funds under the Government scheme was competitive 
with the overall supply of funds, to the agricultural sector 
as then conceived. But not even this would necessarily reduce 
total borrowing by the farming community. Theoretically, 
lower borrowing rates could well increase the average borrow- 
ing , per 
farmer in terms of the principal. j 
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Post-1944 investigations into the subject of agricultural 
credit facilities reached conclusions of further special signif- 
icance. 
In 1944 the havers Commission recommended that the 
Government should provide for short term credit facilities 
to farmers. As an essential prerequisite it was recommended 
that a system of registration of titles to land should be 
introduced to facilitate the provision of security against 
such loans. The Puckridge Committee appointed in December 
1945 vent further in their recommendation that there wus 
an ur6ent need for the provision of W6-term, credit to 
enable farmers to expand cocoa acreac. e and to rehabilitate 
diseased ones. This Committee, like the haver. Commission, 
also drew attention to the need for a system of reaistration. 
of titles to land. 
One Report reco=, iended th_cht arrargenents for the 
granting of credit to relieve existing indebtedness should 
be preceded by a scheme for the registration of debts. 
(l) 
This idea of registering debts though not easily practicable 
was nevertheless borne out of cominenduble vision. 40 will 
oe ak own later, subsequent attempts to provide credit for 
the retirement of existing liabilities to private lenders 
cane up against many cases of fraudulent claims of indebted- 
ness it sorge cases connived at bj loans officers. The risks 
of such practices might have been reduced if the debts had 
been i. reviousl y registered at the time trat debts viere 
contrr.: cted. however, one cannot pretend that the re4ist- 
ration of debits would have been a simple matter. In 
(1) See, Li srVane, op. cit. p. 184. 
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particular, with the high rates of interest that prevailed 
the co-operation of creditors would hardly have been forth- 
c om ins . 
A Report by vir. G. D. Paton in 1948 reached conclusions 
ý"ihich were quite an anticlimax to the build-up of ideas which 
various previous Reports had brought about. Mr. Paton stated: 
11W±y corsidered view is that agricultural indebtedness 
qua agricultural indebtedness is non-existant, 
and that there is no case whatever for general 
measures for the relief of agricultural indebted: 
n. ess. "(1) 
Presumably, Mr. Paton did not mean that there was no general 
indebtedness among farmers. For, this would be a wilful 
diseregard for impressive evidence amassed by previous 
investigators. %hat Mr. Paton probably meant was that 
farmers' indebtedness was not acquired directly in respect 
of their agricultural operations -ihich would be partially 
true. Even so there could be no doubt that the reduction 
in farmer's disposable income net of heavy debt repayments 
affected their investment decisions in a manner that affected 
the overall economy and their own standard of living. Their 
relief from the vicious circle of perpetual indebtedness was 
there'ore basic to long-run improvements it the economic 
conditions of the agricultural sector which then, as now, 
was the backbone of the economy. Lr. rdtonts conclusion 
was clearly narrowly conceived and short-sighted. 
Three important considerations would seem to the author 
to provide the rationale for breaking the farmer's heavy % 
(1) G. D. P ton, op. cit. 
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reliance on the private money lender. First, while the bulk 
of agricultural credit vas supplied by private money lenders 
it gras unlikely that the authorities would be adequately 
informed about the factors that affected the farmers invest- 
ment decisions. Secondly, private investment and its 
control with respect to volume, structure and terms are 
obviously of great interest to the authorities. These 
are all better controlled when organised in some central 
manner uuuject to similar conventions and conditions. 
Thirdly, an orderly development of the economy would neces- 
sarily need to be based on the growth and diversification 
of the agricultural sector. It was therefore imperative 
that. farmers be lifted from the harsh and crude conditions 
of the unorganised loans market into the orbit of modern 
credit schemes where it would be possible to supplement 
credits with other operations aimed at improving agricult- 
ural techniques. 
Actual Operation of agricultural Credit 
The first efforts to issue loans to relieve agricultural 
indebtedness date back to the late 1920's and were centred 
on Co-operative Societies engaged primarily in the marketing 
of agricultural produce. 
It has been reported that Co-operative Society loans 
during the crop year 1933-34 averaged £2 per loan and that 
in 1936-37 the number of separate loans issued to farmers 
to enable redemption of mortgaged farms was 163 involving 
a sum of £3,676 or 32 per cent of the total amount of loans 
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issued by the Societies in that year. 
(') This programme 
was rationalisd by the Co-operative Societies Ordinance 
of 19F1 among whose provisions was that disputes arising 
from the Society's business should be settled by the Registrar 
of Co-operatives. 
The data presented in Table 47 compiled from various 
sources indicate the progress blade by Co-operative Societies 
with respect to the iesue of loans to farmers (presumably 
only cocoa producers) from 1931 to 195C. Of a total amount 
of E2.25 million issued in loans by the Co-operative 
Table 47 
Co-operative Society Loans, 1931-56 
(Selected Years) 
Crop Year Loans Issued Loans Recovered 
,, G £G 
1931-ý 2 865 494 
1932-33 2,244 1,468 
1933-34 3,712 3,302 
1945-46 11,444 10,991 
1946-47 15,56e 16,261 
1947-48 32,991 30,629 
1948-4.9 66,013 62,257 
1949-50 86,940 77,287 
1950-51 110,626 107,774 
1951-52 216,040 191,137 
195E-53 294,166 269,635 
1953-54 455.502 405,123 
1955-56 562,037 413,138 
Sources: Colonial Reports; La Anyan©, Table 26 
(1) J, or further details see La AnyfAne, op. cit. p. 186 ff. 
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Societies during the period 1945 to 1955-56 to their members 
the total outstanding in arrears at the end of March 1956 
was £G290,579. Given the peculiar conditions of the average 
Ghanaian farmer this represented an appreciable measure of 
success in comparison with the first major credit scheme 
organised under Government auspices by the Cocoa Purchasing 
1 
Company from 1953. 
) 
In 1946 the Government passed the Agricultural Bank 
Ordinance aimed at establishing a bank to issue loans for 
relief of agricultural indebtedness. Once again as in the 
case of most of the previous investigations the emphasis 
was on this aspect of agricultural credit. Obviously the 
granting of credit for productive purposes in agriculture 
had to be preceded by a scheme to unfetter the farmer from 
his axparertly perpetual debtor position. For the reasons 
stated earlier a credit scheme for agriculture was necessary 
per se quite apart from the need to relieve existing indebt- 
edness. however, the proposed bank was a non-starter. 
In 1952 an :, gricultural Loans Board was_set up. 
Between 1952 and 1953 ä total of £G60,000 was given to 
the Loans board from Goverrmert funds to be given out in 
loans to farmers at the interest rate of 22 per cent per 
annum and over a maximum amortization period of twenty 
years. 
In 1953 the functions of the Agricultural Loans board 
were transferred to the Cocoa C-urchusing Company. Invest- 
(1) The credit scheme organised by the Cocoa Purchasing 
Company will be shortly examined in some detail. 
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igations conducted later in 1956 into the operations of the 
Cocoa Purchasing Company as a result of legal-cum-political 
inquiries provide# the best documentary source of detailed 
information into the operation of agricultural credit and 
small loans schemes generally in Ghana over the period under 
review. 
The agricultural credit scheme of the Cocoa Purchasing Company 
The Cocoa Purchasing Company was incorporated as a 
limited liability company on the 27th June 1952 with an 
authorised share capital of f2 million all subscribed by 
the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board which had been formed in 
1947 for the principal purpose of stabilising the unit 
price paid to the cocoa producers. The original function 
of the Cocoa Purchasing Company (referred to hereafter as 
the C. P. C. ) was to purchase cocoa from local producers as 
an agent of the Cocoa Marketing Board. Our interest in the 
C. F. C. commences in 1953 when there was established within it 
a Loans : agency as stated above. 
(1) 
On the 23rd august, 1953 the C. P. C. accepted an invit- 
ation from the Cocoa Marketing Board to act as the latter's 
agent in the issue of loans to farmers. 
(2) 
ZNNO types of 
(1) For the factual account on the C. P. C. Loan Agency 
the author is heavily indebted to the findings of a Commission 
(referred to here simply as the Jibowu Report) appointed 
in l56 to investigate the operations of the C. P. C. 
(2) This invitation followed upon a letter from 
Mr. K.. A. Gbedeznah to the Cocoa Marketing Board asking the 
latter to assume responsibility for the issuing of loans 
to farmers through agencies. 
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loan were envisaged: (1) for the relief of indebtedness and 
(2) for the expansion of area under cultivation. 
Under (1) above loans were to be issued only in respect (1) 
of debts legally enforceable. Although a loan was 
required to cover the full amount of indebtedness it was 
also required that each loan should not exceed the annual 
income of the borrower. Each loan was to be liquidated 
within a maximau period of three years and was to be 
normally repayable in three equal anmalinstalments. 
Under (2) above the following initial conditions were 
imposed by the Cocoa Marketing Board. The planned additional 
acreage in respect of which a loan was granted was not to 
exceed one-half of the area already under cultivation by the 
farmer concerned. The upper limit of each loan was not to 
exceed the annual income of the borrower. Lastly, each 
loan was to be repaid within a period of seven years: two- 
thirds of the repayments were to be concentrated in the 
(2) 
sixth and seventh years. The seven-year limit, it should 
be added, would enable the additions to the stock of cocoa 
farms to bear fruit. 
The C. P. C. itself was to pay interest to the Cocoa 
Marketing board at the rate of 2to 4 per cent on the funds 
obtained from the latter for the discharge of its loans 
agency business. In turn the C. P. C. was to grant loans 
(1) i-r"esumably this meant debts which were governed by 
written agreements. 
(2) TI e Jibovru Report, Appendix 5, p. 57. 
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at a rate of interest sufficient to meet operating costs 
and to provide for reserves against bad debts, but in any 
case not to exceed a limit of 10 per cent imposed by the 
Goverrment. 
A few changes were subsequently made in these initial 
conditions. In a letter from the Ministry of Trade and 
Labour dated 15th August, 1955 the C. P. C. was notified of 
the Government's approval of the following changes in the 
(1) 
conditions governing the issue of loans. 
First; the condition that the amount of a loan was 
not to exceea the annual income of the borrower was deleted. 
Secondly, with regard to loans issued specifically to enable 
the farmer to cancel his debts to the private money-lender, 
the maximum repayment period was raised from three to five 
years. Finally, at the initial stages the C. P. C. had 
been required to obtain the prior approval of the Cocoa 
Marketing Board in respect of a loan exceeding £150; this 
limit was raised to £1,500. 
rpplications for loans were in theory subjected to 
a ratter lengthy procedure. The debtor-farmer was required 
to complete forms bn which he stated the full extent of his 
indebtedness. This and other particulars were required to 
be approved by the Farmers' Group Committee of his village. 
The approved forms were then submitted to the local Receiver 
and on to the area Supervisor and finally through the latter 
to the Loans Manager in Accra. The Loans Manager then 
detailed out a Field Inspector to report on the applicant's 
(1) The Jibow« Report, «ppendix 6, p. 58. 
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farm. The latter's report was followed by a visit by the 
Loans Manager to the applicant's village where he interviewed 
the Group Committee, the debtor-farmer (the api; licant) and 
his creditor. Finally, when the Loans Manager was satisfied 
that all necessary conditions were complied with he approved 
the loan which was then paid to the debtor-farmer (applicant 
for C. I. C. loan) through the Area Supervisor from moneys 
remitted from ýocra. 
The applicant fulfilled the final condition for the 
receipt of the proceeds of the loan by preparing and signing 
a deed of pledge witnessed by two members of his family 
(in tY e Ghanaian sense). On the receipt of the funds 
borrowed he was required to cancel all his debts (that is, 
if the loan covered his debt fully), collect all the relevant 
documents from his former creditor and to hand them over to 
the Loans Manager. Thus, the loan granted by the C. F. G. 
was usually secured by the same property as was pledged to 
the previous creditor. As far as the C. P. C. was concerned 
repayment was, in theory at least, expected to be simpler 
because the borrower would almost certainly sell his annual 
cocoa crop to the company. 
The processes described above were clearly arduous 
and were in theory designed to ensure that applicants for 
c. i'. C. accommodation were genuine cocoa farmers and that 
they were actually in debt. However, it must be pointed 
out that this was no safeguard against bribery and corruption 
which are believed to have been the scourge of various 
measures introduced in Ghana under official auspices. One 
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could, not unrealistically, conceive of the applicant paying 
a briLe to every individual involved in his application's 
arduous journey to the final authorities. This in turn 
could lead to overstütement of the extent of indebtedness 
to ensure that in the final analysis the borrower received 
a sum adequate to cover his debt. Thus the farmer would 
become-indebted to the C. P. C. for a sum in excess of his 
debts and the purpose of the scheme would be defeated. 
The available information does not distinguish . 
adequately between the two kinds of loans envisaged under 
the loans scheme, but the evidence suggests that the issue 
of loans was heavily weighted in favour of accommodation to 
enable farmers to substitute liabilities to private money- 
lenders for liabilities to the C. P. C. 
Table 48 shows the amounts released by the Cocoa 
Marketing Board with Government approval to the C. Y. C. for 
the issue of loans to cocoa farmers. The amounts of loans 
issued to cocoa farmers from 1953 to 1955 are presented in 
Table 4-9. These show that on the 2nd September 1955 total 
funds released by the Cocoa Marketing Board to the C. P. C. 
to be issued in loans to cocoa farmers amounted to £G2.6 
million. on the same date total loans issued to date 
amourited to £G2.9 million including interest. 
By 1956 total loans issued by the Company under the 
Loans agency amounted to £G3,227,845 representing some 
13,002 individual loans. The total number of loans entirely 
repaid by 1957 was 128 involving an amount of £G41,225. 
mýt_ t_ AA 
Funds received by C. P. C. (Loans Agency) from the 
C. I . B. for Loans to Cocoa Paruero, 1953-55 
A l? ro, -, iraatc date on 
rihich funds acre 
received 
Funds released to 
C. P. C. 
ZG 
29-' 9-53 100,000 
8-10-53 400.000 
12-11-53 300,000 
7- 9-54 200,000 
14- 9-54 500,000 
11- 6-55 400,000 
2- 9-55 500,000 
Total received up to 30-9-55 298009000 
Source: The Jibown Report, p. 21. 
Table 49 
r,. p. C. (Loans Agency): Amounts Received 
frort C. I. D. and Loans Issued to Date 
Amounts received Loans issued by 
from C. U. D. to date G. P. C. to date 
Date wG 
30-9-53 100,000 95,000 
30-9-54 1,900,000 1,531,549 
30-9-55 2,800,000 2,936,334 
6ource: The Jiboviu Report, Appendix 11. 
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Thus in value torus the outstanding loans equalled 98.7 per 
cent of the total granted up to 1956. The whole of this did not 
necessarily represent arrears because, there were basically 
two different types of lending each on separate repayment 
terms. The Commission inquiring into the affairs of the 
C. i . C. expressed doubt about the possibility of recovery of 
most of the loans outstanding in 1956. The Commission 
unearthed many irregularities in the operations of the 
Company, a fact which heralded the ultimate dissolution of 
the C. F. C. in 1958. 
Of the £G2, million share capital invested by the Cocoa. 
Marketing Board in the normal trading operations of the C. F. C. 
£G1.2 million was written off as bad debt and £G350,000 was 
recovered leaving a further capital loss of . 1CG45,000. 
(1) 
The sources of information stopped short of disclosing 
the fate of the amount of £G2.8 million handed out to the 
C. Y. C. by the Cocoa Marketing Board to be issued in loans 
to cocoa. farmers beyond the general statement that loans 
were still in the process of being recovered. 
Apart from the familiar risks involved in the extension 
of cash. credits to small scale peasant farmers, the failure 
of the C. P. C. arose principally from the disconcerting 
combination of factors that frequently foiled measures Aunder 
official auspices to deal with various economic problems in 
Ghana over the period under review. These were the priority 
accorded to partisan gains and sheer corruption on the part 
of some officers. 
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Political considerations undoubtedly weighed heavily 
in the appointment of the officers of the C. Y. C. and in the 
distribution of loans. It would not be unrealistic to state 
that many borrowers were given the impression that they 
would not be seriously required to repay advances made to 
them - and all this for political reasons. 
rin influential member of the Government party publicly 
interxreted the status of the C. Y. C. as followvs: 
"Zhe Cocoa Purchasing Company is the product of 
a master brain, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, and it is the 
atomic bomb of the C. P. P. (Convention People's 
iarty).... the Cý.. C. is part of the organisation 
of the C. P. P. "l1 
In a letter from the Loans Manager to the Acting Managing 
Director (who later became Minister of Trade) of the C. P. C. 
dated 23rd December, 1953 the Loans Manager wrote: 
rrjýs politicians, having the interest and solidarity 
of our Party at heart, we should always have in 
mind that we depend mostly on the farming community 
.... for our votes 
to ramain in power for along time 
to enable us to carp"r out for a long time rind success- 
fully, what our gallant ahd noble leader (. 0r. Jc urge 
-. rumah) has established for the farmers. t'(2) 
These two quotations leave- one in no doubt about the fact 
that the authorities of the C. P. C. regarded it their duty 
to win the farmers' votes for the Convention People's Farty. 
Furthermore, this was substantiated by the evidence 
exhibited before the Jibowb! Commission that the board of 
Directors of the C. P. C. a --io^red on 20th April, 1956 various 
recommendations proposed by a Director who was also 
General 
1 wCo (1) Mr.. ntbto Edusei, Gold Coast Legislative isserrbly Debates, 
3rd March, 1954, Column 1,2 3. 
(2) The Jibow4A Report, para. 69. Brackets are: -mine. 
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Secretary of the United Ghana Farmers' Council that -an 
applicant for a loan should in addition to being a cocoa 
farmer also be a member of the Council which he headed. 
(l) 
The Council was a recent grouping of Co-operative Societies 
rivalled to the long-established Co-operative Societies. 
Later, after Independence it became the only recognized 
Co-operative movement, subsequently made a "wing of the 
Party. " 
The fusion of Party politics and the loans scheme 
meant that only a section of the farming community benefited 
from it even though the funds released for this purpose by 
the Cocoa Marketing board were the savings of all cocoa 
farmers collectively. Most probably loans did not neces- 
sarily go where the need was greatest or the prospects of 
repayment favourable. 
Moreover, the Police inquiries which preceded the 
sitting of the Jibes Commission revealed irregularities 
of imf ens e dimensions. 
There were cases of application forms (in respect of 
requests for loans) being sold to intending borrowers. A 
police examination of 6,000 loans dockets (out of a possible 
total of 15,000), relating to four centres found the follow- 
mng other forms of irregularities. 
1. Creditors of debtor-farmers to whom loans were granted 
to relieve indebtedness were not interviewed by the C. P. C. 
officials. 
(1) The JibowU Report, para 32. 
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2. fraudulent thumb-prints purporting to be those of members 
of Farmers Group ; omuitteeewhose inital approval of the 
applicantIs particulars were required by the Regulations. 
This indicated that those who obtained loans on such practices 
were either not indebted or in some cases were not cocoa 
farmers at all. 
3. In some cases loans were paid out to applicants before 
the related applications were approved or recommended. 
4.13. pplicants' farms were in many cases not inspected; 
false inspection reports were supplied. 
Agricultural Credit Since 1957 
After the liquidation of the Cocoa Purchasing Company 
the organisation of agricultural credit under governmental 
sponsorship continued in various forms. The need for a 
diversified agricultural sector continued to be an important 
factor. Moreover, the problem of agricultural indebtedness 
still prevailed. In 1957 a Committee on Agricultural 
Indebtedness appointed under the Ministry of , agriculture 
concluded in its Report that "perhaps three-quarters of the 
farmers of Southern Ghana and Ashanti are indebted in one 
form or another. " 
Tr. e tentative nature of this conclufion echoed the margin 
of doubt about the true extent of indebtedness among the 
agricultural community. Obviously, the time had come when 
the formulation of agricultural credit schemes should be 
directed at increasing productive capacity in the agricult- 
ural sector an integral part of which would be the encourage- 
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vent of agricultural diversification. 
The extent to which this view prevailed in the organis- 
ation of agricultural credit could not be determined by the 
author. The Cocoa Marketing hoard continued to be the 
principal source of funds operated this time through the 
United Ghana Farmer's Co-operatives Council. This organ- 
isation was also appointed the sole buying agent of the Cocoa 
Marketing board from 1561. More important, the Farmers, 
Co-operatives was without doubt a political organisation with 
the responsibility of rallying the support of the farming 
communities for the Government. In its general personnel 
and the public pronouncements of all its senior personnel 
the Farmers' Council exhibited all the general characteristics 
of the Cocoa Purchasing Company. 
by the end of 1964, an amount of £G437,000 transferred 
to the Farmers' Council to issue in loans to farmers had 
remained static because repayments had been nil. 
(l) Loans 
were also granted tocther agriculturdl bodies on which there 
is a dearth of general information. We will therefore 
turn to consider the most recert institutional arrangements 
on agricultural credit, namely the Rural Credit Department 
(1) Information supplied by a senior official of the 
----G6coa Tiarketing Board. 
The view was also expressed that 
the Government might ask the Loard to write off the corres- 
ponding asset as bad debt. The only obstacle seen in the 
way of such an eventuality was that since only a small section 
of the farmers benefited from the loans to write off the loans 
would amount to differential subsidy in favour of only the 
small section. The farmers might therefore grumble. This 
would appear to the author to be a sophisticated analysis 
which would be far from the realities of the Government's 
political power and machinery against disenters from its 
actions. 
.i 
«ý 
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of the Bank of Ghana set up on April 1964 and converted - 
in accordance with the original plan - into an agricultural 
. 
Credit Bank in 1965. 
About the time of Indpendence the Government established 
the Euilders Brigade later renamed the Workers Brigade as 
a multi-purpose organisation whose general agricultural 
activities gradually emerged as the principal operation. 
In 1963 the Government formed the Ghana State Farms Corpora- 
tion out of various smaller agricultural organisations within 
the public sector. Together these two organisations const- 
ituted the margin ofAagriculture most immediately amenable 
to scientific tecrbniques of production. 
From its inception the I'Torkers Brigade had obtained 
both investment and corking capital requirements from the 
national budget. The State Farms Corporation was also 
similarly operated. By the end of the period under review 
the latter had not been in operation long enough to permit a 
fair judgment of its efficiency. However, it was legitimate- 
ly feared that it might, like the Workers Brigade and other 
State-owned enterprises, become another subsidised commercial 
enterprise. 
It was therefore the official policy to bring both 
State-owned agricultural organisations under external control 
by recuiring them to purchase their general capital require- 
ments from the then newly constituted Rural Credit Depart- 
p 
_za6.. 
ment(1) 
The Rural Credit Department as Constituted at the end 
of 19¬4 was designed to provide loans for the development of 
agriculture, fishing and handicrafts in line with the Govern- 
ment's expressed desire for expansion in these areas of the 
primary sector. 
The Rural Credit Department differed from all other 
previous agricultural credit organisations in three signific- 
ant senses. First, its policy was to grant advances for 
directly productive purposes. In other words the relief 
of agricultural indebtedness lay outside its scope of oper- 
ations. Secondly, advances were made mainly to co-operative 
societies concerned with production as distinct from marketing 
Thirdly, wherever practicable loans were made in the form of. 
equipment instead of cash except of course where advances 
were required to meet wage and salary payments. 
1n all, up to the end of 1964 credits granted to the 
farming sector were channelled through the United Ghana 
Farmers'-Council Co-operatives which handled the initial 
processing of applications for advances. The Council also 
(1) Information supplied by the Manager of the Rural 
Credit Department. Two problems arose in relation to the 
Workers Brigade. Its initial objective was to provide 
employment and therefore this would raise the question of 
a realistic criterion of its efficiency. More significant, 
the 'Workers Brigade had shown a disconcerting versatility 
in its activities including political thuggery evidenced 
by its para-military structure. In the favoured position 
which the Brigade occupied within the Government's political 
machinery it could be overoptimism to envisage a high degree 
of control from the Credit Department. 
It should, however, be added that this situation was 
probably modified following the recent political changes. 
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provided guarantees against the advances recommended by it. 
In this way the general difficulty of obtaining adequate 
collateral security, was averted. 
(') 
Finally, the Department 
provided the link b etweer_ its lending procedure and the 
efficient use of advances by supervisory functions carried 
out tt-rough the use of the services of extension servicemen 
of the Ministy of Agriculture. Thus conceived it would 
appear safe to argue that this credit scheme was a vast 
improvement over all previous schemes. A more comprehensive 
analysis will, however, need to await the supply of statist- 
ical and other related information so far unavailable. 
(1) 'W. -ilst the Farmers Council remained with its heavy 
political trappings the maintenance of a sense of responsib- 
ility would ultimately depend on the Governments preparadness 
to insist on elimination of interference from the senior 
officials of the Council. Again., it would appear that the 
recent political changes have removed the fears expressed 
here, although it is probably too early to be confident 
about this. 
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SECTION B. 
The Industrial Development Corporation 
The Industrial Development Corporation (I. D. C. ) was 
established in 1947 under the Gold Coast Industrial Develop- 
1 
ment Corporation Ordinance with objectives broadly similar 
to those of the National Investment Bank described in Chapter 
4. in 1951 the law was supplanted by the Industrial Devel- 
2 
opment Ordinance, 1951. The latter was amended in 1956. 
The original objectives of the I. D. C. were to establish 
and conduct any industrial undertaking, to promote, guide 
and assist in financing new industrial undertakings and the 
expansion and modernisation of existing industrial establish- 
3 
ments. These objectives were to be pursued through 
advances, subscription to shares and purchases of debentures. 
The 1951 Ordinance differed from the 1957 Ordinance in 
establishing a much closer relationship between the Corpor- 
ation and the Government The Government was to guarantee 
any loans raised by the Corporation other than from the 
4 
Government. The provision for Government advances to 
the Corporation additional to the original Government sub- 
scription to the share capital was a novelty. Under the 
1951 Ordinance in addition to Government holdings of the 
total share capital of £G100,000 the Government could make 
1. Ordinance No. 38 of 1947. 
2. Ordinance No. 22 of 1951. 
3. Ordinance No. 38/1947$ Section 4. 
4. Ordinance No. 22/1951, Section 8. 
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advances to the Corporation to a maximum of £G1 million 
outstanding at any time. This apart, the Government could 
grant temporary advances to the Corporation to a total of 
£G25,000 outstanding at any time. The Amendment of 1956 
made no change in the form of the Corporation save the 
abolition of the post of Managing Director. 
As at 31st March 1952 outstanding Government advances 
I 
to the Corporation amounted to £G360,000; it rose to 
2 
£G1.4 million on 31st March 1956. The balance sheet 
as at the end of June 1961 
3 
showed outstanding Government 
advances at £G8.8 million. The Corporation was dissolved 
by the President (of the Republic) in 1962. Thus the last 
quoted figure would approximate the position of the Corpor- 
ation with respect to Government advances at the time of 
its dissolution. 
The operation of the Corporation was befogged with 
disturbing irregularities as pointed out in successive 
"iuditors' Reports. These matters cannot be pursued in this 
study due to limitations of space. 
From 1953 the Corporation operated as a holding 
company controlling directly and indirectly a number of 
industrial projects of considerable diversity. Each of 
these projects was turned into a separate public corporation 
when the Industrial Development Corporation itself was 
4 
abolished. The dissolution of the Corporation was not 
1. I. D. C. Report, 1951-52 
2. I. D. C. Report, 1955-56 
3. I. D. C. Report, 1960-61 
4. For a lis of such enterprises see Ministry of Finance (Ghana), bu dget Statement 1965, Appendix. L 
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accompanied by any statement on its overall financial position, 
and at the time of investigations by the author the Corpor- 
ation was still in the process of liquidation. It is 
however common knowledge that the enterprises operated by 
1 
it were largely losing concerns. Certainly, by 1961 the 
Industrial Development Corporation was in the hands of the 
Government's political supporters as happened in many public 
organisations outside the civil service. In this Section 
we will restrict ourselves to only the Small Loans scheme 
operated by the Corporation. 
The Small Loans Scheme was established within the 
Corporation for the special purpose of assisting small 
Ghanaian industrial enterprises not incorporated as companies. 
In theory loans were given whenever feasible in the form 
of equipment at an interest of about 5 per cent on outstand- 
ing balances. 4Igain, in theory, loans were meant to be 
issued against adequate collateral the nature of which 
did not seem to have been clarified in the Reports issued 
annually. It was also stated in the Annual Reports that 
small loans were followed up with technical advice the nature 
of which was not specified. At any rate the loans were 
dissipated among so many kinds of enterprises probably of 
such small average size that one wonders if the authorities 
had the necessary resources for useful technical advice. 
on 4th January, 1961 the Board of Directors resolved 
that the functions of the Loans Department should be decen- 
tralised on a regional basis through the Regional Commissioners. 
L. Th zd', &216ri Z. Ministry of Finance, Budget Statement 
1965. Chapter 3. 
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For tfis the Government issued to the Corporation a total of 
£G2 00,000 divided among the Regions at £020,000 per Region 
and £G60,000'for the Accra District. 
Table 49A shows the Regional distribution of small 
loans outstanding at the end of June 1960 and 1961. It 
Table 49 A. 
Rao-innal nistribution of Small Loans. 1960 and 1961 
Region 
Outstanding 
Balance 
30.6.60 
£G'000 
Outstanding 
Balance 
30.6.61 
Accra 182.7 287.5 
Eastern 27.1 56.6 
Volta 17.4 42.2 
'tie stor"n 19.9 40.8 
Central 22.0 27.1 
Ashanti 54.7 116.9 
Brong-Ahafo 24.5 35.5 
Northern 8.3 6.1 
Upper 3.3 3.4 
Total 360.0 616.1 
Other Development 
Loans 54.0 113.2 
414.0 729.3 
Source: I. D. C. Report 1960-61. 
must be noted that the distribution of loans on a Regiona'. '.. 
basis was consciously carried out in the financial year 
1960-E1. Included in Table 49A is the item "Other 
v 
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Development Loans" not classified under the Small Loans 
Scheme. Total outstanding loans under the latter increased 
substantially from £G360,000 in 1960 to £G616,100 in 1961 
probably reflecting the effect of regional decentralisation 
referred to above. 
Table 49B 
Distribution of Small Loans by Industry 
1959 and 1960 LU1000 
Outstanding 
Balance 
30.6.59 
Outstanding 
Balance 
30.6.66 
Cereal Processing 15.4 18.2 
Bakery and Bottling 5.5 30.3 
Engineering and Electrical 55.4 77.0 
Bricks and Pottery 1.6 32.9 
printing 1.0 27.5 
? 7ood,:; ork and Sawmilling 35.4 54.8 
Tailoring and Dressmaking 3.7 4.4 
Shoemaking and Leathercraft 1.7 22.4 
Other Trades and Crafts 45.6 81.2 
: artisan Training 
10.2 11.3 
"Special Development" 53.7 54.0 
229.3 414.0 
Source: I. D. C. Report 1960. 
Table 49B above shows the industrial distribution of 
outstanding balances under the Small Loans Scheme as at the 
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end of the financial years 1958-59 and 1959-60 for which 
adequate breakdowns were available to the author. At the 
end of Ju ne 1960 the number of individual small loans granted 
by the Corporation totalled 285 of which 147 had been granted 
in the Accra District alone. 
A detailed list of the types of economic activity for 
which loans were granted gives a picture of loans of small 
value covering a host of diverse activities. This is 
illustrated in Table 49C. 
it the time of the Corporation's dissolution most of 
the small loans were heavily in arrears and it was commonly 
believed that recovery would by no means be easy. A surpris- 
ing aspect of the Small Loans Scheme, as indeed of the 
Corporation's activities as a whole was the fact that the 
Government continued to make increasing funds available 
despite an early warning by the Auditors in 1951-52 about 
the likelihood of heavy arrears. 
Several reasons may be suggested as having accounted 
for the failure of the scheme. First, the borrowers listed 
in Table 49C would be very largely small scale operators 
organising their business in conditions in no way modern. 
It would appear that the Corporation should have encouraged 
ik 
the merger of the various businesses with which theiy had 
dealings. as argued at the end of Chapter One the key to 
a well-organised indigenous business sector lies in amalgam- 
ation of the numerous small operators. Secondly, it is 
very likely that political considerations featured prominently 
_MaA- 
Table 49C 
Number of Small Loans According to Type of Business 
Type of No. of 
Business Loans 
Type of 
Business 
No. of 
Loans 
Bakery 12 Juice Bottling 1 
Battery Charger 1 Kente (Cloth) Weaving 7 
Blacksmith 2 Knitting 1 
Block Making 1 Laundry 1 
Building Contractor 5 Lumber Contractor 1 
Cabinet Maker 8 Meat Canning 1 
Cattle Dealet 1 Mechanic (Unspecified) 5 
Chop (Bating) Bar 15 i. Tineral haters 5 
Cinematograph 3 Pharmaceuticals 1 
Cold Store 1 Photography 3 
Corn Mill 36 Pottery 3 
Craft (Unspecified) 1 Printing 5 
Dental Mechanic 1 Radio etc Mechanics 5 
Diamond Digging 2 Restaurant 3 
Electrician 3 Rice Rill 3 
Fishmonger 2 Rubber Stamps 1 
Fitting Mechanic 5 Sand/Stone Contractor 31 
Foodstuffs (Unspecified) 17 Saw Bench 2 
Gold and Silver Smith 7 Dressmaking :. 11 
Hairdresser 1 Tailoring 8 
Hotel 9 Retail Trading 3 
Ivory Carving 2 etc. etc. 
Total 285 
Source I. D. C. Report 1960 
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in the granting of loans. It may be fair to suggest that 
loans obtained by reason of one"s. political affiliation 
stood the least chance of being repaid. Readers familiar 
with Ghana over the period 1953-66 would readily agree with 
this suggestion. Together with this factor would also be 
the likelihood of considerable corrupt practices. Thus 
the decentralisation policy, which based the granting of 
Loans on the Regional Commissioners would only have intensi- 
fied the likelihood of political consideration and corrupt- 
ion. 
SECTION C 
a 
The Gtranteee Corporation and the Mortgage Loans Scheme 
of 
Both the Girantee Corporation and the Mortgage Loans 
Scheme were established under Government auspices for the 
purpose of granting loans and advances to the indigenous 
sector in connection with activities to be clarified shortly. 
In each case the Ghana Commercial Bank administered the day- 
to-day business under agency arrangements receiving a modest 
fee in return. Separate accounts were maintained in respect 
of each. 
The Guarantee Corporation. 
The Gurantee Corporation was set up in September 
1954 on capital subscribed by the Government on the one 
hand and Ghanaian or African traders organised under the 
Ghana Chamber of Commerce. 
The capital was divided into equal amounts of ordinary 
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and preference shares. The latter were taken up and paid for 
by the Government and the ordinary shares were to be subscribed 
by the traders. Up to 1957 the ordinary shares had been 
called up to half the nominal value. Thus in effect the 
Government contributed two-thirds of the effective, that is 
paid-up, capital which at the end of October 1956 amounted 
1 
to £G375,000. 
The funds of the Corporation were to be used to assist 
Ghanaian traders in three ways: 
1. by giving guarantees to the Ghana Commercial Bank in 
respect of short-term loans granted by the bank to the private 
sharel olders of 
2. by providing 
Bank in respect 
parties on beha 
3. by endorsing 
shurel: olders in 
The funds 
the Corporation. 
counter-guarantees to the Ghana Commercial 
of guarantees given by the bank to third 
if of the shareholders. 
and discounting promissory notes made by 
favour of the Corporatioh. 
of the Corporation were employed principally 
to assist traders importing from overseas; oversea suppliers 
were paid in full for goods supplied to the members. She 
guarantees or loans were originally for a period of six 
months, subject to renewal. But this was later considered 
too short a period to allow "a good ttkrnover and proper 
2 
planning ... of. supplies". 
" accordingly the repayment period 
was extended to one year and later to three years. 
L. Source: J. W. Williams, op. cit. 
2.2.0. Ksare, op. cit. 
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Althot.. -[, h the management of the Corporation was handled by 
the 0&na Commercial Bank the actual authorisation of guaran- 
tees was made by area committees elected by the shareholders 
in 
' 
areas, whose authorisations (in effect equivalent to 
guarantees) were made independently of one another. 
however, in the final analysis the liability for guarantees 
fell on the Corporation as a whole, even though the losses 
resulting from authorisations from one area were, in theory, 
required to be met by the group in that particular area. 
$y 1960 the business of the Corporation began to 
stagnate and the authorities of the Ghana Commercial Bank 
began to press for its removal into the Chamber of Commerce. 
The end result, however, was that the Guarantee Corporation 
was liquidated shortly afterward. Three reasons may be 
put forward as having occasioned the failure of this project 
First, in 1960 there were said to be fewer Ghanaian 
firms or individuals importing goods directly. The corol- 
lary of this is that a number of the traders who had been 
members of the Corporation were able to obtain credit facil- 
ities from wholesalers in Ghana. Thus, regrettably, the very 
purpose of the Corporation, to improve the competitive 
position of the Ghanaian traders, was undermined as they 
once again came to depend on foreign importers for their 
supplies. 
Secondly, some of the members of the Corporation 
; imply lost their business. The peculiarities which tend 
to exert adverse effects on indigenous enterprise have 
-297- 
been amply discussed in Chapter One. 
Thirdly, it appears likely that because the Ghana 
Commercial Bank was in charge of the actual management of 
the Guarantee Corporation it tended to pick up the cream 
of arrlications for credit and to shift the bad risks to 
the Corporttioh. 
The Government }Y, brtgage Loans Scheme 
The Mortgage Loans Scheme was started in 1953 with 
capitvc1 provided entirely by the Government. At the end 
of Harch 1957 the Government had contributed a total of 
äG825,000 to the Scheme; by the end of 1960 the total 
amounted to 901.1 million. 
The purpose of the Scheme was to provide financial 
assistance to existing Ghanaian businesses and in some 
cases for the establishment of new enterprises. Loans 
were made on the security of house property at 7 per cent 
and originally for a period of three years. In 1960 the 
repayment period was extended to six years. Thus two advan- 
tages were derived from the Scheme. The interest charged 
was 1 per cent lower than the average rate charged by the 
commercial banks on overdraft facilities, and the three- 
year repayment period was longer than the commercial banks 
would normally permit. 
'ihe idea of this Scheme sprang principally from the 
peculiar problems of the indigenous business community 
vis-a-vis the lending policies of the commercial banks and 
the general absence of a capital market. The kind of 
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security which most of them were in a position tocffer 
against loans was house property which was not usually 
acceptable to the commercial banks at that time. The 
Ghana Commercial Bank, itself set up to meet the credit 
needs of the indigenous business sector was precluded by 
its statute from lending on the primary security of 
mortgages. Thus the Mortgage Loans Scheme was another 
demonstration of the Government's efforts to encourage 
Ghanaian participation in the industrial organisation of 
the country. 
gis happened in the case of many such organisations 
established under Governmental sponsorship, the repayment 
of the loans was frequently in arrears. The position in 
1960 v. 'as said by officials interviewed to give cause for 
concern. The increase in the duration of loans as stated 
above may have been a response to increasing difficulties 
on the part of borrowers to meet repayments. obviously, 
the softening of loans would not be the right solution in 
such circumstances. The Scheme, technically still in 
operations by 1964 had in fact been inactive since 1961. 
, 1gain information on recovery of outstanding loans is lacking 
and one might venture a surmise that the loansiWere either 
written off or would subsequently be treated as such. 
It is worth noting that both of these schemes laid 
emphasis on the security which could be offered, rather 
than on the objectives, which were whether or not increased 
production would enable the borrowers to repay the loans. 
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The repayment capacity of borrowers depends basically not on 
the initial security offered, but on the use made of the loan 
in expanding producers' income. It was essential to shift 
the emphasis from the desire to arrest loan defaults by 
ensuring adequate security to an approach that would combine 
credit facilities with a study of the technical manpower 
needed to make use of the loans and on adequate technical 
supervision at all stages of their use. Credit facilities 
on their own are not the answer to these problems. As 
repeated in several places in this study, in the Ghanaian 
circumstances a necessary prerequisite is the development 
of larger industrial establishments. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Analyses of Developments in the Monetary System 
In many respects the period under review divides roughly 
around 1960. Before 1960 the monetary system and general 
financial practices were subject to fairly stable relation- 
ships. From 1960 the economy of Ghana was subjected to 
many measures of experimental nature with the result that 
monetary and general financial magnitudes came under various 
transitional influences. Contraction, stability and expansion 
occurred in a somewhat erratic manner. Causal relationships, 
even where remarkably conspicuous did not necessarily provide 
a basis for generalisations of fundamental applicability. 
In this Chapter an attempt will be made to analyse the 
monetary system in terms of what were or zppeared to be 
basic developments over the period under review. The major 
developments, examined in detail in previous chapters, are 
summarised below: 
1. The replacement of the Sterling Exchange Standard by a 
managed currency in 1961 heralded previously in 1957 by the 
establishment of the Central Bank. 
2. By 1960 local credit operations supplanted foreign 
exchange accumulation as the main force behind net changes 
in the money supply. 
3. The ratio of bank money in the money supply was on the 
ascendancy from 1961 and money supply itself expanded rapidly 
in the 1960's. 
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4. Towards the end of the period under review a combination 
of low cash reserves in the commercial banking system and an 
increasing proportion of illiquid assets in total assets 
presented quite a different picture from the earlier years 
of considerable excess banking resources. 
5. Finally, in the last year of the period commercial banking 
activity was for the first time subjected to Central Bank 
credit control regulations. 
Section A 
Implications of the Sterling Exchange Standard 
Discussions on the British Colonial Currency Board System 
tended to focus attention on aspects of the currency system 
that were most significant at the time of writing. Thus 
the earliest writings emphasized the rationalization of 
the payments system introduced by the sterling exchange 
standard. 
' 
Post-war writers viewed the operation of the system 
in a different perspective, and although the currency 
arrangements continued to be discussed in a descriptive 
manner, there was already emerging a body of thought that 
resulted from deeper analysis of these arrangements in 
terms of economic development and the growth of the financial 
system. 
The early 1950's were years of consider. ble boom in 
exports due in part to the Korean War and the economies on 
the Sterling Exchange Standard were threatened with inflationary 
1. For a very early commentary see J. M. Keynes's review of 
the report of the 1912 Departmental Committee in Economic 
Journal, May 1913 . Many other references were giver, in Chapter 2. 
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pressures resulting from persistent large external surpluses 
whilst limitations of port and transport facilities led to 
shortages of supply in the real goods markets. This 
phenomenon seemed to lay bare the inadequacies of a monetary 
system devoid of any weapons for combatting externally induced 
disequilibria whereas the system itself was designed primarily 
to facilitate international transactions and thus aided the 
development of the economies into predominantly foreign-trade 
oriented economies. 
Again, the post-war years saw an escalation of 
n'tionalism in most of the British colonies with its sudden 
release of economic and social aspirations and a subsequent 
pressing need for social and productive investment. 
Consequently, econcmists writing in the early 1950's devoted 
considerable attention to the possibility of reducing the 
statutory sterling backing of colonial currencies to make 
funds available for development expenditure. Two economists 
in particular, Newlyn and Rowan, were more specific in their 
view that a sterling reserve of 50% of the currency or even 
less would be "perfectly adequate for the maintenance of 
convertibility". There were, of course, contrary views; 
the whole question of the status of the sterling backing of 
colonial currency was the subject of a controversy from 1951 
to 1954 between Arthur Hazlewrwood calling for changes and 
Ida Greaves defending the existing currency arrangements. 
A few recurring views held sway in the discussions on 
the colonial sterling exchange standard in the post-war 
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contributions to the literature. These were: - 
1. The inadequacy of the system in standing aloof of the 
internal economic ahd monetary conditions. From the point 
of view of the internal economy the system was criticised for 
being inflexible and rigid in its automaticity. The legal 
functions and actual operation made it a currency changer 
with no management functions whatsoever over general internal 
economic and monetary conditions. 
2. That the neutral position of the currency board gave a 
great deal of power to the commercial banking system which. 
by concentrating on the financing of foreign trade was 
partly responsible for the extreme dependence on foreign 
tr-. de in colonial and ex-colonial territories. 
3. Th^. t the operation of the Currency Board established an 
automatic link between the balance of payments and the money 
supply. In its simple form this meant that when the balance 
of payments was in surplus the domestic money supply increased 
to the extent of the surplus and when there was a deficit the 
money supply fell to the same extent. Thus the neutrality 
of the monetary authority did not permit the complementary use 
of monetary measures to support countercyclical fiscal policy. 
(In. 
practice the influence of countercyclical fiscal policy 
, as in typical colonies severely limited by the facts of low 
incomes and the dominance of politically powerful foreign 
fi rms. ' 
The operation of the sterling exchange standard involved 
a cost to the domestic economy represented by the forgone 
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imports embodied in the sterling earnings sterilized as a 
backing for the local currency. 
Colonial status itself was associated with several 
peculiarities which make it rather hazardous to identify 
the functioning of a particular institution with the existence 
or absence of any particular economic situation. Thus it 
would be a simplification to blame wholly on the operations 
of the Currency Board the absence of a well developed money 
or capital market. Nor can one even accept in its entirety 
the argument that the functioning of a Currency Boßrd did 
not permit the institution of monetary measures for one 
objective or other. For one thing the replacement of a 
Currency Board by a national monet? ry institution did not 
immediately allow the effective use of monetary policy. 
For another, the existence of the Currency Board in Southern 
Rhodesia, for example, did not prevent the Government of that 
territory from issuing a directive to the commercial banks 
to curtail credit for non-essential imports in early 1952 
to couhteract the post-Korean import drain. 
- There can 
be no doubt that in a colony or a country that has only 
recently shed colonial status there are immense political 
and economic bottlenecks which make it hazardous to raise 
arguments against the sterling exchange standard on the 
basis of the established theories. It will therefore be 
more useful to bring out briefly the major limitations on 
1. See S. I. Katz, "Development and Stability in Central and. 
West Africa", Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 5,1956, 
pp. 290-1. 
f 
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monetary developments arising from the operation of a neutral 
Currency Board in contrast to a Central Bank even though the 
influence of the latter cannot be significantly felt until 
the usual bottlenecks have been overcome. 
Monetary policy is said to be of 'little effectiveness 
in underdeveloped countries because the traditional objective 
of monetary policy, namely the influencing of private 
investment is relatively unimportant in such economies. 
A further implication of this fact is that public 
investment being so fundamental to the development 
of the infrastructurecannot be assigned the limited 
countercyclical role postulated under Keynesian employment 
theory. The Keynesian "public works programme" is a 
short-run measure which takes for granted a social and 
economic infrastructure adequately developed to support 
short-run growth. 
Generally, in Ghanas as in many countries in a similar 
stage of development the importance of credit of all types 
and lengths in consumption expenditure, working capital 
and fixed capital formation is very difficult to estimate. 
However, the indications are that there was a substantial 
volume of credit transactions in all these areas taken 
together, though they were nearly all very short term. 
What vras needed therefore was an extension of these facilities 
along with moderating other social and economic obstacles. 
If monetary and credit policy is seen as an integral part 
of an overall economic and social policy r^ther than as an 
independent policy instrument there is certainly great scope 
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for it in developing economies. 
It is the author's view that in a developing country 
where the commercial banks are the only important source 
of institutionalised credit the banks should be encouraged 
to be more than providers of seasonal or very short-term 
credit. They should m.. ove to a position nearer that of 
development banks. If the banks were to be encouraged to 
invest their funds in medium-term capital loans there was 
obviously a need for an institution with powers and 
resources to help them out of any liquidity crisis that might 
occur. The corollary of this is th? t such a monetary 
institution would have to exert its energies in the direction 
of encour^ging improvements in business practices. In its 
unmodified form - as was true of the West African Currency 
Board - the Currency board system was not in a position to 
carry out either of these important monetary and related 
reforms. 
Throughout most of the literature there is an expressed 
or implicit argument that under the system of rigid sterling- 
backed currency issues and low-levels of domestic credit 
operations by banks, money exerted very little impact 
outside the foreign trade sector and hence impeded the 
expansion of the economy from subsistence production into 
production for money exchinge. Following upon this line 
1 
of thought one writer his reached a tentative conclusion 
that in Ghana from 1955 to 1'59 (he could not obtain all the 
relevant data for the pre-1955 period) the process of 
1. Tony Killick, op. cit. 
I' Clý&fkC., i3. 
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monetisation was hindered by a slow growth in the money supply 
and therefore by implication that the slow growth rate of 
money supply acted positively as a deflationary force. 
The basis of this conclusion was that in real terms the 
gross domestic product grew at a faster rate than the 
money supply: at 22% and 13% respectively. 
The usefulness of such analysis is severely limited by 
several factors, For one thing, the low growth rate of the 
money supply relative to the gross domestic product could well 
mean an efficient use of the existing money balances. For 
another, the meaning to be attached to the gross domestic 
product is somewhat limited by the fact that it included 
a substantial proportion of estim^, ted subsistence consumption 
(against which no money balances are held) whereas it excluded 
a considerable amount of production for money such as the 
output of various craftsmen and tradesmen. 
These statistical problems aside, there is no simple 
relationship between money supply and the flow of resources 
from the non-monetized sector to the monetized sector. The 
factors which influence the expansion of the monetized sector 
relative to the non-monetized sector are  ny. 
l For long-run 
purposes it is more useful to measure monetization of an 
economy by reference to the resource allocation between the 
self-supporting sector and the monetized sector. An 
increcse in the monetized sector may then be said to come 
1. For a cömprehensiye analysis of the forces which may 
influence expansion of the monetized sector see United 
Nations, "Enlargement of the exchange economy in Tropical 
Africa , New 
York, X954 Chapter 1. 
See also S. Ghosh, Inflation in an underdeveloped economy', 
Calcutta, 1959, Chapter III. 
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about when the proportion of total resources of land and 
labour devoted to money-earning activities increases, with a 
corresponding decline in the proportion of resources devoted 
to subsistence activities. The extent of monetization 
depends on the balance of the push of forces driving 
resources from the subsistence sector and the pull of forces 
attracting subsistence sector resources into the monetary 
sphere. The former -re generated by forces which make 
it difficult or impossible to obtain a livelihood through 
subsistence activities whilst the latter are related to the 
opportunities for economic improvement and the desire for 
the goods and services available in the money sector. 1 
Thirdly, the status of the sterling reserves held 
against currency issued under the Sterling Exchange Standard 
was the subject of much argument. The sacrifices of imports 
(for consumption and development) implied in the hundred 
percent sterling backing of local currency have been echoed 
in the statutes of the Central Banks which replaced the 
currency boards by providing for varying degrees of sterling 
(or foreign exchange) backing, in many cases considerably less 
than hundred percent. We will in the following paragraphs 
review briefly the main trends of views expressed on the 
subject. 
The polemics probably arose from the findings of two 
writings published just before the turn of the 1940ts. 
Writing about Nigeria Dr. J. Mars argued that increments 
1. See S. Ghosh, op. cit., p. 18. 
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of the local currency circulation were virtually obtained 
at the expense of a commodity loan by Nigerian producers to 
London. 1 Mr. John Exter in his Report on the establishment 
of a Central Bank in Ceylon reached a similar conclusion 
namely that the sterling reserves were a "costly luxury" 
for an underdeveloped economy. 
One writer in particular was prominent in taking a 
stand of uncompromising defence of the sterling exchRnge 
standard, namely Ida Greaves. She contended that "in no 
sense nre they (the sterling currency assets of the currency 
authority) an overseas loan to this country (the United 
Kingdom)". 2 To this may be contrasted the argument by 
Arthur Haclewood that "the sterling earnings which would 
otherwise be available for purchasing imports ... are tied 
up in the reserves of the currency authority'i". 
3 To this 
Ida Creaves replied that holdings of the Currency Board's 
currency were available for purchases of local as of imported 
goods and services. In other words as witrh holdings 
of any form of money, holders of currency were merely 
showing their preference for money against real consumption. 
An integral part of the arguments of Ida Greaves was 
th't initially London funds preceded the distribution of 
Colonißl income and therefore "to treat colonial income, 
silved or not, as cresting the currency funds is to put the 
cart before the horse". 
4 Among the «London'fund. s" she 
1. J. Mars in MA Perham (ed. ) op. citr. 
2. Ida Greaves Sterling balances and the colonial currency 
system', Economic Journal, June 1951. 
3. Arthur Hazlewood, `Sterling balances and the colonial 
currency system", Economic Journal, December 1952. 
4. Ida Greaves, ibid. 
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listed wages paid by British firms, colonial government 
disbursements to the militia, the police and public utility 
employees, and the expenditure of travellers in colonial 
territories. 1 
To this argument Arthur Hazlewood contended that 
irrespective of the source of the sterling funds that gave 
rise to colonial (as indeed countries on a full sterling 
exchange standard) currency expansion, once the currency was 
paid out to local producers and as long as the latter held 
on to the issued currency it was they who were "financing the 
currency expansion". 
2 However, in this Arthur Hazlewood 
was again laying emphasis on exports as constituting the 
claim on imports a point which though generally true was not 
accurate for all times and for all the colonial territories. 
Both sides 'of the argument were couched in considerable 
confusion. As B. M. Niculescu pointed out the answer to the 
controversy "is provided by the present-day treatment of 
currency issues as (normally interest-free) loans by currency- 
absorbing populRtions to currency issuing nuthorities'i. 
3 
The sterling balances of the Currency Boards were loans to 
the United Kingdom (and other dominions and colonies within 
the British Commonwealth) made possible by past and current 
savings on external account. When locally established 
institutions became the issuing authorities and chose to 
provide no foreign exchange cover for issued currencies the 
1. ; 1161d. Ida Greaves, opo cit. 
2. Arthur Hazlewood, oplcit. Also by the same author "Sterling balances and the colonial currency systems, Economic* 
-Journal, September 1954. 
3. B. M. Niculescu, "Sterling balances and the colonial currency system: a comment", Economic Journal, September 1954. See also E. Nevin, op. cit., Chapter 1. 
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sterliný balances would bo taken over by the issuing authorities 
and could be used immediately for local investment or as 
loans to the governments. 1 In practice, of course, even if 
the national issuing authority did not have to hold foreign 
exchange (or sterling) assets specifically earmarked as 
currency cover it would have to arrange its assets in such 
a manner as to permit transactions in foreign currencies. 
Dr. Niculescu's conclusion should be contrasted with 
the approach of one writer that "if Bank of England notes 
were used in circulation in place of the Board's notes ... 
these London balances would be wiped out. '12 But then 
even if Bank of England notes were used the question would 
arise as to what asset would need to beý transferred to the 
Bank of England in order to obtain the latter's notes. 
If it was sterling then the situation is exactly the same. 
If it is some form of local debt then it is no longer a 
sterling exchange system and the argument referred to 
hove would appear to be irrelevant. 
A currency issuing -iuthority (whether a Colonial 
Currency Board or a Central Bank) does not have to give up 
real resources or anything else in issuing currency. The 
question, however, is whether the economy as a whole gives up 
the opportunity of using foreign exchange for other purposes. 
To this the answer is simple and familiar: foreign exchange 
1. B. I. Niculescu, ops cit. 
2. S. I. Katz. op. cit. 
At the time of this writing (1956) notable examples of outright 
adoption of a foreign currency were provided by Leiberia 
and Panama, San Domingo having desisted from the use of the 
U. S. dollar in 1948. See E. A. Birnbaum, `The cost of a 
foreign exchange standard..... " IMF Staff Papers Vol. 5, 
1956-7, p. 477. Also N. A. D. Macrae, op. cit. 
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does h? ve to be given up. This foreign exchange comes from 
the current flow of exports of goods and services, ci net 
capital inflow itself made up of new capital flows and of a 
switching of net foreign assets and liabilities such as 
when a commercial bank shifts from a foreign exchange asset 
into the monetary liabiýities of the currency authority. 
It is not sufficient to establish how the person or unit 
obtaining the currency is affected (or the person actually 
giving up the foreign exchange, which is not usually the 
same thing) because it is the final result on the economy 
which requires determining. To this, however, no straight- 
forward answer can be given. 
Implied in the idea that the sterling reserve held 
against currency issues represented a sacrifice of real 
consumption and investment was a call for their reduction 
relative to the volume of currency to make funds available 
for development. As has been stated earlier Newlyn 
and Rowan estimated a 50% sterling reserve in the case of the 
African territories which they examined. Similar specifi- 
cat ions regarding foreign exchange cover are to be found 
in various recent Central Bank enactments. 
The reason for foreign exchange backing is undoubtedly 
to preserve exchange rate stability and to modify balance of 
Payments crises. Even assuming a zero balance on capital 
flows a simplified basis for determining the adequate size 
of foreign reserve would be the level of money income and 
not currency issues. Realistically it has to do with the 
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expected Rbsolute values, trend and fluctuations in exports, 
imports, net capital flows and the degree of restrictions 
and controls over each of these. Each of these is subject 
to diverse influences and effects so that the link between 
them and the money supply (in this respect the level of 
currency issued is irrelevant except in a very simple 
economy) is likely to be unpredictable. Thus it is somewhat 
pointless to make a general rule on currency backing for 
purposes of exchange rate stability. 
As far as Ghana is concerned the 100; 0 foreign exchange 
reserve (zgainst issued currency) as under the Currency 
Bo-! rd was probably as h? rmful in being so restrictive, as 
the current low ratio has proved to be fraught with instability 
and distortions. In the final analysis this is one area 
in which common senso should replace regulation. 
Section B 
The Balance of Payments, External Reserves and the 
Money Supply 
For a long time the sterling exchange standard was 
criticized for automatically tying changes in the money 
supply to the balance of payments. Compared with the other 
criticisms of the Standard this particular criticism was 
unique in passing for a relatively longer time as n valid 
theory of the monetary conditions of countries on an automatic 
exchange standard with currency fully backed by foreign 
exchange assets. 
Liter writers have criticized this view on the ground 
th^. t the b. nking system Wits not iutomntically hindered by 
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the sterlintr exchange standard from influencing the money 
supply by their internal credit operations and that in any 
case the earlier writers were vague about their concept 
of the balance of payments. 
' In particular it has been 
argued that earlier writers gave the impression that their 
concept of the balance of payments was one which excluded 
the balance on autonomous capital flows, thus concentrating 
on the balance on the current account. 
There were certainly examples in the earlier formulation 
of the theory which were deficient in this respect. 2 One 
variation was that the balance of payments determined strictly 
3 the currency circulation. Another variant, differing only 
slightly from the last, was that the whole money supply was 
responsive to the balnnce of payments due to negligible 
credit operations by the banks. 
4 An integral part of the 
theory was that changes in the currency circulation were the 
one item that brought about equality between the positive 
and negative items of the balance of payments. By this 
was meant that changes in the sterling assets of the monetary 
system (currency authority and commercial banks) provided 
the compensatory finance to balance the external accounts. 
Two aspects of these criticisms are here singled out 
1. See C. Y. Thomas, "The balance of, payments and the money 
supply of a colonial monetary economy , Social and Economic Studies, March1963; also Tony Icillick, op. cit. 
2. See H. A. Shannon, op. cit., In this article the writer 
definitely treats the balance on current account as the 
relevant balance of payments with corresponding changes 
in the currency circulation. The analysis is couched 
in terms of export earnings. - 
3. J. Mgrs, op. cit. 
4. Newly and Rowan. 
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for ex^minction in rel? tion to Ghana; the extent to which 
the balance on the current account of the balance of payments 
was reflected in opposite changes in the external reserves 
of the monetary system and tho link between the balance of 
payments and the domestic money supply. But first we should 
comment briefly on the criticisms advanced against the 
theoretical conclusions of the early writers. 
The early theory which was criticized by later writers 
was indeed in a broad sense a correct interpretation of the 
monetary conditions of the territories served by the 
colonial sterling exchange standard. When the early 
theory was couched in terms of the current account balance 
instead of the overall balance what the proponents were in 
fact saying w'. s that by and large exports constituted the 
major source of money income and foreign exchange receipts. 
For most of the territories on the sterling exchange standard 
the considerable net inflow of foreign capital (including 
sterling capital) is a post-Independence phenomenon. 
l 
Secondly, in many such territories credit operations by 
commercial banks were, until relatively recently, subject 
to various real bottlenecks (abstracting from their own 
broad lending policies) which required time and changing 
political cirou. mstnnces to reverse or modify. From this 
fact arose the implication in the earlier accounts that 
currency was the principal component of the money supply. 
In many cases empirical examination established this as a 
fact with the consequent, implication thRt the ratio of changes 
1. See A. K. Crirncross, "F"ctors in economic development".. 
Allen and Unwin, 1962. Chapter 3. 
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in the money supply to changes in the sterling assets of 
the currency authority -, ras not far from unitary. 
Thus the achievement of the later writers is in 
the refinements to the theory which were needed to take 
account of later developments, and in drawing attention to 
the peculiarities of individual currency board territories 
which detracted from the universal validity of the early 
theory. In so far as recent writers have tended to review 
the early theory in terms of the conditions of recent 
times it might be said that they have laid criticism where 
it did not belong. 
The balance of payments and changes in external reserves in 
Ghana 
In Table 50 and Table 51 we present the balance of 
payments against changes in external reserves for the 
periods 1950-60 and 1961-64 respectively. The classification 
is less detailed for the latter period because available 
detailed data is characterized by considerable discrepancies. 
In Table 50 the overall balance of payments has been 
taken as the total change in external assets. This 
procedure is adequate for the period covered in Table 50 
as other forms of accomodating transactions became established 
only in the second period. From the point of view of 
balance of payments accounting the positive changes in 
reserves would be represented as negative entries or debits 
and negative changes would show as positive entries or 
credits. However, as these are changes in reserves 
positive and negative changes have been left as their usual 
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Table 50 
Ghana: The Balance of Payments and Changes in 
External Reserves, 1950-60 
£G Million 
Balance Chang es in Exte rnal Res erves 
of 
payments Currency Commercial Total Govern- C 
N (c) t l T Authority(a) Banks (2)and(3) ment . M. B Othors o a 
(1) (2) (3) (k. ) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
1950 30.8 3.4+ 14.3 7.7 1.1 20.8 1.2 30.8 
1951 23.8 2.2 -1.0 1.2 11.7 11.3 -0.3 23.8 
1952 7.9 2.0 3.8 5.8 4+. 4 -2.4 0.1 7.9 
1953 15.1 J -1.0 3.5 2.5 1+. 2 4.9 3.4 15.0 
195+- 37.2 1.7 0.5 2.2 37.6 0.2 -2.8 37.2 
1955 13.8 0.8 3.1 3.9 7.7 -3.1 5.3 13.8 
1956 -18.3 2.8 -2.0 0.8 -8.1. 11.3 0.6 -18.3 
1957 -18.1+ -2.6 -1.0 -3.6 14.3 -1.9 1.4+ ' -18.4. 
1958 9.8 1.1 3.7 1+. 8 1.8 2.4- 0.7 9.7 
1959 -11.6 7.1 -3.6 3.5 -0.8 11+. 9 0.6 -11.6 
1960 -21.0 7.5 -4.. 3 3.2 16.9 -6.8 -0.5 -21.0 
Notes; - (a) Until August 1957 the Currency Authority was the : test 
African Currency Board and since then the Bank of Ghana. 
(b) Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board 
(c) Local authorities, higher educational institutions 
and other public bodies other than the Cocoa Marketing 
Board. 
Discrepancies are due to rounding. 
Sources: Quarterly Digest of Statistics, June 1959. 
Bank of Ghana Quarterly Economic Bulletin, June 1962. 
Table 51 
Ghana: Balance of Payments Accounts 1961-6lß 
£G Million 
1961 1962 1963 116? 
1. Balance on Current Account -52.7 -28.3 -45.8 -32.6 
2. Net change in Reserves of 
Official and Banking Institutions 75.0 1.6 24.5 9.3 
3. Government Capital Transactions -18.1 21.1 13.3 17.1 
4. ' Net Private Capital Movement - 6.8 11.1 9.6 
Net Capital Account 56.9 29.5 48.9 35.9 
5. Errors and Omissions -4.2 -1.3 -3.1 -3.3 
Not Balance on Capital Account 52.7 28.3 45.8 32.6 
Di W between totals and the sum of parts arisg from rounding. 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Economic Surveys. 
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signs. 
From 1950 to 1955 the balance of payments wcs in overall 
surplus but although the monetary system (Currency Authority 
and commercial banks) was accumulating external assets these 
were lower in each of those years than the amount of the 
surplus. Similarly, in 1958 when the external account 
was restored into an overall surplus - after two successive 
years of deficits - the total net increase in the reserves 
of the monetary system was only £G4.8 million as compared to 
a surplus of £G9.8 million on the balance of payments. 
In 1956,1957,1959 and 1960 when there were deficits on 
the balance of payments the monetary system was adding to 
its external reserves except in 1957 when its reserves 
declined by £G3.6 million, even this substantially below 
the full amount of the deficit £18.4 million 
These observations reflect the fact that the peculiar 
arrangements of an individual country were not taken. into 
account when the earlier writers built up models in which 
the balance of payments was m: 1de the automatic determinant 
of equivalent changes in the external assets of the 
monetary institutions from which followed their conclusion 
that the balance of payments brought about equal or . 
parallel changes in the domestic monetary liabilities. 
The existence of foreign-asset holders other than the 
Currency Authority and the commercial banks meant an absence 
of absolute parallelism between the balance of payments 
and the changes in the external assets of the traditional 
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holders of foreign financial assets, unless any such holdtngs 
were regarded is autonomous capital outflows. But any such 
treatment of external reserves held within the public and 
semi-public sectors would be largely conceptual as in 
practice the indications are that they were operated as one 
and the salve reserve. ' 
Thus a deficit or surplus would lead initially to 
changes in the money supply if all domestic units banked 
only with local commercial banks. In that case the stage 
where the Cocoa Marketing Board, for example, decided to 
invest in sterling or to run down sterling would be a second 
and separate stage. However, as the units shown in Table 50 
had direct dealings with abroad they thereby short-circuited 
the domestic banking system to a considerable extent. 
The bnlmnce of payments for the period 1961-64 is 
summarized in Trb1e 51. First, some explanation of the 
figures is called for. The item "errors and omissions", 
sometimes referred to as "the balancing item", probably 
accounts for net private capital outflows which has usually 
been poorly accounted for in the official statistics. 
Private capital movements have come within the grasp of the 
authorities only with the tightening of exchange control 
regulations. The non-identification of private capital 
movements could mean a serious misrepresentation of the true 
external reserve/liability position of the economy. To 
give a hypothetical illustration, suppose that a resident 
earns interest on external assets and keeps the interest 
1. See Tony Killick, op. cit. 
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abroad (that is, reinvests the interest abroad) of which 
the authorities are not able to obtain any record. The 
overall balance of payments remains the same but there is 
an understatement of the balance on current account and a 
corresponding overstatement of the net balance on capital 
&count. 
In 1961 Government capital transactions showed 
one item on the credit side, namely £G11.4 million of 
suppliers credit. On the payment side Government capital 
transactions consisted of purchases of gold mines in Ghana 
(£G5.5 million), long-term loans to other African countries 
(£G10 million) and cocoa bills drawn on the London money 
market tG14 million). In 1962 Government capital payments 
were virtually nil whilst receipts amounted to £G21.1 million 
consisting of an IMF loan (G5 million), suppliers' credits 
(£G12.4 million), pension funds (£G2 million) and balances. on 
bilateral trade agreements (£G1.7 million). In 1963 and 
1964 Government capital transactions settled down to only 
suppliers' credits and bilateral trade balances. Net credits 
on the former were £Gll. 5 million and £G16.0 million 
respectivelyl while net receipts on the latter account were 
£G1.7 million and 01.5 million respectively. 
On private capital movements the net inflows as 
entered in Table 51 represent principally re-investment of 
profits in Ghana. Foreign firms were in some cases unable 
to repatriate distributed profits due to the combined effect 
of tight exchange controls and depleted foreign exchange 
1. It must be noted that the suppliers credits were most 
probnbly understated due to unrecorded transactions. 
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reserves. Whether directly invested in real assets or 
held in fin^. ncial assets such funds hive been entered as 
cßpital receipts in the balpnce of payments. 
According to the orthodox computation of the overall 
balance of payments the deficits of the last four years 
of the period would be equivalent to changes in the 
official and banking, reserves. 'This.. however, would not 
be an illuminating way of measuring the external - 
disequilibrium indicated by the deficits (that is, negative 
savings) on the current account. To calculate the overall 
balance in this way would be tantamount to treating the 
suppliers' credits as autonomous capital credits and so 
would the IP1 loan mentioned above. Viewed in this way 
we should exclude from autonomous capital inflow the 
retention of distributed profits (due to foreign residents) 
on the grounds that in so far as they are held in financial 
assets r^ther than real assets they represent financial 
balances whose continued retention in Ghana is induced by 
the continuing balance of payments deterioration. The 
retention of such funds in Ghnna prevents the balance of 
payments from deteriorating to the full extent. So long 
as it remains in the domestic economy the accounting effect 
is neutral, but should it be exported (which wo assume it 
would if the controls were loosened) this would be a negative 
entry in the accounts which would need to be financed by 
some other means. The growing importance of suppliers 
credits in the external account also poses a further problem 
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of cpncept and interpretation of the external position. 
It indicates that as foreign exchange reserves have declined 
to an `Tirreducible". minimum, so to speak, to get an accurate 
measure of the balance of payments deficits one has to go 
beyond changes in external reserves and take a critical 
look at the changing position of the public external debt. 
To summarise, throughout our period changes in external 
assets of the banks and the Currency Authority were never 
linked to the balance of payments in a unitary ratio. 
The actual relationship between the balance of 
payments and the money supply is indeterminate a priori. 
In other words in an ultim^te sense one cannot say that the 
balance of payments determines the money supply or vice 
versa. The two variables are interdeterminate. One 
therefore has to distinguish between an initial and final 
position. To clarify the processes involved we may postulate 
four extreme initial cases as regards the financing of an 
overall deficit ignoring foreign short-term credits. 
1. Assume the public draw on their deposits whilst the 
banks finance the deficit by selling domestic currency to 
the Currency Authority. In this case the money supply 
fnllg the banks' not foreign exchange asset position is 
unchanged but both their deposit liabilities and currency 
decline to the extent of the deficit. 
2. The public may pay in currency to the banks whilst 
the banks sell currency to'the Currency Authority. In this 
case the money supply falls through a reduction in net 
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currency circulation. Commercial bank currency position 
remains unchanged and so is their net foreign exchange asset 
position. 
3. Where the public draw on their own deposits and 
the banks finance the deficit by reducing their own net 
foreign exchange assets. Again, the money supply is reduced. 
The reduction in bank deposit liabilities is then matched 
on the assets side by n corresponding reduction in the banks 
net foreign exchange assets. 
4. Where the public pay in currency to the brinks and 
the banks finance the deficit by reducing their net foreign 
exchange assets. Again, as under all the other cases 
postulated above the money supply falls to the extent of 
the deficit. The change in the banks' position takes 
place within their asset structure. The decline in their 
net foreign exchange assets is matched by a corresponding 
increase in their domestic currency assets. 
Subsequent to each of the processes analysed above the 
public may adjust their currency/deposits ratio position and 
the banks may also need to adjust their cnsh/deposits 
position, and the interaction of those factors would exert 
income effects through a change in the money/income ratio. 
The higher the public's new 'currency/deposits ratio the higher 
will be the banks' own new cash/deposits ratio, assuming 
previous equilibrium positions. It is clertrly important 
what the banks regard operationally as cash which may include 
among domestic cash assots, not foreign exchange assets and 
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facilities available from oversea sources in the case of the 
British banks. The banks' ability to maintain the previous 
level of the money supply or to offset the deflationary 
effect, if any, of the balance of payments deficit would, 
given the state of their investible resources, depend on the 
^vail bility of suitable investment opportunities which would 
in turn depend partly on supply elasticities in the short run. 
A balance of payments surplus entails an excess of 
receipts over payments. Therefore the initial effect of a 
surplus on domestic monetary circulation depends on the 
manner in which the saving (on foreign account) is 
distributed among various classes of income recipients in 
the economy: households, firms and the Government. In 
Ghana the Cocoa Marketing Board, as n result of the 
practice of witholding part of the cocoa proceeds from the 
producers, came to hold large funds which were invested in 
sterling. Thus the whole of cocoa earnings did not necessarily 
accrue as income to cocoa producers. Ignoring capital flows 
cocoa earnings were the major constituent of external 
receipts. This means that a balance of payments surplus 
would be pertly reflected in increased sterling assets of 
the Cocoa Marketing Board which did not increase the sterling 
assets of the monetary institutions and hence did not initially 
affect the money supply or total domestic financial assets to 
the full-extent of the surplus. 
One must perforce limit oneself to only a brief comment 
on the determination of the supply of and demand for banking 
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services. 
The total potential supply of bank credit in Ghana is 
a function of several variables: interest rates, credit- 
worthiness in the economy and the policy of head office in 
the case of the internitional banks and the state of the 
balance of payments which, as discussed above, would either 
raise or lower the banks' net foreign exchange assets. 
Similarly, the demand for bank credit is a function of 
several variables: interest rate as compared to borrowers' 
own expected returns, creditworthiness etc. One cannot 
easily identify and quantify the influential key variables 
in either case. Thus a simple analysis in terms of cash/ 
deposit ratios and the ratios of bank credit to money 
national income are not very helpful. The system could be 
said to have been fraught with rigidities and imperfections 
a viable analysis of which would require a full study of 
its own. * In the following section we will simply examine 
the sources of changes in the money supply over the period 
under examination. 
The sources of change in the money Supply 
In the advanced countries money supply is defined as 
the sum of currency held outside the banking sector and 
demand or current account deposits with commercial banks 
excluding deposits of the Government. As noted in Chapter 2 
(page 1`7Jf ) this is also the definition stipulated in the 
Bank of Ghana Act, 1963. 
With reference'to Ghana the exclusion of Government 
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deposits leaves much to be desired. For one thing if we 
are to include bank credit to Government in the sources of 
changes in the money supply (as will be done in this study) 
then there appears to be no logical explanation for the 
exclusion of Government monetary balances from money supply. 
To include Government credit transactions among the sources 
of money supply but exclude Government deposits amounts to 
saying that proceeds from credits obtained by the Government 
are immediately transferred to the private sector. Similarly, 
foreign exchange conversions are partly the result of 
Government external receipts and payments on both current 
and capital transactions. Since all foreign exchange 
conversions are counted among the factors that affect the 
money supply there is no reason why Government deposits 
arising from the same sources should be excluded from the 
money supply. 
The only rationale for the exclusion of Government 
deposits seems to be that Government expenditure is not 
influenced strictly by the level of Government money deposits. 
Much as this would be largely true it raises the question 
of what distinction can be drawn between the Government 
and the non-Government sector in this respect. Clearly 
the private sector can and does increase its expenditure 
beyond its monetary balances by acquiring liabilities. 
Ignoring foreign credits, a limiting constraint is imposed 
on the private sectors ability to increase its expenditure 
beyond existing monetary balances by the fact that such 
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liabilities must be financed within the same sector whose 
total resources are limited at any given time. But if we 
again ignore foreign credits this kind of constraint applies 
to the Government which cannot ordinarily obtain unlimited 
amounts of credits within the domestic economy. Similarly, 
both the Government and the private sector can increase 
their expenditure by the acquisition of foreign liabilities. 
The distinction between the Government and the private sector 
can at best only be in degree if one makes the plausible 
assumption that the Government's ability to add to its gross 
financial assets both domestically and abroad is greater. 
However, the tenuity of this distinction, in the opinion 
of the author, fails to provide a convincing basis for the 
exclusion of Government deposits from the money supply. 
In addition to the issue raised above the conventional 
definition of the money supply itself is currently a subject 
of controversy ultimately centred on the question of what 
coverage should be given to monetary policy. 
If the money supply can no longer be defined as the 
summrttion of not currency circulation (that is, issued 
currency held outside the banking system) and current account 
deposits held with the commercial banks, then one should 
include among the money supply the time and savings deposits 
in commercial banks and non-bank financial intermediaries. 
If this is so then, the arguement runs, monetary policy 
and regulations should be extended to cover the non-bank 
financial intermediaries whose debt is conceptually difficult 
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to distinguish in a watertight manner from the assets 
conventionally included in the money supply. Thus it has 
been contended that commercial banks shade into industrial 
banks, savings banks, building societies etif. l Naturally, 
the controversy is partly a question of which type of 
institution is a lender of other people's savings and which 
kind in its acquisition of assets brings about additions to 
ex ante loanable funds. 
2 r 
For the purpose of this study our main interest 
centres on the doubts raised regarding the concept of money. 
The aspect of the controversy outlined above seems to relate 
to liquidity. Obviously, deposit accounts (time and savings 
deposits) can be drawn upon Rt the permitted intervals to 
effect transactions. Thus the argument seems to draw its 
strength from the f^ct that deposit accounts are nearly 
perfectly liquid, wh-. tever way one looks at the concept of 
liquidity. Such deposits are not only close to maturity 
(that is, encashable date) but also when converted to perfectly 
liquid assets (currency and demand deposits) suffer no value 
depreciation except, of course, the general depreciation of 
value due to the instability in the goods market from which 
existing money balances are obviously not exempt. if, 
therefore, one looks at the supply of money as the supply 
of liquidity then we should include in the money supply 
time and savings deposits in commercial banks and similar 
debts of other financial institutions. 
1. R. ý. Sayers "Monetßry thought and. monetary policy in England , 
Economic Journal, December 1960. 
2. For an early view in support of an equal treatment of 
non-bank financial institutionq and commercial banks as creatorq 
of money see Gurley and Shaw, Financial aspects of development , American Economic Review, September, 1955. 
Also see W. L. Smith, "On the effectiveness of monetary policy", American Economic Roview, September 1956. 
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An opposite point of view centres the definition of 
money on the "means of payment" function of money. 
According to this view an asset should be regarded as money 
if by drawing upon it there is no decrease in their 
aggregate or an increase in demand relative to supply in 
the market for loans. 1 
Quite apart from the fact that there is no easy answer 
to the controversy, in Ghana, (as in many countries in a 
similar stage of development with regard to the financial 
system) special peculiarities suggest a need for ß 
separate analysis. 
In Gh-nit where banking facilities though undergoing 
tremendous rette of expansion are stillnot within 
the immedi^te reach of many the distinctions implied in the 
debate outlined above acquire a special significance. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1 the fact that low-income earners 
do not have access to chequing account facilities at the 
banks gives a special meaning to a part of savings deposits. 
It would not be precisely correct to regard currency and 
demand deposits as the only constituents of transactions 
balances within the private sector. If we invoke the usual 
assumption that low-income earners have a high average and 
marginal propensity to consume then it stands to reason 
that savings deposits held by the low-income group are held 
mainly as transactions balances rather than to take advantage 
1. W. T. Newlyn, The Supply of Yoney and its Control", 
Economic Journal, June 1964. 
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of the income return on such deposits. Thus the size, ' 
source and receipt pattern of income, and accessibility to 
monetary and financial institutions all have their influences 
on the manner in which individuals hold their money balances 
and on the manner in which they operate such balances. An 
important facet of this is that since both the banking habit 
and banking facilities are not very widely spread a proportion 
of currency hoards is similar in concept to time deposits 
differing, though, in the sense that they are withheld from 
the organised loans riarket. 
1 Furthermore, in Ghana as 
probably in many underdeveloped countries the use of cheques 
is largely confined to inter-business transactions. The 
use of cheques outside this sector is very little, a fact 
which is accentuated by the relatively large number of 
illiterate and rural populations and a generally small 
tverctge size of transactions. Thus oven when one talks of 
current accouht deposits as money (in the sense of a means 
of payment) one is, in fact, talking of the liquidity concept 
of money. In Ghana, outside of inter-business transactions 
(and of course, transactions between Government and the 
business sector and a limited group of the personal sector) 
current account deposits can be regarded as money only because 
they are readily convertible into currency. 
Thus, viewed in Z world-wide context the doubts raised 
in the literature about the adequrte definition of money could 
be of immense significance. In this study total money 
1. For n brief account of various forms in which ex post 
savings may be held in an underdeveloped economy see Okware 
p. mdgu, "Some aspects of savings in an African economy", 
Social and Economic Studies, Volume 5,1956, p. 202. 
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supply has been defined as the sum of currency circulation 
net of bank holdings and the demand liabilities of commercial 
banks and the Central Bank ('from 1957) to both the Government 
and the private sector defined to include autonomous and 
semi-autonomous Government enterprises and institutions. 
It is clear from the arguments rzised above that this 
definition can by no means be final. Its adoption rather 
indicates that as far as Ghana is concerned a better definition 
of money requires a full investigation which cannot be 
undertaken in this study. 
In Table 52A and Table 52B are tabulated changes in the 
money supply and the sources of the changes. 
The data on money supply presented in Table 52A nre 
riverages of end-of-month figures whereas the data on sources 
of money supply are Annual series representing the position 
as at the end of December. Figures on time And savings 
deposits are also end-of-December series. Thus there is 
no unitary relitionship between changes in money supply 
, ind the sum of 
the sources. A further caution should be 
exercised with regard to the money supply series. Between 
1950 and 1957 the West African Currency Board revised 
estirantes of currency circulation first as st June 30 1953 
znd again as at June 30 1956. The major atntlstica1 sources 
used for Table 52 show the old series up to the end of 1956 
and a second series commending in 1954 to agree with the 
revised estimates. The first series is subject to grezte r 
error whereas the second series provides ' figures for only 
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1954 onward. On the other hand if we use the old series 
up to 1953 and then use the second revised series from 1954 
the treater mirgin of error indicated gives rise to a rather 
1-rge decline between 1953 and 1954. In Table 52A the latter 
method has been followed and hence the observed decline in 
both currency circulation and total money supply in 1954. 
In spite of the statistical limitations outlined here it may 
be reasonable to state that the validity of the conclusion 
from Table 52L is not seriously impaired. 
In Table 52L and Table 52B an attempt has been made to 
calculate not bank creation of money by the banking system 
from the formula 
Lp +' Lg - Dt ý Itb 
where Lp bank credit to the private sector (including public inst. ) 
Lg bank credit to the Government 
Dt time Rnd sa'tings deposits in commercial banks 
and Mb net creation of money by the bnnking system. 
Over the period 1950-57 totnl net incrertse in money 
supply due to bank credit eras £G0.7 million equivalent to 
5.1% of the total increase in money supply. On the other 
h^nd foreign exchange accumul tion by the banking system 
furnished £G12.7 million of the total change in money 
supply of £G13.8 million for the period 1950-57, equivalent 
to 92% of the total. 
It should be noted thnit the strong force of foreign 
exchange as a factor in the expansion of the money supply 
does not contradict the conclusion reached earlier that in 
Ghana the compensatory finance of the overall balance of 
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payments was not fully reflected in the foreign exchange 
reserves of the monetary system. A juxtaposition of these 
two conclusions means that the state of the balance of 
payments affected strongly the domestic monetary circulation 
but not necessarily to the full extent of the balance of 
payments. Nor should this clarification be interpreted to 
mean that the balance of payments determined the monetary 
circulation. As stated earlier the relationship between 
the two variables is not one-sided. 
In Table 52B are presented changes in the money supply 
and the sources of changes for the period 195b-64. The 
data relate to the end-of-year changes because reliable 
detailed information on the sources of change are available only 
on this basis. 1958 has been left blank to avoid the 
discrepancy embodied in deducing end-of-December figures 
from the 1957 level of the money supply which, as stated 
above, is the average of monthly figures. 
T? b1e 52B includes gong sources of changes in the 
money nsupply the item "capital and other accounts". This 
item, not easy to explain in its entirety, is a miscellany 
of items comprising amon others interest credited to deposit 
accouhts, various capital reserves etc. 
One significant development in the monetary system was 
the replacement of additions to the foreign exchange assets 
of the banking system (both commercial banks and the Central 
Bank) by domestic bank credit (again both commercial banks 
and Central Bank) as the main force behind expansions in 
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Table 53 
Gross Credit by the Banking System, 1958-bfa. £G Million 
Credit to the Private Sector Credit to the Governmen 
End of 
By Central By By By Total 
Period 
Bank Comm- Central Commcr- Outstanding 
(Cocoa Bills) ercial Total Bank cial Total Bank Credit 
Banks Banks (3) + (6) 
i1) (2) (3) (t+) (5) (6) (7) 
1958 Dec. - 6.8 6.8 0.02 0.2 0.2 7.0 
1959 Mar - 6.9 6.9 0.02 0.2 0.2 7.1 
June - 7.4 7.4 0.04 0.4 0.14. 7.8 
Sept. - 9.4 9.4 9.07 0.2 0.3 9.7 
Dec. - 14.1 14.1 - 0.2 0.2 14.3 
Average 9.5 0.3 9.7 
1960 Mar. - 8.9 8.9 0.1 0.2 0.3 9.2 
June - n. a. n. a. 0.2 n. a. n. a. n. a. 
Sept. - n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. n. ae n. a. 
Dec. - 19.8 19.8 0.2 0.2 0.2 20.0 
Average 14.4. 0.3 14.6 
1961 Mar. - 19.3 19.3 2.4 5.3 7.7 27.0 
June - 15.8 15.8 3.5 5.3 8.8 24.6 
Sept. - 23.2 23.2 12.8 6.8 19.6 42.8 
Doc. - 26.7 26.7 9.8 7.2 17.0 4.3.7 
Average 
, 
21.3 13.3 34.5 
1962 Mar. - 23.8 23.8 11.7 13.1 24.8 48.6 
June - 18.6 18.6 18.4 15.1 33.5 52.1 
Sept. - 17.6 17.6 13.2 21.5 34.7 52.3 
Dec. - 30.0 30.0 17.6 19.4 37.0 67.0 
Average 22.5 32.5 55.0 
1963 Marf - 29.3 29.3 18.7 22.5 41.2 70.5 
June - 28.0 28.0 20.3 26.1 46.4 74.4 
Sept. - 30.4 30.4 20.3 21.6 41.9 72.3 
Dec. 14.5 38.7 53.2 20.4 23.8 44.2 97.4 
Average 35.2 43.4 78.6 
1964 Mar. 16.3 31.5 47.8 15.2 26.4 41.6 89.4 
June 11.4 29.1 40.5 27.8 31.5 59.3 99.8 
Sept. 5.1 31.4 36.5 27.0 32.5 59.5 96.0 
Dec. 33.9 37.9 71.8 31.2 40.6 71.8 143.6 
, average 
49.2 58.5 107.2 
Note; Private sector includes public corporations and institutions. 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Accra. 
Bank of Ghana. 
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the money supply from 1961 to 1964. 
Over the period 1958-64 the money supply as at the end 
of December rose by £G75.6 million. There was a net 
loss of foreign exchange assets from the banking system to 
the tune of £G21.8 million. By contrast total net bank 
creation of money as explained. above was about £G109.7 million 
or 144.3, % of the total cumulative increase in money supply. 
In parti. cular, attention must be drawn to the large increase 
in bank loans and advances from 1961 to 1964, and to the 
spectacular increases in the last two years of the period. 
Table 53 shows quarterly figures on outstanding bank 
credit (commercial banks and the Central Bank) to the 
Government and the private sector. These data are further 
summarized in Table 54 to bring out clearly the amounts 
of b? nk credits to the Central Government on the one hand 
and the private sector on the other. Table 55 shows the 
amounts of credit ¬. ranted by the commercial banks and the 
Central Bank respectively. In Table 56 are presented 
quarterly changes in outstanding bank credit to the private 
sector and the Central Government. In all these cases 
the private sector includes public bodies other than 
the Central Government so that data relating to the private 
sector as ordinarily understood are considerably overstated 
because as noted in Chapter One State-owned enterprises became 
very significant users of commercial brink credit in the last 
two years of the period under review. Public corporations, 
institutions etc., hive been c1? ssified with the private 
sector becruse. sep. qr ite dhtri were not readily obta finable . 
--- 3'33 A- 
Table 54 
Distribution of Bank Credit Outstanding, Classified 
by Broad Groups of Borrowers, 1959-64 £G Million 
Quarterly Averages 
Total To Central To Private 
Outstanding Government Sector 
Amount of Total 
I 
Amount of Total 
1959 
1960(a) 
9.7 
14.6 
0.3 
0.3 
3.1 
2.1 
9.5 
14.4 
97.9 
98.6 
1961 34.5 13.3 38.6 21.3 61.7 
1962 55.0 32.5 59.1 22.5 40.0 
1963 78.6 43.4 55.2 35.2 44.8 
1964. 107.2 58.5 54.6 49.2 45.9 
(a) Average of first and last quarters. 
Source: : mss for Table 53. 
Table 55 
Total Bank 
by Lender, 
Credit Outstanding Classified 
1959-61+. ,, moufts in # Million 
Quarterly Averages 
Total By Commercial By Central 
Banks Bank 
1959 9.7 9.7 0.01+ 
1960 14.6 14.6 0.2 
1961 34.5 27.4 7.1 
1962 55.0 39.8 15.2 
1963 78.6 55.1 23.6 
1961+ 107.2 65.2 42.0 
Sources As for Table 53. 
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Table 56 
Changes in Conm ercial Bank Credit to Private Sector 
and Central Government, 1959-64, £G Million 
End of Quarters 
Private Sector I Central Government 
1959 March 0.1 Nil 
June 0.5 0.2 
Sept. 2.0 -0.2 
Dec. 4-7 Nil 
1960 March -5.2 Nil 
June n. a. n. a. 
Sept. n. a. n. a. 
Dec. n. a. n. a. 
1961 March -0.5 3.1 
June -3.5 Nil 
Sept. 7.4+ 1.5 
Dec. 3.5 0.4+ 
1962 March -2.9 5.9 
June -5.2 2.0 
Sept. -1.0 6.4 
Dec. 12.4 -2.1 
1965 march -0.7 3.1 
June -1.3 3.6 
Sept. 2.4 -2.1 
Dec. 8.3 2.2 
1964 March -7.2 2.6 
June -2.2 5.1 
Sept. 2.3 1.0 
Dec. 6.5 8.1 
Note: Private Sector includes public corporations and institutions. 
Source: Based on Table 53. 
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It must alsc be noted that bank credits cover all the various 
media through which commercial banks and the Central Bank 
acquire Government ahd private debt, in short, customer credits 
and open-market credits . 
In terms of quarterly averages total domestic earning 
assets held by the banking system increased from £G9.7million 
at the end of 1959 to £G107.2 million at the end of 1964 
(see Table 53). On the same basis of calculation Central 
Bank gross domestic earning assets rose from practically 
nil in 1959 to £G41.0 million in 1964, whilst commercial 
bank assets rose from £G9.7 million in 1959 to £G65.2 million 
in 1964. Central Government borrowing from the banking 
system incre^sed from £G 0.3 million in 1959 - 3.1% of the 
total - to £G5B. 5 million in 1964, equivalent to 54.6% of 
the total domestic earning assets of the banking system. 
Although credits to the private sector as explained above 
rose consistently in absolute terms from £G 9.5 million in 
1959 to £G49.2 million in 1964 the relative share in. total 
bank credit declined from 97.9; to 45.9% respectively with 
a general downward trend. 
The amounts of credit to the private sector as such 
most probably declined in both absolute and relative terms 
in 1963 and 1964 because as noted in Chapter One (p, -Ag42 L°1c) 
the State-owned industrial and trading enterprises were very 
important borrowers in those years. 
Figure 7w4 illustrates clearly the higher level of 
credits to Government rel«tive to other sectors from 1962. 
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OUTSTANDING BANK CREDIT TO CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND 
THE PRIVATE SECTOR (INCLUDING PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS AND 
ENTERPRISES) 1959-6G. QUARTERLY AVERAGES 
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Lgain we must of necessity repeat that loans to the private 
J, L t 
sector as such are overstated j the inseparability of loans 
to the State-owned enterprises and other quasi-governmental 
bodies. 
Changes in bank credit to the Central Government and 
the (crudely defined) private sector halte been plotted in 
Figure 2. Credits to the private sector were subject to 
greater seasonal fluctuations because of the strong relation rip 
tetween the cocoa season and the import and export trade. 
On the other hand changes in credits to the Government were 
positive in all but two quarters (December 1962 and September 
1963). 
With respect to commercial bank lending it, ' should be 
noted that from 1962 to 1964 positive changes in credits to 
the Central Government were associated with negative changes 
in credits to the private sector. Thus in 1962 commercial 
bank credits to the private sector declined in the first 
three quarters to an average of £G3 million whilst in the 
same period the average increase in commercial bank lending 
to the Central Government was £G4.7 million. In December 
of that year credits to the Central Government fell by £G2.1 
million whilst credits to the private sector rose by £G12.4 
million over the end of September. In 1963 and 1964 this 
pattern was repeated in the first and second quarters of 
the year. The major deviation from this pattern was in 
December 1964 when credits to the Central Government increased 
by a higher amount than did credits to the private sector. 
--- 33 SA - 
CHANGES IN COMMERCIAL BANK CREW TO THE PRIVATE 
ISECTORIINCLUDING PUBLIC CORPORATIONS AND INSTITUTIONS) AND 
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 1959- 64 
END OF QUARTERS 
Private sector (As defined 
above) 
8 0 
'I 
I 
1 
ý II 
II 
4 
ool f 
ýf 
0 1960 1962 j 1964 
II 
Central Government 
Source. -Based on table 56 
FIG S. Z 
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The main explanation for this was the introduction of credit 
control regulations which required the commercial banks to 
hold Government stocks to the value of 18, E of their deposit 
liabilities. Along with this may also be cited the effects 
of various restrictions on external payments. 
Previously the commercial banks liquidated their 
holdings of short-term Government debt in the last quarter 
of the tieir to nccommodnte increased demand for advances 
from the private sector. In the rest of the year private 
sector debts were generally rep-id, and currency flowed back 
to the banks thus providing the banks with liquid resources 
to be invested in local Treasury Bills. 
It would be interesting to estimate the effects of large 
Government borrowing from the commercial banks on the supply 
of co: rmercial bank funds to the priv'te sector. Whilst 
commercial bank lending to the Government and the private 
sector were negatively correlated in response to seasonal 
financial requirements of the two sectors there was no serious 
problem. Commercial banks increased their lending to the 
Government at a time when effective demand for funds by the 
private sector was at its ebb : end vice versa. However, 
a general theoretical discussion of the effects of large 
Government borrowing do the supply of funds to the private 
sector is not possible at this stage. Effective private 
demand for loanable funds came to depend not only on the 
borrower's ability to repay advances but also on the level 
of foreign exch? nge resources within the banking system. 
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Customers with ready access to bank advances were not always 
in a position to utilize such facilities because the necessary 
foreign exchange permits and import licences could not be 
obtained. Perhaps the best one can do at this stage is to 
draw attention to the tremendous expansion in bank lending 
and in particular to the Government by both the commercial 
banks and the Central Bank. This reflects the increasing 
economic role of the Government as investor in both long term 
capital projects and productive enterprises. In this respect 
we should notice the growth of the public internal debt in 
the lest few years of the review period as shown in Table 
(c6el6 Qry Av) M^ -C 
Y Da-dzI,, 
A-f. Jire 
SFCTION C 
Analysis of the Money_ Supply 
In the preceding section money was defined in the 
conventional manner with one important difference: the inclusion 
of Government deposits at both the Central Bank and the 
Commercial banks. Time or deposit accounts hnve been 
excluded notwithstanding the debate regarding the definitibn 
of money and for reasons give.. in the preceding section. 
Table 57 shows money supply and its components for 
the period 1954-64. The period 1950-53 his been omitted 
becrtuse the , iviilnble d'ta are largely unrevised and form 
a rrither unrealistic series with the revised estimates of 
1954 and after. 
As indicoted in Footnote (a) to Tgb1e 57 data on 
1958-64 ,. re qu^rterly 'iver? res whilst those on 1954-7 nre 
--337A - 
Table 57 
Money Supply, 1951+-64(a) £G Million 
Demand Deposits 
Currency held Government Money 
Outside Banking deposits at supply 
System(b) Commercial Banks Central Bank Total (1)+(4) 
(1) (2) (3) (4-) (5) 
1954 26.0 15.3 - 15.3 x+1.3 
1955 26.4 15. x+ - 15.1 1 1.8 
1956 - 28.6 16.1 - 16.4 15.0 
1957 29.4 17.0 0.9 17.9 47.0 
1958 26.4 17.5 1.8 19.3 1+5.7 
1959(c) (°) 28.7 
20.2 
6 
1.6 21.8 
25 
50.5 
62 6 1960 37.3 23. 1.7 .3 . 
1961 - . -, -- 35-7 ------ 26.7 5.0 - 31.7 67.4 
1962 39.3 33.0 6.6 39.5 78.8 
1963 40.3 41.5 9.7 51.1 91.1+ 
1964. 49.6 52.5 6.1 58.2 107.8 
Notes: (a) 1954-57 are averages of end of month figures 
1958-64 'c averages of quarterly figures. 
(b) Currency circulation for 1954-57 are revised estimates. 
There could be errors arising from unrecorded movements of 
cur_. -ency betcrcen Ghana and the other West «frican countries 
served by the Vast African Currency Board. 
(c) 
. 
averages of two quarters (March and December) 
I 
Differences between totals and the sum of parts are the effects of rounding. 
Sources: Bank of Ghana Reports and 
Economic Surveys. 
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monthly averages. The available data would not permit any 
closer basis without the risk of excessive non-comparability 
between the periods 1954-57 and 1958-64. It will be noticed 
from Table 57 that not currency circulation actually declined 
as between 1957 on the one hand and 1958 and 1959 on the 
other. This is clearly an unrealistic phenomenon brought 
about probably by the different bases of calculation and by 
the fact that in 1958 and 1959 two currencies - those of 
the West African Currency Board and the currency of the Bank 
of Ghana - were circulating together pehding the complete 
withdrawal of the West African currency. Furthermore net 
currency circul^tion could be underestimated or overestimated 
bec^use Gh^na sh^. red a common currency with three other West 
African countries (see Chapter Two, Section One) and there 
is every likelihood that currency movements across frontiers 
were not recorded to any significant extent. 
Money supply as defined and calculated in Table 57 
rose by £G5.7 million from £G41.3 million in 1954 to £G47.0 
million in 1957, an increase of 13.8%. This was only a 
modest incre^se compared to a rise of £G62.1 million between 
1956 and 1964 from £G45.7 million to £G 107.8 million respectively, 
or a growth ritte of 135.9%. Between 1961 and 1964 the 
money supply as defined in T: ible 57 rose by 59.9% from 
£G67.4 million to £G107.8 million. 
In Tßb1e 58 irre present the money supply of the public 
over the period 1954-64. Money supply of the public is 
defined to exclude Government deposits itnd ns such is ß 
. -33,? A- 
Table 58 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960(00 
1961 
1962 
963 1 
196tß 
Composition of the Money Supply of the Public 
1954-64(a) 
Currency in Demand 
Circulation Depositsýbý 
(1 
26.0 
26.4 
28.6 
29.4 
26.4 
28.7 
37,3 
35.7 
39.3 
40.3 
49.6 
(2 
1 5.3 
15.1+ 
16.1,. 
17.0 
17.5 
20.2 
23.6 
26.7 
33.0 
41.5 
52.2 
Money Supply 
of the Public 
(1) + (2) 
(3) 
4.1.3 
41.8 
15.0 
46. t+ 
x+3.9 
x+8.9 
60.9 
62. tß 
72.3 
81.8 
101.8 
Column (1) 
as Ratio 
of Col. (3) 
(4-) 
63 
63.7 
63.6 
63.4 
60.1 
59.8 
61.2 
57.2 
54-. 4 
49.3 
48.7 
Note: (a) Figures for 195+-57 are monthly averages 
" 1958-6L- are quarterly averages 
(b) Exclude Government deposits at the Central Bank 
but include Government deposits in commercial 
banks which cannot be separated out from the 
available data. 
(c) leverage of cnd of two quarters. 
Source: Iss for Table 57. 
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crude measure because Government deposits with commercial 
banks could not be separated out of total domestic demand 
liabilities of the commercial banks. It can, however, be 
safely assumed that Government deposits with commercial 
banks were both quantitatively and relatively small in 
value, and being; characteristically volatile should be only 
minutely reflected in the averaged figures. Thus to a 
practical degree "the public" represents all domestic units 
but the Central Government. 
Thus defined the money supply of the public showed 
practically the same p"ttern of growth as did total money 
b^lances of all domestic units including, the Central Government. 
From £G41.3 million in 1954 it rose to £G46.4 million in 
1957 representing a growth rrite of 12.3%. On the other 
hand, ietween 1958 and 1964 the money supply held outside 
the Central Government (subject to the qualification made 
in the preceding paragraph) rose from £G43.9 million to 
£G101.8 million, an increase of 131.9%. Between 1961 and 
1964 the money supply of the public rose by 63.4; from £G62.4 
million to £G101.8 million. Signi_f icantly, the money 
supply of the public rose by about 25% in 1964 over 1963. 
Table 58 also shows the ratio of currency to the total 
money b-qlnnces of the public (Column 4). The cash/money 
ratio declined consistently from 1955 to 1964 with the 
exception of 1960 in which ye'r the increase ws most probably 
due to the huge weijht of December. As explained in the 
previous Section the public's demand for currency usually 
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rises with the sale of the cocoa crop around December and 
the concentration of private sector expenditures in the Christmas 
period. In 1963 the rit4b of currency to the money supply 
of the general public fell below 50 and in 1964 stood at 
48. T, il. 1 
In Table 59 is presented the ratio of the money supply 
of the public to total financial assets over the period 
1958-64. The financial assets are here defined as money 
balances plus various deposit accounts held with the commercial 
banks, the Gh^na Savings Bank and the Building Society. 
Thus defined financial assets of the public amount to what 
is usually referred to -is the sum of money and quasi-money. 
This is to a large extent a tolerably accurate measure of 
financial wealth outside the Central Government. Although 
bonds and other securities (including Treasury Bills) are 
undergoing a rapid increase quantitatively a very high 
proportion of such financial instruments is known to be 
held in the banking system. Secondly, other forms of 
holding savings such as life assurance policy was known to 
be of very little qunntitative value. Thus it can be safely 
assumed that the figures in Table 59 Five a fairly accurate 
measure of financial assets held outside of the Government 
find the banking system. Lrst1y, in Trkble 59 all data have 
1. The rel^tive mrtturity of n bnnking system may be measured 
by the extent to which its liabilities are used as means of 
poyment in the economy. On the basis of this view one 
could reg? rd the risin¬ rotio of commercial bank liabilities 
in the public's money baln. nces as indicating a growing m'turity 
of the system. Of course, this conclusion itself r^ther tentative would need to be qualified by the ei rlier argument that the use of cheques is very much limited outside inter- business transactions. 
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been presented as at the end of December to allow 
comparability over the whole period. 
Table 59 indicates a high proportion of perfect liquidity 
T rib le 59 
Ratio of Money Supply to Total Gross Financial 
Assets of the Public, 1958-64 
End of Period 
Money Supply(s) Deposit Accounts Total Gross Ratio of 
Held in All Financial Assets (1) to (2) 
£G Million FinnnciRl of 
the Public (b) 
Institutions £G Million 
£G Million % 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
1958 51.1 14.9 . 
66.0 77.4 
1959 57.1 16.1 73.7 77.5 
1960 67.1 18.6 85.7 78.3- 
1961 72.9 18.9 91.8 79.4 
1962 81.6 22.6 104.2 78.3 
1963 86.4 26.4 112.8 76.6 
1964 120.9 33.3 1 154.2 78.4- 
Notes (a) Defined as in Table 58 
(b) Deposit accounts held in commercial banks, 
the Ghana Savings Bank and the Building Society. 
Sources: Bank of Ghann. Reports 
Economic Surveys 
in the fin^. ncial balrinces of the general public; the ratio 
of perfectly liquid isssts to total gross financial sssets 
r^nged between 76.6% end 79.4" thus showing relative short-run 
constancy, and a high preference for perfect liquidity as 
-. gainst other financifll assets. We may now turn to n 
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general theoretical analysis of the observations made in this 
Section with respect to the trends and composition of the 
money balances of the general public. 
Monetary theory separates money balances into trans<actions,. 
precautionary and speculative balances. Transactions balances 
are held against real goods and services and are thus related 
directly to consumption requirements and through it to the 
level of money income. Precautionary balances may simply 
be said to vary with the state of uncertainty, whilst 
speculative balances are temporary balances held against 
the possibility of changing asset prices. Thus expectations 
and risk considerations are very important facets of the 
theory of the speculative demand for money. The speculative 
demand for money is based on a complex of factors for a 
whole economy and for a particular group of investor-speculators 
Jr, a simple form it implies that the willingness to invest 
cash balances will be small (and that consequently, idle 
balances will increase) when it is feared that due to a 
rise in interest rates capital losses may exceed interest 
gains .l 
it is generally recognized that the speculative demand 
for money is of little importance in an underdeveloped, economy 
because of the thinness and general underdevelopment of the 
m^rket for securities. In Ghana there wrs, throuLhout the 
1. For recent appraisals of the theory of the demand for 
money see W. T. Newlyn, "Theory of Money Oxford 1962, PP-38-63- 
and R. J. Bally "Inflation and the theory of money", Allen and 
Unwin, 1964, pp. 163-225. 
r, 
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period under review, no intermedi? te trading in securities. 
Thus, like deposit ^ccounts in commercial banks and other 
financial institutions securities and Treasury Bills were, 
as now, fixed-yield and fixed-value assets. 
In t recent study of the monetary nn_: ilysis of 
underdeveloped countries with special reference to India, 
Dr. Pr. qsad h^s inalysed the speculative demand for money 
in terms of an additional vnri'ble, real commodities instead 
of the post-Keynesi^n analysis limited to bonds and other 
financial assets. 
' The relevance of this approach to 
Ghana is very limited because the analysis depends for its 
validity primarily on the existence of n substantial group 
of individuals and firms whose business is to speculate 
in commodity, price chin¬es. The existence of such a class 
depends on the extent of price flexibility both in terms of 
time and magnitude of flexibility. In an economy where 
there is considerable stable equilibrium in the goods market 
or where commodity prices are kept rigid by means of zdminis- 
tratiVe decisions, the speculative demand for money induced 
by price expect^tions on the goods market loses much of its 
applicability. Were prices vary only to a small extent 
the gins to be mnde by holding on to commodities may not be 
signif ic^. nt . To make large gains in such a case a specuPto r 
would have to obtain ° large turnover and this also increases 
the cost of storage and consequently reduces the margin of gain. 
1. Kamta Prasad, t ttThe impact of money supply on the Indian 
economy, 1950-51 to 1963-64". Unpublished h. P. Thesis, 
University of heeds 1966. A su nary of this work was published 
in "The Journal of ^conomic 9tq ie ', Winter 1965. 
4 
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Furthermore, the analysis demands for its validity a careful 
analysis of the classes of com. odities to be included. In 
an underdeveloped economy a major proportion of the household 
budget is devoted to basic necessities and this means that 
food commodities occupy a major part of the eligible class 
of commodities to be included in the theory. Apart from 
the difficulty of drawing ? sharp line between luxuries and 
necessities in the goods nr rket, given such r distinction, 
the income rind price e1osticities of demind for '`luxuries" 
vis-a-vis the slow Growth in money incomes, indicotes that 
an important factor likely to influence the demand for 
"luxuries" in the skort run would be chinos in the prices 
of ne. cessities. Thus we are back ntnin to the importance 
of necessities in the theory of the speculstive demand for 
money in terms of commodity price chrtnFes. 
The degree of upward changes in the prices of necessities 
wt-, ich the authorities cnn permit acquires a political facet 
which needs to be taken into account in the application of 
the theory. Once we ^. dmit that the authorities will not 
favour sizable incre-ses in rrices of necessities then we cQn 
presume in inducement to hold stocks for speculative purposes 
when there are expectations of severe short-ges of supplies 
as in the case of a climatic cplamity. But obviously, under 
such circumstances the continunnee in office by the political 
autInorities depends crucially on how ably they implement 
price controls to prevent serious reductions in real balances 
or real income of the personal sector. 
_y 
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In Ghana speculative holdings of stocks may have 
occurred in the last two years of the period under examination 
when there were severe shortages of supply. Price controls 
were side-stepped by the rapid development of "black" 
markets. Fven so the extent of specul"; ti on may have been 
considern, bly modified by the influence of limited foreign 
exchange resources. Therefore we may conclude that in 
Gh-n^ for most of our period the speculative demand for money 
(as distinct from the transactions demand for money) was 
insignificant whether couched in terms of instability in 
the goods market or in the market for financial assets. ' 
The transactions and precautionary Motives for holding 
money, therefore, provide the fulcrum. for a conventional 
analysis of the demand for money in. Ghana. 
The degree and organisation of specialisntion within 
to economy is of key importance on the dem^nd side. As an 
economy develops one would expect a l'irger proportionnte 
rise in tronsactions demand. On the other hnnd. the financial 
system becomes more sophisticoted ? nd this often means a 
decline in money/income ratios as money then becomes only 
one of many assets in which wealth may be held and therefore 
the demand for money becomes ? complex function of many 
vnrinbles. This sophistication has generally been tardy 
in the case of Ghana althou-, h developing in recent years 
one would expect that Ghana would be able to take advantage 
of sophisticated credit system earlier than did the present 
advanced nations (relative to the stage of economic development. 
that is). 
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Generally, the size of transactions balances is 
rel^ted to the propensity to consume out of money income. 
The development of the theory of consumption indicates that 
despite the heavy dependence on income there nre other factors 
to be taken into account. 
The relevant definition of money income is no longer 
regarded by all economists is measured income. Professor 
Friedman has put forward (in the context of detailed statistical 
data iii the United States) p theory of consumption based on 
permanent income. 1 In this theory income is divided into 
permanent and transitory income, and the individual's broad 
arrangement of income between consumption and savings 
depends on his permanent income. Before the emergence 
of the permanent income hypothesis there hid been a challenge 
to the absolute income theory of consumption by the relative 
income hypothesis which found wide acceptability in the 
Deusenberry formulation that relative income is important 
within and between communities through increased awareness of 
the ^vnilnbi_lity and usefulness of superior goods. 
Emul-tion of consumption patterns is therefore the central 
point of the Deusenberry thesis. 
Over the skort run one can expect a high degree of 
constancy in the ratio of income to zverage money supply in 
a given period. This is bemuse of (1) the limited range 
and marketability of financial assets, (2) the low levels of 
income which make for a high propensity to consumo out of 
1. Y. Friedman, "AL theory of the consumption function". 
Princeton 19517. 
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incre^. ses in money income, mnd consequently (3) the 
low level of net worth which is reinforced by the fact that 
the class of income recipients with a high ratio of savings 
to income are to a large extent non-residents whereas the 
social concept of the family is so wide and the obligations 
so far-reaching that the 'Local Chanaian capitalist class 
cannot simply be described as economically significant in 
this sense. 
In Table 58 it was observed that the ratio of currency 
to the money balances of the public declined generally over 
the period 1955-64. There are various theoretical and 
practical considerations that influence the public's choice 
between currency and bank money. 1 
In theory, the c%-'. oice between these two forms of money 
c^n be formulated in terms of costs. If b'nk money 
(dem"nd deposits) yielded in income return, then given 
perfect knowledge and allowing for a short time-lag for 
effecting decisions the ratio of currency to money supply 
would represent an equilibrium position reflecting the 
estimates of wealth holders regardin, the costs and 
advantages of holding money in the one or other form. 
However, in Ghana bank money does not yield income but 
is rather subject to service char r5es and stamp duties in the 
form of the money costs of cheque sheets. Once we take 
account of this cost element the Hexch^nge rate" ' etween 
l. See P. Cagan, "The demand for currency relative to total 
money supply", Journal of Political Economy, Aurust 1958. 
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currency and bank money is no longer one to one. The real 
value, to the owner, of bank money is less than the real 
value of the same nominal value held in currency. On the 
other hand charges on bank money may be said to reflect the 
risk involved in holding money in the form of currency. 
Viewed in this way the service ch-rges become a sort of 
insurance premium which must be paid for the security involved 
in having money kept with a bank. There is, of course, a 
sort of psychic income implied in holding all money balances 
in currency, but this also assumes a significant probability 
of bank failures. 
1, realistic explanation of the observed relative decline 
of currency in the money supply of the general public must 
be sought in a variety of factors. Among these are the 
spread of banking and education, the advancement of economic 
development implying the growth of a larger business sector and, 
perhaps, some element of prestige attached to the possession 
of a bank account. 
The Price Level 
Two sets of price indices have been plotted in 
Figure Q One for Accra and with 1954 as brise yertr and a 
second series measuring movements in m'rket prices of only 
locally produced foodstuffs and also based on 1954. The 
other set of price indices is based on a more recent survey 
carried out in 1961, has March 1963 as 'Case and covers the 
whole nation. 
The usefulness of the series based on 1954 is limited 
( ý. S 
5 
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by the fact that the extension of it into the latter part of 
the period assumes fixed tastes and expenditure habits over 
-. period during which there his been considerable change in 
social and economic conditions. The more comprehensive 
indices based on March, 2963 CLt of little comparative use 
in being limited to only 1963 and 1964. However, both series 
give a picture of considerable price inflation from 1961 to 
1964 in contrast to the earlier period characterized by 
general price stability. 
The relative price inflation of the 1960's must also 
be seen in relation to price ndministrztion of incrensing 
intensity supported legally on the Control of Prices Regulations, 
1949 and various Executive Orderst, all supplanted by the 
Control of Prices Act, 1962 (No. 113). 
There nre, of course, obvious qnd familiar limitntions 
on the effectiveness of price ndministrstion. - However, 
n fuller measure of the true price level as would be determined 
by free m", rket forces may be sought in the price index of 
local food because in a country where the sale of foodstuffs 
by-the weight is quite uncommon the prices of-foodstuffs 
are by no means r1menable to official adniinistr ition. 
Figure q. / shows that on the basis of both the old and new 
series the index of market prices of local foodstuffs was 
higher in each year then the general retail price index. 
There is, of course, no straightforward conclusion that 
this shows the relative impact of price control on either 
of the two sets of price indices. It is merely intended 
10 control or Prices (M'ximum Prices) Order, 1961 (F. I. 111) 
'nd the Control of Prices (Il ximum Prices) (Amendment) Order, 1961 (F. I. 116). 
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to indicate the possibility thrit price control rcted to 
hide the true force of inf 1'tionuiry pressures. 
Neither c? n one rel^te the monetary expansion directly 
to the rising price level of the 1-st four yenrs of the 
period. The in_flrtti onr ry spiral of the period 1961-64 
most probtbly not idequ-tely described by the published 
price indices -. vrns caught in the web of i vicious circle 
involving i complexity of factors. The following would 
nppegr to describe -fairly -dequntely the path of criusntion: 
1. The emergence of in jdverse current account bil. nce 
in 1956 which but for n respite in 1958 continued on n rising 
scale to the present. 
2. A rapid decline in the foreign exch^. nge reserves 
of the banking system and of all resiLent units. 
3. As a result of (1) and (2) the imposition of severe 
quantitftive controls on imports in 1961, subsequently 
intensified by vririous administrrttive bottlenecks and continuing 
decline in foreign exchinge resources. 
4. From 1960 n considerzble incrertse in publicly-owned 
industrial enterprises r'nd other public cgpitql projects. 
5. Rising public expenditure - p9rtly as ' result of 
(4) ^bove - tarts rissbci^ted with increi. sed domestic borrowing 
by the Government from the banking system. 
6. Supply inel'. sticities affecting both inported rind 
loctl factors coupled with outright mism'tnngement in public 
enterprises d^mpened the flow of domestic output. 
These developments are illustrated in Figure q. '$ showing 
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the simultaneous occurrenco of declining foreign exchange 
resources and steeply rising money balances, bank lending 
and the internal public debt. For a developing country 
heavily dependent on foreign supplies these conditions 
constituted the classic basis for inflation and economic 
distortions. 
Section D 
Scope for Monetary Policy 
The concept of monetary policy as normally understood 
rind ripplied in idv-inced western countries would h^rdly hive 
hod my scope in the Ghoniian context until the latter port 
of the period under review. 
First, there were no marked swings in domestic income 
as usually identified in the literature with cyclical variations 
in export proceeds. A strong negative correlation between 
the volume of cocoa exports and the average unit price as 
obtained on the world markets tended to stabilize gross 
receipts from exports because of the large weight of cocoa 
in total merchandise exports. An additional factor was the 
practice of varying up and down, in accordance with world 
market prices, the price actually paid to the cocoa producer. 
Secondly, until about 1960 the most needed investments 
were of long-term n^ture ^nd these were recess'irily the 
dom'in of Government. 
Thirdly, even ibstracting from the problems of supply 
inelzsticities and diseconomies imposed by market conditions, 
there was practically no scope for influencing private 
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investment. This was due to the familiar limitations - 
underdeveloped money and capital markets and the fact that 
private investment was probably largely external. 
Fourthly¢ there was until 1961 overall internal price 
stability, whilst the legal basis of the full sterling 
exchange standard combined with sizable international 
reserves to allay nny problems of external disequilibrium. 
Up to the end of the period under review there was no 
Banking Lew in Ghnnq. From 1956 various drafts of -i 
Banking 
Lnw were prep-red in the Ministry of Finance but none of these 
re'ched the legisl^ture because, in the opinion of the author, 
the influence of transitional economic and political forces 
was so overwhelming that it was difficult to decide on the 
form of n law that would have general validity. 
The relative unimportance of non-bank financial 
institutions limits the usefulness of credit or general 
monetary control to the commercial banks. The Central 
Bank itself, in the last few years of the period, became a 
source of considerable money creation for Government financial 
needs. Control over Central Bank lending to Government 
would have amounted to calling upon the Government to desist 
from further deficit spending. Whether or not the Central 
Bnnk had the courage to do this one cannot say. All we knoi 
is that the Government continued to operate widening cash 
deficits and the result was inflation and further worsening 
of the balance of payments. 
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The attempt at credit control from April 1964 derived 
its origin from the Bank of Ghana Act 1963 (See Chapter Two, 
Section C). For, although the Bank of Ghana Ordinance 1957 
empowered the Central Bank to control commercial banking 
via prescription of asset ratios these powers were generally 
unused save with respect to the requesting of information from 
the banks. 
Until the establishment of the Central Bank there were 
two laws on the statute books which provided a legal basis 
for the regulation of banking. These were first provisions 
of the Companies Ordinance (Laws of the Gold Coast, 1954 
Edition, Cap 103, Part 2, Sections 23-29) which specified 
minimum authorized capital of £G25,000 and a minimum paid-up 
capital of £G12,500 in the case of locally incorporated banks, 
and minimum paid-up capital of £G 100,000 in the case of foreign 
banks incorporated overseas. The second means of regulation 
was embodied in the Money Lenders Ordinance, 1940 (Cap 176 
of the 1954 Edition of the Laws-of the Gold Coast) which 
fixed maximum lending rates at between 12.5% and 30% according 
to the type of security. Both regulations are not known to 
have been enforced, nor could their enforcement have exerted 
any significant impact. Maximum lending rates of the 
commercial banks hardly ever touched 12.5; and as for credit 
transactions on the- unorganized markets they were and still 
are very difficult to control. Similarly, until about 1961 
control over bank lending would have had little or no effect 
in a banking system dominated by international banks whose 
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local resources were by no means an adequate measure of their 
total potential resources. 1 
Thus during most of the period under examination monetary 
and credit policy might be identified with various Rdministrative 
measures which would not be niversally regarded as monetary 
policy but which were very important in the context of an 
underdeveloped country. Thus, for example, might be 
considered the Central Bank's role in the development of 
commercial banking by the establishment of regional currency 
centres and by the provision of facilities for and supervision 
of bank clearing. Secondly, one should emphasize the laying 
down of the nucleus of a money market on the basis of the 
Central Bank's pledged support for the market in Treasury 
Bills - to which was later added substantial use of inland 
cocoa bills - by the offer of rediscounting facilities on 
soft terms. In a restricted sense it may be said that 
credit policy was revealed in the Government's establishment 
of a locally based commercial bank in 1953 thus broadening 
the base of the credit system. Fven more significant was 
the limitation imposed by the Fxchange Control Regulations 
of 1961 on the size of commercial bank foreign exchange 
assets. As extensively discussed in Chapter 2 this particular 
policy had far reaching effects on domestic monetary conditions. 
The near-revolutionary changes witnessed in the structure of 
bank assets during the 19601s were clearly predicated on 
the operation of Exchange Control against transactions with 
London. 
1. See E. Nevin4, op. cit. p. 2g. 
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In contrast to 1950-60 the period 1961-64 was fraught 
with serious economic problems a summary of which was attempted 
nt the end of the last Section. Economic policies were 
dominated by the wishes of the political authorities which 
did not often be^. r much rel'tioriship to the real problems on 
hand. ;n analysis of the somewhat chaotic fusion of 
politics, ^nd economics will not be permitted here due to 
limit^tions of sp? ce. 1 
We sh^11 limit this section to the analysis of the 
measures which the Central Bank adopted ns a means of 
influencing monetary conditions and general economic problems. 
It was clear that the central objective of the Bank of 
Ghana was to direct credit into local productive or industrial 
enterprise as against pure commercial enterprise based 
largely on imports of consumer goods. In this the Central 
Bank was simply tuning its monetary policy to the declired 
economic policy of the Government. 
The' Government policy 
vrns to provide a long-term solution to the worsening balance 
of trade by increasing domestic production of norm illy 
imported goods. It must be pointed out thit the major 
obstoicle to the achievement of this goal lay in the timing 
end the approach adopted., By basing domestic industrialisation 
on imported raw materials or semi-processed goods the external 
dependence of the economy was intensified as both dorlestic 
consumption and the level of employment came to depend crucially 
1. For a generally valid-account and analysis of the chaotic 
fusion of'politics and economics during the period 1961 to 
February 1966 see "Resent trends in Ghana", The Bankers' 
Magazine, lurch 1966 and 1Gha a after Tlkrumah1, The Economist, 
August 6th 1966. 
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on the st^te of net foreign exchange resources. As we khow 
from Section C of this Ch? pter foreign exchrtnge resources 
declined further; ind three elements featured prominently 
in the unsuccessful effort to preserve foreign exchange 
resources and internal price stability. These were: 
intensified quantitative restrictions on imports, mounting 
external liabilities, price administration and the final 
big stick - the Government's absolute powers against 
dissension from their economic policies and the expressed 
dissatisfaction with the results of their economic policies. 
Does one therefore discuss the scope for monetary 
policy in terms of the declared objectives or does one look 
instesd -it the general results of the objectives, between 
which there wets considerRble dichotomy? In view of the 
limit,, tions of sp? ce the discussion in this Section will be 
rel^ted to the objectives of diverting credit into domestic 
productive enterprise and of curbing inflationriry pressures. 
But it must be made clear that domestic productive enterprise 
was dominated by the rowing Government sector and the available 
evidence showed clearly that neither the Government nor the 
Central Bank achieved much significant' control over the 
inefficiency that characterized Government enterprises. 
The traditional weapons of monetary control - varihtions 
in Bank R 1te and open-market operations - would have been 
ineffectual in the Ghanaian context during the period under 
review because of the thinness of the money market whilst a 
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capital market as such was non-existent. Both the Central 
B-nk and the Commercial Banks were inclined to support the 
Government's financial needs by taking up as much of local 
Treasury Bills as their resources and internal policies would 
permit. Thus the Central Lank usually purchased the residue 
of Treasury Bill issues subject theoretically to subsequent 
resale. 
Rediscounting facilities in so far as they were used by 
the banks directly in respect of their own portfolios or on 
behalf of their customers were available at a pegged differ- 
ential of e% above the Discount Rate on Treasury Bills. 
Similarly, the use of internal trade bills was based essentially 
on the Bank's readiness to discount such bills to allow a 
smooth process of cocoa purchnses and . Tres not known to have 
been reg^rded in a=j uray as a measure of exprnsion or 
restraint. 
Mor, i1 sussion h". d its effect mainly in the reduction 
of internal transfer charges of the banks. Although the 
banks were instructed not to raise their lending rates the 
effect of this was rather dubious. Päaximura lending rates 
were stabilized (according to type of security) from 1961 
but this did not necessarily have any bearing on credit 
conditions since for the most part the operational rates wore 
not the published maxima or minima. It is also known that 
before formal control was initiated in April 1964 the Central 
Bank had intim^ted to the commercial banks the need to curtail 
advances for imports. That imports of consumer goods tended 
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to decline crnnot necesssrily be ascribed to such instructions 
fýs the effective limit to imports w's the low level of foreign 
exch^. nge resources r^. ther than. reduced avnilnbility of credit 
for imports. 
The only measures of control which could be applied 
with some degree of success was the prescription of reserve 
requirements since in theory it allows both selective and quanti- 
tativc credit controls necessary in an environment characterized 
by structural imbalance. Inflation and unemployment 
(or underemployment) of resources existed side by side and 
it appeared that the only measure likely to have some desired 
effects vias the use of reserve ratios. The attraction of 
this method of control `ras increased by the closed banking system 
which t he imposition of exchange control fertilized. 
For, with severe restrictions on foreign exchange payments 
both in theory and practice the international banks desisted 
from increasing their loc-il resources by implying sterling 
from London. 
In Ghana the only serious attempt Rt"credit control took 
the form of reserve ratios. First, WO Will survey briefly 
the different bases of reserve requirements and then examine 
the, nature of reserve ratios as actually applied in Ghana. 
Basis for computing reserve requirements 
Commercial bank reserve requirements may be stipulated 
in relation to assets or liabilities. In either case specific 
ratios (usually minimum ratios) may be required against 
overall totals or specific totals or terms of totals. 
r 
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The r! doption of total assets as the basis of reserve 
requirements is open to the major objection that it does not 
of itself assure a balanced growth. In an underdeveloped 
economy both couht(: rcyclical and growth Awould often involve 
some structural or inter-sectorial differentiation in monetary 
and general economic policy. For an underdeveloped economy 
the only advantage of this approach is the simplicity 
of administration and enforcement. , 
The same arguments apply 
to the basing of reserve requirements on total deposit 
liabilities or overall liabilities including reserves. 
With regard to deposits as the basis of n cash reserve 
ratio the United States features among the few countries 
that require separate legal ratios against 
Time 
and Demand 
deposits with the former the smaller of the two. 
An important objection to this approach is that in a 
period of credit restraint 
the banks will be induced to 
encourage a shift in favour of 
Time Deposits. ' The potential 
extent'of this re. ction is very much 
limited by the fact 
that basically it is the customer who determines how he wishes 
to hold his deposits. Moreover, since Time Deposits earn 
interest in comtr^st to Demand Deposits a shift in favour of 
Time Deposits raises the interest cost of deposit liabilities 
which must be weighed against potential earnings from the 
resulting asset expansion. However, if'we impute a theoretical 
1. M. Friedman quoted by Neil Jacoby, The Structure and use 
of variable. bank reserve requirements i, in Banking and Monetary 
Studies (ed. Deane Carson) op. cit. p. 231. 
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justification to the objection described above then clearly 
the imposition of a lower cash reserve against Time Leposits 
allows the holding of lower totnl reserves and thus constitutes 
a loophole in the event of credit restraint. 
In the United States where differential reserve ratios 
nre based on the contractual terms of deposits several 
arguments have been advanced in support of replacement by a 
uniform ratio applicable to total deposits. One variant 
of the argument is based on the fact that the liquidity 
argument for imposing separate ratios is not useful because 
bank man^gements are able to maintain adequate reserves 
against Time Deposits and therefore an excess of reserves 
against Time Deposits over the banks' own estimate of a safe 
amount is tantamount to sterilization of reserves not conducive 
to higher bank profitability. L. second variant is that 
Time Deposits are not part of the active money supply and 
therefore, to specify cash reserve ratios against them militates 
against the competitive position of commercial 
banks vis-a.. vis 
other financial intermediaries. 
1 These objections apart, the 
adoption of the differential cash ratios according to 
the 
contractual basis of deposits is open to the same serious 
objection that from the point of view of an underdeveloped 
economy it does not take account of structural or sectorial 
requirements in accordance with needed economic reform. 
1. Paper prepired by the Americin Bnnkers' ssocintion 
for the Americ^n Commission on Money nhd Credit quoted by 
Neil Jacoby, op. cit. p. 231. 
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An alternative approach suggested in certain United States 
quarters is that reserve requirements be based on deposit 
turn over. 1 The theoretical basis for this proposition is 
that the ratio of an individual banks' reserve requi'rements 
to total reserve requirements of all banks would be the same 
as the' ratio of the expenditures on final product by that 
bank's depositors to total gross national product. The 
reserve requirement of a particular bank would thus be related 
to the annual income velocity or turnover of its deposit 
balances. 
A. further advantige claimed for this system is that the 
monetnrf effects of the reserve requirements work nutomntically 
exercising a brake to an expansion of monetary densnd and the 
brake being eased autom? tically as turnover falls with a 
slowing down of business activity and reduction of interest 
2 
rates. 
This plan is subject to several serious grounds for 
objection. A really meaningful size of deposit turnover can 
only be obtained as an ex post magnitude. A. 1ternittively, 
however, observed velocity over a period may serve as the 
basis for determining the required reserve ratio. But this 
would be open to the drawback that conditions in any particular 
period mny differ rlrrkedly from conditions in the bile period. 
1. Neil Jacoby, op. cit. The author's propossl is rctunlly 
n. re-stitement of ? me. 3sure which had been used before outside 
the United States. Mexico tried it in the 1930's. 
2. R. Goode and R. S. Thorne, "Variable reserve requirements 
against commercial brink deposits", INS' Staff Papers, Vol. 7, 
1959-60 p. 9 ff. 
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Human judgement would have to replace what is basically 
postulated to operate automatically. Secondly, the rate 
of deposit turnover is not necessarily related in any simple 
way to income velocity of money or to transactions that the 
monetary authorities wish tQ control at any particular time. 
In a pragmatic sense, deposit turnover covers expenditures 
on both new and existing real and financial assets including 
speculative expenditures all of which will not evoke the same 
reaction from the authorities. Under the velocity reserve 
plan expenditure on imports of consumer goods and capital 
goods would come under the same measure of control and so - 
more important - would be expenditures on imports and domestic 
goods. This plan is deficient in being undiscrimin^ting, 
and likely to entail considerable administrative complexities. 
Mexico experimented with a velocity reserve in the 1930's 
but abandoned it in 1941 because of immense administrative 
difficulties involved. 
' 
. 
The method which has gained considerable ground in 
underdeveloped countries. is the relation of reserve requirements 
to specific groups of assets or selective credit controls. 
2 
The general effect of such measures is to direct resources 
into specific sectors which may be the public sector, or the 
private sector or particular divisions of any of these sectors. 
In 'i mixed economic system the distinction between private 
and public sectors may not be important and the objective 
1. R. Goode and R. S. Thorne, op. cit. 
2. For ^ general discussion see P. G. Fousek, "Foreign 
Central Banking: the instruments of monetary policy", 
New York 1957 pp. 57-81. 
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of monetary policy may be simply to channel credit into a 
particular industrial sector. The major drawback to selective 
asset ratios is the possibility that the ostensible purpose 
of a loan may differ from the ultimate use of borrowed funds. 
Fven the use of selective credit controls may need to be 
supplemented by other measures. In the conditions of an 
underdeveloped eco-ý, omy the principal and most effective 
supplementary measure would be requests to commercial 
b? nks to submit loan applications above a certain minimum 
for Central Bank screening. The possible administrative 
delays apart, selective credit control has the greatest 
appeal in the conditions of an economy devoid of developed 
financial systems. 
In addition to the alternatives discussed above another 
technique used in various forms in underdeveloped countries - 
mainly the Latin American nations - is the requiremoht of 
advance deposits against imports. 
1 
The deposit may be held by the Central Bank or, if 
originally held by the importer's bankers may be subsequently 
transferred to the Central Bank. Or it may be hold by the 
importer's bankers. The exact manner in which the deposit 
is held differs =among individual countries. Similarly 
there -re v-ri^tions in the period for which the deposits are 
withdrawn from the use of the importer: it may be returned 
to the importer ifter action is taken on import licence, 
when goods ire cleared through customs or after the final 
1. For a detailed account specifying the use of this technique 
by various countries see E. A. Birnbaum and M. A. Guroshi, 
"Advance deposit requirements for imports", IMF Staff Papers, 
Vol. 8 1960-61; Jorge Marshall, '1Advnnce deposits on imports 
INIF Staff Papers, Vol. VI 1957-58, pp. 239-57. See also J. O. W. 01zkimpo, Monetary management in 
dependent economies", Fconomica (New Series) November 1960. 
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transfer of foreign exchange payment for the goods concerned. 
Other specifications also differ among countries. Thus in 
some countries a smaller proportion of import value may be 
required in the predeposit requirement in respect of nonessential 
in contrast to several times the value of imports in other 
countries. 
Originally introduced ^-. s a me^ns of correcting bnlince 
of p^ynents crises advance deposit requirements required the 
st^t us of monet^ry control through the effect on the 
liquidity of the private sector under certain conditions. 
The liquidity of the commercial banking system is reduced 
by the transfer of the deposits to the Central Bank or by 
the sterilization of the deposits with the commercial banks 
if they are required to hold a large reserve - up to 100% 
against these deposits. 
If the objective is to curtail liquidity of the banking 
system then it is essential to require the transfer of the 
deposits to the Central Blink. The ßltern-ttive would be to 
impose ß hundred percent reserve on the commercin 1 binks 
ýý; ýinstýthe deposits otherwise the liquidity curbing effect 
of the deposits would not be felt, is commercinl brinks cmn 
simply debit their loan account and credit the advance 
deposit account. This also implies thr't where the Central 
Brink is the depository the same sterilization is necessary 
to prevent a feeding back of reserve money into the banking 
system through increased Government expenditure resulting from 
Central Bank lending. Whether financed by bank advnncen or 
from the importers' oven resources the liquidity effect on the 
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banking system is contractile. However, where biinks rre 
free to fin'tnce the deposits there is likely to result a 
short? ge of credit to other sectors because of the generally 
preferred stitus of imports among bunks. Besides, in ti 
country like Gh^n-i where the traditional destin^tion of bank 
credit is imports the commercial banks might be quite willing 
to provide finince for predeposit requirements on imports. 
Since ultim"^. tely the deposits 're returned to the importers 
concerned they provide a sure security rgninst the advances. 
It is rather improbable that importers will be able to 
provide the deposit requirements from their own resources. 
It is more realistic to presume that the deposits will be bank- 
financed under one guise or another even where commercial 
banks are forbidden to finance the deposits. The implied 
shortage of funds to other domestic sectors is clearly a 
serious drawback to the use of the ndvRnce deposits technique 
in a country which aims it directing resources to domestic 
productive sectors. 
On the other h^nd, it is nn effective v: 'ty of trinsforring 
resources to the Government. But IS stated above this 
renllocition of resources will be unwise in infl^tionnry 
conditions unless Government expenditure will increase real 
output or provide a basis for short-run solution to inflntionary 
pressures. Part of the question is political. The 
authorities may seek reallocation of resources in favour of 
the public sector for purely political reasons without any 
real evidence thit the output of public enterprise will be 
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higher than the altern^tive use of the resources in the 
privrtte sector. As happened in Ghgnn public enterprise 
proved to be i-rgely inefficient. 
Monnt'ry policy in practice. 
The structure of commercial bank assets crime under direct 
legal regul tons for the first time from 1st April 1964. 
The legal basis of the Credit Control Regulations derived 
from the sank of Ghana Act, 1963 which gave the monetary 
authorities wide powers of control over the operations of 
commercial banks. 
1 The Regulations are set out below. 
1. Sieht balances due to banks abroad (head offices, 
correspondents, foreign branches and subsidiaries) should 
be covered fully by foreign currency deposited with the 
Bank of Ghrtns. 
The foreign currency cover may be interpreted generally 
of., .s foreign exchange assets although 
the Regulation does not 
specify. It mry also be presumed that sterling is in 
practice the required foreign currency (however defined) 
since bnsictlly foreign exchange tr^nsactions are conducted 
in sterling. 
2. Unlike (1) above the banks are not obliged to 
hold specified assets zgninst borrowing from banks abroad. 
3. Each bank is required to hold liquid assets as 
a proportion of total deposit liabilities to customers 
amounting to 48% from 1st March to 31st August and 549 between 1st 
September and 28th February. 
1. See Chapter Two, Section C. 
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4. Within the liquid assets ratios as under (3) above 
there is ß minimum cssh reserve requirement of 8ö consisting 
of till money, net b. lgnces with banks in Ghrnq and Current 
Account deposits with the B'nk of Ghgnn. It should be noted 
th^t the 8 minimum cash/deposit r. tio applies throughout 
the yen r. 
Thus the non-cash element of the liquid assets ratios 
are 4O of total deposits liabilities between 1st March and 
31st August and 46 between 1st September and 28th Fobruiry. 
Assets required to be held to satisfy these ratios are 
listed as follows: 
(a) Government of Ghana Treasury Bills` 
(b) Approved agricultural loans. 
(c) Approved industriril loRns, ßnd 
(d) A special deposit account ("L'' Account) with the 
Bank of Ghinß. 
The t'L" account is meFnt to be an nccommodhting item when 
the total of the other liquid reserve items is less thin the 
required minimum. 
1 
5. In rddition to the liquid reserves specified nbov© 
each bank is required to m. intrtin with the Bank of Ghana in 
; "rhat is called the Special Deposit Account "B"- deposits 
amounting to 5 of total deposit liabilities to customers. 
6. Each bank is required to hold Government of GhnnQ 
stocks to an amount equivalent to 181'of of total deposit 
liabilities. 
1. Bank of Ghana, Annual Report June 1964, p. 77. 
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7. In addition to the quantitative controls listed 
above each bank is required to submit to the Bank of Ghana 
for prior approval all applications for advances above £G5,000 
for purposes other thin agriculture and industry. 
8. Before opening n letter of credit in respect of 
imports of dur? b1e and non-durzble consumer goods q bank is 
required to request n down payment of 15% of the vrtlue of 
imports. 
On deposits mrint'ined in the "L" rind "B" accounts the 
Brink of Ghana pays interest at 3 below Bank Rate. 
The assets of commercinl banks under the Credit Control 
Regulations ire presented in T^ble 60 on a monthly bnsis 
computed from averages of weekly returns submitted to the 
Bank of Ghana as required by the Regulations. 
The cash ratio exceeded the prescribed minimum of 8% 
in every month but August when the combined cash ratio was 
7.5 . There is evidence that one of the banks found 
considerable difficulty in meeting the reserve requirements 
at the initizl stngesbeciuse of its overloaned position. 
The Quthorities were disposed to regird such difficulties 
as not unexpected problems assoCiated with the introduction 
of rules into o system previously free to determine its choice 
of ? ssets. Fora meaningful appraisal of the effects of the 
reserve requirements on the banks' operations we would need 
to look , it post-1964 figures because the first nine months 
for which statistics are available should be characterized by 
adjustments of various kinds. 
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Thus excesses of the liquid issets ratios above the legal 
minimum requirements were matched by the observance of lower 
ratios in respect of the "B" Account. (1 nthly ratios 
observed on the "B" ýiccount nvernged for the nine months, 
April-December, 2.8V, _. s compered to the required minimum 
of 52. 
: [1so, the Government stocks ratio 'ivernged over the 
nine-month period 16.2% compared with the required minimum 
ratio of 18; 3% As in the case of the cash reserve there is 
evidence in official records that one of tho banks experienced 
considerable difficulty in meeting the requirement on holdings 
of Government stocks as a result of heavy commitments on 
advances. Such advances, complained the cloficiont bunk, 
could not be reduced on both business and political grounds. 
Furthermore, in the initial months Government stocks were 
not available in the required volume. Indeed, the incronsod 
volume of Government stocks held by the banks was partly the 
result of further funding of Tre-isury Bills said to h've boon 
pressed for by the banks themselves. 
' 
The B-nk of Gh^. nni Report for June 1964 provided officinl 
explrtnntions for the Credit Control Regul'tions which rro 
adopted here for a brief discussion of the regul1tions. 
First, it was stated that by requiring the banks to 
deposit with the Bank of Ghana full foreign currency covor 
against sight balances due to banks abroad the objective 
was to "discourage the commercial banks from holding idle 
1. Bank of Ghana, Annual Report June 1964, p. 6. 
-370- 
balances with banks abroad". 
1 Conversely, therefore, it 
wvgs reported th&t the non-stipulation of a reserve requirement 
ýg inst oversew borrowing wßs intended to encourage the 
commercirtl banks to bring in funds from abroad. 
There -1ppeirs to be some confusion here. B'i1 nces due 
to banks abro^d ^. re liabilities which may be indistinguishable 
in origin from borrowing from oversew banks. Thus it 
would appear to be p'radoxical to impose s reserve requirement 
against balances due to banks abroad and at the same time 
state one's intention to encourage overc. borrowing. Moreover, 
one of the principal determinants of the banks' access to 
advances from oversew banks (in reality head offices of the 
international banks) is the ease with which repayment can 
be effected. Therefore in a regime of stringent restrictions 
on international payments it may be overoptimistic to expoct 
that the banks will have any inclination to imply resources 
from overses sources on any sustained scale. 
Secondly, in imposing i higher liquidity reserve ratio 
in the cocos season (September to Febru^ry) the offisin1 
explRnmtion ran As follows: 
"The re'son for 
lending to the 
sector, during 
usually high. 
expansion in m 
this distinction is to try to reduce brtnk 
public, especially to the commercinl 
the cocoa season when bank credit is 
This would reduce the high rate of 
coney supply during the cocoa season. i2 
With the cash element of the liquidity reserve ratio fixed 
at the same level throughout the year the only eff©ctWK 
1. Bank, of Ghana, Annual Report June 1964 p'. 76. 
2. Ibid, pp. 76-7. 
-371- 
means of ensuring th^t the high liquidity ratio of the cocoa 
season will not led to expznded credit is through Central 
Brink rejection of loan requests submitted for screening. 
But for the. screening powers of the Central Bank a higher 
liquidity reserve would not lead to credit expansion only 
if the banks voluntarily or through inadequate demand for 
credit maintained a cash reserve higher than the legal 
minimum. 
Furthermore, it is debatable whether restriction* on 
credits for commerce is an expedient measure in the cocoa 
season. Credit for commerce is almost synonymous with credit 
for imports. To restrict imports in the cocoa season Would 
merely intensify inflitionrtry pressures whilst the productivity 
of domestic industry remained largely rtt low levels. 
Thirdl, it was stated that by m'tking the I3nnk of Gh1nz 
the depository of the 15ö down p-iyment A grinst imports of 
consumer goods expansion of the credit-creating base of tho 
commercial banks would thus be prevented. 
' This, however, 
is a misrepresentation. Theoretically, the effect is not 
simply to prevent expansion but rather to contract the credit 
base initially whether the deposit is financed by bank credit 
or from the importers? own resources. As n moans of discouragil 
imports the ultimate effectiveness of the advance deposit 
techqnique is predicated on preventing the commorcinl banks 
from advancing funds to importers to enable compliance with 
this regulation. In view of the proferrod status of 'dv-inces 
for imports, the only effective check nERinst commorcißl 
1. Ibid, p. 79. 
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bank f inßncing of the "down payment" is provided by the screening 
powers of the Central Bank with respect to credits for purposes 
other than agriculture and industry. 
Whether viewed as a means of curbing inflation, 
correcting the balance of payments or directing resources 
into desirable sectors the only sharp element in the Central 
Bank's armoury is the power to reject loan requests in excess 
of ß.. G5,000. Even this must be weighed against the fact 
that the Bank'sgcreening powers (though not necessarily final) 
reihte to only credits for purposes other than agriculture 
and industry. 
The overall ostensible objective of the Regulations was 
echoed in the following quotation from the Central Bank 
Report refegred to above. 
"The function of monetary policy ..... is not only 
stabilising one, but also, and perhaps even more 
important, thit of promoting growth in the desired 
sectors of the economy..... the banking institutions 
should also provide some of the needs for medium-term 
loans for the directly productive branches of the 
economy. The banks have therefore been asked 
by making use of quantitative and selective controls, 
to practise a wider measure of discrimination in their 
lending activities in order to move away from their 
traditional short-term credits to traders into 
sustained medium and long-term finance for development. "' 
In actual fact stabilization and diversification of tho 
economy of Ghana are two aspects of the same policy of modifying 
extreme dependence on foreign trade as an income generator 
and as s means to rising; consumption strtndirds. Tho crucial 
connecting nexus betw'en stabilization and diversification 
is, however, the elasticity of supply in domestic industry 
1. Ibid, p. 76. 
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-nd ^griculture. Thit the controls failed to nchieve either 
of the two objectives up to the time of the political changes 
may therefore be attributed to failure of domestic output 
to catch up with monetary expansion resulting not from credit 
for imports but from credit for financing domestic industrial 
operation. 
Two interesting aspects of the Credit Control Regulations 
are tho concept of liquidity implied in the composition of 
the liquid assets reserve ritio and the implied allocation 
of resources in favour of the public sector including the 
Government. 
First, it is very, unlikely th'tt the commercinl banks 
would themselves look upon the so c^lled approved agricultural 
and industrial loins ßs liquid issets in the ordinsry sonso 
of the term. Theso -ire no different from the old clnssifiention 
Loans and Advances. If one mikes the correct assumption that 
medium-term loans to industry and rigriculture are c1zssified 
under this category the phraseology of the Regulntions would 
be meaningless. As customer credits their distinguishing 
feature is that unlike Treasury Bills, for exnmplo, they are 
not shiftable on the open market or to the Central Bank. 
In. ordinary circumstances, therefore, the only room for 
manoeuvre left to the banks within the liquidity reserve 
ratio lies in their ability to manipulate their holdings 
of Tre-sury Bills and cash. Thus their effective liquidity 
ratio is overstated by the liquid assets ratio as specified 
by the Credit Control Regulations. In actual fact, 
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conceptually their liquidity ratio is not affected in any 
way by the Regulations. 
Secondly, the nature of the credit control regulations 
reinforced what was nlrendy a noticeable trend from 1961, 
namely an increasing shift of commercial bank resources into 
the public sector defined as the Central Government, public 
authorities and state-owned industrial and i riculturt-t1 
enterprises. Ap'trt from the requirement that Government 
stocks should constitute n minimum r^tio of 181 to deposits 
it is pl^. usible to zssume - in view of the Government's 
rising cash deficit oper^. tions - that deposits in the "B" 
and 1°L" Account would normally be used to finance further 
acquisitions of Government debt. To this lust be added the 
banks' investments in Treasury Bills which as the major singl© 
income-yielding liquid asset was bound to weigh heavily in 
the banks' choice of asset within the liquidity reserve 
category. Furthermore, doaestic large scale manufacturing 
industry in particular, was heavily dominated by State-owned 
enterprises. lt was therefore, reasonable to assume then, 
if not now, that n sizable proportion of assets classifiod 
, is approved industrial and agricultural loans would in fact 
be loans to the public sector. The classifications listod 
in T'ble 60 were probably a mere rennming of existing assets, 
with a negligible exception. 
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